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Cyber Warfare (CyW) [1] 
Any act intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our national will, executed against the 
software controlling processes within an opponent’s system. CyW includes the following 
modes of cyber attack: cyber infiltration, cyber manipulation, cyber assault, and cyber 
raid. 
 
Information Assurance [2] 
(DOD) Information operations that protect and defend information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
 
Information Operations [2] 
(DOD) Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while 
defending one's own information and information systems. 
 
Information Superiority [2] 
(DOD) The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. NOW 
CHANGED TO That degree of dominance in the information domain which permits the 
conduct of operations without effective opposition. 
 
Information Warfare [2] 
(DOD) Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or 
promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW.  
[4] Information Warfare is any action to Deny, Exploit, Corrupt or Destroy the enemy’s 
information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions and exploiting 
our own military information functions 
 
Network Centric Operations [3] 
Network Centric Operations (NCO) involves the development and employment of 
mission capability packages that are the embodiment of the tenets of Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) in operations across the full mission spectrum. These tenets state that 
a robustly networked force improves information sharing and collaboration, which 
enhances the quality of information, the quality of awareness, and improves shared 
situational awareness. This results in enhanced collaboration and enables self-
synchronization improving sustainability and increasing the speed of command, which 
ultimately result in dramatically increased mission effectiveness. 
 
Psychological Operations [2] 
(DOD) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the 
behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of 
 1
psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior 
favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. 
 
Psychological Warfare [2] 
(DOD) The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the 
primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile 
foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. Also 
called PSYWAR. See also psychological warfare consolidation. [this definition has now 
been removed from the DoD Dictionary] 
 
 
 [1] from DoD Dictionary -- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/  
 
[2] from  Alford, Lionel D., Jr. “Cyber  Attack: Protecting Military Systems.” Acquisition 
Review Quarterly, Spring 2000, v. 7, no. 2, p. 105. 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/2000arq/alford.pdf  
 
[3] from Military Operations Research Society [MORS] 
http://www.mors.org/meetings/oa_nco/oa_definition.htm  
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FOUO or DOD only) due to the public nature of this bibliography, this section includes 
unclassified/unlimited distribution references only. Abstracts were taken from various databases 
and were written by the authors of the documents cited or by the abstracting service from which 
the citations were generated not by the author of this bibliography. 
 
Adamiec, Raymond. Information Warfare: Evaluating Information Targets. Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, 14 June 1996. 26p. 
Abstract: Information Warfare in its broadest definition has existed since armed conflict began. As the 
pace of battle accelerates and information collection intensifies it is necessary to have a means of 
synergistically combining the advanced technological tools, organizational structure and mathematical 
analysis of information target vulnerabilities. This essay provides a model to accomplish such a goal by 
establishing a framework to evaluate methods of employment, types of attack and desired results when 
prioritizing information targets. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA312069 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA312069  
 
Ammann, P., et al. “Surviving Information Warfare Attacks on Databases.” p. 164-174, 
IN: Security and Privacy, 1997. Proceedings, 1997 IEEE Symposium, 4-7 May 1997. 
249p.  
Abstract:  We consider the problem of surviving information warfare attacks on databases. We adopt a 
fault tolerance approach to the different phases of an attack. To maintain precise information about the 
attack, we mark data to reflect the severity of detected damage as well as the degree to which the 
damaged data has been repaired. In the case of partially repaired data, integrity constraints might be 
violated, but data is nonetheless available to support mission objectives. We define a notion of 
consistency suitable for databases in which some information is known to be damaged, and other 
information is known to be only partially repaired. We present a protocol for normal transactions with 
respect to the damage markings and show that consistency preserving normal transactions maintain 
database consistency in the presence of damage. We present an algorithm for taking consistent 
snapshots of databases under attack. The snapshot algorithm has the virtue of not interfering with 
countermeasure transactions. 
 
Anderson, Christina M. Development of a National Information Warfare Strategy: A 
Reengineering Approach. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Center for Aerospace 
Doctrine, Research, and Education, December 1997. 93p. 
Abstract: This thesis presents an analysis of the United States' national strategy for defensive against 
information warfare (IW). Vast improvements in technology have created new problem areas regarding 
U.S. national security and strategy. National security is now threatened by potential attacks on our 
national infrastructure. The need for defense against such attacks continues to grow as a national 
security problem. However, there is currently no national direction in this increasingly critical area of 
national security. Regarding this need for a national IW policy, the following questions are investigated: 
(1) How and by whom is the U.S. ensuring reliability and security of its information. (2) Are current key 
organizations in IW, and their associated strategies, adequately defending the U.S. against the threat of 
IW. (3) Is there a need for a national IW strategy to successfully defend against information warfare 
threats. (4) What recommendations have been made regarding organizational means to address national 
IW strategic objectives., and (5) How might business process reengineering be applied to accomplishing 
a national IW strategy. To answer the above questions, this study discusses the roles and responsibilities 
of organizations currently involved in IW. The research then evaluates the problems areas associated 
with these current efforts and experts' recommended solutions. The thesis then recommends business 
process reengineering as an effective methodology for developing and implementing the needed national 
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policy. Specifically, the research provides a step-by-step process, based predominantly on Hyde's (1995) 
process management model, to utilize when pursuing this new national policy. 
REPORT NUMBER: AFITGIRLAS97D1 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA345731 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA345731   
 
Anderson, Emory A., Cynthia E. Irvine and Roger R. Schell. Subversion as a Threat in 
Information Warfare. Charleston, SC: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 
North, 2004. 13p. 
Abstract: As adversaries develop Information Warfare capabilities, the threat of information system 
subversion presents a significant risk. System subversion will be defined and characterized as a warfare 
tool. Through recent security incidents, it is shown that means, motive, and opportunity exist for 
subversion, that this threat is real, and that it represents a significant vulnerability. Mitigation of the 
subversion threat touches the most fundamental aspect of the security problem: proving the absence of a 
malicious artifice. A constructive system engineering technique to mitigate the subversion threat is 
identified. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA435312 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435312
 
Anderson, Robert H., et al. Securing the U.S. Defense Information Infrastructure: A 
Proposed Approach. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999. 179p.  
Abstract: This report addresses the survivability and assured availability of essential U.S. information 
infrastructures, especially when they are under various forms of 'information warfare' attack. To the best 
of our knowledge, the term 'minimum essential information infrastructure' (MEII) was coined by one of the 
authors (Mesic) as part of the planning for a series of 'Day After. in Cyberspace' information warfare 
exercises conducted from 1995 to the present under the direction of our RAND colleague Roger 
Molander. The idea is that some information infrastructures are so essential that they should be given 
special attention, perhaps in the form of special hardening, redundancy, rapid recovery, or other 
protection or recovery mechanisms. Players in the 'Day After' exercises were intrigued by the MEII 
concept but asked: Is this concept feasible. Is it practical. For what portions of the Department of Defense 
and U.S. infrastructure is the concept relevant. What would such infrastructures look like. How effective or 
useful would they be. This report documents the findings of the first year of a study of the MEII concept, 
attempting to formulate some initial answers to these questions-or, if these are not the right questions, to 
ask and answer better ones. This report should be of interest to persons responsible for assuring the 
reliability and availability of essential information systems throughout the U.S. defense establishment, the 
U.S. critical infrastructure, and other organizations. Its findings and recommendations are relevant at all 
organizational levels, from small units to major commands. 
REPORT NUMBER: RAND-MR-993-05D/NSA/DARPA 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA365673 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA365673  
 
Ashman, Bruce W. Defensive Information Warfare in Today's Joint Operations: 
What's the Real Threat. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1997. 47p. 
Abstract: Information warfare (IW) is an emerging concept that affects the use of automated systems 
and reflects the growing realization that information technology can be used to gain an advantage over 
other users. Since the Gulf War, the incidents of information systems attacks have increased, especially 
in the civilian environment. Attacks against military systems have gone as far as penetrating sensitive, 
previously secure systems. As this threat against information or computer-based systems becomes more 
blatant, it raises the question of how vulnerable to attack are our automated military systems. Emerging 
technologies promise greater speed, accuracy and reliability for military operations while simultaneously 
producing greater lethality and situation awareness. However, as the Armed Forces depend more and 
more on these systems to perform routine and specialized operations, the risk of penetration, disruption, 
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or even compromise becomes apparent. While information warfare has great potential as a valid 
offensive tool, this paper explores the threat to unified and joint military operations from a defensive 
information warfare perspective. We must first identify what the threat entails and design defensive 
procedures because this is where the greatest vulnerabilities lie. Research and development of IW as an 
offensive weapon can be pursued and funded along with other conventional weapons programs. What is 
critical is identifying weaknesses and correcting them before we become victims of information warfare 
itself. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326368 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326368   
 
Barac, Gregory G. Interoperability: The Cornerstone of Information Warfare. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1996. 27p. 
Abstract: Information warfare has won the joint acceptance within DoD and may become the biggest 
threat faced by our nation. The great achievement of interoperability between information-based systems 
(e.g., computers) also introduced inherent risks and vulnerabilities, which is the cornerstone of 
information warfare. Information warfare includes the ability to exploit and dominate information made 
assessable through computers and communications. Should there be concern about these vulnerabilities. 
Absolutely. Modern societies depend upon these information-based systems to live and work. This paper 
introduces the recentness of information warfare and highlights some current issues, like who is leading 
the effort. The success of the information society to make their systems interoperate with other systems 
greatly increased the potentiality of information warfare. A review of the evolution of system 
interoperability highlights this phenomenon. As a result of being directly influenced by the industrial-age 
society, leaders over the age of forty may be too challenged to adequately grasp the issues of information 
warfare and may lead ineffectively. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA312146 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA312146  
 
Bennett, Sheila G. A Process for Vectoring Offensive Information Warfare as a 
Primary Weapon Option Within the United States Air Force. Wright-Patterson AFB, 
OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2001. 150p. 
Abstract: Consistently and comprehensively using Information Operations (IO) capabilities as a primary 
weapon option within the Air Force is the next step to operationalizing IO within the Air Force. Doctrine 
and official guidance have set the variables of mission and concepts of operations, organizational 
structure, and IW players in place. The missing variable to operationalizing IO and probably the most 
difficult is the "how" or process of the equation. This research will introduce a useable process that can be 
incorporated within the Air Force for integrating offensive IW activities into the current and given 
environment. The process is the basis for further decomposition and identification of target aim points. In 
addition, its use of effect points should aid in focusing long-range, deliberate, and crisis action planning 
on the possible desired effects on an adversary. The research sets the stage by briefly defining the first 
three variables; organization, mission, and players in which AF IW is practiced and the inherent 
deliverables required. It will then introduce a view and decomposition of the information battiespace as 
the basis for offensive IW activities where affecting the information factors in order to induce a desired 
decision to achieve desired effects is the overall goal. 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=2607   
 
Black, Bruce J. Modeling Organizational Configuration and Decision Processes for 
Information Warfare Analysis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 
1997. 142p. 
Abstract: For an organization to survive it must be able to adapt to its environment. A military 
organization operates in an environment that is constantly changing. The ability to model organizational 
configurations and organizational decision processes can assist the commander in adapting to the 
environment and understanding how a military organization is susceptible to Information Warfare (IW) 
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attacks. First a commander must understand the concepts of Information Warfare, Command and Control 
and the concept of organizational decision processes and how these permit an organization to adapt to its 
environment. Then the commander must determine what level of detail is necessary to model the 
organizational decision processes for its environment. Next the commander must analyze his model for 
configuration and decision processes. Using such commercially available software as Organizational 
Consultant and vDT the commander can identify any organizational misfits to the environment and the IW 
attack susceptibilities of the organizational decision processes. In the end, this approach demonstrates 
that it is feasible to model organizational configuration and organizational decision processes in an 
Information Warfare environment. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA333373 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA333373
 
Boll, Kenneth. Like a Lightning Bolt - Information Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Army War College, February 1999. 47p. 
Abstract: Combatant commanders currently do not have the best possible support from information 
warfare doctrine and capabilities that facilitate organizing forces for offensive and defensive information 
warfare. A balance of offensive and defensive information power is required and this research project 
suggests clearer doctrinal command and control relationships, integrated ways of employment, and 
sufficient information warfare means to enable a joint force commander to project dominant information 
power. The appropriate organization for combat will include a Joint Information Warfare Task Force to 
assist the joint force commander's planning effort and execute information operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA364265 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA364265  
 
Braddock, Joseph V., et al. Concepts and Technologies for the Army Beyond 2010. 
Washington, DC: Army Science Board, March 1999. 236p. 
Abstract: A study assessing the 2010-2025 timeframe and seeking technologies and enablers for Joint, 
Army and other Service operations with emphasis on Joint missions involving land combat. Specific areas 
of analysis include Mobility and Sustainment, Information Dominance, Platforms and Weapons and 
Investment Strategies. Study analyses suggest tapping commercial successes as private sector 
investment is strongly supporting improvements in many areas. However, to fully tap these developments 
the Army must begin participating in the design of future commercial systems. This study provides 9 
major recommendations including: establishing an Investment Council, exploiting non-Army commercial 
capabilities, establishing a C4ISR testbed, and using FSCS vehicles as precursors for AA2010 platforms. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA369372 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA369372  
 
Brand, John H., II. Proposed Modeling Protocol for Evaluating Information Attacks. 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Army Research Laboratory, January 1999. 37p. 
Abstract: The essence of an information attack is to alter, either by intrusion into and manipulation of a 
database or by deception, the scenario under which a target mind or organization evaluates and selects 
future courses of action. The aim is to influence the actions of the target. The method is alteration of the 
perceived desirability or expected payoff of specific courses of action. This alteration of the information in 
possession of the target can be described as alteration of the perceived reality under which the target 
operates. Probable success by an attacker in altering the target's perceived behavior, given a successful 
manipulation of the target's information, has, in the past, been subjective. A modeling protocol based on 
the use of game theory is proposed that may, in certain cases, allow optimization of the scenario, or 
reality, imposed on the target to force the choice of a desired course of action. It should also allow a 
quantitative estimate of the likelihood of the target's adopting a given course of action. This tool can be 
used to estimate friendly susceptibility to information attack. 
REPORT NUMBER: ARL-TN-112 
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http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA362101  
 
Bray, Clifton L., Jr. SCORPION: A Low Cost, Low Risk, Low Asset Strategy For 
Resolving Low Level Conflicts. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1996. 
75p. 
Abstract: Despite a significant drawdown, the U.S. military must be ready for two nearly simultaneous 
Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). Frequent deployments in support of contingencies short of an 
MRC are affecting our MRC readiness. Often the cost for these large deployments comes from training, 
readiness, and modernization related funds. Deployed units cannot complete certain types of critical 
training and in some cases, lost training is never made up. Another problem is a rising concern toward 
casualties, especially casualties not clearly associated with America's vital interests. Is there a low cost, 
low risk, low asset strategy for resolving low level conflicts. This paper analyzes our current situation and 
proposes a strategy that combines precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft, information warfare, 
psychological operations, and unconventional warfare into an integrated method of fighting. This strategy 
is codenamed SCORPION. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA309113 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA309113  
 
Buchan, Glenn. Information War and the Air Force: Wave of the Future? Current 
Fad? Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, March 1996. 16p. 
Abstract: Information War, in all of its actual and semantic variations, is a very hot topic these days. The 
subject has received considerable attention in a variety of forums: serious analysis for professionals, 
popularized accounts for lay audiences, pop futurology, and post-Cold War melodramas. The national 
security bureaucracy is currently very active in this arena, with all of the military services and various 
civilian agencies and their supporting analytical organizations establishing centers for information warfare, 
writing position papers, and generally grappling with the problem of how to cope with the information 
revolution and its consequences. There is good news and bad news in the surge of interest in information 
warfare. The good news is that the public discussion could heighten the awareness of policy-makers to 
information-related issues and possibly help focus policy-level debates. Recognizing the importance of 
using information effectively in war is hardly news-Sun Tzu, for example, covered the subject over 2000 
years ago. Moreover, there have been continuing, well established efforts in the national security 
community in many critical information-related areas electronic combat, computer and communications 
security, intelligence collection of all sorts, etc.-that long predate the current interest in information 
warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA322532 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP149/index.html  
 
Burke, David A. Towards a Game Theory Model of Information Warfare. Wright-
Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, November 1999. 116p. 
Abstract: The repeated game of incomplete information model, a subclass of game theory models, was 
modified to include aspects of information warfare. The repeated game of incomplete information model 
was first developed to analyze nuclear weapons disarmament negotiations. The central role of 
information in this model suggested its applicability to IW, which focuses on the defense and acquisition 
of information. A randomized experimental design was utilized to determine how people behave in a 
laboratory IW setting and to test the IW game model's basic predictions. The impact of experience and 
learning on IW performance was also assessed during the experiment. IW experience and devices that 
support learning during an IW engagement improved performance in some situations. The IW game 
theory model was shown to have some predictive capability and, with further development, could support 
further IW analysis and simulation. 
REPORT NUMBER: AFIT/GSS/LAL/99D-1 





Butler, Bradley L. Need for a USAF Information Warfare (IW) Strategy for Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1 April 1996. 
65p. 
Abstract: With the end of the Cold War, much has been written recently about the future direction the 
U.S. should take in an uncertain and rapidly changing world environment. The decision will have far 
reaching implications for many years to come. Two areas having an impact on the answer to this question 
but not normally examined together are information warfare and the broad area of military operations 
short of large scale conventional combat operations commonly known as military operations other than 
war (MOOTW) and very recently alluded to as other military operations (OMO). This paper examines both 
the information warfare environment and MOOTW to determine emerging information warfare 
technologies that may impact on MOOTW, as well as to determine those types of MOOTW requiring 
unique information warfare capabilities not currently planned for in large scale conventional warfighting 
operations. The limitations of using information warfare in MOOTW are also examined in some detail. The 
author contends that although emerging Air Force strategy and doctrine on information warfare should 
attempt to address MOOTW more than it currently does, in general strategy and doctrine will be subject to 
more constraints than corresponding information warfare strategy and doctrine for mid to high intensity 
conflict. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA330874 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA330874   
 
Cabral, Paul A. Information Warfare and Information Operations: Protecting The 
Global Information Environment. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 
1998. 41p. 
Abstract: The United States is an information and information systems dominated nation. Because of its 
dependence on information and information technology, the United States has become one of the most 
vulnerable nations to information warfare attacks. This study examines vulnerabilities in the global, 
national and defense information infrastructure and information operations attacks (information warfare) in 
the context of the national strategy for protecting the information infrastructure. It reviews directives, 
regulations, and policies currently in place to protect the information infrastructure and recommends the 
part government should play in this effort. It concludes with recommendations regarding a coordinated 
government and private sector office at the national level to provide the leadership required for such an 
effort. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA344848 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA344848  
 
Cardillo, Richard G., Jr. Fighting the 20th Century Army into the 21st Century. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1999. 45p. 
Abstract: The Army of the future is undergoing a transformation from a forward deployed 'Cold War' 
army to a power projection force. This transition will eventually result in a fully digitized, more tailorable, 
rapidly expandable, strategically deployable, and effectively employable organization. Until this 
transformation is complete, it may require a change to our doctrine and to our tactics, techniques, and 
procedures on how we integrate digitized and non- digitized systems and organizations into the fight. This 
paper addresses those possible changes. To leverage the true power of the future battlefield, 
commanders and their staffs must have a clear understanding on the capabilities and limitations that 
these new systems possess. Our challenge and primary goal of America's Army in this process is to keep 
the preeminent war-fighting skills ready and relevant while the Army evolves into the world's premier 21st 
Century fighting force. 




Carr, Thomas H. War on the Cheap. Using Information Warfare to Lengthen the 
Decision Cycle. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1996. 27p. 
Abstract: This paper investigates how an adversary of the United States might indirectly attack a center 
of gravity of a United States military operation by disrupting operational tempo using information warfare. 
Current military doctrine mandates quick and decisive victories whenever United States Forces are called 
to combat. A key element of this doctrine is the creation of an operational tempo that an enemy cannot 
match and so defeating him quickly with as few casualties as possible. The doctrine reflects a political 
reality that the American public will not support protracted and indecisive conflicts with large numbers of 
casualties. It is also a fact that most future United States military operations will project forward from the 
continental United States to immature theaters of operations. The combination of the requirements for 
high operational tempo and power projection from the United States will demand much from our 
information technology. Automated support systems for administration and logistics will be key to any 
future successful operation. This paper will not discuss how information resources are used by the United 
States but rather how a potential adversary might be able to manipulate these resources to disrupt 
operational tempo. This paper will show how a financially limited country could effectively fight the United 
States military, not by buying expensive exotic weapons systems, but by paying talented computer 
hackers and others familiar with United States support networks to disturb these systems. A good 
information warfare capability such as this would be a great combat multiplier for any foe and is not a 
capability realized sufficiently by United States military joint planners. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA307767 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA307767  
 
Carter, Rosemary M. Army Information Centers of Gravity: Can We Protect Them. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, May 1999. 62p. 
Abstract: As the Army keeps pace with the information age, it must determine how to leverage 
information to win its wars. According to Brigadier General Wayne M. Hall information is a tool for 
influencing an enemy's decision cycles. This is achieved by attacking the enemy's information centers of 
gravity. BG hall defines these information centers of gravity as the physical place or mental construct in 
cyberspace where a confluence of intellect, decisions, collection, automation, communications and 
planning occurs. The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the U.S. Army has information centers 
of gravity and if so, can they be protected. The monograph first determined the key components of 
information from the definition of information superiority. These key components were analyzed using 
three criteria to determine the Army's information centers of gravity. The criteria used were their influence 
on decision cycles, effects on strategic aims, and impact on combat power. The analysis concluded that 
there are two information centers of gravity Army commanders and information operations cells. The 
monograph used the Army's defensive IO capabilities to determine if it can protect these information 
centers of gravity. The conclusion is that the U.S. Army does have the capability to provide protection for 
these information centers of gravity. The monograph concluded with a look at additional initiatives that are 
ongoing to protect both information centers of gravity and the key components of information that support 
these centers. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA370329 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA370329  
 
Chaturvedi, A. R., et al. Agent-Based Simulation Approach to Information Warfare in the 
SEAS environment.” p. 32, IN: System Sciences, 2000. Proceedings of the 33rd 
Annual Hawaii International Conference, January 4-7, 2000.  
Abstract: Not available. 
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Clark, Howard W. and Saundra K. Wallfesh. Measuring Effectiveness of Theater 
IW/C2W Campaigns. Wilmington, MA: Dynamics Research Corporation, April 1995. 
20p. 
Abstract: This effort, which addresses measures of effectiveness for theater operations, is a continuing 
commentary on how the senior commander of a military operation pulls all these things together and how 
IW and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) supports the theater campaign. The paper first establishes 
some groundwork in the Background section, which presents the concepts of theaters, levels of war, 
levels of command, OOTW, and sources. Next, IW and C2W are discussed. The Measurement section 
examines the concept of measuring, looking at what, when, how to measure, and subjective versus 
objective measures. Examples of theater level measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are provided in the 
following section, Theater MOE, in which the Theater Level MOE Worksheet is introduced. Modeling is 
addressed in the next section, which states why models are of interest, suggests improvements, and 
discusses worksheet applicability. Finally, we present suggestions for improving the measurement of 
theater level C2W. It is our intent to provide, for policy makers as well as commanders, some techniques 
for them to measure the effectiveness of their campaigns and operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA330423 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA330423  
 
Clements, Stacy M. One With the Most Information Wins: The Quest for 
Information Superiority. Wright-Patterson AFB: Air Force Institute of Technology, OH. 
School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, December 1997. 140p. 
Abstract: The escalation of interest in information as a corporate resource is reflected in the military's 
quest for information superiority. A volume of directives, articles, and doctrine is appearing to meet the 
unique challenges presented by information as a resource. Discussions of how to achieve information 
superiority have given rise to investigations of such related concepts as information warfare and 
information operations, with associated taxonomies and ideas of how to use information capabilities for 
attack and defense. This thesis examines information superiority and the related concepts, and examines 
current information technology initiatives in order to discern the characteristics which can aid in the quest 
for information superiority. A synthesis of the most prominent perspectives on information superiority is 
formed. In the context of this definition, a process model of information superiority and its necessary 
activities is developed, with acquisition and decision making identified as key. The idea of information 
technology as enabling information superiority is probed, and an alternate view proposed; contending that 
information technology is more likely to be detrimental to information superiority unless certain criteria are 
met. The resulting conceptual model depicts the key attributes of information superiority and information 
technology, and represents the relationships between these concepts. 




Collier, Mark. Information Warfare Modeling I. San Antonio, TX: Southwest Research 
Institute, October 1997. 46p. 
Abstract: This report documents the results of survey task in which the contractor was asked to identify 
current Information Warfare (IW) modeling development within the Department of Defense (DoD) and 
recommend an approach for IW modeling. It involved working with Rome Laboratory to identify their 
primary interest area in IW Modeling, surveying DoD for ongoing unclassified IW modeling efforts, and 
defining an IW modeling architecture which Rome Laboratory could use in the future to guide research 
and development. 
REPORT NUMBER: RLTR97176 




Cook, Wyatt C. Information Warfare: A New Dimension in the Application of Air 
and Space Power. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1994. 38p. 
Abstract: The emergence of information warfare and its application to air and space doctrine will forever 
change the form and conduct of modern warfare. While history does not provide specific solutions that 
can be applied without modification to present and future situations, it does provide a broad conceptual 
basis for understanding war, human nature, and air and space power. This document provides the 
framework for exercising judgement and is a starting point for understanding what information warfare is 
and hit it can be applied. Like any doctrine, information warfare doctrine should be alive--growing, 
evolving, and maturing. New experiences, reinterpretation of past experiences, advances in technology, 
changes in threats and cultures can (and should) require alternation of doctrine. We must leverage and 
maximize the advantage of technology to harness the benefits of the information technology explosion, if 
we are to win the information war. 
ACCESSION: ADA280804  
 
Cooney, David M., Jr. Warfare in the Information Age: Adding Capability 
Multipliers. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, May 
1999. 25p. 
Abstract: One recurring theme in military writings since the end of Desert Storm is that the American 
military is on the cusp of a new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Proponents of this viewpoint cite 
major changes in business and society brought on by the personal computer and the Internet. They view 
these changes as part of a new information age and predict that the explosive technological growth in the 
speed of microprocessors and networks will lead to whole new ways to wage war, with information 
superiority being the key ingredient to assure victory. Critics argue that war as a rough, brutish, and 
frequently irrational business, and that no network will eliminate either the fog or friction of war. They see 
many of concepts being put forward as not respectful of the enduring principles of war. This paper argues 
that regardless of whether revolutionary changes occur in the way wars are fought in the information age 
or whether developments will continue to follow a more evolutionary path, - the military needs to look 
beyond technology and begin the process of accelerating its ability to assimilate the changes technology 
brings. This paper presents five capability multipliers for warfare in the information age: (1) assembling 
and maintaining the intellectual capital to operate in the future networks; (2) developing information as a 
true discipline; (3) improving human computer interaction; (4) seeking greater understanding of how 
people process information and make decisions; and (5) furthering the cultural, organizational, and 
operational concepts to support the technological change. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA370707 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA370707  
 
Cooper, Jeffrey R.  Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 1994. 57p. 
Abstract: The author urges defense planners to determine what strategic--as opposed to operational--
benefits might be derived from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). He cautions against being so 
focused on the technology of the RMA as to divert attention from the critical relationships between 
purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation and organizational adaptation. He concludes that 
making the internal reforms that will be required will be as challenging as coming to terms with the 
operational and strategic implications of the new technologies.  






Cramer, Michael J., Sowmya Ramachandran, and Janelle K. Viera. Using Computer 
Games to Train Information Warfare Teams. San Mateo, CA: Stottler Henke 
Associates, Inc., 2004.  11p. 
Abstract: Information warfare and security are crucial to maintaining homeland security. An important 
mission of the information warfare force is to ensure that secure information and facilities are well 
protected. One way to ensure this is to try to gain access to this information as outsiders and see how 
well the practices and policies designed to protect data are being enforced. Teams of Information Warfare 
personnel (a.k.a. the Red Teams) are dedicated to the mission of testing the security of information and 
assets crucial to American interests. Most such missions necessitate deception in order to test the extent 
to which data is protected from strangers and parties who are not trusted. High-levels of stress are 
inevitable, and the Red Teams need to be highly skilled in thinking creatively under such stress. Given 
the criticality and the degree of danger of these missions, they have to be carefully trained. For computer-
based approaches, providing realistic simulations is essential for successful training. Engaging the trainee 
emotionally to elicit the types of stress responses they will experience on real missions is crucial. 3D 
computer games have proved themselves to be highly effective in engaging players motivationally and 
emotionally. This effort, therefore, uses gaming technology to provide realistic simulations. These games 
are augmented with Artificial Intelligence techniques for enabling trainees to interact with the simulation 
using natural language, intelligent evaluation of the student's performance, and automated after-action 
review that allows the trainees to assess their own performance and provide justifications for their actions. 
This paper describes the details of this approach, providing examples of the simulations and after-action 
reviews, and discusses its benefits and limitations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER:  ADA459676 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA459676
 
Crawford, George A. Information Warfare: New Roles for Information Systems in 
Military Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, December 1997. 
20p. 
Abstract: Information warfare (IW) theory has tremendous political, technical, operational, and legal 
implications for the military. This article seeks to define IW for the layman and discuss its potential 
applications. It also attempts to identify potential military uses of existing information systems technology 
and address some of the issues facing those who will be responsible for implementing this new doctrine. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA332446 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA332446    
 
Crew, Benjamin F. Information Warfare, Organizing for Action. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, June 1996. 32p. 
Abstract: The armed forces of the United States have recognized the potential importance of 
Information Warfare (IW) and have defined it as it will apply to military operations. It now remains for them 
to identify and implement an optimum organizational structure at the regional unified command level to 
develop, plan, synchronize and employ it effectively. Official publications recommend an 'IW cell' made up 
members from the J3, J6 and J2 directorates of the CINCs staff. Any such organization needs unity of 
command, unity of effort and uniformity between the commands to succeed. Alternative organizational 
structures include a separate staff element, a single DoD Agency or service in charge, or a new functional 
unified combatant command--USINFOCOM. Although none of the organizations offers a solution that is 
totally acceptable, USINFOCOM may be the best alternative. That solution can only be implemented, 
however, after careful consideration of the way in which IW is to be viewed--as a force multiplier or as a 
form of warfare, and then only after today's warriors become acculturated to the phenomenon of IW. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA312020 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA312020    
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Curts, Raymond, J. and Douglas E. Campbell. Command & Control as an 
Operational Function of Information Warfare. Fairfax Station, VA: Strategic 
Consulting Inc., 2004. 33p. 
Abstract: Data - the competition for information is as old as the first conflict. It involves increasing and 
protecting our own store of information while limiting and penetrating the adversary's. As it pertains to C2 
as an operational function of information warfare - targeting the enemy's information functions, while 
protecting ours, with the intent of degrading his will or capability to fight. Management e.g., advanced 
battlefield management (e.g., using information and information systems to provide information on which 
to base military decisions when prosecuting a war); and Risk Management for the risks potentially 
associated with information and information technology (IT) to be identified and managed cost effectively, 
it is essential that the process of analyzing and assessing risk is well understood by all parties and 
executed on a timely basis. Process - Information Warfare processes are making dramatic changes in 
how we fight wars. The process must allow a commander's vision and view of the battlespace to be 
shared at the lowest possible level. From the unique perspectives of soldiers, sailors, marines and 
airmen, the process must forge a common understanding of how to use information warfare to enhance 
joint C2 warfighting capabilities. The Global Information Grid (GIG) is an example of such a process. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA465787 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA465787
 
Denno, Patricia. Defense Information Warfare Technology Applications (DIWTA) 
Automated Intrusion Detection Environment (AIDE) Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD). McLean, VA: Northrup Grumman Technology 
Defense Enterprise Solutions, 2004. 63p. 
Abstract: This report represents work done in Task 0001 and Task 0008. This paper is organized into 
the three years represented. Introductory material provides an overview. Subsequent sections for each 
year begin by describing the development process which was based on incorporating the lessons learned 
from the previous year, the goals for the year, and including innovations from AFRL. The paper then 
describes for each year the deployment and demonstration planning processes. Demonstration 
performance is described and summary data from each year's demonstration follows. Finally user 
feedback and hot wash conclusions are then presented by year, leading to a discussion of suggested 
improvements for Year Three development. A final conclusions section completes the document. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA429896 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA429896
 
DeVries, Anita D. Information Warfare and Its Impact on National Security. Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, June 1997. 20p. 
Abstract: For years, the United States national security posture has relied heavily on secured sea lines 
of communication, friendly borders, unmatched human and material resources, unlimited mobilization 
capability, and nuclear hegemony. This paper defines information warfare; examines its offensive and 
defensive components; explores potential threats, information warfare legalities and nature; and 
concludes that we face a tremendous challenge at the strategic level to keep our current status of being a 
world power to be reckoned with. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA325003 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA325003   
 
Dick, Samuel R. Operational Proponent for Information Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 1996. 24p. 
Abstract: How Information Warfare is integrated into the Commander in Chief and Joint Task Force 
staffs will determine its successful application in wartime. Three criteria are formulated: (1) inter-agency 
participation, (2) national approval for operations, and (3) a long-term studies program. Three models are 
analyzed: (1) Command and Control Warfare cell, (2)Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, and (3) 
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Special Operations Component. The most suitable choice using the three criteria is to establish an 
Information Warfare organization similar to the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA311989 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA311989   
 
Dishong, Donald J. Studying the Effect of Information Warfare on C2 Decision 
Making. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1994. 61p. 
Abstract: The goal of practitioners of information warfare is always concerned with affecting the 
decisions made by the enemy. With a clear understanding of how the enemy makes decisions, it is easier 
to target the processes which are involved in making those decisions. The purpose of this thesis is to 
demonstrate whether information warfare, when directed at a command and control decision maker, can 
be administered in quantified amounts which can be used to change what would normally be a good 
tactical decision into a bad one. This thesis uses a software package called Tactical Tic-Tac-Toe (T4), to 
simulate command and control decisions being made in an information warfare environment. The three 
measures of effectiveness of winning battles, winning missions (aggregate battles), and increasing one's 
won-to-loss ratio are used to evaluate the quality of the decisions being made. Fog of War, Tactical 
Delay, Area Delay, and Communications Delays are combined to determine their effects on command 
and control under these measures of effectiveness. Clearly the data shows that delaying one's immediate 
opponent from grasping the tactical picture serves to greatly enhance the chances of increasing one's 
effectiveness. Further, delaying the enemy's understanding of 'pieces' of the strategic picture (which 
might not be viewed as immediately tactically important), also dramatically increases effectiveness.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA283639 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA283639  
 
Dockery, J. T. and A. E. R. Woodcock.  “’Crisis Mind’ Versus ‘Combat Mind."’ p. 1120-
1124, IN: Military Communications Conference, 1995. MILCOM '95, Conference 
Record, IEEE, 5-8 November 1995, 1291p. 
Abstract:  This paper is about modelling information warfare and its effect on simulated command and 
control. In it we introduce a new perspective based on the arguable difference between decision making 
during a (possibly extended) crisis and that occurring during combat. Our subject is the commander's 
mind set. For this purpose we distinguish what we call a crisis mindset and a combat mindset. Each is to 
be evaluated by the nature of the response which the commander chooses. While it is true that combat 
may be thought of as one long crisis, we make a distinction between a crisis situation and a combat 
situation. Our purpose is to better incorporate human command decision making into simulations. Only 
them can the effects of information warfare be reliably predicted. 
 
Downs, Lawrence G., Jr. Digital Data Warfare: Using Malicious Computer Code as a 
Weapon. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air War College, April 1995. 38p. 
Abstract: Digital Data Warfare (DDW) is an emerging field that has great potential as a means to meet 
military, political, economic or personal objectives. Distinguished from the 'hacker' variety of malicious 
computer code by its predictable nature and the ability to target specific systems, DDW provides the 
attacker with the means to deny, degrade, deceive and/or exploit a targeted system. The five phases of a 
DDW attack -- penetration, propagation, dormancy, execution and termination -- are presented for the first 
time by the author in this paper. The nature of DDW allows it to be used in the strategic, operational and 
tactical warfare roles. Three questions should be considered when developing a strategy for employing 
DDW: (1) Who should control the employment of DDW. (2) What type of systems should be targeted, and 
(3) Under what circumstances should DDW be used. Finally, a brief overview of possible 
countermeasures against DDW is provided as well as an outline of an effective information system 
security program that would provide a defense against DDW. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA328638 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=1623  
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay1995/awc/downslg.pdf   
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Elam, Donald E. Attacking the Infrastructure: Exploring Potential Uses of 
Offensive Information Warfare. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 
1996. 216p. 
Abstract: The world has entered the Third Wave; it has entered the Information Age. One of the 
fundamentals of this paradigm shift is the fact that information is power. The side that controls information 
more effectively will be victorious. Thus, countries and militaries must change their mentality in order to 
survive. A new form of conflict, Information Warfare, has been born. This new discipline is large, dynamic, 
and complex. The need exists for education among military officers and other concerned professionals 
throughout the country. This thesis helps to bridge the education gap. It presents a snapshot of 
Information Warfare today, exploring many different avenues and possibilities along the way. The first half 
of the document is focused on Information Warfare in general, and the second half deals specifically with 
the offensive side. The purpose of this thesis is not to present an all-encompassing view of Offensive 
Information War or eve of Information Warfare in general. The field of Information Warfare is too big for 
any one individual or organization to fully comprehend all of its intricacies. Indeed, due to the dynamic 
nature of this discipline, chances are that some, or maybe even all, of the material contained herein will 
be obsolescent upon publication. The goal of the thesis is to present one view of Information Warfare, as 
seen through the eyes of many. The hope is that some benefit will be garnered by the reader, even if it 
only sparks an idea or helps to understand the importance of this growing warfare dimension. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA311391 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA311391   
 
Englin, David L. Lightning Bolt and the Quill: Determining the Role of Air Force 
Public Affairs in Information Warfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, October 
1998. 50p. 
Abstract: As the Air Force's internal and external public voice, Air Force public affairs is uniquely 
positioned to influence the flow of information to different audiences about a variety of issues and 
operations. In this new operating environment, Air Force public affairs must determine its proper role in 
information warfare. The key to determining this role is to examine the tension between the public 
information and public relations functions of Air Force public affairs. The public information function 
focuses on the complete release of all information about the Air Force. The public relations function 
focuses on influencing public opinion to benefit the Air Force. A survey of documents defining the mission 
of public affairs suggests conflicting views within the US military concerning the public information and 
public relations functions. Department of Defense and Joint Staff documents define the mission of public 
affairs strictly in terms of public information, and even prohibit some public relations activities. Air Force 
documents define the mission of public affairs in terms of both public information and public relations, 
permitting the use of accurate, honest public information to perform public relations. Moreover, the Air 
Force public affairs core competencies (Trusted Counsel to Leaders, Airman Morale and Readiness, 
Public Trust and Support, Global Influence and Deterrence) identify several important public relations 
activities. Several Department of Defense and Joint Staff documents explicitly constrain the potential 
information warfare role of Air Force public affairs. The following list of constraints emerges from these 
publications: (1) Quickly and completely release all information. (2) Never release any kind of 
misinformation. (3) The only valid reasons for restricting or withholding information are national or 
operational security and the safety and privacy. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA358580 






Feiring, Douglas I. Information Warfare...From the Sea. Integrating Information 
Operations and the Marine Corps Planning Process. Quantico, CA: Marine Corps 
Command and Staff College, 2001. 12p.  
Abstract: Although the Marine Corps's current method of planning and employing Information 
Operations (IO) seeks to integrate its various elements, improvements must be made for this emerging 
concept to be a truly effective force multiplier. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA400017 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400017  
 
Ferguson, Robyn E. Information Warfare with Chinese Characteristics: China's 
Future View of Information Warfare and Strategic Culture. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Army Command and Staff College, 2002. 68p. 
Abstract: The Information Age presents a unique opportunity to China with regard to both modernization 
and building an Information Warfare (IW) capability. China's active pursuit of an IW capability will cause a 
change in Chinese strategic culture. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, strategic culture defines how a 
nation assesses a threat to its interests and whether it will use force to deal with those threats. The 
author's original research question asked how Chinese strategic culture will affect the development of a 
Chinese IW capability. The author answers that question by defining IW from American and Chinese 
perspectives and defining Chinese strategic culture, and then describes key aspects of People s 
Liberation Army (PLA) theorists vision for IW. The conclusion of this thesis is that the nature of 
cyberspace, the futility of the static defense, and the interdependence of the defense and the offense will 
change some aspects of Chinese strategic culture. This finding is contrary to the expected outcome, as 
the original research question anticipated that Chinese strategic culture would affect the development of a 
Chinese IW capability. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA416897 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA416897
 
Fields, Gregory S. The Effects of External Safeguards on Human-Information 
System Trust in an Information Warfare Environment. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: 
Air Force Institute of Technology, 2001. 150p.  
Abstract: This research looks at how human trust in an information system is influenced by external 
safeguards in an Information Warfare (IW) domain. The military command and control environment 
requires decision-makers to make tactical judgments based on complex and conflicting information 
received from various sources such as automated information systems. Information systems are relied 
upon in command and control environments to provide fast and reliable information to the decision-
makers. The degree of reliance placed in these systems by the decision-makers suggests a significant 
level of trust. Understanding this trust relationship and what effects it has on the focus of this study. A 
model is proposed that predicts behavior associated with human trust in information systems. It is 
hypothesized that a decision-maker's belief in the effectiveness of external safeguards will positively 
influence a decision-maker's trusting behavior. Likewise, the presence of an Information Warfare attack 
will have a negative affect a decision-maker's trusting behavior. Two experiments were conducted in 
which the perceived effectiveness of external safeguards and the information provided by an information 
system were manipulated in order to test the hypotheses presented in this study. The findings from both 
experiments suggest that a person's trust computers in specific situations are useful in predicting trusting 
behavior, external safeguards have a negative effect on trusting behavior, and that Information Warfare 
attacks have no effect on trusting behavior. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA394373 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA394373  
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=3635   
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Franklin, Derek L. Information Warfare: Issues Associated With the Defense of 
DOD Computers and Computer Networks. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command 
and Staff College, 2002. 62p.  
Abstract: The threat to the Defense Information Infrastructure is growing Hackers have advanced in 
sophistication and the potential exists for an alliance of independent hackers and terrorist/criminal groups 
that may threaten the critical information pathways of the armed forces An analysis of the history of 
computer information warfare reveals that there was an embarrassing lack of readiness and defense 
capability available to the armed forces of the United States before 1999. With the establishment of the 
Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CNO) later renamed to Computer Network Operations 
in 1998 (JTF-CNO), a minimum capacity to respond has been developed However, as the issue has 
grown in importance, policy makers and planners have come to realize the limitations of Computer 
Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Defense (CND) as warfare areas The growth of related 
legal and law enforcement issues, and the effect of a possible enemy CNA strike, will require the 
coordination of civilian, armed forces, and law enforcement officials to respond effectively This will 
prevent CNA/CND from being a purely military issue. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA404740 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404740
 
Franz, George J. Information --The Fifth Element of Combat Power. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, May 1996. 74p. 
Abstract: This monograph proposes that one of the Army's primary doctrinal concepts, combat power, 
requires modification to keep pace with the changing environment of conflict. It argues that the Army's 
combat power model, defined as the combined effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, and 
leadership, represents one element of the Army's foundation that must be updated to meet the 
requirements of modern warfare. The current combat power model fails to recognize the impact that the 
current Revolution in Military Affairs, specifically embodied in the emergence of information operations, 
has on today's Army and will have on the Army of the future. The monograph examines emerging 
information operations (IO) doctrine contained in FM 100-5 Operations, FM 100-6 Information Operations, 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 Force XXI Operations--A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional 
Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, and related publications. It analyzes 
the current model and defines the integral elements of combat power and the conditions that affect their 
application. In turn, the study identifies the current elements of combat power that are included in 
information warfare (IW) and distinguishes those aspects of 10 not imbedded in the current combat power 
model. Detailing the components of IW and surveying current Army doctrine regarding information 
operations builds a foundation for examining the historical case study and for examining proposed future 
doctrine. A historical case study of Operation DESERT STORM provides the groundwork for considering 
the role information plays in the current combat power model. The analysis of the contemporary paradigm 
and the historical examination of IO combined with an overview of emerging concepts developed to 
support Force XXI affords a thorough basis for establishing a new framework. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA314297 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA314297   
 
French, Geoffrey S. Rethinking Defensive Information Warfare. Oakton, VA: General 
Dynamics, 2004. 47p. 
Abstract: Although the origins of information warfare lie in the defense of critical computer systems, 
defensive information warfare (DIW) per se has advanced little beyond an information assurance model. 
Information assurance is an integral part of any military organization's operations, but it falls far short of 
meeting the needs for robust defense of critical command-and-control (C2) computer networks against a 
sophisticated adversary. By looking at the ways that militaries have responded to challenging defensive 
situations in the past, some insights can be made into the nature of IW and potential application of 
conventional operations. This paper examines defensive tactics and strategies from the German defense 
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in depth that emerged from World War I to the American Active Defense that developed in the Cold War 
and proposes a new mindset for DIW that draws on these operational concepts from military history. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA 465836 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA465836
 
Gauthier, Kathryn L. China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, 
Space, and Information Warfare. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air War College, 
July 1999. 45p. 
Abstract: In China as Peer Competitor. Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare Lt 
Col Kathryn L. Gauthier analyzes the potential for China to emerge as a peer competitor of the United 
States in the coming decades. First, she examines two traditional pillars of national strength--China's 
status as a nuclear weapons state and as a space power. Second, she then explores China's growing 
focus on information warfare (IW) as a means to wage asymmetric warfare against a technologically 
advanced adversary. Third, the author carefully examines the status of the three programs highlights 
areas of concern and potential conflict with the United States, and analyzes the implications of these 
issues for the United States. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA367983 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=418    
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA367983   
 
Gilliam, Mary M. Information Warfare: Combating the Threat in the 21st Century. 
Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air Command and Staff College, 1997. 52p. 
Abstract: As we approach the dawn of the 21st century, success of our national security strategy will 
depend greatly on our ability to combat the Information Warfare (IW) threat. Old paradigms regarding 
conventional warfare must change to incorporate this new form of warfare. Our nation's growing 
dependency on information and information-based technologies has made IW a legitimate weapon for 
potential adversaries. The "information" and its support infrastructures are becoming extremely vulnerable 
to hostile attacks. Adversarial forces can now wage information-based warfare from anywhere in the 
world, and literally remain anonymous. Thus, our ability to recognize and defend against this new form of 
warfare is paramount to the survival of our national security infrastructure. The thesis of this research 
project is predicated upon the following premises: First, the exploitation of "information" as a weapon is 
changing the nature of warfare. Second, although there is much debate about the reality of the IW threat, 
this paper postulates that adversarial IW tactics pose a legitimate threat to our national security 
infrastructure. Finally, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff, and the Services must remain  
actively committed to combating the IW threat in the 21st century. 




Ginn, Patrick W. Correlation Analysis of Fleet Information Warfare Center Network 
Incidents. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001. 53p.  
Abstract: The Navy's Intrusion Detection process is currently reactive in nature. It is designed and 
programmed to detect and provide alerts to the Fleet Information 
Warfare Center (FlWC) of suspicious network activity while it is in progress, as well as to record/store 
data for future reference. However, the majority of activity taking place within and across Naval networks 
is legitimate and not an unauthorized activity. To allow for efficient access and utilization of the 
information systems sharing the network the Intrusion Detection Systems must be set at a level that filters 
out activity deemed as normal or non-hostile, whilestill providing an appropriate level of security. With this 
filtering in place an IDS system will not register all suspicious activity, and may not detect mild and 
seemingly harmless activity. When increasing security, limits must be imposed upon access. This thesis 
examines FIWC network incident data from 1999 to see if a correlation can be drawn between United 
States visibility in the foreign media during 1999 and the occurrence of suspicious network incidents. A 
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positive correlation may provide advance-warning indicators that could lead to the development of a 
procedure for increasing security posture based on the current environment. These indicators would 
provide a more proactive method of defense, significantly reduce potential damage caused by hostile 
network incidents and provide for more efficient network activity. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA396275 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA396275  
 
Guthrie, Samuel A. Knowledge-Based Operations: The 'So What' of Information 
Warfare. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, April 1995. 
59p. 
Abstract: After publishing the Army's centerpiece doctrinal manual FM100-5 Operations in June 1993, 
the Army lived up to its assertion that intellectual change leads physical change and immediately began 
working on its vision of future joint military operations. This vision, referred to as Force XX1 Operations, 
lays a conceptual foundation for military operations in the 21st century. This monograph explores a part of 
the future vision referred to as Knowledge-Based Operations. Battlefield frameworks have evolved over 
time providing a useful construct to guide preparation for the nation's next war. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 
introduces a knowledge-based battlefield framework. This framework promotes the battle commander's 
ability to visualize the employment of forces and resources to dominate operational tempo. Within this 
framework the US Army proposes to achieve a decisive edge through the conduct of Knowledge-Based 
Operations. This monograph traces the evolution in battlefield frameworks, describes the knowledge-
based framework, and presents a concept for Knowledge-Based Operations. This concept is the heart of 
the - monograph. The potential impacts of the new framework and Knowledge-Based Operations on 
campaign and joint operations planning are discussed and conclusions are presented. Elements of the 
battle dynamics are used for evaluation criteria throughout. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA300210 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA300210   
 
Hall, Larry P. National Military Strategy: Information Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Army War College, April 1997. 33p. 
Abstract: The U. S. Government has realized that new technologies will have a significant impact not 
only on everyday life but also on national security and the conduct of future warfare. While evaluating the 
powerful potential of information, policymakers are also attempting to understand a variety of problems 
surrounding it. This paper analyzes IW, specifically the protection of information, as a component of the 
1995 National Military Strategy (NMS). It reviews the ends, ways, and means of our IW strategy. It 
focuses on the actions of the U. S. Government, the Department of Defense (DoD), and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), especially on the U. S. Army's role. It examines the Army's IW strategy and provides some 
recommendations for what it needs to do to further support national policy. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326624 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326624   
 
Hamby, Janice M. Operational Protection of Information Technology Assets. A 
Commander's Guide to Risk Reduction. Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 1997. 
30p. 
Abstract: Information technology (IT) is an essential part of any military action. The U.S. military 
increasingly relies on the force multiplier effect yielded by technological superiority and plans to conduct 
information warfare (IW) in future conflicts to minimize exposure and risk to forces. Despite the clear 
advantages that IT and IW can create for the combatant commander, their use is not risk free. Heavy 
dependence on IT yields a target rich environment for any adversary wishing to conduct his own IW 
campaign. Current developments in doctrine for IW do not adequately focus on the potential ramifications 
of IW and fail to highlight the criticality of the function of defensive IW (IW-D) and the operational 
protection of our extended IT infrastructure. Thoughtful, methodical approaches to minimize risk are 
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needed. This paper provides context for and proposes one such approach. Information technology (IT) is 
an essential part of any military action. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA328131 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA328131   
 
Hampton, Emanuel. Towards a National Strategy for Information Technology. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1999. 44p. 
Abstract: In the 21st century, our national security and our continued economic prosperity will depend 
on how effectively we develop national strategies and policies to shape the development and use of 
information technology. Specifically, how should we develop current information technologies to meet 
future national needs. And how do we protect current information technology infrastructures from 
intellectual theft, sabotage, terrorism, information warfare, and natural disasters. To maintain our current 
technological advantage, the United States must remain the world leader in information technologies. To 
remain the world leader in information technology, the United States must maintain a viable national 
information technology strategy. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363945 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363945   
 
Harley, Jeffery A. Information, Technology, and the Center of Gravity. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, June 1996. 57p. 
Abstract: The American 'way of war' emphasizes overwhelming force and advanced technology. 
Unfortunately, these factors may not be decisive in every type of conflict. Information and technology 
remain tools with limitations that are not fully recognized. Information systems are enhancing command 
and control as well as target acquisition. However, reliance on these tools limits the opportunity for 
operational innovation and obscures the use of planning tools. The center of gravity concept is limited by 
service perceptions and differing definitions. Common understanding of these tools of war would enhance 
their utility and help the United States fight better in the future. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA310922 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA310922   
 
Harley, Jeffery A. Role of Information Warfare: Truth and Myths. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 1996. 26p. 
Abstract: The rapid growth in information technologies has generated three myths of information 
warfare: omniscience, obsolescence of armed forces, and information itself as a new center of gravity. 
Unfortunately, this obscures the true role of information technologies in better integrating information at all 
levels of warfare as well as creating an enhanced capability in synthesizing information with the better 
placement of ordnance on target. Information thus serves as a force multiplier and is best seen as a 
critical strength or vulnerability dependent upon the ability to exploit any information differential that may 
exist between opposing forces. At the same time, information technologies have had a pronounced effect 
upon the operational commander by enhancing and limiting mission planning, necessitating more 
complex information filtering, and through altering the commander's ability to execute a mission in a 
decentralized manner. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA307348  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA307348   
 
Hayes, J. L., et al. BM/C3 Information Technology Distributed Processing and 
Information Warfare. Huntsville, AL: Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 
1997. 15p. 
Abstract: The US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (USASSDC) Advanced Technology 
Directorate (ATD) currently manages several research programs that have the potential to significantly 
advance the current state of the art in information technology for future Battle Management/Command, 
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Control, and Communication (BM/C3) systems. These programs address some of the challenges 
associated with full spectrum dominance in information warfare by providing new and innovative 
technologies for advanced distributed processing. The definition of information technology as it applies to 
BM/C3 is provided, as well as our vision for the future of distributed processing and its role in future 
BM/C3 systems. We propose that the realization of more effective BM/C3 systems utilizing 
megacomputer architectures to support the human in control will require continuing technological 
advances in high speed communications, architectural structures, automated decision support, modeling 
and simulation (MS), and parallel processing algorithms. The current research in optimistic computing, 
and photonic interprocessor routing and switching, and the applicability of this research to distributed 
BM/C3 is discussed. Finally, the future research plans including the application to the BMDO's 
development of a Virtual Distributed Hardware in the Loop (HWIL) Test Bed (VDHTB), are described. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA329064 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA329064   
 
Hosmer, C. and G. Gordon. Forensic Information Warfare Requirement Study. 
Cortland, NY: Wetstone Technologies, 2002. 36p. 
Abstract: The study presents an analysis of the state of the art in computer forensic technologies 
employed by the military, law enforcement, and business and industry sectors. Additionally, it charts the 
observed deficiencies in this area, by providing a research and development roadmap of consolidated 
requirements of all sectors of the economy which rely on the existence of a robust forensic toolset for 
accomplishing forensic computer investigations. An extensive survey of existing forensic tools was 
performed in order to develop a Forensic Information Warfare (FIW) Matrix that provides an in-depth look 
into the issues and the state-of-the-art technologies being used. The Computer Forensics matrix 
permitted the development and refinement of a FIW research and technology Road Map that integrates 
data from the FIW Matrix, with on-going university research, industry interests, and real forensic case 
data needs. The results provide a solid framework for determining the requirements for future R&D thrusts 
in computer forensic science. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA407355 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA407355
 
Howard, J. D. “Security Incidents on the Internet, 1989--1995.” 15p. IN: INET98 - The 
Internet: Entering the Mainstream, 8th Annual Networking Conference December 
1995. 
Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of trends in Internet security based on an investigation of 
4,299 Internet security-related incidents reported to the CERT{reg_sign} Coordination Center 
(CERT{reg_sign}/CC) from 1989 through 1995. Prior to this research, knowledge of actual Internet 
security incidents was limited and primarily anecdotal. This research: (1) developed a taxonomy to 
classify Internet attacks and incidents, (2) organized, classified, and analyzed CERT{reg_sign}/CC 
incident records, (3) summarized the relative frequency of the use of tools and vulnerabilities, success in 
achieving access, and results of attacks, (4) estimated total Internet incident activity, (5) developed 
recommendations for Internet users and suppliers, and (6) developed recommendations for future 
research. With the exception of denial-of-service attacks, security incidents were found to be increasing at 
a rate less than Internet growth. Estimates showed that most, if not all, severe incidents were reported to 
the CERT{reg_sign}/CC, and that more than one out of three above average incidents (in terms of 
duration and number of sites) were reported. Estimates also indicated that a typical Internet site was 
involved in, at most, around one incident (of any kind) per year, and a typical Internet host in, at most, 
around one incident in 45 years. The probability of unauthorized privileged access was around an order of 
magnitude less likely. As a result, simple and reasonable security precautions should be sufficient for 
most Internet users.  
REPORT NUMBER: SAND-98-8497C; CONF-98-0723 
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Hull, George B. Information Revolution and the Environment of Future Conflict. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, May 1997. 87p. 
Abstract: An information revolution is a fundamental and complete change in the way knowledge or 
intelligence is communicated and received. The heart of the revolution is the ability to communicate and 
receive information in ways never before possible. The consolidation of what became known as the 
Industrial Revolution, changed the way men worked and earned wealth, the way men governed 
themselves, the relations between nation-states, and the way men fought wars. The information 
revolution portends similar fundamental changes in society. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA331261 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA331261   
 
Hutcherson, Norman B. Command and Control Warfare. Putting Another Tool in the 
War-Fighter's Data Base. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Airpower Research 
Institute, September 1994. 78p. 
Abstract: Command and control warfare (C2W) is the military strategy that implements information 
warfare (IW) on the battlefield. Its objective is to attack the command and control (C2) decision-making 
capabilities of an adversary while protecting friendly C2. C2W's focus is, sealing the eyes and ears of the 
enemy commander. It does this by disrupting and dominating the flow of information between the enemy's 
combat forces and their associated decision-making command elements. Ideally, through information 
dominance, friendly commanders will be able to work inside the enemy commander's decision-making 
cycle forcing him to be reactive and thus cede the initiative and advantage to friendly forces. In any 
conflict, from large scale transregional to small scale, localized counter-insurgency, a joint or coalition 
team drawn together from the capabilities of each service and orchestrated by the joint force or theater-
level commander will execute the responses of the United States armed forces. Units should perform their 
specific roles in accordance with the doctrine and policies provided in joint publications. The training and 
execution of a unit's response and a commander's C2W actions should be based on doctrine, policies, 
and terminology provided in joint publications. 
REPORT NUMBER: AU-ARI-941 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA286005 
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Jensen, William J. Information Warfare's Missing Quarterback: The Case for a Joint 
Force Information Warfare Component Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, Joint Military Operations Department, February 1998. 22p. 
Abstract: The synergistic success of Information Warfare (IW) during Operation Desert Storm marked 
the birth of coordinated strategic and operational IW. Ironically, Desert Storm's 'textbook application' of IW 
has prevented subsequent joint IW operations from reaching their full potential and has hindered further 
IW organizational improvements. Challenging future joint operations are a diminishing military budget that 
is producing a smaller, interservice dependent force. Exacerbating the situation is the application of 
Desert Storm lessons learned, by potential adversaries, to their command and control systems. No longer 
can operational IW rely upon tactical redundancy to overcome ad hoc planning; the joint force 
commander (JFC) must get it right the first time. As a result of the Gulf War's robust application of IW, 
today's Commander in Chief (CINC) and joint force commander (JFC) can mistakenly think the current IW 
planning process promotes multiservice unity of effort. However, available methods to organize for the 
joint IW effort traditionally produce a powerless IW commander that plans and executes single dimension 
operations. To reap force multiplying effects that full spectrum IW can offer, the JFC must delegate 
sufficient coordinating authority and provide clear planning guidance to his IW commander. Unfortunately, 
current IW organization methods also fail to provide a reliable integrated planning process that allows 
seamless coordination across service boundaries. Implementation of a Joint Force Information Warfare 
Component Commander (JFIWCC) provides the IW commander with the authority to resolve current 
planning problems and execute multifaceted IW operations. The JFIWCC can compose the IW story' and 
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ensure its exacting performance--ultimately allowing the JFC to operate inside the adversary's decision 
cycle. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA349113 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA349113   
 
Jo, K. Y. and J. T. Dockery.  “Virtual Network Representations of Information Warfare 
Battlespace.”  p. 457-461, IN: Military Communications Conference, 1998. MILCOM 
98. Proceedings., IEEE, v. 2. October 18-21, 1998. 1083p.  
Abstract: Virtual network methodologies are applied to information warfare (IW) simulation in which 
objects and agents behave with special relationships. Decision makers operate in a virtual battlespace, 
which is in essence an information cyberspace in which IW attacks damage assessments, 
countermeasure efforts, and repairs are interrelated through virtual networks. The virtual network 
representation is used to model not only communications networks but also socio-technical networks with 
dynamic hyperactive characteristics.  Different virtual network representations are realized to characterize 
various behaviors and to help generate associated performance measures. Communications network 
attacks will constitute a major source of IW activities that will be analyzed. Virtual networks are used to 
represent object behaviors with appropriate levels of abstraction depending on IW scenarios and problem 
domains. 
 
Johnson, Robert E. Information Warfare: Impact on Command and Control 
Decision-Making. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1996. 31p. 
Abstract: The military's senior leadership has openly acknowledged that in future wars we must win the 
information war to achieve decisive victory. This paper reviews decision--making when command and 
control (C2) systems are interrupted, contaminated, or destroyed. The United States is an information 
dominant society. For every technological advancement in the development of an offensive information-
based system, our vulnerability to information warfare increases. Future conflicts will undoubtedly include 
threats to degrade our information systems. Are we training our leaders to respond in an environment 
where our information systems are corrupted, manipulated, or destroyed. As we prepare to 'Win the 
Information War,' our leaders must not allow predictable attacks on their information--based technology to 
force them toward unfavorable conflict resolution. 'Winning the Information War' must include contingency 
planning for disruptions in the flow of information. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA309107 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA309107   
 
Kadner, S., E. Turpen, and B. Rees. The Internet Information Infrastructure: 
Terrorist Tool or Architecture for Information Defense? Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, NM, December 1998. 17p.  
Abstract: The Internet is a culmination of information age technologies and an agent of change. As with 
any infrastructure, dependency upon the so-called global information infrastructure creates vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, unlike physical infrastructures, the Internet is a multi-use technology. While information 
technologies, such as the Internet, can be utilized as a tool of terror, these same technologies can 
facilitate the implementation of solutions to mitigate the threat. In this vein, this paper analyzes the 
multifaceted nature of the Internet information infrastructure and argues that policymakers should 
concentrate on the solutions it provides rather than the vulnerabilities it creates. Minimizing risks and 
realizing possibilities in the information age will require institutional activities that translate, exploit and 
convert information technologies into positive solutions. What follows is a discussion of the Internet 
information infrastructure as it relates to increasing vulnerabilities and positive potential. The following 
four applications of the Internet will be addressed: as the infrastructure for information competence; as a 
terrorist tool; as the terrorist's target; and as an architecture for rapid response.  
REPORT NUMBER: LA-UR--98-1348; CONF-98-0489 
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Kennedy, Kevin J., B. M. Lawlor and A. J. Nelson. Grand Strategy for Information 
Age National Security. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, May 1996. 125p. 
Abstract: Current national security strategy is obsolete. Based upon industrial age threats and defenses 
with limited information-age applicability, it fails to defend against structured information attacks 
threatening U.S. centers of gravity, and relies upon DoD as sole provider of national defense in the 
information dimension. U.S. technology dependence presents a strategic threat to the information 
systems that control key aspects of our national power. Future competitors may undermine our national 
will to fight by exploiting our reliance upon information systems, our present technological vulnerability. 
This threat would be most effective in situations where U.S. forces application is discretionary, and the 
desirability of employment is not obvious. The study proposes a strategic framework demonstrating the 
potential strategic effects of information weapons employment and conceptualizing both offensive and 
defensive information campaigns, highlighting shortfalls in present policies by suggesting accessibility of 
U.S. centers of gravity and limitations of protecting against employment of information weapons. It 
recommends that certain information systems, as strategic national security assets, require protection and 
demonstrates how strategic warfare's scope expands into the broader information dimension of conflict. 
Information assurance should be the theme for US defensive grand strategy, giving priority to the systems 
most essential to our national information infrastructure and systems that permit command and control 
and employment of military forces. A strategic plan for information assurance is offered. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA311158 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA311158   
 
Key, Olsen S. Impact of Information Warfare When Conducting Operational 
Deception. Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 1996. 23p. 
Abstract: U.S. military leaders placed a renewed emphasis on Operational Art in the late 1970s. The 
driving factor was the need to give operational commanders the tools necessary to better design 
campaigns to fill the gap between the strategic and tactical levels of war with a focus on translating 
national strategy into military objectives across the spectrum of conflict. The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' 
in the 1980s both enhanced and complicated this effort. Of particular difficulty was properly using 
expanding Information Warfare (IW) capabilities when planning and executing operational deception. 
Research reveals three areas where operational commanders may have to adjust their thinking in the 
operational design of the campaign plan: surprise, security, and boldness. Analysis of the use operational 
deception and IW in both the air and land campaigns in DESERT STORM reveals how CINCCENT 
blended these items into a successful operational deception plan. The lessons learned when the 
reviewing the planning and execution of the deception offer some insights into the use of operational 
deception with IW in future campaigns. U.S. planners and operational commanders cannot assume that 
the potential dominant battlefield awareness IW can provide will necessarily translate into successful 
deception operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA312053 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA312053  
 
Khalilzad, Zalmay M. and John P. White. Changing Role of Information in Warfare. 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1998. 462p.  
Abstract: This effort to assess how the role of information in warfare is changing seeks to understand 
many of the remarkable developments under way in information and communications technology, and 
their potential effects on warfare. Indeed, this volume reveals several important lessons that can be 
gleaned from the very different and distinct perspectives contained in it: Information advances will affect 
more than just how we fight wars. The nature and purpose of war itself may change. How wars start, how 
they end, their length, and the nature of the participants may change as shifts in the relative power of 
states and nonstate entities occur. New technologies cut both ways in terms of their effects on national 
security. Together, the chapters make clear that advances create new vulnerabilities; new threats create 
new opportunities. We should resist the temptation to see the changes documented here either as wholly 
bad or wholly good. Rather, we need to understand that profound technological changes are inevitably 
two sided. The Department of Defense (DoD) has little control over the pace and direction of the 
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information revolution. Although in the past DoD played an important role in developing, refining, and 
implementing new information technologies, today the technological envelope is being pushed largely by 
the commercial sector. 
REPORT NUMBER: RAND-MR-1016-AF 
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Killam, Timothy B. Weapons of Mass Disruption for the Operational Info-Warrior. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1996. 24p. 
Abstract: The technological advances of the information age have the potential for drastically altering 
contemporary ideas about power and its application. Future conflict and warfare have become 
inextricably intertwined with the information realm of cyberspace. Information Warfare (IW) is the logical 
extension of applying new and unconventional technologies to power projection and national defense. 
However, IW is not merely propaganda, command and control warfare (C2W), nor even simply a force 
multiplier in the operational toolbox. It is a way to control and attack the enemy's Observation, Orientation, 
Decision, and Action (OODA) loop. Instead of physically removing his 'center of gravity' C2 loop as in 
C2W and making him deaf, dumb, and blind, IW seeks to manipulate the OODA and the cyberspace in 
which it exists to make the enemy deaf, dumb, and blind to anything except that which we permit him to 
hear, say, or see. The Weapons of Mass Disruption (WMD) provide a new and unique capability to render 
the enemy's operational forces impotent by short circuiting the OODA loop and controlling the enemy's 
decisions and hence his courses of action. When combined with traditional military operations in a 
conventional war or OOTW, the effect can be quick, devastating, and decisive. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA307354 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA307354   
 
Kirk, David C. Artificial Intelligence Applications to Information Warfare. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1996. 35p. 
Abstract: In the coming years, a critical element of combat will likely be waged in the information 
infrastructure. Current strategic concepts do not compensate for the vulnerability of our ever-increasing 
information-based society. In this research project, artificial intelligence technology (specifically, intelligent 
agents) was explored. Intelligent agents were found to have characteristics that could help execute an 
information war. Although there still is work to be done, intelligent agents may someday manage the 
information flow, be the core technology in network firewalls, and contribute to overall network security 
through continuous Red Team vulnerability assessments. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA309400 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA309400   
 
Klinefelter, Stephen. National Security Strategy and Information Warfare. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1997. 35p. 
Abstract: This paper examines how the National Security Strategy (NSS) and its new subcomponent, 
the National Security Science and Technology Strategy (NSSTS) address Information Warfare. The 
Executive Branch has put the Department of Defense (DoD) on the front lines of the national effort to 
define and build a National Information Infrastructure (NII). The Defense information Infrastructure (DII) is 
described in its relationship to the NII. Two information systems of the DoD are then examined. They are: 
Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data interchange (EC/EDI) and the Defense Message System (DMS). 
They are described nontechnically to press home three points. First, Information is a national strategic 
asset and that using it and protecting it should be national priorities. Second, the world and the United 
States are becoming extremely interconnected and interdependent during this information Age. This 
represents a new dimension of warfare and national security across all levels of conflict and all locations 
of the battlespace. The NSS and the NSSTS should explicitly recognize Information Warfare, probably 
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under a different diplomatically acceptable name. Third, the Administration recognizes these trends and 
has accounted for them in the NSS even if not explicitly recognized. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326621 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326621   
 
Kluepfel, H. “Countering Non-Lethal Information Warfare: Lessons Learned on Foiling 
the Information Superhighwayman of the North American Public Switched Telephone 
Network.” p.  474-479, IN: Security Technology, 1995. Proceedings. Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers 29th Annual 1995 International Carnahan 
Conference, 18-20 October 1995. 512p. 
Abstract:  The United States relies for its very existence-economically, socially, and politically-on an 
extraordinary sophisticated and intricate set of long distance networks for energy distribution, 
communication, and transportation. In addition to their serious vulnerabilities to accidents and nature, 
these networks present a tempting target to terrorists and to any antagonist contemplating an 
international move contrary to US interests. While warnings such as the one cited above predicted 
potentially catastrophic consequences, the fragility of today's global networks of computer based 
systems, used to business process reengineer America's industrial and military infrastructure into lanes 
on the information superhighway, together with concerns over information warfare, are taking front burner 
attention on the agenda's of military and civilian agencies within the United States. The paper describes 
and helps to further set the stage for the establishment and realization of a defensive information warfare 
security baseline architecture for the NII information superhighway and its global partners and 
components throughout their lifecycle, from research and development to deployment and beyond. 
 
Koehler, Stephen T. Operational Level of War: Radical Change Needed to Support 
the American RMA. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1999. 27p. 
Abstract: Information technology continues to grow at an enormous pace all over the world, increasing 
the speed of information exchange and subsequent availability of knowledge. The industrial age has 
given way to the information age, and the truth of the adage, knowledge is power will yield a vast array of 
wielders that will require strong leadership to contain. For operational commanders to maintain an 
advantage over other emerging information savvy opponents, they must fundamentally alter the way 
operations are conducted and must do so now. The fundamental factors of time, space and force will still 
apply in a futuristic world where arguably instantaneous information will allow a completely clear 
battlefield. Regardless of how it is done the operational commander must still dictate all three. The 
lessons learned in the past will provide future foes the necessary tools to exploit an American weakness; 
the speed of maneuver has not kept pace with the speed of strike, let alone the speed of information. The 
technology is presently here to alter the way that the United States fights in a CONUS to Objective 
Maneuver that increases the speed of maneuver to one that matches both the speed of strike and the 
speed of interaction in a globally connected society. The U.S. military must start changing its concepts to 
drive technology to meet them, thereby dictating a huge space with a mandated smaller force and shorter 
time. To not adjust now will leave the United States with a weakness that they helped foster. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363061 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363061   
 
Komar, David M. Information-Based Warfare: A Third Wave Perspective. Maxwell 
AFB, AL: Air University, Air War College, May 1995. 42p. 
Abstract: The information revolution provided the technology to process vast amounts of data and make 
it accessible instantaneously and simultaneously to anyone anywhere in the world. The Tofflers proposed 
a model which depicts a trisected world with societies categorized by how they make wealth. The most 
advanced wave, the Third Wave, creates wealth through knowledge. Consistent with the Tofflers' model, 
economies of Third Wave societies are becoming more and more dependent upon knowledge. The 
effects of the information revolution on the global economy have made the wealthy nations more 
vulnerable to information-based warfare against the economic instruments. If the Tofflers' model 
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accurately depicts the wealth generation methods of the Third-Wave, then the most likely future war-form 
is information-based warfare against the economic instruments. Third Wave societies are ill-prepared to 
defend against this new war-form. The advanced nations must recognize their vulnerabilities and develop 
the policies and means to protect themselves against these new threats. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA328862 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=1637    
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA328862   
 
Kurdys, Martin P. Information Warfare (IW) Command and Control Warfare (C2W) 
for the Naval Expeditionary Task Force Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, April 1996. 27p. 
Abstract: The bottom line to a Commander of a Naval Expeditionary Force is how Information Warfare 
(IW) and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) can increase the operational effectiveness of the force 
responding to a contingency. To get there, one must examine the national strategic role of IW, the 
traditional role of the Naval Expeditionary Force, and the operational role of C2W. From these, an 
operational level approach to IW/C2W can be developed that is both consistent with strategy and doctrine 
and useful to the Commander of a Naval Expeditionary Force. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA312051 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA312051   
 
Lankhorst, Debra A. Using Expert Systems to Conduct Vulnerability Assessments. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1996. 111p. 
Abstract: An Information Warrior faces a complex and dynamic operating environment. To conduct an 
accurate Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis of the enemy force (or a friendly force), a multitude 
of cause and effect relationships must be examined. Many times the person at the battle scene 
conducting the assessment may lack experience and/or knowledge, precluding a time-sensitive and 
effective assessment The author proposes a framework for a global network of expert systems and 
decision support systems to conduct the Vulnerability Assessments and maintain Information Warfare 
readiness through realistic training. The author also presents a Vulnerability Assessment and Risk 
Analysis heuristic with the objective of expanding the knowledge base and decision speed at the on-
scene commander level. In achieving and implementing this global network, numerous benefits can be 
realized, including increased speed and efficiency in the receipt of intelligence information, thereby 
allowing for improved decision making capabilities. Since the technology and know-bow are already 
available, this vision of the global network is attainable and can be successfully implemented and 
operated. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA319367 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA319367   
 
Leney, Derek J. Improving Information Warfare Targeting: An IW Fires System. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, February 1995. 
30p. 
Abstract: Information Operations (IO) has grown in importance during recent conflicts. Yet some 
aspects of IO coordination and integration have fallen short of expectations. This has led to a desire by 
many in the IO community to better manage Information Warfare "fires" using the Joint Targeting Cycle as 
a rational process for their execution. However, current doctrine and joint organizations do not adequately 
provide for control of these fires. This paper addresses the conceptual challenges of Information Warfare 
(IW) targeting, including the differences between attacking "will" and attacking "capability." Recent 
lessons learned in Iraq and Kosovo highlight additional IO problems within the Joint Targeting Cycle. An 
IW Fires System is proposed to address these shortcomings, providing a formalized and connected 
organization for IW targeting and fire support. 




Luiijf, H. A. M. Survey of Information Warfare, Information Operations and 
Information Assurance. The Hague, Netherlands: Fysisch en Elektronisch Laboratory, 
1999. 92p. 
Abstract: Research survey on the phenomena Information Warfare, Information Operations (Info Ops) 
and Information Assurance. History, development, definitions and developments in various countries 
around the globe. Appendix with list of abbreviations of terms in these fields. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA367670 
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Littleton, Matthew J. Information Age Terrorism: Toward Cyberterror. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995. 150p. 
Abstract: The growing ubiquity of computers and their associated networks is propelling the world into 
the information age. Computers may revolutionize terrorism in the same manner that they have 
revolutionized everyday life. Terrorism in the information age will consist of conventional terrorism, in 
which classic weapons (explosives, guns, etc.) will be used to destroy property and kill victims in the 
physical world; technoterrorism, in which classic weapons will be used to destroy infrastructure targets 
and cause a disruption in cyberspace; and cyberterrorism, where new weapons (malicious software, 
electromagnetic and microwave weapons) will operate to destroy data in cyberspace to cause a 
disruption in the physical world. The advent of cyberterrorism may force a shift in the definition of 
terrorism to include both disruption and violence in cyberspace in the same manner as physical 
destruction and violence. Through the use of new technology, terrorist groups may have fewer members, 
yet still have a global reach. The increasing power of computers may lower the threshold of state 
sponsorship to a point where poor states can become sponsors and rich states are no longer necessary 
for terrorist groups to carry out complex attacks. This thesis explores the shift toward information warfare 
across the conflict spectrum and its implications for terrorism. By examining the similarities and 
differences with past conventional terrorism, policymakers will be able to place information age terrorism 
into a known framework and begin to address the problem. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA306243 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA306243   
 
Litton, Leonard G. Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, February 1999. 25p. 
Abstract: The U.S. military is currently experiencing a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which has the 
potential to increase its combat capability orders of magnitude over any potential adversary. The essence 
of this revolutionary affair is that the character and conduct of warfare is undergoing a significant change 
driven primarily by the ability to acquire, collect, disseminate, and employ information in a very rapid 
manner. Conversely, there are many reason to believe that warfare is more evolutionary than 
revolutionary. There is a body of thought that suggests that there has always been in existence certain 
principles of war that are immutable, timeless, and independent of place or situation. If the information 
based RMA really has the potential to deliver on its promises, we must begin to embrace it by 
reexamining the underlying elements of our doctrine, the principles of war, and insure they lay the proper 
foundation for the military of the 21st century. We should challenge the current paradigms we hold and 
begin to think of these principles in new ways, some being radical departures from the old school solution. 
We must choose our words and definitions in our publications carefully, for they serve to convey to our 
soldiers what we hold to be true about the ways in which we wage war. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363157 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363157   
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Lofaro, A. “The Cultural Factor in Information Warfare.” p. 11-17, IN: Technology and 
Society, 1998. ISTAS 98. Wiring the World: The Impact of Information Technology 
on Society, Proceedings of the 1998 International Symposium, 12-13 June 1998. 176p. 
Abstract: In its most general meaning, information warfare is based on disrupting, faking or limiting 
access to information by whatever opponent you have. Usually, information warfare analyses are 
centered on the technical skills needed, on the specific instruments used and how to use them, and even 
(mainly in threat analysis) on the motivations that could push someone to use old, direct methods or more 
sophisticated kind of attacks. Thanks to its effects on how somebody (and even a social group) reacts to 
information, an important factor in the possibility, effectiveness and likelihood of an information warfare 
attack is the cultural framework in which the attack is done, or (wherever different) the mutual interactions 
between the cultural frameworks of the attacker and the attacked opponent. In this paper, I look at some 
example of different reactions to information taken from various cultural contexts and from various fields 
(like advertising, software localisation and international working environments) in which the problem has 
already been studied, and I try to show how this can affect information warfare, making this a variable 
which must be accounted for every time in order to make an effective analysis. 
 
Luoma, William M. Netwar: The Other Side of Information Warfare. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, Department of Operations, February 1994. 40p. 
Abstract: The JCS' recognition of Information Warfare as an important area of concern has resulted in 
the promulgation of policy for development of the Command and Control Warfare (C2W) concept. 
However, while intended to be employed across the spectrum of conflict, C2W is oriented more toward 
military objectives and lacks completeness as a strategy when viewed against the plethora of future 
national security threats. In many of these instances, use of military force may not always be an effective 
or credible expression of national power for the theater CINC when executing his Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan responsibilities. The network or Netwar concept complements C2W as an Information 
Warfare strategy which can provide a vehicle for action in scenarios where application of military force is 
not appropriate and/or during operations other than war. To be effective, the Netwar strategy requires 
coordination of all elements of national power to counter and neutralize the power of network adversaries. 
Application of Netwar in support of non-military Flexible Deterrent Options provides a framework for 
analysis. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA27958  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA279585  
 
Marr, Patrick M. Information Warfare and the Operational Art. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, February 1996. 24p. 
Abstract: Command and Control Warfare (C2W), the military strategy for implementing Information 
Warfare (IW), is self-limiting by definition. Taken individually, the components of C2W - OPSEC, PSYOP, 
EW, military deception and physical destruction - - are not indicative of the information revolution. The 
continued effort to expand the military strategy of IW beyond the current bounds of C2W may be 
indicative of a technology-strategy mismatch or disconnect. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA307441 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA307441   
 
McCauley-Bell, P. and R. Freeman. “Quantification of Belief and Knowledge Systems in 
Information Warfare.” p. 1597-1585, IN: Fuzzy Systems, 1996, Proceedings of the 
Fifth IEEE International Conference, 8-11, September 1996. Vol. 3  
Abstract:  This research presents an application of fuzzy set theory (FST) to the management of 
uncertainty in information warfare. Emphasis is placed on evidence accrual in the context of uncertain 
and/or incomplete performance. This analysis considers the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop and 
the human responses in these four stages. The methodology proposes the analysis of evidence accrual 
by categorizing responses in the OODA loop as a result of knowledge systems and belief systems. A 
fuzzy approach is use to measure each of these systems. This approach considers distributed task 
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accomplishment in information warfare such as surveillance, ground or air based command, control, 
communication, computers, intelligence sensors, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and F-15E attack, 
systems. 
 
McCauley-Bell, P. and R. Freeman. “Uncertainty Management in Information Warfare.: 
p. 1942-1947, IN: Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 1997. Computational 
Cybernetics and Simulation, 1997 IEEE International Conference, 12-15 October, 
1997.  Vol. 2.  
Abstract:  This paper investigates the application of fuzzy uncertainty management to information 
warfare simulation (SimIW). Information warfare (IW) is manifested in uncertainty; no resolved or 
conclusive definition currently exists. From the creation of false signals to alteration of network 
performance, uncertainty is rooted in this type of combat. A model for defining the types of cognitive 
systems that perceive information is presented as well as an explanation of the types of uncertainty 
associated with information. The measurement of uncertainty associated with this project is managed 
using fuzzy logic.  Fuzzy logic manages different types of uncertainty and provides a linguistic modeling 
capability that more closely match that of the human communications capability. The chosen application 
was to develop an example of a fuzzy generic intelligent agent where this agent is an active participant in 
IW. The project provides a model of how an agent will characterize and measure associated uncertainty. 
 
McCollum, William W. Role of the Intelligence Community in Preparing to Win the 
Information War. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1997. 25p. 
Abstract: Increasing reliance on information-based technology is not unique to the United States, but 
growing awareness of the vulnerabilities created by this reliance has focused attention on protecting our 
information and information systems, while the potential value of offensive information operations, 
particularly in peacetime, has been less fully explored. This paper examines the relationship between 
defensive and offensive information warfare, looks at the status of governing policies and doctrine, 
discusses the vital role of intelligence in winning the defensive and offensive information war, and makes 
recommendations regarding organizing the intelligence community to support the successful prosecution 
of the offensive information war. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326646 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326646   
 
McKethan, Colton. U.S. C4I and Logistics Vulnerabilities to Offensive Information 
Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 1997. 31p. 
Abstract: The information revolution fostered by the microchip has made it possible for military 
commanders to receive information in unequaled quantity and quality. U.S. commanders have a broad 
range of opportunities resulting from digitized technologies that enhance of military equipment 
performance and the application of force. These information advances represent force enablers providing 
synergistic advantage to operational command and control (C2), intelligence, and logistic functions. 
However, there is a down side, in that the computers and microchips have vulnerabilities that must be 
addressed to retain operational force advantage. Information warfare is central to the way the nation 
plans to fight in the future, and information systems now connect U.S. military forces on a worldwide 
basis. Despite the enhancements that connectivity brings, with integration of global communications, 
state and non-state actors are provided new ways to access and undermine the C2, intelligence, and 
logistics function via computer and communication networks. This new area of vulnerability extends from 
the strategic, through the operational, down the tactical levels of warfare. State and non-state actors have 
means of attacking core military centers of gravity and critical strengths without resorting to conventional 
attack or deception. Today, joint commanders and civilian leaders must seriously consider the 
ramifications of unwanted intrusion into the national and defense information infrastructures. As U.S. 
forces become increasingly dependent on information to leverage battlespace awareness the need to 
protect information systems will increase. Backup capability must be designed into the information 
infrastructure to preclude erosion of force application capability. 
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ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA328226 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA328226   
 
McLendon, James W. Information Warfare: Impact and Concerns. Maxwell AFB, AL: 
Air University, Air War College, April 94. 42p. 
Abstract: Information has always been a critical factor in war. Clausewitz said 'imperfect knowledge of 
the situation... can bring military action to a standstill.' Sun Tzu indicated information is inherent in 
warfighting. Information warfare embodies the impact of information on military operations. The computer 
age gives us the capability to absorb, evaluate, use and transmit and exchange large volumes of 
information at high speeds to multiple recipients simultaneously. Multiple sources of data can be 
correlated faster than ever. Thus, the value of information to the warfighter has been magnified to a new 
level. Churchill used information warfare when he used the ENIGMA machine to read German codes 
during World War II. He also used information warfare through his elaborate network emanating from the 
London Controlling Section, for its time a very complex intelligence and deception operation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA328933 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=1648    
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA328933   
 
Mengxiong, Chang. Prospects For Weapons, Troops, and Battlefields in the 
Information Age. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: National Air Intelligence Center, February 
1996. 37p. Translation of unknown Chinese source, np nd. 
Abstract: This is a high-level soft scientific research report in predicting future developments in military 
trends. In the fundamental viewpoint, weapons and troops are currently on the eve of great technical 
innovation. Weapons and troops in the 21st century are the 'informationized' weapons and troops. Their 
concrete realization constitutes 12 aspects: informationized ammunition, informationized soldiers, 
informationized combat platform, defense information system (C3I), informationized weapon system, 
informationized battlefield, information warfare, information intimidation, combat command system with 
combination of high centralization and high automation, as well as smooth transition from virtual weapons 
and virtual battlefields toward real weapons and real battlefield. Intensity is the matrix indicator of troops 
in the 21st century; troops will be the highest cultural and technical component in the society, as the 
informationized weapons still require other technical supports. In the last part of the paper, a 28-character 
methodology is presented by the author in studying weapons and troops of the 21st century: based on 
major technical progress, new conceptual weapon systems are set forth, new types of combat are 
initiated. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA306614 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA306614   
 
Minehart, Robert F., Jr. Information Warfare: The Organizational Dimension. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, February 1996. 27p. 
Abstract: Since the December 1992 publication of the Department of Defense (DOD) classified directive 
on Information Warfare (IW) considerable effort has been expended examining this issue. Despite this 
attention, a clear vision for the implementation of IW within DOD and the U.S. Government as a whole 
has yet to emerge. Three pillars are essential to achieving a viable IW strategy and supporting 
architecture: policy doctrine, organization training and requirements/technology. Much has been written, 
discussed, and even debated on the need for overarching national policy in this area, as well as the 
multitude of capabilities and vulnerabilities stemming from our increased reliance on advanced 
technology. A similar focus on the organizational component of IW has not occurred. The study 
specifically addresses the role of organizations as a key component of IW. Both the progresses achieved 
to date within DOD and the significant challenges remaining to be overcome at the interagency level are 
examined. Specific recommendations are provided on how better to organize the IW effort. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA309782 
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Moore, Joe W. Information Warfare, Cyber-Terrorism and Community Values. 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2002. 155p. 
Abstract: Information Warfare involves the attack and defense of information and information systems, 
both in time of armed conflict and in operations short of war. While information technology provides the 
promise of a new class of less lethal military instruments, it also presents vulnerabilities occasioned by 
widespread dependence on an increasingly complex and interconnected global information infrastructure. 
These vulnerabilities, when exploited by those who would target civilians in order to inspire widespread 
fear in hopes of accomplishing a political agenda, can be understood as cyberterrorism. As information 
warfare techniques evolve, those employing them should look to several relevant sources for normative 
guidance. Relevant, internationally shared values can be found in international custom, the U.N. Charter, 
treaties dealing with the subject of "cybercrime," those governing the communication media likely to be 
utilized by information warriors, UNGA Resolutions and those treaties and customary norms that make up 
the Law of Armed Conflict. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA410710 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA410710
 
Mullis, William S. Using the Acquisition Process to Reduce the Vulnerability of 
Future Systems to Information Warfare. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
March 1997. 78p. 
Abstract: Information warfare (IW) is a growing concern for the United States Army. The sophisticated, 
high-technology modern weapons systems upon which the U.S. Army heavily relies are increasing 
vulnerable to IW weapons and tactics. The acquisition process plays a major role in reducing defense 
systems IW vulnerability. This research identifies the primary IW threats to systems during the acquisition 
lifecycle and what factors in the acquisition environment contribute to IW vulnerability. This research also 
suggests a technique for integrating IW countermeasures into the defense systems acquisition process. A 
primary finding of this research is that while a Program Management Office (PMO) can institute a myriad 
of useful countermeasures, influencing the prime contractor to establish a secure development 
environment is the most important action it can take in reducing the vulnerability of future systems to IW. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA331209 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA331209   
 
Nault, Mark. General! They've Captured Our Hard Drive! Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army 
War College Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997. 35p. 
Abstract: Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), an overview document describing the strategic vision of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), was released in early 1997 and revealed a new joint armed 
forces battlespace concept called Full Spectrum Dominance (FULL SPECTRUM DOMINACE). 
Information Operations (IO), which includes both Information Warfare (IW) and Command and Control 
(C2) doctrine, is the backbone of this emerging JV 2010 FULL SPECTRUM Dominance  concept. Are 
there any significant strategic level IO concerns, for our military leaders who practice the strategic art in 
today's and tomorrow's joint armed forces, which ultimately delay or degrade the capabilities detailed in 
the new JV 2010. This author believes that the answer to this thesis question is a resounding YES This 
Strategic Research Project (SRP) briefly reviews several basic, but recently updated, IO definitions, and 
describes the role that IO plays in the cyber missions depicted in the new JV 2010 and other related 
documents, such as the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR), the CJCS's National Military Strategy (NMS), as well as individual service concept documents. 
Furthermore, this SRP brings to light several key issues, which have the potential to negatively impact the 
total package, previously referred to as Full Spectrum Dominance. Several recommendations are also 
included, as food for thought for those who are now, or soon will be working hard in the strategic joint 
arena. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA342284 
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Nelson, Ronald J. Strategic Information Warfare National Information 
Infrastructure and the Defense of the Nation. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War 
College, March 1998. 54p. 
Abstract: The national information infrastructure is critical to broad segments of U.S. society, from 
business and government to the military. Reliance on the information infrastructure to streamline business 
processes is saving resources and increasing short-term competitiveness. However the competitive 
global environment that is driving business to streamline allows little margin for disruption of business 
information flow. Disruptions of business processes that rely on the information revolution could lead to 
offshore migration or outright concession of segments of U.S. industry to foreign competitors. Legal 
ambiguities abound in almost every aspect of infrastructure assurance. Significant strategic thinking is 
required to resolve ambiguities in the domestic and international information environments that affect 
infrastructure assurance and deterrence through offensive or defensive use of information warfare. 
Cyberspace is not geographically bounded; the legal landscape must expand beyond physical boundaries 
and material property rights if infrastructure assurance is to be achieved. Since security measures have 
not kept pace with the explosion in technology associated with the information revolution, the purpose of 
this paper is to determine if the information infrastructure is at risk, and to conclude what coherent steps 
must be taken to both increase awareness of the threat and protect the U.S. information infrastructure. 
Moreover, second order effects of the information revolution need to be studied to insure that long term 
competitiveness of U.S. business is not placed at risk by external information operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA341299 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA341299   
 
Newman, Herb W. Digital Data Warfare Tools: Should CINCs Have Control. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1999. 51p. 
Abstract: The meteoric explosion of information-age technologies led by the ongoing rapid evolution of 
cyberspace and microcomputers has brought about a revolution in Military Affairs. A new form of 
Information Operations (IO) warfare, Digital Data Warfare, portends enormous ramifications for the 
national security of the United States, its allies, and potential coalition partners. Joint Pub 3-13 provides 
doctrine for the execution of IO in joint operations. It discusses integration and synchronization of 
offensive and defensive IO in the planning and execution of combatant commanders' plans and 
operations to support the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. What Joint Pub 3-13 does not 
do is state that combatant commanders should have control of Digital Data Warfare tools. This paper 
examines and answers important strategic questions concerning combatant commander's control and 
authority to employ offensive Digital Data Warfare tools. The guideposts of this study provide a primer for 
understanding control and employment of Digital Data Warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA364586 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA364586   
 
Nowowiejski, Dean A. Concepts of Information Warfare in Practice: General George 
S. Patton and the Third Army Information Service, August-December, 1944. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, March 1995. 57p. 
Abstract: This monograph looks for historical examples of information warfare in order to gain insight 
into its current practice. It first describes key elements of the concept of information operations, 
particularly as they relate to battle command. It then explores how George S. Patton and his Third Army 
Information Service demonstrated those ideas, and how their example offers direction for current 
developments in information warfare. Key sources used in research included emerging doctrinal literature 
on information warfare, biographical information on the professional development and command qualities 
of Patton, and after action reports of the Third Army and 6th Cavalry Group, the unit that constituted the 
Army Information Service. This monograph found that Patton aggressively sought information advantage 
as a battle commander, and that he demonstrated the key qualities of vision and intuition. The Third Army 
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Information Service developed a relevant common picture of the battlefield by the expanding the 
instrument of directed liaison. What needs emphasis in current concept of information warfare is the 
improving the ability of commanders and staffs to process information. We must reemphasize the human 
dimensions of information operations through refined professional development. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA301155 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA301155   
 
Okello, Fredrick, et al. Information Warfare: Planning the Campaign. Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air University, Air Command and Staff College, April 1996. 78p. 
Abstract: Information warfare is a nebulous concept, but widely cited as a keystone in any future 
campaign. Even though information warfare has been used for centuries, current doctrine, policies, and 
guidance provide little help for the warrior to understand first, what information warfare is, and secondly, 
how to do it. 'Information Warfare: Planning The Campaign' provides a logical approach for the 
information warrior to employ in planning for this aspect of warfare. This paper addresses the: (1) Current 
state of information warfare policy and doctrine, (2) Modeling of a system to identify its critical nodes and 
links, (3) Modeling of a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) to serve as an example, (4) 
Examples of current and potential offensive and defensive information warfare tools used in information 
encounters, and finally, and (5) A step-by-step approach to information warfare campaign planning. 
Analysis of information and its flow is a daunting undertaking in all but the most simple of organizations. 
To remedy this, one can view the organization as a system and employ a model which will help illustrate 
information flows. It is reasonable to employ the same model for this purpose as is used by system 
engineers who create information systems. This paper describes such a model, the Operational 
Architectures Model, which employs the Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) Definition 
Methods or IDEF for short, to identify the flow of information in a system. Internal to the Operational 
Architectures Model are five modeling perspectives: functional, physical, static, informational, and 
dynamic. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA331946 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA331946   
 
Olbrys, Elizabeth B. Information Culture in DoD: Preparing for the Third Wave.  
Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, April 1994. 36p. 
Abstract: Is the Department of Defense prepared to receive, process and share information according to 
the model of the information superhighway. If we are, how will the Department of Defense be changed by 
adopting the new information-sharing model over our current information-control. As our war-fighting 
model evolves from attrition warfare to information warfare (Alvin Toffler's third wave warfare), swift 
access to current, reliable information will become our most basic requirement. If we are to maximize 
future readiness and achieve the cost reductions promised from the information superhighway, the 
Department of Defense must make major cultural changes. We must achieve enterprise integration, 
embrace the culture of process improvement, and accept a radical reorganization in order to realize 
information superiority--and therefore military superiority--on the battlefield. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA288500 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA288500   
 
Panda, Brajendra and Thomas Wiggins. Damage Assessment and Recovery from 
Information Warfare Attacks. Fargo, ND: North Dakota State University, Department 
of Computer Science and Operations, 2002. 6p. 
Abstract: Sensors at different Air Force operation sites collect information on various system 
parameters and send to the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) for analysis. 
Due to the massive amount and complex nature of data involved, this process, however, is inefficient and 
time consuming. It is rather desirable that each site pre-processes the data before transmitting to the 
AFCERT. For efficient processing of data at both local and global sites, development of a suitable format 
for storing data locally, and determining characteristics desired at the global site for the fusion of data 
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obtained from different sites are important. In this research, the following issues have been addressed: 1) 
reduction of collected information for the diagnosis of attack, 2) efficient analysis of resultant data, 3) fast 
and accurate damage assessment, and 4) real-time recovery of the system. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406469 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406469
 
Payne, Allan D. Impact of Computer Network Attacks on Infrastructure Centers of 
Gravity. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1999. 29p. 
Abstract: Computer Network Attack is a significant asymmetric threat to the United States and its 
military. Motives vary, but the threat from CNA is real; US infrastructure targets are vulnerable; those that 
directly affect the ability of the US military to conduct its missions are evident Innovation in CNA is 
unrestrained, and privacy rights of the US citizenry conflict directly with US government efforts to take 
active measures to help defend against CNA. CNA today could be economically damaging to the 
computer and network dependent society that the United States has become. The challenge is to define 
the problem separately from every other consideration and challenge that the military faces in the 
Information Age including the broader mission areas of Information Operations and Information Warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA364072 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA364072   
 
Pears, Andrew H. Planning for the Information Campaign. Masters thesis. Wright-
Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, May 1996. 69p. 
Abstract: Desert Storm demonstrated the importance of dominating the information realm during a 
conflict. Information warfare is the means through which our forces can maintain information dominance 
on future battlefields. Air Force doctrine is currently being modified to include three new roles and 
missions related specifically to information warfare. Plans for future conflicts should include these new 
roles and missions. Campaign plans serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare. This study 
examines the various aspects of campaign planning and information warfare. This research provides 
future planners eight specific information campaign planning recommendations. It is recommended that 
the information campaign plan support the joint effort, follow the fundamentals of campaign plans (JCS 
Pub 5-0), and accomplish information warfare objectives. Furthermore, information campaign planners 
should examine communications network survivability, friendly and enemy centers of gravity, satellite 
systems capabilities and vulnerabilities, the possible effects of the media and specific user requirements. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA309717 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA309717   
 
Peifer, Kenneth V. Analysis of Unclassified Current and Pending Air Force 
Information Warfare and Information Operations Doctrine and Policy. Wright-
Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, December 1997. 178p. 
Abstract: This study focused on determining if unclassified current and pending Air Force information 
warfare and information operations doctrine and policy is moving in the direction it should in terms of 
being complete, consistent and cohesive based on what has been mandated and studied about 
information warfare. A model of unclassified current and pending Air Force information warfare and 
information operations doctrine and policy was examined through criterion-based congruence analysis to 
make this determination. Investigative questions were developed in reference to the current state of 
unclassified Air Force information warfare and information operations doctrine and policy. Secondary data 
analysis was conducted along two paths. The hierarchical path included an examination of unclassified 
information warfare and information operations doctrine, policy and regulatory guidance. The academic 
path included an examination of studies and commentary on information warfare and information 
operations focusing on doctrine and policy. A model of unclassified current and pending Air Force 
information warfare and information operations doctrine and policy was developed. Then the model was 
analyzed for congruence in terms of completeness, consistency, and cohesiveness using the hierarchical 
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and academic secondary data analysis as a diagnostic tool. The model was found to be partially 
incongruent in all three areas. 
REPORT NUMBER: AFITGIRLAS97D10 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA340379 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=1208  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA340379   
 
Perusich, K. “Information Warfare: Radar in World War II as an Historical Example.” p. 
92-99, IN: Technology and Society, 1997. 'Technology and Society at a Time of 
Sweeping Change'. Proceedings, 1997 International Symposium, 20-21 June 1997. 
328p.  
Abstract:  Emerging technologies have increased the capability to acquire and use data as a weapon in 
warfare. Although aggregated under a common term, information warfare actually represents a variety of 
different ways with different actors in different environments that information can be used as part of an 
arsenal. One important form of information warfare is decision making (or OODA-loop) warfare, in which a 
defender or attacker uses information acquisition or processing technology to complete their decision 
making cycle quicker than an opponent can to maintain the initiative in the battle. Such a type of 
information warfare was used during the Battle of Britain in World War 2. Radar was an enabling 
technology that gave Great Britain an edge in the decision making process that contributed to England's 
ultimate victory in the battle. 
 
Phillips, Gary E. Information Operations - A New Tool for Peacekeeping. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, May 1997. 92p. 
Abstract: This monograph discusses the application of information operations to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of peace missions ranging from peacekeeping to peace imposition. Using a variety of 
models and an examination of the components of information operations this monograph demonstrates 
the applicability of these operations to peace missions. Examples from recent history provide a backdrop 
for evaluating previous applications and investigating other potential uses of information operations to 
support peace missions. Based on the validation of applicability the possible increase in effectiveness 
and efficiency are postulated and potential resource savings evaluated. The monograph first examines 
the status of international relations as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of 
information technology. The impact of these two earthshaking events have forever changed the face the 
world. As the nations of the world seek a new geometry of relationships without the Soviet Union the level 
of violence continues to rise. Without the unifying ideologies of the Cold War, many nations are seeking 
identity through ethnicity. This factor in conjunction with a freedom to act completely in promotion of 
national interests without the specter of a global nuclear war has led to a very unstable world. At the 
same time that United Nations pleads for resources to enforce peace on the new world disorder, nations 
are increasingly captured by domestic issues. The question becomes can we afford the expanding 
resources necessary to keep the peace and still answer domestic problems. The final sections of this 
monograph address the utility of information operations for peace missions. Information operations, the 
application of the continued advances in information technology, provides a tool to make peace 
affordable. Information operations allow cost effective solutions. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA331354 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA331354   
 
Pritulsky, Philip S. Strategic Military Communications of the Future: Leveraging 
Civilian Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1998. 53p. 
Abstract: The Department of Defense is transiting from a technology driver to a technology rider in 
strategic communications. Today 95 percent of all military communications travel a portion of their routing 
via commercial public switched networks. Early in the 21st century, a new generation of commercial 
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systems will serve as the backbone for all military communications. This extensive leveraging of civilian 
technology provides tremendous efficiencies for the government. However, with the emergence of the 
threat of Information Warfare (IW), we must assess the strategic implications of America's reliance on 
civilian information infrastructures. Does this reliance pose an unacceptable risk to national security. This 
paper examines the broad implications of military leveraging of strategic communications. It uses the 
Strategic Principles of War for the 21st Century to assess the impact of this policy on military 
preparedness.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA353653 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA353653   
 
Rader, Karl A. Blockades and Cyberblocks: In Search of Doctrinal Purity. Will 
Maritime Interdiction Work in Information Age Warfare? Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 
1995. 64p. 
Abstract: This paper examines the blockade, as both a current concept and a tool suitable to 
Information Age Warfare. It addresses doctrine's twin demands for precise terminology, to aid shared 
understanding, and intellectual flexibility, required to win future conflicts. Using joint doctrine, international 
law, and contemporary practice, the paper examines mixing the military and economic elements of power. 
Bloodless military coercion, as embodied by maritime interdiction--blockades, embargoes, and 
quarantines--cannot achieve political ends on its own. It requires the exercise of all elements of national 
power in order to be effective. The paper applies this finding to information Age warfare, and proposes 
the doctrinal concept of cyberblock-- the blockade of information transmission media as a Third Wave 
flexible deterrent option. Like the blockade, the cyberblock cannot necessarily achieve political ends 
alone. It is a strategic option, utile in the multilateral strategic environment, that relies on all elements of 
power to coerce international miscreants into compliance with United Nations' behavioral norms. The 
paper shows that current joint doctrine requires more precise terminology. It further suggests 
incorporating the term cyberblock as a doctrinal concept that represents an Information Age approach to 
bloodless military coercion. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA301164 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA301164   
 
Rattray, Gregory J. Strategic Information Warfare: Challenges for the United 
States. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, May 1998. 718p. 
Abstract: This work examines the potential for strategic information warfare and the challenges posed 
for the United States. Strategic information warfare consists of attacks against, and the defense of; 
information infrastructures for achieving political objectives. My analysis includes consideration of both 
state and non-state actors. The work focuses on the use of digital means and the cyberspace operating 
environment for the conduct of such warfare. The first half develops a theoretical basis for addressing 
strategic information warfare. The work outlines frameworks for the analysis of strategic warfare based on 
past theories and historical experience. Relying on literature dealing with technology, how it is acquired, 
assimilated, and diffused, it also creates a framework of factors which facilitate the establishment of 
organizational technological capability. These frameworks are then applied to the potential offensive and 
defensive challenges posed by strategic information warfare to identity key areas of concern and 
uncertainty. The second half undertakes two case studies comparing the development of strategic 
warfare capabilities. The case studies empirically illustrate the utility of the frameworks across different 
time periods and types of technologies. The development of air bombardment capabilities by the U.S. and 
their employment in World War II illustrates the difficulty of creating a new form of strategic warfare. The 
analysis then details the nascent U.S. effort to develop doctrine, organizations, and technological 
capability to conduct strategic information warfare in the 1990s, focusing on the defensive aspects of the 
task. Both case studies rely on primary source material archival materials and accounts of key individuals 
in the case of strategic bombing; and U.S. military doctrinal publications. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA346502 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA346502   
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Rios, Cesar G., Jr. Return on Investment Analysis of Information Warfare Systems. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 81p. 
Abstract: The United States Navy's Cryptologic Carry-On Program Office manages a portfolio of 
Information Warfare (IW) systems. This research and case study demonstrate how the Knowledge Value 
Added (KVA) Methodology can be used to formulate a framework for extracting and analyzing 
performance parameters and measures of effectiveness for each system. KVA measures the 
effectiveness and efficiency of CCOP systems and the impact they have on the Intelligence Collection 
Process (ICP) on board U.S. Navy Ships. By analyzing the outputs of the subprocesses involved in the 
ICP in common units of change, a price per unit of output can be generated to allocate both cost and 
revenue at the subprocess level. With this level of financial detail, a return on investment (ROI) analysis 
can be conducted for each process, or asset. 




Scafidi, Anthony L. Information Warfare and the Principles of War. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, February 1997. 23p. 
Abstract: Within all the Services the debate is raging about information dominance, control of 
'cyberspace' or the 'Infosphere' and Information Warfare. Some argue that Information Warfare (IW) is 
just a repackaging of old concepts and current practices, while others contend it is the next Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA). The question that needs to be addressed is; can IW achieve strategic and 
operational military objectives on its on merit. A way to answer this questions is to analyze IW against our 
current doctrine. Using the principles of war as a framework, does IW fit (or can it be employed) in the 
operational environment. Will it be necessary to redefine or update the principles of war to accommodate 
this changing environment. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA325198 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA325198   
 
Schechtman, Gregory M. Manipulating the OODA Loop: The Overlooked Role of 
Information Resource Management in Information Warfare. Wright-Patterson AFB, 
OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, December 1996. 129p. 
Abstract: A ground-swell of interest in information as a weapon of warfare is growing within the U.S. 
armed services. Military strategists are looking at information as a tool to leverage our forces and make 
them irresistible in battle. Yet, there is little agreement as to what information warfare (IW) is, let alone 
how it is best fought. This fundamental disagreement is serving as an impediment to unified actions as 
the Air Force seeks its role in this arena. In particular, information resource management practitioners are 
questioning their role in supporting this mission. This thesis discusses limitations of existing information 
warfare interpretations in light of Col John R. Boyd's decision model, the Observation-Orientation- 
Decision-Action (OODA) Loop, and offers a synthesized model of information warfare for use in the Air 
Force. It then offers information resource management (IRM) as a viable decision support mechanism in 
that interpretation. By analyzing the applicability of information resource management to the Air Force IW 
mission, this thesis proposes a better way to view information: a tool for winning the information war 
through making superior decisions more rapidly than our opponents. An understanding of how IRM and 
IW relate to one another will provide a model for achieving and maintaining dominance of this new realm 
of warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA319636 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=1474  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA319636   
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Schneider, Barry R. and Lawrence E. Grinter. Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century 
Warfare Issues. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air War College, September 1998. 
277p. 
Abstract: This book is about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as 
the world moves into the twenty-first century. Its 11 essays examine topics such as military operations 
against a well-armed rogue state or NASTI (NBC-arming sponsor of terrorism and intervention) state; the 
potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states; the revolutionary potential of information 
warfare; the lethal possibilities of biological warfare; and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military 
affairs (RMA). The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, 
and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The 
participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in 
national security Issues. Two of the architects of the US air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War have 
contributed essays that discuss the evolving utility of airpower to achieve decisive results and the lessons 
that might portend for the future of warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA358618 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA358618   
 
Schwartzstein, S. J. D. Information Revolution and National Security: Dimensions 
and Directions. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, c1996. 
296p. 
Abstract: Information and communications technologies are having a profound impact in a number of 
ways, domestically and globally, including how national security is maintained and how war is waged. 
There are also implications for civil liberties and how we, as a society, deal with new kinds of conflict. The 
issues that are raised are both far-ranging and complex. 
 
See, Judi E. and Gilbert G. Kuperman. Information Warfare: Evaluation of Operator 
Information Processing Models. Dayton, OH: Logicon Technical Services, Inc., 
October 1997. 134p. 
Abstract: The present document provides a review of 17 models of human information processing. The 
models were grouped into five classes: Memory and attention, artificial intelligence, visual attention, 
language comprehension, and situation awareness. The utility of the models was evaluated with respect 
to their contributions toward understanding the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act phases of the OODA 
Loop, the predominant decision making framework for the Third Wave Battlespace, or information 
warfare. The assessment indicated that current information processing models contribute primarily to the 
Observe and Orient phases; however, their contributions are disappointingly minor. Further, among the 
models considered in this review, effective portrayals of the Decide and Act phases were lacking 
altogether. 
REPORT NUMBER: ALCFTR19970166 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA339749 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA339749   
 
Sexton, Joanne. Combatant Commander's Organizational View of Information 
Warfare/Command and Control Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 
1995. 33p. 
Abstract: Information warfare and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) are widely recognized as 
describing how the United States will fight its future wars. Of the two, information warfare remains 
undefined; whereas, C2W is finely detailed and fully defined in joint publications. Despite the inadequate 
information warfare definition, the combatant commanders have created an Information Warfare/C2W 
organizational cell built around the five elements of C2W (OP SEC, Deception, PSYOP, EW, and 
Destruction). From this stepping stone, the combatant commanders will evolve into a more 
comprehensive strategy to incorporate information warfare. An essential step to this evolution is the need 
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for the combatant commander to fully understand the ramifications of the following Information 
Warfare/C2W issues and questions: (1) Why the United States must have a national information policy; 
(2) What organization should take the lead if the continental United States suffers a devastating, 
widespread information warfare attack; (3) What is the role of information warfare during peacetime; (4) 
Who should take the military information warfare lead; (5) Who should have the responsibility to prevent 
redundant information warfare programs; (6) What should the national security guidance be on black 
programs; and, (7) How should C2-protect programs be improved. When solved, these seven issues will 
dictate what future organization and role the military will have in information warfare. The key for the 
combatant commander is to comprehend these seven issues and seek to shape their solution.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA297904 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA297904   
 
Smith, Carleton M. Logistics Principles in Third Wave Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Army War College, April 1999. 47p. 
Abstract: In response to a new conceptual world view brought about by the 'Information Age', the Army 
has committed itself to a course of revolutionary change as it transitions to Army After Next. Already, 
division redesign initiatives are spreading organizational changes throughout our fighting forces. 
Transformation of doctrine must proceed apace, challenging whether established principles grounded in 
past 'Industrial Age' wars can be carried forward through both a revolution in military affairs and an 
entirely new era of warfare. If logistics truly defines the art of the possible in war, the principles that guide 
its planning and practice deserve careful scrutiny. This study provides a brief review of current doctrinal 
logistics principles and explores the ramifications of a trisected world on their status quo. It concludes with 
a proposal for eight revised logistics principles suitable to Third Wave warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363825 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363825   
 
Smith, Kevin B. Crisis and Opportunity of Information War. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 
1994. 69p. 
Abstract: This monograph focuses on the possibility of defeating any and all enemies with an 
information-intensive force. Clearly, no one currently possesses this capability. However, in the 
intermediate and long-term, such a force may be within the reach of any post-industrial nation. This 
monograph explores why this is so, and identifies the major technological 'benchmarks' that must be 
achieved in order to enable a purely third wave force. Starting with the agrarian notion of the center of 
gravity, and continuing to the concepts of industrial systems, this monograph will briefly analyze the 
theories of each of the two preceding 'waves' to determine potential loci of decision. The monograph 
describes how information systems are starting to form around discrete technological benchmarks that, 
when eventually integrated, will form a 'knowledge engine' powerful enough to enable commanders to 
locate and attack the systemic weak point(s) of any enemy. Where possible, case studies will be used to 
show how this information technology is being used today. Each case study will contain reasonable 
estimates on where the particular technology involved is trending. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA284756 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA284756  
 
Staker, R. J. Military Information Operations Analysis Using Influence Diagrams 
and Coloured Petri Nets. Salisbury, Australia: Electronics Research Laboratory, 
December 1999. 78p. 
Abstract: This report describes how Influence Diagrams, Coloured Petri Net models and related 
techniques may be used to analyse certain aspects of Military Information Operations. An example is 
employed to demonstrate these techniques. The example used is a very simplified representation of a 
Military Command Organisation dealing with a decision problem. The objective of the report is to provide 
theory, methods and techniques to support the assessment of the effect of Military Information Operations 
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on such organisations. The simplicity of the example permits the basic concepts to be clearly conveyed. 
They may readily be extended to the analysis of more complex examples as required. The most 
fundamental and significant concept developed in this report is that of a common quantitative measure of 
effectiveness that encompasses all types of Information Operations relevant to Information Warfare. This 
permits the direct comparison of the effectiveness of alternative Information Operation options with one 
another and also with conventional operations options. This latter ability is essential if Information 
Operations are to be employed appropriately as part of a broader range of military options. 
REPORT NUMBER: DSTO-TR-0914 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA373934 
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Strategic War ... in Cyberspace. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, January 1996. 
2p. 
Abstract: National security is becoming progressively more dependent on and identified with assets 
related to the 'information revolution.' As part of this revolution, both defense and civilian activities are 
becoming more heavily dependent on computers and communications, and a variety of key information 
systems are becoming more densely and extensively interlinked. With the many benefits of the 
information revolution have also come vulnerabilities. Civilian data encryption and system protection are 
rudimentary. Talented computer hackers in distant countries may be able to gain access to large portions 
of the information infrastructure underlying both U.S. economic well-being and defense logistics and 
communications. Current or potential adversaries may also gain access through foreign suppliers to the 
software encoded in U.S. transportation and other infrastructure systems. We could thus one day see 
actions equivalent to strategic attack on targets of national value within the U.S. homeland and on 
essential national security components and capabilities. In short, there will exist the capability for strategic 
information warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA322533 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA322533  
 
Summe, Jack N. Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, and a Policy for 
the Future. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1999. 52p. 
Abstract: There is a growing interest within DoD concerning the advent of Information Warfare. This 
interest seems to center around two competing concepts of IW. First is the asymmetrical threat of 
information-based capabilities used against critical U.S. systems, and second, the burgeoning 
opportunities that a future Revolution in Military Affairs presents when based on the geometric growth of 
friendly information-based capabilities. Both analytical tracks seem to indicate that the U.S. must boldly 
and firmly grasp the potentialities embedded in the growing information age. Yet there are areas within 
the information environment that have not yet been addressed. Two such areas are a stated National 
policy for Information Warfare and the future strategic requirements and capabilities for the application of 
DoD Psychological Operations in support of our new Information Warfare policy. This paper addresses 
both issues and develops a point of departure for academic dialogue in these two extremely important 
and sensitive areas. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363817 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363817  
 
Szapranski, Richard. Theory of Information Warfare; Preparing for 2020. Maxwell 
AFB, AL: Air University, 1995. 12p. 
Abstract: THE PROFESSION of arms in a democracy is not exempt from oversight or from 
consideration of just conduct, even in warfare. Where the will of the people, the moral high ground, and 
the technological high ground are the same, the profession will remain a useful and lofty one. If, however, 
the moral high ground is lost, a domino effect occurs: public support is lost, the technological high ground 
is lost, and the armed forces are lost. It is within this framework that this article postulates a theory of 
information warfare within the larger context of warfare and proposes ways to wage information warfare at 
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the strategic and operational levels. The tools to wage information warfare are at hand, and because 
information weapons are such powerful weapons, both combatants and noncombatants need to be 
protected against them. The vulnerability to information warfare is universal The decisions to pursue the 
development of information weapons or to prosecute information warfare are governmental decisions. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA328193 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA328193  
 
Tait, Steven W. The Effects of Budgetary Constraints, Multiple Strategy Selection, 
and Rationality on Equilibrium Attainment in an Information Warfare Simulation. 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2001. 150p. 
Abstract: Information warfare (IW) has developed into a significant threat to the national security of the 
United States. Our critical infrastructures are linked together by information systems in a way that is 
unprecedented in time and is increasingly vulnerable to information attack. However, beneath all the 
technical means of instigating or defending against such an attack lies the individual decision-maker. This 
study seeks to understand sum of those factors which affect the ability of an individual to make accurate 
decisions in an information warfare environment. The study used game theory to analyze the behavior of 
decision-makers within an IW simulation. The information warfare game model is based on a set of 
games known as infinitely repeated games of incomplete information. It uses the Bayesian 
Nashequilibrium concept to determine the strategy which a player should use repeatedly in order to 
maximize his or her payoff. The results of the experiment show that when a person is faced with 
increasing numbers of potential strategies, he or she is less likely to make an accurate decision. The 
results also show that decision-makers that are faced with budgetary constraints and forced to pay for 
alternative strategies tend to pick those strategies which are most expensive. This is regardless of the 
actual utility of the strategy as long as it is within the decision-makers’ allotted budget. Additionally, the 
study found that the rationality of the decisions made by an opponent did not significantly affect a player’s 
ability to find the strategy that maximizes his or her own payoff. 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=3268  
 
Tempestilli, Mark. Waging Information Warfare. Making the Connection Between 
Information and Power in a Transformed World. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 
Joint Military Operations Department, May 1995. 47p. 
Abstract: This paper discusses the emerging ways, means, and ends of offensive information Warfare 
(IW). IW is seen as being conducted in a distinctly unique dimension, however, inextricably linked to time, 
space, and physical force. The context of major geo-social transformation from the proliferation and 
convergence of powerful information technologies is shown as an underlying theme for change in joint-
military operations. The nature of IW is viewed as interwoven in a highly interactive geo-social-technical 
tapestry- -including various layers of organized conflict (war organisms), represented by an overall system 
of functional subsystems (physical, mental, spirit). The relationships among physical force, information, 
and will are deemed essential to leveraging information for appropriate and useful operational effects. 
The nature of IW and the relationships among the functional subsystems are presented as creating 
potential for a new level of warfare synergy. Controlling an information continuum of information--
knowledge--capability is seen as the key to generating information-based military power. New potential 
high value target sets are revealed that demand unique understanding and orientation--including a full 
development of IW beyond the current military interpretation as Command Control Warfare (C2W). A 
comprehensive view of offensive IW is presented in terms of target development, weaponeering, military 
options, and organizing for action. 






Thomas, Laurence E., Jr. Information Warfare Force XXI Situational Awareness. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1998. 44p. 
Abstract: The 80's saw the introduction of stovepipe digital architectures in the primary combat arms 
branches (Aviation, Armor, Artillery, and Infantry) weapon systems. Some of these systems were not 
interoperable due to their unique software protocols. Aviation and Artillery platforms were interoperable 
since they utilized the same protocol. In the 90's, General Sullivan expounded on his Force XXI vision to 
digitally link all the combat arms horizontally and vertically to increase situational awareness. The materiel 
and combat developments communities produced an internet type system for the combat arms to provide 
situational awareness. An applique system was installed on some of the platforms so the weapons 
systems could digitally communicate within the internet. The applique system proposed to solve the 
stovepipe architectures will not work. Each combat arms system (AH-64D, MlA2 Abrams, M3 Bradley, 
Paladin/Crusader) has limited space, weight, and power constraints which prevent the integration of the 
applique system. The Army Acquisition Executive must charter a Project Manager with adequate 
resources to fully integrate an open architecture system with one operating system tailored into each 
platform. The Army can not meet the situational awareness objective of Force XXI with another stand 
alone, federated applique system. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA342718 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA342718  
 
Thomas, T. R. “InfoWar, InfoTheft, and InfoSec.” Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM: 
1993. 3p.  IN: Workshop on Future Directions in Computer Misuse and Anomaly 
Detection. Davis, CA (United States), 31 Mar - 3 Apr 1993.  
Abstract: According to its title, the 1993 Davis Computer Security Workshop sponsored by the NSA's 
Office of INFOSEC (Information Security) and the Air Force's Cryptologic Support Center was suppose to 
focus on Computer Misuse and Anomaly Detection. No doubt these topics were chosen in response to 
discussions at the 1992 workshop which clearly identified these areas as critical in the coming year. 
However, a year in modern computer science is a very, very long time. What was remarkable about this 
year's meeting was that anomaly detection schemes and misuse models were discussed only to the 
degree that they were dismissed as irrelevant to the current situation. Rather, the focus this year was on 
the seriousness and sophistication of the real and potential threats to the integrity of this country's 
computer-based information systems. This report provides a discussion of information warfare, 
information theft, and information security. 
REPORT NUMBER: LAUR933693, CONF93032361 
ACCESSION NUMBER: DE94002700XSP 
 
Thomas, Timothy L. and Cathy Eliot. Russian and Chinese Information Warfare: 
Theory and Practice. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2004. 55p. 
Abstract: Russian and China have developed concepts of information operations (IO) and information 
superiority (IS) that differ from US concepts. Russia divides IO theory into information-technical and 
information-psychological aspects. According to Rastorguyev, "an information weapon can be any 
technical, biological, or social means or system that is used for the purposeful production, processing, 
transmitting, presenting or blocking of data and or processes that work with the data." Effectiveness of 
disorganizing an enemy's control system determines who will win or lose, even in wars of a limited nature. 
Chinese General Dai states that "Information operations are a series of operations with an information 
environment as the basic battlefield condition, with military information and an information system as the 
direct operational targets, and with electronic warfare and a computer network war as the principal forms; 
focus is on strength of forces and knowledge." China's focus is on stratagems and control; its IW thinking 
is evolving away from Western thinking. 




Thompson, Michael J. Information Warfare - Who is Responsible? Coordinating the 
Protection of Our National Information Infrastructure. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army 
War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 1997. 42p. 
Abstract: The government of the United States relies on the information Superhighway, officially known 
as the National Information Infrastructure (NII), to pass critical information. Banking, transportation, 
communication, medicine, electrical power, and manufacturing are also dependent upon the NII to pass 
the information required for them to operate. The U.S. Military depends on the NII for the movement of 
personnel and equipment, voice and data communications and research and development. The nation's 
power is provided through the national power grid which is connected to the NII. The NII is vulnerable to 
intrusion, disruption and exploitation by hackers, hostile entities, or anyone with a modest amount of 
automation equipment. Leadership at the national level is required to coordinate government and private 
sector actions to ensure the security and reliability of the NII. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326536 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326536  
 
Thrasher, Roger D. Information Warfare: Implications for Forging the Tools. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1996. 160p. 
Abstract: One part of the modern Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is the possibility of a new form of 
warfare-often called information warfare. Development of information warfare depends on technological 
advances, systems development and adaptation of operational approaches and organizational structures. 
This thesis assesses the implications of information warfare for the technology and systems development 
areas, with the underlying motivation of ensuring the military is postured to win the information warfare 
RMA through effective research, development and acquisition. This assessment takes place primarily 
through a 'Delphi' process designed to generate discussion between selected information warfare experts 
about the impacts of information warfare. This thesis concludes that information warfare is largely 
dependent on commercial information technology. This dependence means the military should rely on the 
commercial sector for most technological advances and products-with government research funds 
focused on military-unique research areas. Use of commercial items, coupled with DoD standard 
architectures, may enable a decentralization of information warfare acquisition to the user level. Finally, 
this dependence means the acquisition system should focus on architecture development, technology 
insertion, systems integration and on managing functions and services of systems-primarily through 
development of operational software to run on mostly commercial hardware. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA311887 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA311887  
 
Treadwell, Mark B. When Does an Act of Information Warfare Become an Act of 
War: Ambiguity in Perception. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, May 1998. 
47p. 
Abstract: There is no clear-cut point where information operations can cross over to become the 
decisive point leading to the start of armed conflict. The use of information operations by nations and 
individuals could have a significant impact on the public opinion, and, by extension, on the leaders of a 
nation. Traditional acts of war have been directed towards events that influence a nation's access to, use 
of, or benefit from land. How these concepts may be extended to information, either historical (archived or 
stored) or real-time (systems in use), is problematic at best. This paper addresses how information 
warfare may be interpreted by nations and private citizens in this context. 





Uchida, Ted T. Building a Basis for Information Warfare Rules of Engagement. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, December 1997. 67p. 
Abstract: The U.S. armed forces face a global information threat which could launch an attack without 
warning. This surprise attack could damage the U.S. armed forces ability to mobilize, deploy and control 
forces worldwide. The attack will use the global information infrastructure to target the information based 
processes the U.S. armed forces utilize to dominate the entire spectrum of conflict. To protect information 
based processes, U.S. armed forces joint operational planners are building plans to defeat and possibly 
attack information based threats. This monograph discusses how the U.S. armed forces should regulate 
the defensive and offensive responses to information attack with Rules of Engagement. After defining 
several terms, this monograph illustrates the gravity of the threat the U.S. armed forces face in the 
information spectrum. The proliferation of computers and networking is creating a huge underclass of IW 
warriors bent on destroying, manipulating, and stealing information. While past IW threats were curious 
'hackers,' the modem IW environment is encompassed by over 18 countries currently pursing active IW 
attack and defense programs. Dealing with a threat requires operational planners recognize that 
information is rapidly becoming the center of gravity for military operations. This monograph proposes IW 
planners build IW ROE that extends maximum protection to information by protecting key information 
systems and infrastructure. Additionally, IW ROE should also allow the U.S. armed forces to 
autonomously implement retaliatory or pre-emptive self defensive actions to counter any information 
based threat. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA340230 
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_______. Domestic Information Warfare: The Department of Defense's Role in the 
Civil Defense of the National Information Infrastructure. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies. May 
1998. 82p. 
Abstract: Now more than ever every facet of society relies on the NII to facilitate critical information 
related activities. Entities around the world have not ignored this transformation and seek to steal, disrupt, 
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Although there are a number of very relevant reports issued with distribution limitations 
(e.g. FOUO or DOD only) due to the public nature of this bibliography, this section 
includes unclassified/unlimited distribution references only. Abstracts were taken from 
various databases and were written by the authors of the documents cited or by the 
abstracting service from which the citations were generated not by the author of this 
bibliography. 
 
Aiken, Scott D. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Offensive Information Operations, 
Supporting Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army 
Command and Staff College, 2000. 147p. 
Abstract: The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the organizational structure that the Marine 
Corps will continue to use to task organize forces. The Marine Corps must prepare doctrine to meet the 
challenges and opportunities that Information Operations (IO) offers. The challenges and opportunities of 
IO are only now beginning to be defined by the Marine Corps. Currently, there is no Marine Corps 
doctrine to assist MAGTF personnel in the conduct of offensive IO. This thesis proposes thirteen doctrinal 
principles for the employment of the elements of offensive IO for a forward deployed MAGTF operating in 
a littoral, unformed or developing operational environment. These proposed doctrinal principles support 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea and provide a link between the 1998 Marine Corps Concept Paper A 
Concept for Information Operations and actual operating procedures. These proposed doctrinal principles 
are more specific than current Joint doctrine. This thesis also proposes several recommendations for the 
implementation of these principles into procedure. The documentary (historical) method and the case 
studies, based on successful historical examples of operations in the littorals from World War II to the 
present, are used. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA383920 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA383920  
 
Ball, Charles R. Decision Aids and Wargaming for Information Operations. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1999. 47p. 
Abstract: Information operations are an essential component of our current and future warfighting 
strategy as outlined in the latest National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2010. Simulations such as 
WARSIM 200 are an important enabler that will permit us to train for and execute this strategy. However, 
information operations are not included in any current simulation nor are they addressed in any 
automated decision aids supporting these simulations. The Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency developed a constraint based decision aid to support Course of Action Analysis (COAA) for 
simulation support at the School of Advanced Military Studies. This decision aid can be extended to 
represent information operations courses of action. This SRP recommends changes to the decision aid to 
support the Electronic Warfare (EW) component of Information Operations. It also describes example 
constraints that can be used to represent the EW component of a division attack scenario. Finally, it 
recommends a strategy for adding information operations components to joint and army warfighting 
simulations and for extending the COAA program to address campaign level planning. 







Bansemer, John D. Meeting the Joint Vision 2020 Challenge: Organizing for 
Information Operations. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air Command and Staff 
College, 2001. 54p. 
Abstract: Joint Vision 2020 recognizes the increasing importance of operations within the information 
domain as well as the need to have appropriately designed organizations prepared to support and 
conduct operations within the information domain This paper provides an initial framework to assess 
organizational structures for IO using the evolution of British and American airpower organizations during 
the interwar years This analysis will show how, over time, the debate over organizing air forces became 
centered on a core set of criteria, Applying these criteria to IO will provide a preliminary determination of 
the degree of organizational autonomy warranted for IO, In a similar manner, the organizational decisions 
made during the interwar years had direct implications on both airpower and service organizations These 
implications will be assessed against three organizational constructs: an independent IO service, semi-
autonomous service organizations, and a joint unified command This analysis will illustrate that an 
independent service is not warranted at this time; however, it does point to a requirement to grant greater 
autonomy to IO organizations within the services to help foster operational and doctrinal innovation, 
Finally, a pre-existing joint unified command should assume control of all IO capabilities to ensure the 
proper integration of the many disparate capabilities grouped under the IO rubric. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406958 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406958  
 
Bass, Carla D. Building Castles on Sand? Ignoring the Riptide of Information 
Operations. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air War College, September 1998. 53p.  
Abstract: This paper postulates that the information operations (IO) mission should be centralized at the 
unified command level, specifically Atlantic Command (ACOM), to capture the plethora of uncoordinated, 
IO related activities ongoing throughout DOD. Using Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a model, 
ACOM would assign teams to combatant commands to help plan and execute information operations 
missions. ACOM should be allocated a program element (PE) for information operations, paralleling 
SOCOM's major force program IO. This would alleviate a major criticism identified in several national 
level studies regarding insufficient, sporadic, and uncoordinated IO expenditures. Establishing an 
information operations PE would also minimize the conflict with conventionally minded elements of DOD 
that resist realigning kinetic resources to fund IO initiatives, another problem identified at the national 
level. Designated as commander in chief for information. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA356005 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA356005  
 
_______. Global Engagement: Building Castles On Sand? Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University, Air War College, April 1998. 59p. 
Abstract: From the earliest ages, technological innovations shaped strategies and tactics, often resulting 
in new eras in military operations. Proliferation of technology, exemplified by computers and sensors, 
challenges civilian and military decision makers and military leaders to understand radical changes 
associated with the information age, and capabilities and vulnerabilities associated therewith. Information 
Operations (IO) challenges traditional, conceptual, and operational approaches to borders, boundaries, 
and sovereignty. Title 10 and Goldwater-Nichols currently define military organizations, structure, 
functions, and influence organizational evolution. In this context, how should the US organize for IO? Is a 
new or non-traditional organizational structure needed to address IO? How might relationships within the 
Intelligence Community and with the DoD be affected? Identify, define, evaluate the range of potential 
policy constraints (e.g., tradition, doctrine, regulation, public law) on IO that civilian and military decision 
makers confront in planning and implementing IO campaigns? Examine ongoing research detailing US 
Information Infrastructure...what are the most pressing "Achilles' Heels?" How can US leverage 
technologies, organizations, concept of operations, and strategies to fend off threats to our infrastructure? 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=1791   
 
 145
Beckno, Brian T. Preparing the American Soldier in a Brigade Combat Team to 
Conduct Information Operations in the Contemporary Operational Environment. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2006. 103p.  
Abstract: This thesis examines whether the Army is adequately preparing its tactical leaders and 
soldiers in Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to conduct Information Operations (IO) in the Contemporary 
Operational Environment (COE). First, an explanation of IO and its Army applicability is presented using 
current examples from military operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While conducting 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, IO has become a critical combat enabler because of its 
nonlethal ability to influence adversarial, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences. Second, the author 
identifies select IO skills and IO applications in which American soldiers in a BCT should be trained to 
effectively conduct IO within a BCT. The skills are intercultural communication, language, negotiation, and 
media awareness. The applications are laws of war, rules of engagement, ethics and morality, and 
commander's intent. Third, the thesis examines the Army's institutional education and operational training 
of IO at the BCT level and below. Using institutional course management plans from select officer and 
noncommissioned officer schools and current operational training directives for deploying units to Iraq, an 
analysis of IO education and training was conducted. The thesis concludes with recommendations to the 
institutional and operational Army for improving IO education and training for American soldiers serving in 
a BCT. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA451276 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA451276  
 
Bishop, Roy V. Information Operations: A Layman's Perspective. Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Army War College, April 1997. 34p. 
Abstract: The subject of Information Operations (IO), formerly called Information Warfare, is having a 
profound impact on the Department of Defense and the Armed Services because of the proliferation of 
information technologies throughout the Armed Services. Most literature on the subject will tell you that IO 
is the center piece for a larger Revolution in Military Affairs. Whether these technological innovations 
represent a revolution or not, is of little importance in the grand scheme of things. But taking maximum 
advantage of their potential is. Utilization of these technologies is not without considerable risk. This 
paper examines where we got started with incorporating high technology into intelligence, weapons, and 
command, control, communications and computer systems, assess where we are and where we are 
going, discuss the associated vulnerabilities and what we are doing to protect against them. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA327427 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA327427  
 
Blackington, Robert E. Air Force Information Operations (IO) Doctrine: Consistent 
with Joint IO Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air Command and Staff 
College, 2001. 60p. 
Abstract: Is Air Force information operations (IO) doctrine consistent with joint IO doctrine as required 
by policy directives? To answer this question, this research paper analyzes the consistency between Air 
Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Information Operations, and Joint Pub (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations, in three principal areas: 1. The components of information superiority (IS) and 
definitions of the key terms IS, IO, and information warfare (IW). 2. Air Force addition of the terms 
counterinformation (CI), offensive counterinformation (OCI), and defensive counterinformation (DCI). 3. 
The capabilities and related activities used to carry out offensive and defensive IO. 






Bohan, Patrick J. Joint Task Force - Information Operations (JTF-IO): Should One 
Exist? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2005. 22p. 
Abstract: Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations was published in 1998 to 
provide guidance on conducting joint information operations. This paper will demonstrate that this 
doctrine did not provide sufficient detail with respect to IO organization as evidenced by IO difficulties 
encountered during recent conflicts. In addition, current doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance on 
component IO tasking. Based on analysis of recent conflicts with respect to IO, creation of a Joint Task 
Force-Information Operations (JTF-IO) is warranted to provide component level control, direction and 
authority to conduct IO throughout the joint task force. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA463384 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA463384  
 
Bookard, Joe D. Defining the Information within Military Information Operations: 
Utilizing a Case Study of the Jammu and Kashmir Conflict. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Army Command and Staff College, 2006. 69p. 
Abstract: The current operating environment requires the United States military to conduct military 
information operations throughout the conflict spectrum, during all phases, and across various military 
operations. A function of the U.S. military is to deter adversaries who oppose the will of the United States, 
and if unsuccessful, render them incapable of physical resistance, thus ultimately altering their behavior. 
In essence, the U.S. military wishes to alter tangible and intangible variables in any system to gain an 
advantage. As the U.S. military increases its reliance on information and its supporting infrastructures, the 
threat will continue to become more sophisticated, clandestine, and complex. Therefore, military 
commanders and their staffs should develop sophisticated approaches to describe, classify, and explain 
essential elements within the information environment, particularly when conducting counterinsurgency 
operations (COIN). The commander's analysis of the information environment is critical. It will be 
challenged by anonymous adversaries in their remote geographic locations using inexpensive "off the 
shelf" technology. Because of this threat, there is a significant demand for accurate and reliable 
information for mission planning and execution for combat operations forces. The research presented in 
this work examines the Indian government's response to counterinsurgency through the categories of 
information defined by the author. The author's definition of information focuses on how decision makers, 
mainly military commanders, assign value to information within, and extracted from, the information 
environment. The definition is an attempt to add clarity to the broad meanings found in the FM and JP 3-
13 doctrine for Information Operations. A bibliography of U.S. Government publications, books, 
monographs, reports, journal articles, and internet sites is included. 
ACCESSION  NUMBER: ADA449966 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449966  
 
Borg, Charles M. Information Operations: Is the Army Doing Enough? Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001. 51p. 
Abstract: For ten years the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have addressed information 
operations. Over the centuries militaries have conducted operations we today call information operations. 
In many respects the United States is the most prolific user of information operations while simultaneously 
it is most susceptible to them. For the U.S. to remain a world superpower and to ensure national security 
it must be preeminent in information operations. The Army, as a leader in information operations and a 
significant member of the national security establishment, must continue to improve its information 
operations capabilities. The Army's execution of information operations must and will tremendously 
reduce the potential for the United States to be strategically disadvantaged and should contribute 
significantly to its strategic advantage. United States Armed Forces will conduct operations under 
conditions of information superiority. Historically, the Army has conducted operations that today are 
considered information operations. This paper asks the question, is the Army doing enough to ensure its 
necessary and appropriate contribution in information operations? It provides background on DOD And 
Army information operations development and identifies shortfalls in current Army doctrine and training. 
The discussion ends with recommendations for improvements to the shortfalls identified. 
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http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389747  
 
Bortree, James R. Information Operations During the Malayan Emergency. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 79p.  
Abstract: Today, Information Operations (IO) is an area of emerging importance in military science. IO 
however is not new. Many of the elements of IO have existed for hundreds, and in the case of specific 
elements like military deception (MILDEC), for thousands of years. IO becomes more important in dealing 
with the conflicts we face today, particularly as modern wars transition away from the large force on force 
encounters of the past. This thesis focuses on the specific British IO lessons learned during the Malayan 
Emergency. The thesis will also examine the IO implications of British organizational and cultural 
adaptation to counter the insurgents. Finally, it will also examine the most recent list of relevant Joint 





Bouchard, Ronald M. Information Operations in Iraq. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army 
War College, April 1999. 48p. 
Abstract: The United States effectively used information operations prior and during the Gulf War. In the 
wake of the U.S. led coalition victory, Iraq developed an asymmetrical approach to defeating any future 
coalition effort. Iraq's pattern of behavior demonstrated a growing mastery in perception management. 
Iraq's effective use of the media squashed U.S. efforts to establish a coalition response to Iraq's non-
compliance with the UNSCOM inspections in early 1998. The successful use of information operations by 
Iraq in early 1998 shows how a small and unsophisticated desert country mastered the use of information 
operations. Taking from the lessons of trial and error an inexperienced Iraq effectively used asymmetric 
actions by using the media to influence international opinion and U.S. policy. This paper addresses the 
media, public opinion and policy prior to, during, and after the Gulf War. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363160 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363160  
 
Breazile, Gregory T. Defensive Information Operations in Support of the Marine Air 
Ground Task Force.  Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2002. 
113p.  
Abstract: Currently the Marine Corps has no doctrine for information operations (IO). The Marine Corps 
Doctrine Division has published an IO concept paper from which to guide the development of IO doctrine. 
In joint and other service doctrine, IO is defined in both as an offensive and defensive capability. This 
thesis only discusses defensive IO (DIO) and will attempt to provide the reader with insight into how the 
MAGTF could conduct DIO. A USMC concept paper on IO, joint IO doctrine, and sister service IO 
doctrine were used to provide an understanding of how IO and DIO are defined by each. Additionally, 
analysis of the DIO threat and an overview of current MAGTF capabilities to conduct each of element of 
DIO (information assurance, physical security, operational security, counterintelligence, 
counterpropaganda, counterdeception, and electronic warfare) is provided. The thesis also analyzes 
historical examples of each DIO element to demonstrate relevance of each to MAGTF operations. 
Conclusions and recommendations are provided for each DIO element. This thesis demonstrates the 
need for DIO in support of the MAGTF and how the MAGTF should incorporate DIO into their service IO 
doctrine. 




Brock, Mark E. How to Organize the Headquarters for Information Operations at 
the Brigade and Division. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2005. 82p.  
Abstract: As the Army transforms into a modular force, the issue of information operations is a topic for 
leaders at all levels. A particular issue is how to organize the unit staff to plan, prepare, and execute 
information operations. Currently, units at the brigade and division level are trying various methods of 
incorporating staff officers and noncommissioned officers into the planning process for information 
operations. Some units are approaching the problem of integrating information operations into operations 
with the use of an Effects Coordination Cell (ECC). Other units have an Information Operations Working 
Group (IOWG) and a Fires Cell. The author asks the following question: what are the benefits of the ECC 
methodology as opposed to the separate IOWG and Fires Cell? The study attempts to determine which is 
the more efficient method, what is gained, and whether the process should be standard across the Army. 
Using Army doctrine and military journals, the author studied information operations planning and its 
implications for brigade and division headquarters. Taking into consideration available resources, the 
commander's intent, and numerous other factors leads to the conclusion that the ECC is the best way for 
these headquarters to organize. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA436501 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436501  
 
Bromley, Joseph M. Evaluation of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and SPARTAN 
SCOUT as Information Operations (IO) Assets. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2005. 63p.  
Abstract: This thesis will address the planned configuration of Lockheed Martin's Flight Zero, Module 
Spiral Alpha Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the ongoing development of the SPARTAN SCOUT, one of 
the Navy's Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV). Technology currently available as well as developmental 
technologies will be recommended for implementation in order to make the LCS and SCOUT assets to 
Information Operations (IO) objectives. Specific technology will include Outboard, TARBS, HPM, 
Loudspeakers, LRAD and Air Magnet. This thesis will include an evaluation of the current policy for 
authorizing Information Operations missions, specifically in the areas of Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) and Electronic Warfare (EW). 




Brock, Mark E. How to Organize the Headquarters for Information Operations at 
the Brigade and Division. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 
2005. 82p.  
Abstract: As the Army transforms into a modular force, the issue of information operations is a topic for 
leaders at all levels. A particular issue is how to organize the unit staff to plan, prepare, and execute 
information operations. Currently, units at the brigade and division level are trying various methods of 
incorporating staff officers and noncommissioned officers into the planning process for information 
operations. Some units are approaching the problem of integrating information operations into operations 
with the use of an Effects Coordination Cell (ECC). Other units have an Information Operations Working 
Group (IOWG) and a Fires Cell. The author asks the following question: what are the benefits of the ECC 
methodology as opposed to the separate IOWG and Fires Cell? The study attempts to determine which is 
the more efficient method, what is gained, and whether the process should be standard across the Army. 
Using Army doctrine and military journals, the author studied information operations planning and its 
implications for brigade and division headquarters. Taking into consideration available resources, the 
commander's intent, and numerous other factors leads to the conclusion that the ECC is the best way for 
these headquarters to organize. 




Brown, Bill R., et al. Cognitive Requirements for Information Operations Training 
(CRIOT). Lawton, OK: Advancia Corporation, June 1999.  250p.  
Abstract: The advent of battlefield digitization increases the work trainers for live force-on-force 
exercises must do to control exercises and provide feedback to units, and it will pull trainers at platoon 
and company level out of the tactical information loop. The goal of this study was to describe 
instrumentation capabilities with the potential for reducing workloads and pulling trainers back into the 
information loop for exercises at the Army's maneuver combat training centers (CTCs) and at home 
stations. This study documents the experiences of approximately seventy of the National Training Center 
(NTC)  observer/controllers (OCs) and analysts that participated in the training of the Army's first digitized 
brigade during the Force XXI Army warfighting Experiment (AWE). To gain a better understanding of what 
is required to support digital training, the study team reviewed emerging tactical doctrine from platoon 
through battalion task force level to develop a sample of potential digital training points and then designed 
displays that would help a trainer monitor unit performance with respect to these points. The team then 
defined the capabilities a workstation would need to create these displays. This report describes, defends 
and illustrates twenty workstation capabilities that support exercise control and feedback for digitized 
units. 
REPORT NUMBER: 1176-0001AF 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA365483  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA365483  
 
Brown, Michael H. Employing Information Operations at the Marine Expeditionary 
Unit Level in the Sixth Fleet Area of Responsibility. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army 
Command and Staff College, 2000. 60p. 
Abstract: Information operations (IO) are defined as actions taken to affect adversary information and 
information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Eased upon this 
definition, at the tactical level, the focus of IO is on affecting an adversary's information and information 
systems related to command and control, intelligence, logistics, maneuver, and firepower as they relate to 
the conduct of military operations while protecting our own capabilities. Military activities at the tactical 
level will often bear a resemblance to traditional operations with the 10 dimension being the effect these 
activities have at the operational level. The significance of this IO capability for a Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) commander, specifically within the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations 
Capable) (MEU(SOC)), is important because it provides that commander with another way of effecting an 
opponent through direct or indirect means. Currently the Marine Corps does not possess the capability to 
perform IO at the MEU(SOC) level. The purpose of this monograph is to explore how the Marine Corps 
intends to employ offensive IO within the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility (AOR). The United States 
Marine Corps has maintained an active presence within the Sixth Fleet's AOR (Mediterranean Sea) since 
the end of the second World War. The MEU(SOC) is uniquely task organized, equipped, and trained to 
meet complex missions ranging from Noncombatant Evacuation Operations to amphibious raids. These 
missions would be enhanced once the Marine Corps develops the capability to employ IO at the 
MEU(SOC) level. The Marine Corps intends to develop this IO force for use within each of the MAGTFs 
(MEF, MEE, and MEU). The projected capabilities of this IO team would be to conduct limited offensive 
and defensive IO for the MEU commander. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA395006 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA395006  
 
Brumfiel, Timothy A., Sr. Information Operations Capability for the Armored and 
Infantry Brigade. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004. 85p.  
Abstract: Presently, no organic information operations (IO) capability exists in the organization and 
structure of the armored and infantry brigade, so these brigades are unable to effectively plan, integrate, 
and coordinate IO activities into the brigade operations without assistance. As the Army transforms to a 
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more modular force that will rely heavily on the ability of brigades to conduct operations using assets 
normally associated with higher echelons or services, this capability becomes more relevant to the 
brigade to ensure success. This study analyzed field manuals, after-action reviews, lessons learned, and 
professional articles to determine the importance of IO to the brigade and to ascertain if a need existed 
for brigades to have their own ability to plan and coordinate IO activities. A survey was utilized to gain 
opinion from Army field grade officers attending the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 
to confirm the need for IO at brigade level. The study then provided a potential solution to the 
organizational structure that should be organic to the brigade to provide the needed IO capability. Based 
on the research conducted, evidence exists that there is a need for a trained, permanent IO staff member 
at the brigade level who can ensure that IO is fully planned, coordinated, and integrated into the brigade's 
missions and operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA428311 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA428311  
 
Buchholz, David R. Information Operations: Where Next? Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, 2005. 21p.  
Abstract: This paper addresses the "ownership" of joint information operations (IO) by asking if U.S. 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is the right combatant commander to coordinate all Department of 
Defense (DoD) information operations. Doctrine already addresses the issue of combatant commander 
responsibility for ensuring that IO is planned and executed in the respective commands, but an IO 
vacuum exists with respect to standardized IO training and integration across the combatant commands. 
For this reason and others there is a compelling argument for the major responsibility for DoD information 
operations integration to fall under the control of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The paper first 
explains how USSTRATCOM became the IO integrator for DoD IO. This is followed by the definition of 
joint IO as found in Joint Publication 3-13. The author then presents four historical examples of IO 
covering conflicts in four different geographic regions spanning 60 years. The examples include the use 
of IO during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Pacific theater, World War II; during Operation Desert Storm in 
Iraq; during Operation Noble Anvil in Kosovo, Serbia; and during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. 
These examples highlight how IO, if successfully implemented, can be a force multiplier and mission 
enabler. They also shed light on the difficulties and consequences encountered if an IO strategy is not 
properly implemented. Finally, the command missions of USSTRATCOM and USJFCOM are analyzed to 
illustrate why USJFCOM is the command most suited to play the major role in the integration and 
projection of joint IO. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA464548 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA464548  
 
Buettner, Raymond. Information Operation/Information Warfare Modeling and 
Simulation. Monterey, CA: Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, [2000].  [46]p.  
Abstract: Information Operations have always been a part of warfare. However, this aspect of warfare is 
having ever-greater importance as forces rely more and more on information as an enabler.  Modern 
information systems make possible very rapid creation, distribution, and utilization of information. These 
same systems have vulnerabilities that can be exploited by enemy forces.  Information force-on-force is 
important and complex.  New tools and procedures are needed for this warfare arena. As these tools are 
developed, it will be necessary to provide education and training into their use.  This project combines 
research to develop capabilities combined with concurrent development of instruction materials. 






Burnett Jr, Peter L. Information Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 
2002. 37p.  
Abstract: This SRP proposes designation of a single entity within the federal government to provide 
strategic guidance across the breadth of the nation's elements of power. It would coordinate and improve 
the security of the nation's critical information infrastructure, which is essential for the survival and 
prosperity of the United States. A review of the recent terrorist activities in the United States and the 
declaration of war against global terrorism revealed U.S. weakness in its ability to protect itself internally 
against terrorist activities. The United States found itself lacking in numerous areas. Area shortfalls 
include a lack of structure and policy and, in some cases, organizational structure that is focused on 
Homeland Defense. The U.S. also revealed an inability to protect its citizens, its physical infrastructures, 
the nation's economic structure, and critical information infrastructures. Numerous policies regarding 
domestic terrorist have been written and debated, but shelved. Older policy focused mostly on deterring 
terrorism and defeating terrorism abroad. On 11 September 2001, America witnessed terror firsthand in a 
well orchestrated attack that ripped and tore the economic and military fabric of its foundation. This event 
has prompted U.S. leaders to take a serious look internally at securing the liberty and prosperity of the 
nation's foundation. This study proposes ways and means of utilizing and protecting U.S. information 
operations in the war on terrorism. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA402019 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA402019  
 
Burton, Gerald V., Jr. Principles of Information Operations: A Recommended 
Addition to U.S. Army Doctrine. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff 
College, 2003. 71p.  
Abstract: It is imperative that Army doctrine fulfill its mandate to create common understanding across 
the force. This includes establishing a common basis for conducting IO across the spectrum of conflict. 
Army IO doctrine must provide commanders and their staffs the foundation necessary to effectively 
integrate IO into full spectrum operations. Without successful IO, achieving information superiority is 
unlikely. Without information superiority, the Army is at risk of failing to accomplish its assigned missions 
in the decisive manner that is expected and necessary. The soon to be released FM 3-13, Information 
Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, represents a leap ahead in Army thinking 
about IO. It is particularly good at describing the IO threat and how the IO elements and related activities 
interact. It also presents numerous and detailed tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting 
(planning, preparing, executing and assessing IO). Still, this monograph asserts that FM 3-13 lacks a 
general, macro-level articulation of how IO elements are combined, so it needs to add a set of principles 
that guide commanders and staffs on how to combine the IO elements. This monograph seeks to 
discover whether or not existing U.S., Russian, and Chinese doctrine and theory can provide the sought 
after guidance on combining IO elements. The answer is yes. An analysis of all three nations writings on 
IO, and synthesis of the related ideas, shows they do offer potential solutions to the problem. These 
solutions are offered as recommended improvements to the ongoing Army IO doctrine debate. The 
monograph subscribes to the idea that IO is an integrating strategy, relating means to ends. Combining 
the elements is the essential part of this strategy, and must be guided by six principles. First, 
commanders and staffs must understand and leverage all three domIn making the case for these 
principles, the monograph covers several key areas. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA415801 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415801  
 
Caldwell, Russell. Information Operations (IO) Organizational Design and 
Procedures. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. 179p.  
Abstract: Multi National Force (MNF) operations recognize the existence of shared national interests in 
a specific geographic region. Furthermore, MNF operations seek to standardize some basic concepts and 
processes that will promote habits of cooperation, increased dialogue, and provide for baseline 
Coalition/Combined Task Force (CCTF) operational concepts. This thesis and its' recommendation for a 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are aimed at improving interoperability and CCTF operational 
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readiness. The SOP will focus on the spectrum of Information Operations (10) with regards to Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) during MNF operations. 
First, existing doctrine and cases will be analyzed to develop a foundation for this study. This thesis will 
seek to identify the existing 10 procedures to be utilized during MNF operations. Next, exercise 
observations and lessons learned reviews serve as the basis for 10 SOP Annex development to support 
the MNF SOP. 




Carter, Rosemary M. Information Operations Coordination Cell-Necessary for 
Division Offensive Actions. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff 
College, School of Advanced Military Studies, December 1998. 67p. 
Abstract: This monograph analyzes the need for a division Information Operations (IO) Coordination 
Cell during offensive military actions. The integrated concept team draft of FM 100-6, Information 
Operations: Tactics Techniques and Procedures, includes a division Information Operations Coordination 
Cell. The cell is responsible for integrating the components of Information Superiority (IS) to defeat the 
enemy's command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) while protecting friendly C4ISR. Their focus is the Information Operations segment of IS that 
includes operational security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, electronic 
warfare (EW), physical destruction, computer network attack (CNA), public affairs (PA), and civil affairs 
(CA). The monograph restricts the topic to Offensive IO, or IO that attacks the enemy commander's ability 
to achieve his objectives. Also, the monograph limits the type of military action to offensive. The 
monograph focuses on offensive actions, the primary action within offensive operations, because that is 
what the Army is designed for; fighting and winning wars. The monograph analyzes the IO tasks using 
three supporting research processes. First, it determines that only five of the tasks are necessary for 
Offensive IO: PSYOP, military deception, EW, physical destruction, and CA. The monograph then 
analyzes current doctrine and the heavy division Army of Excellence Table of Organization and 
Equipment (TOE) to determine the division's capabilities to execute the Offensive 10 tasks. Finally, the 
monograph uses these capabilities and doctrine to determine if the current division staff has the 
necessary staff mechanisms to conduct the Offensive IO tasks. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA366192 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA366192  
 
Cave, William C. and Robert E. Wassmer. Defensive Information Operations 
Planning Tool. Spring Lake, NJ: Prediction Systems, Inc., January 2000.  24p.   
Abstract: This report describes the SBIR Phase 1 development and demonstration of a Defensive 
Information Operations Planning Tool (DIOPT) prototype, which will be used to minimize vulnerabilities 
and corresponding risks to operations, and interface with existing equipment security monitors and agents 
running autonomously or  cooperatively. PSI's approach is based on computer technology that affords 
implementation of the planning tool using a laptop computer. Given operational plans for deploying an 
Information System (IS), a simulation of the IS can be constructed in the field using graphical icons 
depicting parameterized models tailored to specific scenarios to be represented. IS planners can 
construct the simulation by interconnecting icons representing IS nodes and links. Models of threats can 
be used to assess vulnerabilities of the system to various attacks. Planners can determine how the IS 
architecture can be improved to reduce vulnerabilities, and predetermine best courses of action to 
counter an attack. Once the DIOPT is completely implemented in Phase II, the laptop can be plugged into 
the actual system to capture real time data on IS architecture changes, malfunctions or suspected 
intrusions/attacks. This will cause alarms to summon the planner, to further investigate specified events 
automatically, and to aid in the rapid determination of the best courses of action to be taken. 




Charlton, John W. War of Perceptions: Integrating in Formation Operations Into 
Peacekeeping Plans. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff 
College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1998. 73p. 
Abstract: U.S. military forces are conducting peace operations more frequently than ever before. 
Commanders in peace operations are faced with the dilemma of having to provide stability and security in 
an environment where the use of force is severely restricted. That problem, combined with potential 
adversaries that may not follow internationally recognized laws of warfare, could leave peace operations 
forces at a distinct disadvantage. Information operations provide a way for commanders of peace 
operations to combat this dilemma and meet mission objectives. This monograph analyzes how 
information operations (IO) can assist commanders and planners at the operational level of war in 
executing peace operations. It will answer the question, what role can IO play in a peace operation and 
how can planners at the operational level integrate information operations into their overall plan. In 
answering this research question, this monograph will first analyze peace operations as they relate to the 
physical, moral and cybernetic domains of conflict. Using examples from recent and ongoing peace 
operations, this analysis will demonstrate that commanders and staffs must consider more than the just 
the physical domain when planning a peace operation. The analysis will then shift to how the elements of 
operational design relate to peace operations. Finally, this monograph will address the specific 
requirements for integrating IO into the overall plan by analyzing staff organization requirements and IO 
functions in a peace operation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA356951 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA356951
 
Cheeseman, Curtis P. Information Operations - Hardnessing the Power. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 27p. 
Abstract: Information Operations (10) have become more than an enabler in reaching the goals set forth 
in Joint Vision 2020 of 'full spectrum dominance and information superiority'. As a result of the September 
11, 2001, attack on the United States 10 has been identified as one of the six critical operational goals for 
focusing DoD's transformation efforts. The September 30, 2001, Quadrennial Defense Review highlights 
both the imperative for the United States to maintain an unsurpassed capability to conduct information 
operations, as well as the need to strengthen United States capabilities in these areas. However, as IC 
takes on greater importance in achieving information superiority, it has become more complex for 
commanders at all levels, tactical, operational, and strategic, to identify, synchronize, and conduct 
information operations across the full spectrum of operations against 'nontraditional' adversaries who 
engage in 'nontraditional' conflict in the information domain. This study examines potential shortfalls and 
incongruities in practice and doctrine and identifies areas within the domain that can be improved to 
facilitate the transformation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA401957 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA401957  
 
Clapp, Anthony J. Information Operations and Joint Vision 2020: Ready to Accept 
the Challenge. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002 24p. 
Abstract: Ever increasing in importance to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is the still evolving role of 
Information Operations (IO). Properly executed, IO will start during peacetime and play significant role in 
diffusing potential crisis situations. In times of crisis, IO will be a significant contributor to accomplishing 
the JFC's objectives and then will enable a smooth transition to a return to peace. However, it is currently 
not possible for the JFC to fully exploit all aspects of IO in order to gain and maintain an advantage over 
the adversary. Doctrinal shortcomings such as IO cell leadership and the IO organizational structure are 
the main obstacles preventing joint forces from reaping the benefits of fully integrated and synchronized 
IO. Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) poses a challenge to the operational commander by stating the pace of 
change in the information environment dictates that we explore broader information operations strategies 
and concepts. Joint forces should be prepared to accept this challenge, but must first change the way 
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they employ IO if they expect to achieve the JFC's objectives. Implementation of a Joint Forces 
Information Operations Component Commander (JFIOCC), led by the current Joint Psychological 
Operations Task Force Commander is the first step towards a synergistic approach to the employment of 
IO. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA400923 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400923  
 
Costigan, James F. Information Operations; Will We Be Ready for the Next Attack? 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 
Abstract: My thesis is that current doctrine establishes Information Operations in such a way as not to 
provide clarity on how we conduct operations today, but rather it is serving to muddy waters we're trying 
to navigate in. Our adversaries of the future will continue to focus along traditional and non-traditional 
means of attacking us. More emphasis will be placed on rogue and non-state players and their abilities to 
attack this nation. We can no longer afford to focus on traditional methods of conducting warfare. We 
must be prepared to fight and win both symmetrical and asymmetrical battles using both kinetic and non-
kinetic means. The actions taken to protect and defend this country will require a significant cultural 
change on the part of the military and the nation. The defense of our nation is not just about protecting 
our shores against attack. It must include the defense and protection of our national infrastructure. We 
are not ensuring that the soldiers, sailors, airman, and marines, as well as civilians in the Department of 
Defense, are trained properly. Information technology changes rapidly. The warriors that will be required 
to use it, must have a skill set that is maintained accordingly. That doesn't happen today. Our strategic 
leaders must be looking 20 to 25 years down the road when implementing strategies for ensuring that 
such an infrastructure and all the value it possesses is still viable. They must have a vision that will guide 
our actions over the next quarter of a century. We must be open to change. Changes will need to be 
made in the way we look at Information Operations, the systems we use to fight our future wars, and the 
way we train our warriors of the future. If we fight this changing environment and the roles that come with 
it, we risk becoming a force that is irrelevant. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA401927 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA401927  
 
Cox, Joseph L. Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom -- What Went Wrong? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff 
College, 2006. 134p.  
Abstract: This monograph examines the integration of Information Operations (IO) during Operations 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As a rule, most commanders considered IO 
ineffective because IO was unable to respond to the complex environments of Afghanistan and Iraq. This 
monograph examines how the Army prepared commanders to integrate IO into operations in those two 
theaters of operations. Both theaters offer good examples of how some commanders integrated IO 
effectively, and how other commanders failed to integrate IO effectively. There are essentially three 
issues commanders must confront to integrate IO: doctrine, intelligence support to IO, and resourcing the 
IO efforts. First, Army doctrine does not provide commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO into 
their operations. Second, IO requires proper intelligence support to be effective, but intelligence doctrine 
and resourcing do not allow intelligence support to IO to be effective. Third, the Army has not resourced 
itself to conduct IO in an effective manner. As a result of these three issues with the Army's concept of IO, 
commanders do not understand how to integrate IO. This monograph will provide a series of 
recommendations that, if implemented, will help prepare commanders for the task of integrating IO. 
Those recommendations include doctrinal changes and modifications, organizational changes, training 
requirements, material resourcing requirements, leadership and education requirements, and personnel 
resourcing requirements. If implemented, these recommendations will make long-term changes to how 
the Army prepares commanders to integrate IO into their operations. The appendices discuss the 
relationship of Public Affairs to IO, provide an overview of IO organizational and equipment capabilities of 
the units identified in the main body of the monograph, and provide a more detailed breakdown of the 
various units that served in OEF and OIF. 
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Creekmore, Kevin. Battlespace Information Operations Simulation. Huntsville, AL: 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command, January 1999. 7p. 
Abstract: The Extended Air Defense Testbed (EADTB) is a medium to high fidelity constructive 
simulation that is used for theater-level operational planning and analysis of weapons systems. The 
EADTB was developed by the Testbed Product Office in the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 
Battlelab. It models all aspects of the battlefield to include sensors, communications, command and 
control (C2), munitions, and the environment. It offers a combination of scope, detail, and flexibility that is 
unique among simulations. The user is able to create the weapon systems, the C2 elements, threats, and 
the gameboard for the scenario to take place and then develop rulesets that determine the behavior of 
the systems in the course of the battle. One recent scenario built in EADTB was  attlespace Information 
Operations Simulation (BIOS). The purpose of this experiment was to model dynamic Battle Management 
Command Control Communications and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (BMC4ISR) and 
the associated information management. The EADTB was able to provide visualization and analysis of 
decision processes, information flow and latency, and combat operations. It was also able to simulate the 
dynamic system response to changing conditions and assess the benefits of space assets. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA365027 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA365027  
 
Dougherty, Richard K. Organizational Structure for Inter-Agency Information 
Operations. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001.  221p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to stimulate a discussion toward developing an all-encompassing 
Inter-agency Information Operations organization. The authors define an environment and identify 
theories that point toward the necessity of integrating Information Operations (10) throughout the U.S. 
Government (USG). The authors explore the feasibility of establishing and empowering an inter-agency 
organization that will monitor, evaluate and enforce all aspects of IO. Early forms of IO and their 
deployment are depicted in the historical backdrop of World War II. Concepts of renown futurists identify 
the importance of the information Age and the essential process to maximize its' full potential. A 
correlation between the current national security strategy and the IO environment strongly suggests the 
need for innovation. An overview of the current IO environment and USG organizations reveals a 
technological move toward inter-agency IO. Both the art and science sides of IO are incorporated into a 
new organization. OrgCon 7.0 is used to analyze the proposed IO organizational structure, which 
provides specific recommendations and defines misfits that must be addressed. The authors conclude 
that further work is required in modeling the organization via alternate software and a more in depth look 
is required in the area of National Security IO. The authors provide the essential groundwork for further 
research. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA389648 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389648  
 
Dovey, Thomas C., Jr. Conduct of Information Operations by a U.S. Army Division 
While Participating in a Stability Action. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and 
General Staff College, School of Advances Military Studies, December 1998. 55p. 
Abstract: This monograph assesses the capability of a US Army Division conducting stability actions to 
plan and conduct Information Operations (IO) in accordance with the FM 100-6 coordinating draft, 
Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (FM 100-6CD) and Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTP) developed in recent stability actions. It identifies what IO tasks a US Army Division 
must be able to plan and execute in stability actions. It addresses what resources are required to conduct 
those IO tasks. The monograph then provides an assessment of the ability of the Division conducting 
stability actions to perform the required tasks. The monograph concludes that the Division is capable of 
planning and conducting information operations while conducting stability actions. However, this answer 
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assumes that the Division receives its habitual Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support element. The 
monograph brings out shortcomings in current IO doctrinal methods discusses new TTPs developed by 
divisions serving as TF Eagle in Bosnia Herzegovina and ends with recommendations for improving 10 
doctrine and input for FM 100-6CD TTP CD. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA366180 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA366180  
 
Doyle, Kevin J. Information Operations: A Look at Emerging Army Doctrine and its 
Operational Implications. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff 
College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1995.  56p. 
Abstract: This monograph discusses how the Information Revolution is leading the Revolution in Military 
Affairs. Specifically, it examines the operational implications of the changing information environment, the 
army's doctrinal response (Information Operations), and the utility of Information Operations. The 
monograph examines the information environment and concludes that it gives nations and military forces 
unprecedented capabilities to acquire, manipulate, process and disseminate information. This implies that 
military forces will become much more efficient in maneuver, fires, and protection of forces. It also implies 
that information can be used as a separate element of combat power to attack directly the enemy's will to 
fight, to bolster US and coalition support for military operations, or to attack an enemy's information 
system to prevent him from doing the same. Because of this environment, information operations is 
emerging as a new area of warfare, and information is commonly considered as a fifth element of combat 
power. The monograph then examines the army's doctrine for Information Operations (IO). It finds that 
the army primarily treats IO as a force multiplier which enables ground forces to maneuver, fire, and 
protect the force more efficiently, rather than implementing IO as an element of combat power. The army 
doctrine does not detail the capabilities of the present force structure to support 10, and suggests creating 
no new force or task organization. The doctrine recommends an assistant staff officer in the operations 
staff section to synchronize IO, without detailing the responsibilities inherent. The doctrine credibly treats 
10 as a supporting function which enables the force to develop the capability to execute simultaneous 
attack in depth. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA300222 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA300222  
 
Doyle, Michael P., et al. Value Function Approach to Information Operations 
MOE's: A Preliminary Study. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of 
Technology, Department of Operational Sciences, July 1997. 61p. 
Abstract: A value focused thinking approach is applied to information operations. A preliminary value 
hierarchy for information operations is constructed by extracting the values of senior military leadership 
from existing doctrine. To identify these key values for information operations, applicable existing doctrine 
was reviewed and summarized. Additionally, hierarchical representations of the values represented within 
each reviewed doctrine are developed. A value hierarchy requires that supporting objectives be mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Within this analysis, these requirements are enforced, in part, by 
developed definitions which serve as tests to maintain mutual exclusivity. An exhaustive set of supporting 
values is also guaranteed by identifying a spanning set of values that directly support the overall objective 
of information operations. This preliminary value hierarchy serves as the basis for continuing research. 
The implications for this research include the construction of a prescriptive model in which the 
effectiveness of current and future systems can be assessed on a common scale. Further, the 
effectiveness of developing technologies can be assessed and the value of these technologies 
determined with respect to the values of senior military leadership. With this, the value of holes in our 
suite of information warfare systems can also be assessed in terms of their effectiveness in fulfilling the 
values of military leadership. 
REPORT NUMBER: CMSA-TR/97-04 




Dragon, Randall A. Wielding the Cyber Sword: Exploiting the Power of Information 
Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001. 31p.  
Abstract: Information Operations (IO) are rapidly becoming a new Battlefield Operating System (BOS). 
Until the last 3-5 years, emphasis in applying the tenets of IO remained compartmented discretely within 
organizations at each level of war - strategic, operational, and tactical. Given the infusion of technology 
and the potential merger of those levels, information has become a currency for all operations across the 
spectrum of conflict. With the goal for IO to achieve Information Superiority, this study examines current 
IO doctrine and organization in light of expectations of the future battlefield and the transformed Army. 
The fundamental conclusion is that to develop into a viable contributor as a warfighting domain, IO should 
be formally recognized as a BOS and sub-divided to encompass two types of operations: 
influence/perception operations focused on the message; and network/cyber operations focused on the 
media. In the final analysis, current IO systems require radical modification with respect to doctrine, 
organization, leader development, and training. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA390556 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA390556  
 
Duczynski, Guy. Making Information Operations Effects-Based: Begin with the End 
(-State) in Mind! Perth, South Australia: Edith Cowan University, 2005. 60p. 
Abstract: The literature on Effects Based Operations (EBO) continues to be dominated by theory, with 
limited evidence of (successful) practical application reported. This situation is entirely acceptable in the 
early formative stages of any new concept, as first hesitant steps are taken and the authority of a shared 
idea gradually develops. EBO is now a global phenomenon. The effects must have primacy in shaping 
the actions that are taken. EBO practitioners, particularly those within the information operations domain, 
need those hands-on executable actions that can be taken to solve problems in the real world. 
Furthermore, these executable actions can only be enabled through the possession of specific 
capabilities. The paper offers that a systems approach that includes a problem space, a solution space 
and a design space may bring the necessary totality to the subject, guarding against premature use of 
means that appear to fit well with the context a fixation with efficiency rather than effectiveness. The 
paper argues that an examination of the systemic interactions amongst factors may deepen planners or 
policy-makers understanding of why a region or area of interest behaves the way it does, before they 
attempt to change it. A method is detailed that couples effects statements and means and highlights 
capability requirements. A case study example is provided using North Korea. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA472241 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA472241  
 
Duklis, Peter S., Jr. The Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations 
Organization (JRVIO); Cyber Warriors Just a Click Away. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Army War College, 2002. 32p. 
Abstract: Informational power has now been coined as a national power along with political, economic 
and military powers. Moreover, Information Operations (IO) is a key stratagem to protect and facilitate our 
national interests across the full spectrum of engagement. The Department of Defense (DoD) 
incorporates information operations as part of all of its current plans, operations and exercises. Yet, there 
are very few organizations dedicated solely to IO. However, DoD conducted the Reserve Component 
Employment 2000-2005 (RCE-05) Study in which it was directed that a Joint Reserve Component Virtual 
Information Operations Organization (JRVIO) be established to support joint and inter-agency 
organizations. In this paper, I will determine what virtual means, how it will be used for IO, and how a joint 
reserve unit is structured and functions. Furthermore, I will make a recommendation on how and where 
this/these JRVIO(s) should be utilized to support overall DoD Information Operations and specifically, 
Joint Commands and inter-agency organizations. 




Earl, Robert S. and Norman E. Emery. Terrorist Approach to Information 
Operations. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. 149p.  
Abstract: This thesis provides insight into how terrorist organizations exploit the information environment 
to achieve their objectives. The study establishes an analytical IO framework, by integrating US military 
doctrine with a fundamental approach to IO theory. The framework proves useful in examining the IO 
tools terrorists have assembled and how they implement them to influence their target audiences. The 
thesis shows that terrorists are, indeed, naturally linked to the information environment by their nature and 
strategy. Generally speaking, all terrorists employ IO tactically to enhance their operations. However, 
many organizations have a profound understanding of the information environment and also have the 
ability to manipulate information to achieve their objectives. Since, terrorist organizations are militarily 
weaker than the states they face and cannot rely on physical attacks to accomplish their goals, they must 
adopt an information strategy to achieve their objectives. This thesis emphasizes three primary 
conclusions: first terrorist conduct violent attacks in the physical environment to enable operations in the 
information environment. Second, terrorist integrate offensive and defensive IO to survive and appear 
legitimate to potential supporters and to the state. Finally, terrorists intentionally target four different 
audiences: opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and active to influence their perceptions. 




Eassa, Charles N. The Friction of Joint Information Operations. Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 
2000. 51p. 
Abstract: Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations was published in 1998 to 
provide clarity and guidance for conducting joint information operations. This paper seeks to answer if the 
doctrine proved sufficient at the Joint Task Force Level. Outlining information's role throughout the levels 
of war and the requirement for information at the JTF level, this paper uses the hierarchy established by 
previous keystone joint publications to determine if the joint information operations doctrine expanded on 
the established framework. During this process, the friction caused by the focus of Joint Publication 3-13 
is contrasted against the hierarchical joint doctrine. Joint Publication 3-13 created a great deal of friction. 
The publication did not sufficiently clarify the role or the value of information across the spectrum of 
conflict. It did not link the national instrument of power called information to military information operations 
to provide unity of effort. There was no discussion expanding the fundamentals of operational art from the 
joint information operations perspective. Technically oriented, Joint Publication 3-13 did not provide 
guidance for JTF Commanders to include information operations in their intent statements, concept of 
operations, or commander's critical information requirements. These omissions contribute to the friction of 
integrating information operations into JTFs. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA381926 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA381926  
 
_______. US Armed Forces Information Operations - Is the Doctrine Adequate. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, 2000. 45p. 
Abstract: Ultimately, all military operations function on information. This requires an active thought 
process to protect the needed information and information systems as well as to exploit adversaries' 
information requirements. The sister services have pursued approaches in developing and resourcing 
Information Operations based upon their tactical requirements. Outlining the joint and service doctrines, 
this monograph suggests that doctrine at the operational and strategic level is a collusion of service 
tactical doctrine and is too broad in its guidance. The doctrine does not specify responsibilities at the 
operational or strategic levels nor does it afford for synergy based on the services' Information Operations 
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doctrine. The study concludes that the doctrine represent a solid point of departure to continue the 
refinement and delineation of Information Operations at the operational and strategic levels. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA374690 
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Englert, Marvin A. Applying Advances in Information Operations to Peace 
Enforcement. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 23p. 
Abstract: The Armed Services of the United States are experimenting with concepts that use recent 
advances in information technologies to enhance its information operations. Two of these concepts are 
Network-Centric Warfare and Army Battle Command System being developed by the United States Navy 
and the United States Army, respectively. These concepts are being applied to enhance military 
operations in the combat environment. However, there is some question as to their usefulness in the 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) environment that the Armed services will continue to be 
involved in. This paper examines the applicability of these concepts to information operations in the 
MOOTW environment using the peace enforcement operation in Bosnia, Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard, as 
an example. It also examines the impact these developments may have on our allies, coalition partners, 
government and non-government organizations in this environment. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA392869 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA392869  
 
Evans, Alan T. Department of Defense and the Age of Information Operations. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, May 1998. 33p. 
Abstract: This paper explains the challenges and vulnerabilities the Nation and especially the military 
will face in the next century as our dependence on information systems and associated infrastructure 
continues to grow. It will highlight the results of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and discuss the steps necessary to protect the information systems upon which we have come 
to so heavily depend. It will highlight that without a comprehensive national policy in protecting 
information infrastructures poses a great risk to its military, commercial users and ultimately the Nation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA345602 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA345602  
 
Feiring, Douglas I. Information Warfare...From the Sea. Integrating Information 
Operations and the Marine Corps Planning Process. Quantico, CA: Marine Corps 
Command and Staff College, 2001. 12p.  
Abstract: Although the Marine Corps's current method of planning and employing Information 
Operations (IO) seeks to integrate its various elements, improvements must be made for this emerging 
concept to be a truly effective force multiplier. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA400017 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400017  
 
Ferguson, Quill R. Information Operations: The Least Applied Element of U.S. 
National Power. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2004. 28p.  
Abstract: Information operations, one of the four elements of U.S. national power, is supreme in 
defending the country against foreign or domestic adversaries and winning hearts and minds both at 
home and internationally. Following the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the majority of the world was outraged by the disregard for human life 
demonstrated by those who perpetrated the destruction. However, there also was strong animosity 
towards the United States throughout the Islamic World, particularly in the Middle East, that resulted in an 
acceptance of the act on the part of many Muslims. This paper examines the effectiveness of the U.S. 
Informational Element of National Power, compares it with those of U.S. adversaries, and determines 
what changes must occur to strengthen it. Finally, a recommendation is made on how the United States 
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can regain the lead in winning the hearts and minds of adversaries and potential adversaries around the 
world. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA424076 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424076  
 
Ferriter, Michael. Information Operations: Training the Leaders. Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Army War College, April 1999.  24p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this project is to determine if the Army's officer education and training systems 
adequately prepare our leaders to operate within, and to deploy, fight, and win in the Information Age. As 
we depart the industrial age and enter the Information Age the United States Military is undergoing a 
Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA). I undertook this project to exploit the opportunity to study this area. In 
this project I describe and define Information Operations as they are defined by our doctrine. I place IO 
with the context of the strategic environment, and the role of IO across the Range of Military operations 
and spectrum of conflict. I review the Army's plan to establish and integrate information operations within 
the Army. I describe how the Officer Personnel Management System XXI (OPMS XXI) restructured the 
officer corps along related branches and functional areas. I assess the professional military education 
system's current and future plans to address IO and offer recommendations believe will assist the effort. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA367956 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA367956  
 
Francis, Trisha. Requirements Analysis for the Development of Digital Library for 
the DoD Information Operations Center for Excellence (IOCFE). Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 47p. 
Abstract: In a memo from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, "The Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) is hereby designated the DoD Information Operations Center for Excellence. In that 
capacity, NPS shall facilitate development of Information Operations as a core military competency and 
innovation." Commander, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) will serve as Operational Sponsor for 
the Center on behalf of the Combatant Commands. The Secretary of the Navy and Commander 
USSTRATCOM will develop a charter for the Center on Wolfowitz's approval, in coordination with the 
Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
other DoD officials as appropriate. The charter will address oversight and activities of the Center, 
including graduate education, research, research opportunities, and transformation. As a tool to enhance 
the IOCFE USSTRATCOM is looking into the development of a digital library which will specifically 
provide resources for the Information Operations Community. This thesis conducts a preliminary 
requirements analysis for the development of a digital library. Successful development of this digital 
library is expected to effectively enhance the operational areas of Information Operations and Information 
Warfare within the Department of Defense. 




Freeman, Bryan R. The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and 
Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 77p. 
Abstract: Organizing for and conducting effective public affairs, public diplomacy, and psychological 
operations in support of national security objectives is a complex endeavor. In many instances, the 
desired psychological effects are contingent upon the efficiency of the organization conducting the 
programs and the development and dissemination of appropriate messages and themes. At present, the 
U.S. Government's ability to influence on a global scale is deficient due to fragmented organizational 
structure and underdeveloped doctrine relating to strategic influence. Duplication of efforts, inconsistent 
themes, and the lack of a long-term, strategically focused, integrated information strategy have been 
inhibitors to American foreign policy success. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the U.S. 
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Government and the American people have wondered why we have been unable to effectively influence 
the majority of the population in the Middle East. Since that time, the government has struggled with the 
question of how to both organize for and effectively conduct a strategic influence campaign in support of 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The United States' present capacity to conduct strategic influence in 
the Middle East is hindered by a dysfunctional organizational structure relative to strategic information 
operations and an institutional reluctance to recognize or value strategic influence as an effective 
instrument of statecraft. This thesis examines the three primary components of U.S. strategic influence: 
public diplomacy, public affairs, and psychological operations. Next is a look at various U.S. strategic 
information programs, their organizational structure, and the changes that have occurred in focus and 
policies from the beginning of the 20th century to the present. The final chapter examines public 
diplomacy, psychological operations, and public affairs as they relate to Operation Iraqi Freedom. 




Gaines, Robert J. Future Information Operations (IO) in the Military: Is It Time for 
an 'IO CINC.' Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2000. 29p. 
Abstract: The world is growing. Obviously not in terms of geography, but rather in the 'information' 
dimension. Populations, economies, and individual opportunity are each growing at rates unprecedented 
in the human experience. With this growth, the worldwide lust for information makes it a most powerful 
and necessary commodity. The world of Information Operations is where this commodity is produced, 
guarded, and marketed. If the United States of America is to maintain Superpower status, we must be 
pre-eminent in our Information Operations capability and readiness. The Department of Defense is 
funneling significant resources to meet this challenge. The question is: Under what command and control 
hierarchy are these efforts best shepherded? The first step in this study was to review existing literature 
on this topic and glean the present 'as is' condition of national Information Operations policy, military 
vision, private sector concern, law, and ethics. From this foundation, important issues were revealed and 
analyzed within the contextual framework. This research indicates our national interest would be best 
served through establishing an Information Operations Unified Command. Commitment and investment at 
this level by the National Command Authority and Department of Defense is logical and necessary to 
shape, respond, and prepare for worldwide Information Operations, potential Information Warfare, and 
cyber-terrorism. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA394089 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA394089  
 
Gallogly, Erin J. Nonlethal Information Operations Targeting Process: Duties, 
Responsibilities and Procedures. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and 
General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, December 1998. 60p. 
Abstract: This monograph's purpose is twofold. First, it provides the Joint Task Force Commander 
procedures by which to integrate nonlethal information operations into the joint targeting process and 
recommends duties and responsibilities for staff officers to ensure they integrate information operations 
into plans and operations. Second, it offers information operations officers a single document from which 
to develop standing operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint Publications 3-0, 
Doctrine for Joint Operations, and 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, provide the doctrinal 
underpinnings for joint targeting. Additionally, Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations, provides doctrine and guidance for information operations targeting. Currently there is neither 
Army doctrine for information operations targeting nor tactics, techniques, and procedures on how to 
integrate information operations into the targeting process. This monograph attempts to fill this gap. The 
capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations are outlined for the nonlethal information 
operations capabilities and activities (i.e., civil affairs, electronic warfare, military deception, psychological 
operations, public affairs, and special information operations). Finally, the author makes several 
recommendations in the areas of personnel and organization, training and education, doctrine, and 
operations. 
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ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA366242 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA366242  
 
Garrison, W. C. Information Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a 
Weapon of Public Affairs. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1999. 37p. 
Abstract: The U.S. military operates in a global information environment and is subject to propaganda 
influence from both domestic and foreign media. Access to information and disinformation can now 
influence attitudes and behavior from the battlefield to the far reaches of the world. Biased information 
can readily undermine the will of the American people and the American soldier to Support military 
operations. This study examines the role of Public Affairs in information operations. It identifies the need 
for Public Affairs to change the objectives of its Public Information function. It concludes with 
recommendations for Military Public Affairs to engage in defined counter-propaganda activity. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363892 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363892  
 
Gaver, Donald P. and Patricia A. Jacobs. Analytical Models for Battlespace 
Information Operations (BAT-10) Part 1. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
February 1998. 54p. 
Abstract: Modem warfare uses information gathering resources ('sensors') and C4ISR capabilities to 
detect, acquire, and identify targets for attack ('shooters'). This report provides analytical state space 
models that include the capabilities of the above functional elements in order to guide their appropriate 
balance; this includes attention to the effect of realistic errors, e.g. of target classification and battle 
damage assessment (BDA). The great sensitivity of strike effectiveness to BDA error is described in the 
text and illustrated in Figures 3.12-3.15. 
REPORT NUMBER: NPS-OR-98-001 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA341929 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA341929  
 
_______. Analytical Models for Battlespace Information Operations. (Bat-IO) Part 
2. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Operations Research. 
February 1999. 27p.  
Abstract: Modern warfare uses information gathering resources ('sensors') and C4ISR capabilities to 
detect, acquire, and identify targets for attack ('shooters'). This report provides analytical state-space 
models that include the capabilities of the above functional elements in order to guide their appropriate 
balance; this includes attention to the effect of realistic errors, e.g., of target classification and battle 
damage assessment (BDA). Also, an analytic stochastic model that illustrates multiple attractor/steady 
states is presented. 
REPORT NUMBER: NPS-OR-99-002 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA361307 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA361307  
 
Glock, John R. 'Operationalizing' Information Operations. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
Command and Staff College, 2000. 47p. 
Abstract: All military operations utilize information operations (IO). The Joint Staff and Services have 
written doctrine on IO. The cornerstone documents of the Joint Staff and Services, all refer to IO. 
Information Superiority is a core competency of the United States Air Force. Yet, there is virtually nothing 
written on how one actually operationally employs IO in support of a Joint Force Commander. The 
purpose of this paper is to address the question: 'How, at the operational level, does one employ 
offensive counter information operations (OCIO)?' This researcher decomposed the problem of employing 
OCIO into constituent parts. This methodology revealed that successful employment of OCIO requires a 
 163
force application process similar to that used when employing traditional forms of military force (e.g., air 
power). One still needs to establish objectives, identify targets, recommend capabilities, apply these 
capabilities against specific targets and after applying them assess their level of success. Having 
established the requirements of a process for employing OCIO, this paper then analyzes what aspects of 
the current joint targeting process need modification, and how to modify them in order to apply that 
process to OCIO. OCIO can use the existing joint targeting process with only minor modifications. To 
enhance the OCIO targeting process there are seven recommendations. These are: creating IO Target 
Materials, developing IO critical elements, establishing IO target folders requirements, formulating joint IO 
weaponeering methodologies, integrating IO and non-IO planning efforts, ensuring adequate access to IO 
capabilities and refining terminology. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA394084 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA394084  
 
Goble, Jeffrey J. Combat Assessment of Non-Lethal Fires: The Applicability of 
Complex Modeling to Measure the Effectiveness of Information Operations. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2002. 56p. 
Abstract: Military forces conduct information operations against one of the most complex, adaptive 
systems the human mind. Linear thought processes, prevalent in the military, correspond to, and 
understand well, the linear mathematics that measure the effects of lethal fires. They do not lend 
themselves well to the thinking necessary for understanding the effects of non-lethal fires on the complex 
adaptive system of the human mind. While each of the capabilities of information operations (IO) has 
individual Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), the cumulative effects they achieve, once integrated and 
synchronized in IO, are not simply a sum of each of the capabilities MOE. Nevertheless, these non-lethal 
systems, synchronized in information operations, must have predictive effects in order for commanders to 
employ them with confidence. Therein lies the problem; comprehensive MOE for information operations 
do not exist. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA402626  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA402626  
 
Gottschalk, Frederick C. The Role of Special Forces in Information Operations. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2000. 117p. 
Abstract: This thesis examines the role of the Special Forces Group in Information Operations. It 
focuses on providing information to the Joint Task Force planner and the Special Forces unit leaders. It 
provides the Joint Forces Commander and planner an understanding of Special Forces unit's core 
capabilities, mission types and operational methods. It provides the Special Forces leader an 
understanding of what Information Operations are, and how his unit fits into the overall structure of an 
Information Operation. The thesis looks at four recent operations (Just Cause, Desert Storm, Noble 
Obelisk and Joint Guard) and Special Forces unit's missions during those operations. The missions are 
explained and cross-referenced with the elements of Information Operations (Operational Security, 
Military Deception, Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare, Physical Destruction, Physical Security, 
Counterdeception, Counterpropaganda, Counterintelligence, Special Information Operations and 
Computer Network Attack) to demonstrate the potential role of Special Forces units in future Information 
Operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA383815 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA383815  
 
Gray, Jaime V., et al. Information Operations: A Research Aid Includes Coverage 
of Information Warfare, Information Assurance, and Infrastructure Protection. 
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 1997. 129p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide an aid for researchers engaged in studying aspects of 
military Information Operations, including subelements of Information Warfare, Information Superiority, 
and Information Assurance. These topics are also associated with National Critical Infrastructure 
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Protection. The document contains an annotated bibliography of research material arranged by principal 
subject areas (e.g., Information Operations, Defensive Information Operations, National Policy, 
Technology) believed to be of most value to new analysts of this field. Also included are the results of 
interviews conducted with several nationally recognized experts in an attempt to elicit main themes and 
suggestions for improvement. This document can provide an excellent starting point for identifying issues 
and options, as well as applicable policy and implementation publications. 
REPORT NUMBER: IDAD2082 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA338452 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA338452  
 
Gray, James L., Jr. Planning Information Operations to Enable Assured Access. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 21p. 
Abstract: The end of the Cold War brought about an exponential increase in the quantity and quality of 
long-range precision weapons available to Third World countries. This trend is going to make it more and 
more risky for U.S. forces to project power against a country who possess these weapons. The solution to 
this problem is currently being called "Assured Access" and is a very complicated subject. Information 
Warfare (IW) offers the potential to help solve the assured access problem by minimizing risk to forces 
operating within weapons range of a hostile country. The problem is that current plans are not being 
revised to fully integrate IW with other warfare disciplines. One method to focus this effort is to analyze IW 
functions in terms of operational functions. This allows for the analysis of IW mission enablers and 
detractors. The logical follow through would then be to develop workarounds so that incorporating IW 
results in an overall more effective plan. This same analysis can be used by the tactical commander to 
evaluate changing situations and alternate courses of action. It is time to start integrated planning and to 
exercise this capability with the fleet. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA389506 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389506  
 
Gregory, Thomas R. Educating Officers in Information Operations: Is the U.S. 
Army Moving in the Right Direction? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army War College, 
2003. 50p. 
Abstract: Information Operations are becoming increasingly important in military operations. While many 
of the components that comprise Information Operations are not new the U.S. Army is attempting to 
better synchronize these components to increase their battlefield effects. To accomplish this aim the Army 
has produced new doctrine for Information Operations and even created a new career field for 
commissioned officers (FA3O) to address Information Operations. This study examines the doctrine that 
exists to support Information Operations as well as how Information Operations is being incorporated into 
the Army's Officer Education System. The study begins by describing a current military operation where 
Information Operations was the main effort. This case study selected was an operation conducted in 
Bosnia Herzegovina titled, "Operation Bosanova". The study next analyzes current and future U.S. Army 
doctrine for Information Operations. Next, the study addresses how Information Operations are taught as 
part of the current Officer Education System. The study concludes with a series of recommendations for 
how Information Operations should be taught as part of the Officer Education System. The conclusion of 
the study is that while sufficient doctrine currently exists within the U.S. Army to conduct Information 
Operations, there is an Army wide lack of any education in the discipline. While a concerted effort is being 
made to ensure that the Army has trained FA3O officers, no real training exists for the remainder of the 
officer corps to become educated in the fundamentals of Information Operations. It is this lack Information 
Operations education for all officers that is the biggest identified weakness of this study. 





Griffith, James L. United States Air Force Information Operations Doctrine: Is It 
Relevant? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2000. 121p. 
Abstract: This study examines the relevancy of US Air Force (USAF) IO doctrine, organization and 
training to accomplishing the Air Force's missions. This study evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of 
USAF 10 doctrine as compared to joint doctrine and current thoughts being considered by civilian theorist 
and foreign nations. The discussion provides the background for answering the primary thesis research 
question: Is Air Force IO doctrine, organization and training relevant in today's IO environment? To 
adequately analyze the answer to this question, the author provides a definition of relevancy, and defines 
the elements that constitute the current IO environment. These definitions provide the framework upon 
which to evaluate the USAF's efforts in developing IO doctrine, training and organization. IO provide the 
edge our military needs to counter the threat of cyberwarfare, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. 
The USAF must expand its capability to defend its information and information systems while 
simultaneously developing air power tools that contribute to the Joint Force Commander's theater IO 
objectives. Incorporating IO into USAF operations is the only way to maintain our edge in today's 
environment. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA383817 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA383817  
 
Hardy, Charles K. Information Operations as an Element of National Power: A 
Practitioners Perspective on Why the United States Can't Get It Right. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2005. 30p. 
Abstract: Most observers are disturbed to note that the United States of America, the lone superpower 
and the largest democratic and economically successful country in the history of the world, cannot or will 
not apply the means required to achieve overwhelming success in Information Operations. In simplest 
terms, the US is failing to apply a marketing strategy to sell democracy. How often do senior leaders 
acknowledge that Information Operations is critical to the success of combating terrorism? Consistently it 
is stated that "winning the hearts and minds," "winning the war of ideas," or "combating an ideology" is 
key to victory. If these declarations are true, then why do most senior commanders consistently state "we 
are losing the Information Operations fight?" The purpose of this paper is to examine the US strategic 
national policies on Information Operations (IO). Additionally, if the US has a strategic plan in place ,is it 
understood and integral to all operational concepts throughout the force. The author will identify and 
explain why the US consistently fails to achieve success in implementation of IO and will make 
recommendations on how to apply this element of national power to achieve the national strategic ends. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA432386 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA432386  
 
Harris, Jr, David A. Information Operations as a Counter to US Air Dominance: A 
Rival's Perspective. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2007.  
63p.  
Abstract: The purpose of this monograph is to answer the question of what lessons over the past ten 
years of US air operations have foreign militaries integrated into their doctrine and organizations to 
counter US air dominance. By examining the air campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq through the 
lens of Chinese and Russians analysts, information operations has been the key lesson learned to 
counter US air dominance. From this analysis, some broader conclusions were made concerning the 
conduct IO in peace-time, the confusion surrounding IO terminology, the challenges of identifying 
deception in the targeting and operational analysis process, and the integration of IO and air superiority 
objectives within a campaign. 




Heickero, Roland. Some Thoughts on the Application of Military Theory to 
Information Operations and Network Centric Warfare. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish 
Defence Research Agency, 2006 27p.  
Abstract: The transformation into a world based on communication and information leads to Information 
Operations (IO) becoming more important than ever. Thus, there is a need to develop new methodologies 
for successful IO that take into account the change towards network-enabling warfare capabilities. In a 
network-centric warfare approach it is important to understand the opponents' network structure and 
communication system and how they use these resources. Equally important is to understand one's own 
network structure in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Every type of network has it own vulnerabilities 
in the form of vital nodes, links, and platforms, regardless of whether it is a communications, 
organizational, or biological network. If one understand one's own structure as well as that of one's 
opponents, the chances of effective IO increase greatly. A fruitful way forward is to use theories based on 
center of gravity (CoG) and critical vulnerabilities (CV). This paper first discusses the logic of networks in 
general terms and then considers different types of networks and their respective abilities to resist attacks 
of different kinds due to center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Twenty briefing charts summarize the 
presentation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA461536 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA461536  
 
Hellquist, Ingvar. Information Operations - Demands of Increased Cooperation 
Within the Cabinet and Between the State and the Private Sector. Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Army War College, 2003 29p. 
Abstract: This paper presents a comparison of Swedish and U.S. perspectives on actions to reduce 
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure when that infrastructure is attacked via Information Operations. It 
compares the U.S. and the Swedish definitions of Information Operations and offers an example of how 
Information Operations can be implemented. The paper stresses the need for increased cooperation 
among governments and increased awareness of a government's needs within the economic 
environment. With technological advancements occurring mostly in the private sector, no single actor is 
the owner of a critical information system. Yet information technology and globalization lead to the 
international arena and demand international cooperation. This paper suggests ways in which different 
actors (e.g., the Government, information system producers, suppliers of data and telecommunications 
equipment, financial institutions, insurance companies) can attain cooperation throughout a nation's 
critical systems. An area of special interest, because of their authority and collaboration in an asymmetric 
environment, is the role of police and military in protective Information Operations. The paper looks at the 
issues of global security, technological development, and economics as they affect Information 
Operations. The author stresses the need for developed forms of public-private cooperation and 
describes a way to organize traditional domestic responsibilities to keep pace with emerging information 
technology-related threats. The author also recommends new ways of handling crises and conflicts and 
enforcing sanctions in the international arena. Recommendations are provided for cross-sector security 
cooperation within the cabinet and between the State and private sector. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA414596 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA414596  
 
Hestad, Daniel R. A Discretionary-Mandatory Model as Applied to Network Centric 
Warfare and Information Operations. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2001. 84p. 
Abstract: The concepts of DoD information operations and network centric warfare are still in their 
infancy. In order to develop concepts, the right conceptual models need to be developed from which to 
design and implement these concepts. Information operations and network centric warfare are 
fundamentally based on trust decisions. However, the key to developing these concepts is for DoD to 
develop the organizational framework from which trust, inside and outside, of an organization may be 
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achieved and used to its advantage. In this thesis, an organizational model is submitted for review to be 
applied to DoD information systems and operational organizations. 




Hill, Brian A. Can't We All Just Get Along? The Interagency Process at Work in 
Information Operations. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. 22p. 
Abstract: The United States military recently adopted an unprecedented strategy to meet the national 
military objectives of preventing conflict and surprise attacks. Preemption has taken on new meaning for 
the Department of Defense (DoD). The commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) Horn on Africa (HOA), 
Major General Timothy Ghormley, USMC, is leading 1,500 U.S. military personnel in Eastern Africa 
engaged in a battle without bullets. By attempting to stem the growth of radical Islamic militancy in East 
Africa, JTF-HOA aims to defeat Al Qaeda before kinetic weapons have to be fired. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA463536 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA463536  
 
Hollman, Ryan D. Descriptive Study of Information Operations and Information 
Warfare Awareness in the United States Air Force. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air 
Force Institute of Technology, School of Logistics and Acquisition Management. 
September 1998. 69p. 
Abstract: Information has always been important in military affairs, conflicts, and wars. Information 
warfare is an important new concept that is emphasized by the significance of computer and information 
technology. The United States Air Force has educated and trained individuals in information warfare since 
recognizing the importance of information warfare in 1995. The Air Force Information Warfare Center and 
the information warfare squadron were also created to address information warfare concerns. Information 
warfare is important to the entire Air Force. How familiar are Air Force people generally in information 
warfare. This thesis addresses awareness of information warfare and information operations concepts. 
Despite the amount of focus, training, and education, it was unknown how aware individuals were 
concerning information warfare and information operations. This thesis surveyed eight hundred officers 
and enlisted personnel with a response rate of 214 to determine the baseline of information warfare 
awareness. Approximately sixty percent of the respondents indicated that they were aware of information 
warfare. Also, individuals who received information warfare training responded higher than individuals 
without training. This is the first study in information warfare and information operations awareness. 
Additional research is needed to determine how the awareness levels are changing and the effectiveness 
of the training. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA354317 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA354317  
 
Horner, Stephen C. Cryptography, Information Operations and the Industrial Base: 
A Policy Dilemma. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1997. 34p.  
Abstract: The information age is in full swing and it is changing the face of national security. The 
explosive force of information technology places the Global Information Infrastructure, the worldwide 
industrial base and the various world governments in both mutually supporting and somewhat adversarial 
positions. The information infrastructure is rapidly becoming the lifeblood for the world's industry and a 
critical part of the national infrastructure around the world. Consequently, the emerging operational 
regime of information operations is playing a critical role in the protection of U.S. national security 
interests and exploitation of adversary systems associated with information systems. Cryptography, long 
a traditional government area of interest, is taking on increased importance in industry, not only for 
protection of sensitive data but as a worldwide product market itself. The U.S. government cryptography 
policy must balance the need for continued U.S. dominance in information technology and the 
government's legitimate need to access data. U.S. dominance requires increased access to world 
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markets for U.S. cryptography technology. Solution to this policy dilemma requires a team approach by 
U.S. government and industry to provide the best answer. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326657 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326657  
 
Issler, Gordon D. Space War Meets Info War: The Integration of Space and 
Information Operations. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2000. 
19p. 
Abstract: The thesis of this paper is that until current legal, political and technical constraints are 
overcome concerning the weaponization of space, space operations should focus on integrating into the 
information operations campaign with the goal of gaining and maintaining information superiority. This 
paper will describe Space Operations and Information Operations as defined by current and draft joint 
publications, and then discuss the integration of these two areas to produce a synergistic effect on the 
operational level battlefield. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406586 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406586   
 
Jones, Synthia S., Bernard Flowers and Karlton D. Johnson. To Wield Excalibur: 
Seeking Unity of Effort in Joint Information Operations. Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces 
Staff College, 2002.  
Abstract: Throughout history, many authors have used European folklore as a medium to express 
complex ideas and clarify issues. Most known is the legend of King Arthur, a memorable story replete with 
rich allusions and profound metaphors. The Arthurian legend depicts Britain as a divided country: 
factional and disjointed with feudal entities fighting for control of the land. All seemed lost until the Lady of 
the Lake gave King Arthur the sword, Excalibur. Wielding this sword with vision, Arthur unified the people 
to bring order to a troubled land. There is a similar need for order leading to unity of effort in the realm of 
Joint information Operations (JIO). 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA421636 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421636  
 
Keim, Steven M. From Policies to Procedures: The Next Step in Information 
Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, May 1998. 48p.  
Abstract: An effective information operations campaign depends on the successful integration of 
information operations elements and capabilities into the joint force commander's overall operation plan. 
Information operations planning must begin at the earliest stage of a joint force commander's peacetime 
campaign planning and must provide a basis for subsequent information operations in crisis and/or 
conflict. Information operations planning for a particular military operation can occur as part of the 
deliberate planning cycle or in response to a crisis; therefore, this paper addresses information operations 
planning requirements in relation to the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. It also discusses 
methods of planning, integrating and executing information operations and provides some tactics, 
techniques, and procedures in an effort to link information operations policy and doctrine to information 
operations execution. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA347140 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA347140  
 
Kirpekar, Ulhas. Information Operations in Pursuit of Terrorists.  Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.  231p.  
Abstract: The Global War on Terror is in its sixth year now and the battle with the Islamist terrorists is 
being fought both in the physical as well as the informational domain. This research examines the 
relationship between terrorism and information operations keeping in view Martin Libicki's notion of 
information warfare as a Mosaic of Forms. This research begins with the basics of terrorism and 
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information operations and proceeds to highlight the use of information operations by terrorist 
organizations and in particular its use by Al Qaeda. In order to compare the complete spectrum of 
information operations being conducted by United States-led forces in this Global War on Terror this 
research includes two detailed studies on the prosecution of information operations from the perspective 
of both the United States-led coalitions and the anti-coalition elements in Afghanistan and Iraq. The study 
concludes by highlighting the relevance of Libicki's constructs in the context of the Global War on Terror 
and proposes a macro strategy to pursue the Islamist terrorists in the information domain. 




Kucukozyigit, Ali Can. Electronic Warfare (EW) Historical Perspectives and 
Its Relationship to Information Operations (IO)-Considerations for Turkey. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 149p.  
Abstract: The purpose of this thesis is the exploration of the relationship and interaction between 
Electronic Warfare (EW) and Information Operations (IO) core, supporting and related competencies. 
Understanding the definitions of information and its value, information superiority, and the decision 
making cycle provides the foundation for the thesis. Investigation of the historical transformation of EW 
from the U.S. Civil War to the First Gulf War, and also examining how the concept of IO has developed 
and evolved contributes to this study by helping to comprehend the modern day interaction between EW 
and each IO  competency separately. This interaction is constructed upon the guidance and standards 
provided by the latest U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations.  
This study concludes that the relationship between EW and IO is increasingly interactive and consists of 
two aspects: limiting  and interfering, and reinforcing and supporting. Also, the relationship between EW 
and each IO competency is not consistent between the core and supporting competencies. In addition to 
these conclusions, this study expresses some considerations for EW and IO applications with respect to 
the unique environment and requirements of the Turkish Republic. 




La Perla, Philip A. Creating Information Knowledgeable Leaders Through 
Information Operations Education. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 
1997. 51p. 
Abstract: To be effective on tomorrow's battlefield, we must become masters of the 'infosphere.' The 
Army needs leaders who have a deep understanding of warfare in the context of the information age. This 
study defines the information operations (IO) conceptual knowledge required in senior leaders to be 
successful in warfare in the information age. Then it reviews the status of 10 education at USAWO. This 
review then leads to recommendations for changes to the course curriculum based on the curriculum of 
the School of Information Warfare and Strategy's two-year pilot program. These changes are the catalyst 
for transforming industrial-age thinkers into information knowledgeable leaders. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326793 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326793  
 
LaBruzzo, Jon-Paul R. Influencing Friends and Allies: Information Operations 
Doctrine and the Role of the Combatant Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, 2007. 23p.  
Abstract: Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 states that "Information operations (IO) are described as the 
integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological 
operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with 
specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial [emphasis 
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added] human and automated decision making while protecting our own." While this definition addresses 
the full measure of joint efforts in effecting the mind of the enemy decision maker, it cordons off other 
potential recipients of IO-friends and allies of the United States. The term adversarial in the JP 3-13 
definition of IO is limiting; IO has beneficial application in US efforts to influence states and peoples 
friendly or allied with the United States. Certainly, some aspects of IO are best reserved for unfriendly 
target audiences namely actions to disrupt, corrupt, and usurp. But if IO represents a panoply of 
capabilities that can be used to affect the enemy it also includes capabilities that can be used to influence 
friends. Therefore joint IO doctrine should be changed to include friends and allies of the United States as 
targeted audiences (IO-F/A). Furthermore the geographic COCOM has a role to play in IO focused on 
decision makers friendly to the United States through Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, the 
Theater Security Cooperation Plan, and Strategic Communications. This paper examines the COCOM's 
vital role in IO-F/A and justifies the need for JP 3-13 to be changed to reflect the importance of that role 
and information operations vis- -vis friends and allies of the United States. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA470830 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA470830
 
Lane, Randall C. Information Operations: A Joint Perspective. Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 
May 1998. 57p. 
Abstract: This monograph examines the current Department of Defense approach to the integration of 
information operations on the future battlefield. Technology has become one of the driving factors as the 
military enters into the twenty first century. With regards to this focus, each separate military service is 
capitalizing on information technological advances but not with a joint focus or shared desired endstate. 
Information technology and systems are an integral part to the emerging field of information operations, 
but without the joint efforts of each service and a central controlling element the military applications of 
information operations will never meet their intended purpose. This monograph first explains what 
information warfare and operations are along with their military applications according to each service: the 
Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Secondly, this paper looks at what the emerging joint doctrine states 
concerning the definition, employment and integration of information warfare on the future battlefield. This 
portion of the paper examines joint doctrine concerning the integration of information operations at the 
operational and strategic levels with examples of how information warfare was conducted in recent 
deployments in Somalia, Bosnia and the Gulf War. Thirdly, the paper analyzes the potential problems 
determined from comparing the different service approaches to information warfare as opposed to an 
integrated joint approach. Lastly, this paper explores the possible military need to create either a 
functional command responsible for the integration of joint informational warfare or simply maintaining the 
current C2 structure and limiting the focus to C2W for further integration of information operations training 
and doctrinal employment. The recommendations proposed in this monograph are centered on 
developing an integrated joint approach to the training, doctrine and employment of information. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA356947 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA356947  
 
Lawrence, Susan S. Effects of Information Operations on Nonlinear Force 
Structures. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1999. 41p. 
Abstract: This paper will address the advent of information operations and its effect on how the military 
will operate in the future. The goal is to highlight the need to aggressively pursue the execution of 
information operations' strategy and doctrine. Wrapped in this is the requirement to fix responsibility, 
clarify terms and understanding of 10, and find creative ways of responding to this new order of business. 
This may mean a whole new way of thinking that may alter our force structure to be more responsive to a 
threat. This paper also introduces the theory of nonlinearity and its effect on information operations. 
Leadership, innovation, and flexibility of task organization are essential to the success in Army 
operations. Future force designers must look at each mission uniquely and apply the right size and type 
of forces to meet the threat. This means units deploying in non-traditional ways; thus, the challenge of 
providing smooth, reliable information operations. 
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http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363159  
 
Leney, Derek J. Improving Information Warfare Targeting: An IW Fires System. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, February 1995. 
30p. 
Abstract: Information Operations (IO) has grown in importance during recent conflicts. Yet some 
aspects of IO coordination and integration have fallen short of expectations. This has led to a desire by 
many in the IO community to better manage Information Warfare "fires" using the Joint Targeting Cycle as 
a rational process for their execution. However, current doctrine and joint organizations do not adequately 
provide for control of these fires. This paper addresses the conceptual challenges of Information Warfare 
(IW) targeting, including the differences between attacking "will" and attacking "capability." Recent 
lessons learned in Iraq and Kosovo highlight additional IO problems within the Joint Targeting Cycle. An 
IW Fires System is proposed to address these shortcomings, providing a formalized and connected 
organization for IW targeting and fire support. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA465003 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA465003
 
Luiijf, H. A. M. Survey of Information Warfare, Information Operations and 
Information Assurance. The Hague, Netherlands: Fysisch en Elektronisch Laboratory, 
1999. 92p. 
Abstract: Research survey on the phenomena Information Warfare, Information Operations (Info Ops) 
and Information Assurance. History, development, definitions and developments in various countries 
around the globe. Appendix with list of abbreviations of terms in these fields. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA367670 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA367670  
 
MacKenzie, Scot D. Executing Joint Information Operations: Where Do We Go 
After Kosovo? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 22p. 
Abstract: Operation Allied Force, the NATO air operation in Kosovo, was the first major operation where 
Information Operations (I0) was formally implemented, albeit with mixed results. Like many other aspects 
of this historic operation, I0 affects were prosecuted in piecemeal fashion and far too late to be effective. 
Alliance problems aside, the joint warfighting team raised many concerns for how I0 affects are integrated 
into joint and combined operations. While the I0 report card is bleak, it is important to examine what went 
wrong and take steps to improve I0 during future joint operations. We have far to go as a joint community 
until we see the full strategic benefit of I0, which doctrine suggests is to "affect adversary or potential 
adversary decision makers to the degree that they will cease actions that threaten U.S. national security 
interests." This paper proposes taking two concrete steps to elevate the importance of information by 
recognizing IO as a unique operational planning and execution function. At the core of my proposal is 
forming a permanent I0 cell, properly staffed, and led by senior leadership. This cell will develop the 
precursor for successfully executing I0: a theatre-wide I0 strategy that is fully coordinated with all non-
DOD agencies in an AOR. My thesis is generated from the I0 lessons from Kosovo, namely: 1) Make sure 
people know what I0 is; 2) Start I0 very early in planning; 3) Have a adequately staffed I0 cell headed by 
senior staff officer; 4) Have an I0 strategy that is implemented during peace and crisis. Kosovo bears out 
one important point: Joint I0 is not ready for prime time. 






Mackey, Randall L. Information Operations: Reassessing Doctrine and 
Organization. Carlisle Barracks PA: Army War College, 2003. 42p. 
Abstract: Information operations will play a key role in pursuing information superiority as part of the 
Joint Vision 2020 goal of achieving full spectrum dominance. Despite the importance of information 
operations within the U.S. vision of future conflict, the U.S. military does not have a consistent and 
coherent understanding of information operations. Information operations mission areas are ill defined 
and what should be basic terminology is complex, full of nuances, and inconsistent. Organization within 
DoD to accomplish 10 missions is also less than optimal. In some cases different unrelated 10 missions 
are assigned to organizations in an effort to consolidate responsibility for 10. Yet in other instances 
closely related missions that should be centralized are assigned to different organizations. This paper 
examines the various mission areas under 10 as currently defined, proposes modifications, and presents 
a new taxonomy for 10 and 10 component mission areas. This paper also examines current 10 
organizations within DoD and makes recommendations for realignment of 10 missions. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA413656 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA413656  
 
Mackin, Patrick B. Information Operations and the Global War on Terror: The Joint 
Force Commander's Fight for Hearts and Minds in the 21st Century. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2004. 27p.  
Abstract: Information Operations offers the Joint Force Commander with an alternative to using 
traditional military force when objectives are abstract or intangible. General Charles Holland, United 
States Special Operations Command, identifies the Muslim population as the Center of Gravity in our 
current War on Terror. Information operations may be the tool necessary to target this Center of Gravity. 
The successful Australian Defense Force (ADF) experience with Information Operations in two recent 
conflicts offer the United States valuable strategies in fighting the Global War on Terror. Examining the 
ADF IC methods and techniques offer today's Joint Force Commander (JFC) with approaches worthy of 
consideration in a conflict that is religiously and ideologically charged. Analysis of current U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are explored and recommendations are provided for consideration in the struggle to 
win the Hearts and Souls of the greater Muslim population. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA422766 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA422766  
 
Martin, William J. Information Pervades All Levels of War: A Study of Information 
Operations in Iraq. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2003. 21p.  
Abstract: According to U.S. Joint Military Doctrine, the central hypothesis of IO is exploiting the enemy s 
information and information systems, while protecting one s own. (JP 3-13) IO is a concept as old as 
warfare itself, but has attracted more attention in recent years due to leaps in information technology. 
Global Positioning System, data links, computer networks, and even the media represent just a few facets 
of this glittering gem. IO is ubiquitous and applies across all phases and ranges of military operations, 
and pervades all levels of war & tactical, operational and strategic, making it a nation s single most 
powerful weapon. Although used extensively throughout the history of warfare, nowhere else has IO 
served a more extensive role than in than in U.S. military actions in Iraq. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA424992 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424992  
 
Masterson, Michael J. NAIC Support to Information Operations. Wright-Patterson 
AFB, OH: National Air Intelligence Center, 2002. 34p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this document is to provide NAIC Information Operations mission overview 
and demonstrate the Dynamic Information Operations Decision Environment (DIODE) production 
process. 




McGovern, Jim. Information Operations. A USN Perspective. Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 2002. 16p. 
Abstract: These viewgraphs give a navy perspective on Information Operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406362 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406362  
 
McKeown, Wendell B. Information Operations: Countering the Asymmetric Threat 
to the United States. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1999. 40p. 
Abstract: The United States is dependent on information. As we move into the 21st Century our reliance 
on information systems will only increase. The cornerstone of Joint Vision 2010 is information superiority. 
Every facet of future military operations will be critically linked to an aggregate cyber network that relies 
on critical national infrastructures to provide for information superiority. This system of systems is vital in 
performing both routine and crisis action military activities. Our dependence on this infrastructure places 
the United States in a highly vulnerable position to asymmetric attacks. This paper will examine the 
impact on our military if it were unable to effectively communicate and coordinate. It examines the 
vulnerabilities of the information infrastructure and argues that recent national policy changes will be 
effective in dealing with the threats to both civil and military operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363692 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363692  
 
McKiernan, Brian J. Information Operations Roadmap: One Right Turn and We're 
There. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2007. 12p. 
Abstract: During Secretary Rumsfeld's tenure, the Department of Defense embarked on one of the most 
far-reaching transformations in the history of the United States military. This transformation is largely 
driven by the rapid advances in information technology and the belief that information is more critical now 
to military success and will become even more critical in the foreseeable future. The Department of 
Defense addressed this assumption by formulating the Information Operations Roadmap with the 
objective of making information operations a core capability of future forces and a core military 
competency. The goal of information operations is to gain information superiority -- the operational 
advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting the enemy's ability to do the same. Achieving and sustaining a significant 
information advantage over the adversary remains problematic, particularly in asymmetric conflicts. This 
project assesses the Information Operations Roadmap by examining non-military applications of 
information technology in the Information Age, reviewing current doctrine and assessing information 
operations during recent United States military operations. This study provides recommended 
adjustments to the Information Operations Roadmap based on this analysis. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA469629 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA469629
 
McLaughlin, Lawrence W. Organizing for Information Operations Within The Joint 
Task Force. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003.  21p.  
Abstract: Information operations (IO) continue to rise in prominence as a force multiplier for the joint 
force. Joint doctrine defines information operations as a broad range of capabilities and related activities 
that include operations security, psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical attack/destruction 
and special information operations. Given the importance and scope of IO across the spectrum of conflict, 
it would be logical that a robust organizational structure would be prescribed to support the multiple 
functions of IO and ensure the necessary coordination required to implement a comprehensive 10 
campaign. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Joint doctrine inadequately integrates IO into the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) organization to address the many aspects of IO. The current doctrinal organization for the 
 174
conduct of IO - the 10 cell - does not provide for unity of command or centralized planning necessary to 
support the commander's IO effort. A potential solution to this problem is to create a new organization 
within the JTF command and control structure modeled after the Joint Psychological Operation Task 
Force (JS0TF). This would greatly increase the ability of the Joint Force Commander to plan and execute 
a comprehensive IO campaign that is integrated with, and complementary to, the overall campaign plan. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA415438 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415438  
 
Miller, Earl E. Army Transformation and Information Operations: The International 
Legal Implications. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 35p, 
Abstract: As many nations throughout the world have become entrenched in what has been described 
as the information revolution, many legal parameters of information operations remain uncertain. 
Information is fast becoming a strategic resource that permeates every facet of the U.S. National Military 
Strategy. The proliferation of information-based technologies will substantially transform the Army's 
doctrine as well as its structure. The evolution of the information environment has specific legal 
implications within the international community. This paper examines these challenges and proposes to 
establish a framework for the inevitable global debate over related legal issues. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA404415 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404415  
 
Mills, Charles D. The Linkage of Joint Operational Fires, Information Operations 
and the Army: Does the Army Have Effective Feedback Mechanisms that Integrate 
Operational Fires (Physical Destruction) and Information Operations? Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2004. 63p.  
Abstract: The information revolution seems to hold a lot of promise to the U.S. economy and the U.S. 
military, but rigid bureaucratic hierarchies make it extremely difficult for effective integration of operational 
fires and information operations (IO). As one observes the transformation of the U.S. military and other 
traditional institutions, they have been ill prepared to meet new organizational challenges posed by 
nonhierarchical, amorphous, and networked opponents due to adapting unevenly to the information 
revolution. This monograph serves only to suggest that the U.S. military has adapted to the information 
revolution unevenly due to constraints by institutional inertia, service rivalries, and conservative thinking. 
Doctrine traditionally has emphasized centralized control of fires as the most efficient means of matching 
fires to capabilities, missions, and desired effects. In Objective Force (OF), due to the complexity and 
importance of integrating lethal and non-lethal fires and effects within IO, employing fires will require 
positioning delivery systems in a way that allows the ability to apply effects where they are needed. 
Additionally, as the concept of information warfare (IW) becomes more popular with certain circles of the 
U.S. defense establishment, it is imperative that the U.S. Army and the fires support community begin 
establishing effective feedback mechanisms at the operational level that effectively applies IO across all 
phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations, and at every level of war. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA429751 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA429751  
 
Mitchell, Mark E. Strategic Leverage: Information Operations and Special 
Operations Forces. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 1999. 231p. 
Abstract: Special Operations Forces (SOF) have assumed a unique and expanded role as a strategic 
asset of the United States. The conjunction of changing political and security environments and new 
technologies present both challenges and opportunities for SOF. Special Operations Forces provide the 
National Command Authority (NCA) a variety of unique capabilities and expanded options for achieving 
strategic goals at minimum costs. The recent drawdown has placed even more value on the capabilities 
and leverage provided by SOF. Additionally the rapid pace of technological change – the 'information 
revolution' - has opened the door to a potential 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). New approaches to 
warfare, like Information Operations (IO), are beginning to emerge from the RMA. Information operations, 
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like SOF, can also provide a means to leverage limited resources. At the strategic level, SOF can provide 
support for IO; at the tactical level, IO can support of special operations (SO). Each has distinct 
implications for SOF. In either case, the object of the supporting operation is to generate or expand a 
window of opportunity for the supported operation. Separately, both SO and IO can provide economy of 
force. Properly employed, this leverage is multiplied and offers a tremendous strategic asset. 




Molinari, Robert J.  Winning the Minds in 'Hearts and Minds': A Systems Approach 
to Information Operations as Part of Counterinsurgency Warfare. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, 2005. 63p.  
Abstract: Do Information Operations (IO) contribute to success in counterinsurgency campaigns? What 
IO measures of excellence exist to demonstrate achievement of success in counterinsurgencies? These 
questions currently challenge U.S. military forces deployed to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This 
monograph develops a systems framework to better analyze and understand the interactions of IO 
subsystems as part of counterinsurgency operations. In addition to developing an adaptive systems 
framework to understand the importance of IO as part of COIN, this document explains the importance of 
system's aims to identify centers of gravity and feedback loops through existing doctrinal typology of 
situation-specific considerations. Feedback loops are developed into measures of excellence that allow 
synchronization and synergy of IO subsystems to be translated through cultural barriers and adjusted as 
necessary to affect the perception management of all targeted audiences in a counterinsurgency 
campaign. The historical case study analysis of the Malayan counterinsurgency (1948-1960) is utilized to 
describe IO as part of COIN systems approach. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA436114 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436114  
 
Moorman, John R. The Future Role of Information Operations in Operational Art. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002. 19p.  
Abstract: This paper looks at the relationship between the rate of technology development and the role 
of information operations in the operational art. Computer processing power has doubled every two years 
since 1959 in accordance with Moore's Law, bringing with it a corresponding decrease in cost. 
Networking computers has exponentially increased the power of individual computers in accordance with 
Moore's Law. These technological phenomenon have produced the information age, where the ability to 
gather, process and exchange information is the source of power and wealth. The military is adapting to 
the information age, incorporating information systems in its infrastructure and exploring new warfighting 
concepts such as network centric warfare, that leverage the power of networks. The increasing 
integration of technology into weapons systems and operational concepts will increase the operational 
commanders capabilities and vulnerabilities. Without a corresponding increase in information operations 
capabilities and strategies, the best strategy can be defeated by successful destruction of information 
systems. Future operational commanders must understand the effects of increasing technological 
development and integration, and the increasing role and significance of information operations that 
corresponds with it. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA405639 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA405639  
 
Morthland, Samuel P. Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 71p.  
Abstract: This thesis explores the hypothesis that a national information strategy would enhance military 
effectiveness and national security. Analysis of the role of information in conflict, a definition of what 
information is, and how it can be used to support military operations establishes the foundation for the 
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thesis. Perception management, system destruction, and information exploitation are identified as key 
elements of to an effective strategy. They are reflected in the 17 information operational capabilities in 
joint doctrine. Four categories were created to differentiate the IO capabilities along offense/defense and 
technological/cognitive lines. The current focus of IO in the U.S. is the technical/offensive IO category, 
with less attention being given to the conceptual/ cognitive category. This may be due to a lack of 
strategic IO planning. Therefore, a planning methodology is developed herein and used to analyze the 
Administration's response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001. A detailed analysis of the IO capabilities 
used identified two shortcomings: the failure to identify all key audiences, and not considering all the IO 
capabilities available. The thesis recommends adopting the concepts of a National Information Strategy 
and the IO strategic planning methodology used in the study. 




Murphy, Edward F., et al. Information Operations: Wisdom Warfare for 2025. A 
research paper presented to Air Force 2025. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air War 
College, 1996. 72p. 
Abstract: A robust information operations architecture can provide leaders dominant battlespace 
knowledge and tools for improved decision making. US armed forces in 2025 need an information 
operations system that generates products and services that are timely, reliable, relevant, and tailored to 
each user's needs. The products must come from systems that are secure, redundant, survivable, 
transportable, adaptable, deception resistant, capable of fusing vast amount of data, and capable of 
forecasting. The information operations architecture of 2025 this paper proposes consists of thousands of 
widely distributed nodes performing the full range of collection, data fusion, analysis, and command 
functions-all linked together through a robust networking system. Data will be collected, organized into 
usable information, analyzed and assimilated, and displayed in a form that enhances the military decision 
maker's understanding of the situation. The architecture will also apply modeling, simulation, and 
forecasting tools to help commanders make sound choices for employing military force. This architecture 
allows the United States (US) armed forces to conduct Wisdom Warfare. The system can be used by the 
commander in chief, unit commander, supervisor, or technician. Somewhere in the workplace, in a 
vehicle, or on the person there will be a link to the sensors, transmitters, receivers, storage devices, and 
transformation systems that will provide, in push or pull fashion, all the synthesized information needed to 
accomplish the mission or task. Information will be presented in a variety of forms selected by the user. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA333260 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA333260  
 
Myers, John M. Operational Command and Control for Information Operations. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. 26p. 
Abstract: Information Operations (IO) has been a topic of great debate. Much of the discussion has 
stemmed from the fact no individual commander owns or controls the entire discipline. There have been 
several reasons for the lack of ownership such as IO supports all warfare areas, its application is an all-
hands effort and there have been too few capabilities to command. Over the years, models have been 
proposed on how to command and control the discipline. Current joint doctrine provides a framework that 
has IO embedded in the J-3 organization. The doctrine offers a representative IO cell that is led by a J-39 
cell chief who resides below the directorate level of authority. Unfortunately current doctrine does not 
provide adequate guidance for commanding and controlling this discipline. As the demand for IO 
increases and new capabilities come online, IO needs to be commanded vice coordinated. The traditional 
component commanders-by-physical domain (e.g., air, land, sea) breaks down in the information age and 
a new construct to deal with IO and information as weapons should be considered. This paper suggests 
the responsibility for IO during normal operations should be assigned to a Theater Information Operations 
Command (TIOC) who is OPCON to the combatant commander. Once a requirement for a Joint Task 
Force (JTF) has been established, the TIOC is OPCON as the Joint Force Information Operations 
Component Commander (JFIOCC) to the Commander, JTF. 
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Nitzschke, Stephen G. Information Operations: A Conceptual Perspective for Staff 
Organization and Force Employment. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2005. 25p.  
Abstract: The Joint Force Commander (JFC) lacks an adequate information operations (IO) conceptual 
framework. Current definitions derived from various service perspectives have hampered his ability to 
effectively implement an IO strategy in an efficient manner. A different IO conceptual framework, when 
combined with appropriate definitions, will allow the JFC to more effectively and efficiently organize and 
employ forces to accomplish IO objectives. This paper suggests a different perspective that recognizes all 
military capabilities as potential contributors to an IO strategy, and recommends appropriate definitions to 
help redefine the traditional roles of the information operations and information warfare officers. The new 
conceptual framework improves effectiveness by allowing the JFC to employ any military activity or 
capability in an IO strategy specifically focused on the unique decision space of friendly and adversary 
forces. Efficiency is obtained through a staff organization that reflects this reality. The IO officer becomes 
a special advisor to the commanding officer, with expertise in integrating military actions and activities to 
shape the decision space. His staff is augmented based on JFC mission objectives and associated 
priorities. The information warfare (IW) officer is a warfare specialist capable of fighting in the information 
domain. He can function within an IO cell or support other battlespace activities as a member of the 
operations staff. 
ACCESSION NUMBER; ADA463228 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA463228  
 
Nussio, Ricky J. Sherman and Nimitz: Executing Modern Information Operations. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2001. 49p. 
Abstract: Information Operations has become a controversial subject in the US Army. Whether due to 
ignorance of actual employment techniques or reluctance to rely on non-tangible means, information 
operations are often only a check the block consideration for military planners. Emerging US Army 
doctrine emphasizes the use of information operations, stating that in some situations they can be 
decisive operations. This monograph examines two historical examples of modern warfare for the 
possible application of modern information operation (IO) principles. The information operations principles 
found in Student Text 3-0, Operations (destined to become Field Manual 3-0, Operations), are used as 
evaluation criteria to determine if modern principles were applied in past campaign plans. Significant and 
relevant issues from these case studies suggest there are a variety of employment methods for 
information operations. The purpose of this monograph is to increase the knowledge, understanding and 
applications of IO concepts through the examination of two case studies of modern warfare. These case 
studies demonstrate that IO principles have been part of modern US military art since the mid nineteenth 
century. In studying past conflicts a greater understanding can be gained by future military planners of the 
use of IO. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA390484 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA390484  
 
O'Brien, Gregory J. Information Operations and the Law of Perfidy. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2001. 26p. 
Abstract: The Department of Defense (DOD) Office of General Counsel concluded in an assessment of 
international law and information operations (IO) that using computer "morphing" techniques of an enemy 
leader to falsely broadcast that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been signed would be a war 
crime under the law of perfidy. The law of perfidy prohibits IO that would invite the confidence of the 
enemy to lead him to believe that he is entitled to or obliged to accord, protection under the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict with the intent to betray that confidence. This standard is 
flexible, and deception and psychological operations being planned or executed now with IO methods will 
not be precluded by the General Counsel assessment described above. 
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http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA395074  
 
O'Connell, Ed. Off the Trodden Path: Thinking Through the Military Exploration of 
the Information Domain. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1997. 87p. 
Abstract: Trends in today's security environment point to a changed information domain on the horizon--
a cyberspace of increased density, interconnectivity and collaboration, where links and nodes have 
disappeared. As military planners, we are stuck somewhere between institutional skepticism reserved for 
new tricks, and the awe and wonder with which the rest of our society views this new frontier. Yet, insights 
provided by recent strategic information warfare exercises suggest the military is beginning to approach 
cyberspace from a new perspective--as a place like any other. These trends and early insights will have 
profound implications for how we project force into this changed cyberspace of tomorrow. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA327513 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA327513  
 
Osborne, William B., et al. Information Operations: A New War-Fighting Capability. 
A research paper presented to Air Force 2025. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air 
Command and Staff College, 1996. 76p.   
Abstract: In its most basic form, commanders have always performed the functions of observe, orient, 
decide, and act (OODA loop) to prosecute military operations. As with Alexander the Great, history shows 
the military commander who best analyzes, decides, and controls the speed of the engagement prevails 
in nearly every conflict. To master the OODA loop, military leaders have pushed technology to obtain 
more information. Ironically, this situation now leads to the requirement to solve two fundamental 
challenges if the United States expects to maintain air and space dominance in 2025. First, the 
proliferation of unintegrated military war-fighting architectures gives the commander potentially conflicting 
perspectives of the battlespace. Second, the explosion of available information creates an environment of 
mental overload leading to flawed decision making. Failure to master these challenges critically weakens 
the military instrument of power. This paper presents a solution to these challenges by confronting 
commanders as they employ future airpower forces. Regarding the first challenge, the large number of 
specialized war-fighting architectures makes information integration supporting overall coordination and 
control more important and more difficult. Simultaneously, the speed and the range of modern weapons 
drastically reduces the time commanders have to integrate conflicting information and decide on a course 
of action. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA332471 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA332471  
 
Patschke, Gregory M. Information Operations And J-3: A Perfect Union. Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, 2004. 33p.  
Abstract: Information Operations (IO) during Operation Allied Force proved to be a failure. Since then, 
former IO planners and military war college students have focused on a lack of unity of command and 
unity of effort as primary catalysts for this failure. They proposed eliminating the IO cell concept and 
adopting either an IO task force or a specific IO functional component command. I disagree. Currently, we 
are experiencing an explosion of change within the IO community. Not only is the utility of IO being 
embraced among the different services, but also for the first time we have a unified command, U.S. 
Strategic Command, chartered with the responsibility of organizing and coordinating national-level IO for 
the regional combatant commands. These changes, along with painful lessons learned, debunk the 
notional IO task force and component concepts. The nature of IO is often misunderstood. IO is a strategy 
instead of a force. Thus, the IO organization under the Joint Task Force (JTF) J-3 offers the most 
effective way to integrate IO into the overall military plan. To plan and execute IO early, the combatant 
commander should stand up an Operational Planning Team (comprised of theater-specific IO planners 
from the combatant command as well as support organizations) until a JTF is activated. The JTF soul 
initially concentrate on shaping the battlespace through IO until sufficient forces are in theater. Finally, 
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joint IO doctrine fails to address how the IO cell should be internally organized. Properly manned 
disciplines within the different functions of influence operations, physical attack operations, network 
operations, and support will allow the JFC to execute a timely, deconlicted, and synergistic IO combat 
plan. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA422717 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA422717  
 
Patterson, LaWarren V. Information Operations and Asymmetric Warfare...Are We 
Ready? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 30p. 
Abstract: Events of Sept 11th, 2001 have made clear one inescapable fact. Because of rapid advances 
in technology, particularly in the information arena, global communications now enable us to hear and see 
first hand issues, events and concerns from around the world. These in turn raise passions and compel 
people to rethink their own closely held beliefs, prejudices and hatreds, and in some cases morphing into 
actions such as espionage, sabotage or terrorism. Information Operations and future Asymmetric Warfare 
will have a major impact on the U.S. Army's ability to remain a viable warfighting entity as well as our 
simple survivability against future adversaries. Currently, the Army's Field Manual FM 100-6 (dated 
August 1996) is the most up-to-date guide on Information Operations available to the rank and file field 
soldier and leader. While at the same time, the Army's newest doctrinal publications, FM-I and FM 3-0, 
address the Army's future in terms of who we are, what we do, how we do it today, tomorrow, jointly and 
within the full spectrum of operations that is the asymmetric warfare environment. It is, therefore, 
tantamount that our policies and future Army vision ensure Information Operations as a tool against 
asymmetric warfare remain on the forefront of Army strategic planning. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA402007 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA402007  
 
Patton, Gary S. Public Affairs and Information Operations: Integral or 
Incompatible. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2000. 27p.  
Abstract: Today's complex, cyber-powered global information environment presents formidable 
challenges for the military. Facing the certainty of intrusive media and an overload of information, the 
military has elevated the importance of two related battlefield functions: public affairs (PA) and information 
operations (IO). PA serves as the military-media interface, tasked with the role of facilitating media 
coverage of military operations. In doing so, PA fulfills the obligation to keep the American people 
informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's military. 10 has a 
different purpose. It encompasses a wide range of offensive and defensive capabilities aimed at 
achieving information dominance over an adversary. Department of Defense joint doctrine identifies PA 
as a key related I0 activity. But the relationship between the two is problematic. On the one hand, PA 
deals with the public release of factual information. On the other hand, I0 may deal with false intentions, 
as an element of military deception or black propaganda activities. By association alone, actual or 
perceived I0 to manipulate public information could jeopardize the credibility of concurrent PA media 
relations, and potentially damage the credibility of the overall military mission. It will be the purpose of this 
study to further examine this 10-PA relationship under fire in Bosnia, as the initial I campaign there 
confronted multiple non-cooperative and IO-capable adversaries. Through this examination, the study will 
make a determination as to whether PA and I0 are integral or incompatible military functions. Additionally, 
the study will look at initial feedback on I0 and PA in more recent operations involving Kosovo. Based on 
these sets of experiences in the Balkans, the study will conclude with recommendations for a future 
direction for joint and service I0 and PA doctrine. 





Peifer, Kenneth V. An Analysis of Unclassified Current and Pending Air Force 
Information Warfare and Information Operations Doctrine and Policy. Wright-
Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, December 1997.  178p.  
Abstract: This study focused on determining if unclassified current and pending Air Force information 
warfare and information operations doctrine and policy is moving in the direction it should in terms of 
being complete, consistent and cohesive based on what has been mandated and studied about 
information warfare. A model of unclassified current and pending Air Force information warfare and 
information operations doctrine and policy was examined through criterion-based congruence analysis to 
make this determination. Investigative questions were developed in reference to the current state of 
unclassified Air Force information warfare and information operations doctrine and policy. Secondary data 
analysis was conducted along two paths. The hierarchical path included an examination of unclassified 
information warfare and information operations doctrine, policy and regulatory guidance. The academic 
path included an examination of studies and commentary on information warfare and information 
operations focusing on doctrine and policy. A model of unclassified current and pending Air Force 
information warfare and information operations doctrine and policy was developed. Then the model was 
analyzed for congruence in terms of completeness, consistency, and cohesiveness using the hierarchical 
and academic secondary data analysis as a diagnostic tool. The model was found to be partially 
incongruent in all three areas. 
REPORT NUMBER: AFIT/GIR/LAS/97D-10 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA340379 
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Phillips, Gary E. Information Operations - A New Tool for Peacekeeping. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, May 1997. 92p. 
Abstract: This monograph discusses the application of information operations to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of peace missions ranging from peacekeeping to peace imposition. Using a variety of 
models and an examination of the components of information operations this monograph demonstrates 
the applicability of these operations to peace missions. Examples from recent history provide a backdrop 
for evaluating previous applications and investigating other potential uses of information operations to 
support peace missions. Based on the validation of applicability the possible increase in effectiveness 
and efficiency are postulated and potential resource savings evaluated. The monograph first examines 
the status of international relations as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of 
information technology. The impact of these two earthshaking events have forever changed the face the 
world. As the nations of the world seek a new geometry of relationships without the Soviet Union the level 
of violence continues to rise. Without the unifying ideologies of the Cold War, many nations are seeking 
identity through ethnicity. This factor in conjunction with a freedom to act completely in promotion of 
national interests without the specter of a global nuclear war has led to a very unstable world. At the 
same time that United Nations pleads for resources to enforce peace on the new world disorder, nations 
are increasingly captured by domestic issues. The question becomes can we afford the expanding 
resources necessary to keep the peace and still answer domestic problems? The final sections of this 
monograph address the utility of information operations for peace missions. Information operations, the 
application of the continued advances in information technology, provides a tool to make peace 
affordable. Information operations allow cost effective solutions. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA331354 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA331354  
 
Pickle, James A. Developing Joint Information Operations Warriors. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2006. 20p. 
Abstract: The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized the importance of information operations 
(IO), particularly in light of continual technological improvements. Positive direction has been given by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, but the responsibility to organize, train, and equip 
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remains with the Services and allows for different interpretations. The goal of IO is to maintain information 
superiority and, thereby, decision superiority. While influence operations may aim at adversary 
perceptions, joint IO can't be left open for interpretation. Information is impacting the spectrum of conflict 
more than ever before. Information dominance has always been important, but the speed and methods at 
which it can be sent, analyzed, and acted upon is increasing exponentially. This project focuses on the 
need for a dedicated IO career force for the DoD to truly achieve information dominance. The analysis 
begins with a quick review of joint IO doctrine, Service approaches to IO, and IO personnel management. 
Next, IO education and training challenges are explored. Finally, recommendations to improve joint IO are 
broached in an effort to ensure DoD IO warriors can influence, disrupt, degrade, or deny an adversary's 
ability to make a coherent decision at a time of our choosing. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA448653 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448653  
 
Rabena, William S. An Information Operations Approach to Counter Suicide 
Bomber Recruiting. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2006. 26p. 
Abstract: Information Operations (IO) is one of today's least understood, yet most common scapegoat 
for perceived Global War on Terrorism failures in Iraq. Despite the on-going efforts of strategists and 
commanders to leverage the media in an attempt to tell the "good news" successes in Iraq, news 
coverage continually gravitates towards acts of violence, especially suicide bombings. With or without 
media support, recent polls indicate that the Coalition has already won many of the "hearts and minds" of 
the Iraqi people. Yet, most of the success or failure of information operations is measured and stuck on 
telling only the "hearts and minds" story. The analysis from this study suggests that IO correctly shoulders 
blame for all the wrong reasons. More appropriately, IO is underutilized in what can be deemed a "kinetic-
only" battle on the suicide bomber. This project proposes an information operations policy expansion in 
relatively unused supporting elements -- counterdeception and counterpropaganda. This will add a non-
kinetic approach to the kinetic-centric fight on suicide bombers. The study will analyze how information 
operations, in the form of counterdeception and counterpropaganda, can target the recruiting base for 
suicide bombers. More specifically, the project explores the possible success that could be achieved 
when counterpropaganda and counterdeception address cognitive third order effects of those who are 
most influential to the potential suicide bomber's decision-making. This new approach targets the Sunni 
religious faction and the family. This departure from current information operations norms serves as a 
change to current strategy. The recommended strategy changes also are included in the study. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA449231 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449231  
 
Revilla, Arturo, et al. Information Operations Vulnerability/Survivability 
Assessment (IOVSA): Process Structure (Revision A). White Sands Missile Range, 
NM: Army Research Laboratory, 2003. 33p.  
Abstract: This document is a revision of the IOVSA methodology formalized in June 2000. The goal of 
this revised document will be the clarification of the work to be performed for each phase, the 
requirements, and the expected deliverables. Since this revision will be a living document, it will be 
updated as appropriate to include lessons learned. The intent of this revision is to facilitate the dialog 
between the U.S. Army Research Laboratory/Survivability Lethality Analysis Directorate (ARL/SLAD) and 
the decision-makers (program Executive Offices (PEOs), Program Managers (PMs), evaluators, 
contractors, etc.) for U.S. Army IT-based systems. As before, the IOVSA process will provide a structured 
methodology for assessing IT system/System of Systems (SoS) 10 susceptibilities and vulnerabilities. 
The process will provide flexibility that enables the analyst to customize it for the system/SoS under 
assessment. Additionally, the IOVSA results will provide critical information to system developers and 
decision-makers regarding the system's/SoS' 10 susceptibilities and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, enough 
information will be able to be extracted from the process to evaluate different countermeasure techniques 
and protection recommendations to determine their feasibility and cost/reward ratio. 




Richard, Charles A. Submarines and Information Operations. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 2000. 22p.  
Abstract: Information Operations and Information Warfare are efforts to exploit a resource that has long 
been essential for military operations: information. Information has become a new medium for conflict, a 
potent weapon and a lucrative target. The manned, mobile, combatant platform can conduct Information 
Operations. The nuclear-powered attack submarine, and its inherent virtues of stealth, mobility, 
endurance, and power intensity, gives unique opportunities for employment. As the U.S. Navy intends to 
embed IO capabilities in the fleet, sailors, not scholars, need to begin to examine and exploit the field. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA382092 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA382092  
 
Rogers, Carol J. The Functional Relationship Between Information Operations and 
Military Intelligence. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001. 30p.  
Abstract: Information operations are a new approach to managing and manipulating information. 
Through the ages, the possession of information has won wars, and the lack of it often led to defeat. This 
paper attempts to define the relationship between information and intelligence, and concludes that military 
intelligence professionals have the core competencies needed to be effective information operations 
officers. Focusing on a joint perspective, information operations is defined, using illustrations to clarify the 
multi-faceted information operations' missions. The impact of new technologies is examined, as it relates 
to the use of information as a tool for military leaders. The personnel requirements for IO are examined 
and compared to the core competencies of military intelligence. The findings indicate the redundancy and 
overlay of the primary personnel capabilities of information operations and military intelligence. The 
arguments lead to the conclusion that intelligence officers are best suited and qualified to perform the 
responsibilities of an information operations officer and to manage information operations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA390557 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA390557  
 
Rogers, Stephen C. Improving Information Operations with a Military Cultural 
Analyst. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of 
Advanced Military Studies, 2005. 50p. 
Abstract: The concept and practice of using information as a tool in military operations to support 
political objectives has gained increased notoriety and emphasis within U.S. political and military arenas 
over the course of the last decade. Two particular publications of 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report (QDR) and the United States Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, highlight this fundamental shift 
in the growing importance of using information in warfare. Of particular importance, the 2001 QDR 
mandated that information operations be treated not merely as an enabling function, but as a core 
capability of future forces. Recent military operations conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
however, indicate that the application of this newly christened element of combat power has fallen well 
short of desired effectiveness. Without comprehensive changes in training, equipment distribution and 
personnel management, the Army will continue to struggle to employ information operations and fail to 
achieve the directives of the 2001 QDR. Fortunately, the Army has begun several studies in an effort to 
make the necessary changes to improve information operations. Yet one model that the Army has not yet 
studied is that of international marketing and advertising agencies. These firms have developed effective 
organizational structures, techniques, and procedures to share their ideas with people across a vast array 
of cultures, all with the intent of inducing a predetermined action. Gleaning the pertinent lessons from the 
international marketing model can help the Army empower tactical and operational commanders with the 
tools necessary to better understand the culture of a country, region, or area of operations. With this 
knowledge, these commanders could greatly improve the effectives of their information operations. 




Romanych, Marc. Applying the Domains of Conflict to Information Operations. 
Alexandria, VA: JB Management, Inc., 2005. 
Abstract: Military information operations (IO) are about information and its use as a means to fight an 
adversary. Fundamental to the use of information as a military capability, or perhaps even a weapon, is 
an understanding of the information environment and its utility to armed forces. However, several key 
concepts underpinning the conduct of military operations in the information environment are too abstract 
for practical application by operational and tactical level armed forces. As a result, commanders and 
staffs frequently relegate activities to affect the information environment to the realms of the esoteric or 
impractical. Recent work conducted by the Department of Defense's (DoD) Command and Control 
Research Program (CCRP) provides a useful basis for visualizing the structure and characteristics of the 
information environment. Of particular utility is a model that describes three domains of conflict the 
physical, information, and cognitive. Initially used to describe decision-making, this model, when 
combined with the two primary views of information- information-as-message and information-as-medium 
provides a useful framework for describing how information can be used to support military operations. To 
execute an information operation, a military force conducts activities to affect and protect information 
systems and networks in the physical domain. These actions are synchronized to affect information 
content, flow, and use in the information domain. The result is an information advantage that, in turn, 
generates effects to influence adversary and other organizations decision-making in the cognitive domain 
and subsequent actions in the physical domain. This paper explores the relevance of the CCRP's three-
domain model to military IO. By applying the model to the doctrinal concepts of information environment, 
information superiority, and information operations, a view of IO emerges that field commands can use to 
convert doctrinal concepts into practical action. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA463046 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA463046  
 
Ruth, Brian G. and J.D. Eckart. Agent-Based Modeling of a Network-Centric Battle 
Team Operating Within an Information Operations Environment. Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, MD: Army Research Laboratory, 2003. 130p.  
Abstract: A model developed to analyze the emergent behavior of a network-centric battle team 
undergoing hostile information operations (IO) stress events is presented. Networked battlefield platforms 
are modeled as mobile semiautonomous agents that operate within a cellular automata (CA) lattice. The 
CA form a discrete spatially extended dynamical system consisting of a parallel networked lattice of 
computational cells in two dimensions. A software framework that combines CA-based agents with a 
genetic algorithm was developed in order to explore the dynamics of two opposing but "coevolving" units 
of networked combat agents. Simulation results using two variants of the CA-based combat agent model, 
both of which include IO stress in the form of radio frequency communications jamming, are analyzed and 
discussed. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA411990 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA411990  
 
Saegert, Joseph A. Making IO Work: Exploring the Need for an Information 
Operations Command. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.  113p. 
Abstract: This thesis investigates the establishment of an Information Operations (IO) command and will 
stimulate further discussion and research of this issue. Concepts and definitions of Information 
Operations are presented to provide the reader a common framework of understanding upon which to 
base further discussion of IO. Current organizational structure, doctrine for execution of IO, and how IO 
supports national and military objectives are also presented and shortcomings examined. After 
consideration of several possible solutions a proposed structure for an IO command is presented and the 




Sands, Thomas R. and Paul H. Issler. Special Operations Forces, Information 
Operations, and Airpower: Prescription for the Near 21st Century. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998.  121p.  
Abstract: The Gulf War of 1990-1991 has been described as the pinnacle of second-wave warfare, 
characterized by massed field armies, maneuver formations based on the armored vehicle and airplane, 
second generation precision guided munitions (PGMs), and engagements involving thousands of 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. At the height of the conflict, over 500,000 United States (U.S.) 
servicemen were deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The ensuing 
victory by U.S./Coalition forces and loss by Iraqi forces is one of the greatest lopsided outcomes in the 
history of warfare. Unfortunately, the demonstrated U.S. preeminence in conventional second-wave 
warfare may spell trouble for the 21st century. Potential adversaries will have taken note of our capabilities 
in this arena and will endeavor to develop methods and technologies that will negate our strengths either 
through asymmetric attack, innovation, or both. These actions will give rise to asymmetric warfare as the 
dominant paradigm. Combined application of special operations forces (SOF), information operations 
(IO), and airpower (AP) may produce synergistic effects that will permit smaller forces to effectively and 
efficiently counter our adversaries adopting asymmetric warfare. We employ a heuristic approach in 
conveying our vision of combined SOF, IO, and AP operations. 




Schutze, James T. Defensive Information Operations - An Interagency Process. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001. 33p. 
Abstract: The United States military has long held the mission of protecting this country against foreign 
attack. One of the biggest threats facing the United States in the 21st century, however, is of a far 
different nature than that of a conventional armed attack. A cyber attack zeroing in on critical information 
or on the information systems which support critical national infrastructures could be launched from any 
corner of the globe, by a variety of potential state and non-state actors, and could be directed against 
military or civilian targets. Due to the quantity, complexity, and diverse ownership of this country's 
information systems and critical infrastructures, no single governmental or private agency can single-
handedly provide an adequate defense. As a result, the nation's information and infrastructure protection 
effort requires governmental interagency and private sector cooperation. The Department of Defense, as 
a key player in the interagency effort, must rapidly respond to information attacks in coordination with a 
host of government departments and agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Justice and 
State. It must be prepared to defend its own information and infrastructure; to support other government 
agencies in their defense, enforcement, and consequence management functions; and to counterattack 
with information operations weapons. This paper discusses the nature and level of the cyber threat and 
DoD's roles in countering it in an interagency environment. The paper also looks at the legal issues DoD 
must consider in planning and executing its information defense mission. It examines the current 
arrangement for protection of the nation's infrastructure and suggests there are organizational issues 
impeding the speed and effectiveness of the country's defense that must be addressed. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA390545 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA390545  
 
Seward, Andrew B. U.S. Strategic Information Operations: The Requirement for a 
Common Definition and Organizational Structure in Support of the Global War on 
Terrorism. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2004. 39p. 
Abstract: Despite its lofty title as one of the national elements of power, the informational component is 
fundamentally misunderstood in concept, diffused in responsibility, and fragmented in application. In 
American society, the right to free speech has primacy and citizens have a healthy distrust of official 
government rhetoric. Thus, the second tier status of informational power is perhaps unsurprising. But in 
the war of ideas and ideals that is the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), strategic information 
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operations can be neither ignored nor allowed to languish. It is time to re-organize and focus information 
operations at a national strategic level and harness its potential. Kinetic military power, diplomacy, and 
America's economic might are critical to the GWOT, but similar success in strategic information 
operations is essential to creating lasting change. This paper reviews the current state of strategic 
information operations; discusses the lack of existing consensus regarding strategic information 
operations' definition, scope, and what it might accomplish; suggests a new model for strategic-level 
information operations; and compares and makes a recommendation from four options for better 
organizing information operations within the United States Government at the national strategic level in 
support of GWOT. These options are as follows: Create a New Department of Information within the 
Executive Branch, Assign Executive Agency Responsibility for Strategic Information to an Existing 
Department Secretary or Agency, Create a National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee for 
Information Operations, or leave the situation Status Quo. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA424404 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424404  
 
Shaffer, Glen. Air Force Information Operations. Arlington, VA: Deputy Chief of Staff 
Air and Space Operations, 2002 18p. 
Abstract: A briefing about information operations from the Phoenix Challenge 2002 Conference and 
Warfighter Day. 
ACCESSION NUMBERS: ADA406441 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406441  
 
Sherwin, Michael E. Naval Reserve Support to Information Operations Warfighting. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001. 60p.  
Abstract: Since the mid-1990s, the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) has led the Navy's 
Information Operations (IO) support to the Fleet. Within the FIWC manning structure, there are in total 36 
officer and 84 enlisted Naval Reserve billets that are manned to approximately 75 percent and located in 
Norfolk and San Diego Naval Reserve Centers. These Naval Reserve Force personnel could provide 
support to FIWC far and above what they are now contributing specifically in the areas of Computer 
Network Operations, Psychological Operations, Military Deception and Civil Affairs. Historically personnel 
conducting IO were primarily reservists and civilians in uniform with regular military officers being by far 
the minority. The Naval Reserve Force has the personnel to provide skilled IO operators but the lack of 
an effective manning document and training plans is hindering their opportunity to enhance FIWC's 
capabilities in lull spectrum IO. This research investigates the skill requirements of personnel in IO to 
verify that the Naval Reserve Force has the talent base for IO support and the feasibility of their 
expanded use in IO. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA396525 
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Sicoli, Peter A. Filling the Information Void: Adapting the Information Operation 
(IO) Message in Post-Hostility Iraq. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and 
General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005. 73p. 
Abstract: In meeting the challenges of post-hostility Iraq, the area of information operations (IO) has 
received a great deal of attention. Unlike combat operations, the center of gravity in post-conflict Iraq has 
been restoration of basic services and influencing public support and perception. Thus, in post-war 
conflict, IO, with the objective and means to promote legitimacy, reduce confusion, and influence a 
population, can reasonably be seen as the decisive operation. Unfortunately, there is substantial 
evidence that planners faced serious challenges during the transition to post-hostility operations in Iraq. 
This monograph seeks to add to the Army's understanding of IO by providing an in depth examination of 
five challenges faced by IO officers at the start of the post-hostility phase of operations in Iraq. This 
monograph will discuss the major principles contained in FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, 
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Tactics Techniques and Procedure, and examine whether doctrinal adjustments are needed to provide 
more effective guidance for IO officers facing the issues identified in the five problem areas. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA436260 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436260  
 
Slavin, Jim. Close Access Information Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War 
College, 2000. 23p. 
Abstract: The information age comes with the challenge of implementing offensive information 
operations. As the United States executes the National Military Strategy, we must understand that our 
future threats may value information even more than we do. We have to further delineate responsibilities 
for conducting offensive information operations. With the technological security advances and reliance 
upon closed information systems, we must prepare an operational force that will be prepared to conduct 
close access offensive information operations. Finally, we must have the necessary intelligence collection 
for supporting such a force. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA378025 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378025  
 
Smart, Antoinette G. Cyber Power Theory First, Then Information Operations. 
Washington, DC: National War College, 2001. 14p.  
Abstract: The words we use to express ideas and concepts matter. To be present at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, in the midst of an information age, with no theory of information operations (IO) 
seems disconcerting, at least on the surface. Think tanks, government research organizations, and 
learned individuals have all pointed to the need for a viable theory of IO, yet no such theory has emerged. 
Despite the lack of a theory or national strategy for IO, the U.S. military does have IO organizations, 
doctrine, and training. The Department of Defense has the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), 
which provides full-spectrum IO support to CINCs and CJTFs. Each military Department has its own 
Information Warfare Center (IWC), which provide IO support to their respective services AFIWC for the 
Air Force, Fleet IWC (FIWC) for the Navy, and Land Information Warfare Agency (LIWA) for the Army. 
The U.S. military now has IO units, with some services redesignating intelligence units as IO units. One 
example is the mass Air Force redesignation of its Intelligence Wing and subordinate squadrons. The 
U.S. military has both joint and service IO doctrine in some areas it is consistent, in other areas it is not. 
And there are many highly technological tools for IO, so of course there must be training. But there is no 
theory of IO from a national perspective. Carl von Clausewitz said that the primary purpose of theory is to 
clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled. A plethora of questions emerges 
from the apparent entropy surrounding the development of a theory of IO. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA 441637 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA441637  
 
Smith, David E. Bytes or Bullets: The Implications of Chaplaincy Involvement 
Within Information Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2006. 21p. 
Abstract: This paper will discuss the importance of information operations (IO) as an element of 
information policy within the context of military strategy. Recently the U.S. military has participated in 
numerous combat and peace-support operations. In the current fight the strategic/tactical main effort 
focuses on non-kinetic non-lethal means. In light of these operations the Army has changed the means by 
which it plans coordinates and executes information-operations (IO) and IO-effects. A recent change has 
been commanders requesting the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) to participate in IO. The UMT can provide a 
critical role in IO in the area of religion. In current operations religion may be a vulnerability or decision 
point in the fight. The UMT has involvement in humanitarian and civil military operations that has become 
a critical part in support of IO. The UMT does not have the doctrine or training to operate in the IO realm. 
Most UMTs do not have extensive comparative religion training. This paper will review the implications to 
the Army chaplaincy of the UMT participating in IO; understand the impact of UMT involvement in IO and 
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its affect on religious support and mission accomplishment. The paper will propose an expanded role for 
the UMT. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA448686 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448686  
 
Staker, R. J. Achieving Systemic Information Operations for Australian Defence. 
Salisbury, Australia: Electronics  Research Laboratory, October 1999.  28p. 
Abstract: This document describes a proposed program of research into theories, methodologies and 
techniques appropriate to achieving a systemic Military Information Operations capability for the 
Australian Defence Force. The major expected outcomes of this research are decision support aids 
relevant to Information Operations, contributions to the theory of Information Operations and contributions 
to IO Policy and Doctrine. The doctrine would include matters relating to the design of organisations that 
are capable of operating effectively in an Information Operations environment. 
REPORT NUMBER: DSTO-TN-0235   
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA371754 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA371754  
 
_______. An Application of Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology to the 
Development of a Military Information Operations Capability for the Australian 
Defence Force.  Canberra, Australia: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 
March 1999.  30p. 
Abstract: There is widespread concern throughout many advanced nations concerning the potential for 
Information Operations to influence the outcome of Military Operations. This concern is shared by 
elements of the Australian Defence Force and other Australian government agencies. In order to ensure 
that any such potential does not adversely affect Australian interests, there is a need to develop an 
Australian Military Information Operations capability. This document uses concepts from Checkland's Soft 
Systems Methodology to explore methods through which such a capability could be achieved. 
REPORT NUMBER: DSTO-TN-0183 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA362560 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA362560  
 
_______. Military Information Operations Analysis Using Influence Diagrams and 
Coloured Petri Nets. Salisbury, Australia: Electronics Research Laboratory, 1999. 78p. 
Abstract: This report describes how Influence Diagrams, Coloured Petri Net models and related 
techniques may be used to analyse certain aspects of Military Information Operations. An example is 
employed to demonstrate these techniques. The example used is a very simplified representation of a 
Military Command Organisation dealing with a decision problem. The objective of the report is to provide 
theory, methods and techniques to support the assessment of the effect of Military Information Operations 
on such organisations. The simplicity of the example permits the basic concepts to be clearly conveyed. 
They may readily be extended to the analysis of more complex examples as required. The most 
fundamental and significant concept developed in this report is that of a common quantitative measure of 
effectiveness that encompasses all types of Information Operations relevant to Information Warfare. This 
permits the direct comparison of the effectiveness of alternative Information Operation options with one 
another and also with conventional operations options. This latter ability is essential if Information 
Operations are to be employed appropriately as part of a broader range of military options. 





Steele, Robert D. Information Operations: Putting the 'I' Back Into Dime. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. 81p. 
Abstract: The end of the Cold War and the emergence of terrorism; radicalized religion; the proliferation 
and commoditization of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the increased informational and 
economic power of Arabia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, among others, 
have brought Information Operations (IO) to the forefront of the unified national security strategy. In the 
past year, IO has matured from an early emphasis on the protection of critical infrastructures and against 
electronic espionage, and is now more focused on content and on interagency information-sharing. The 
value of information all information, not only secret information and the value of global monitoring in all 
languages, 24/7, have been clearly established by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). 
This monograph defines and discusses three IO elements: " Strategic Communication (the message); " 
Open Source Intelligence (the reality); and, " Joint Information Operations Centers (the technology). 
These elements are further discussed in relation to six IO-heavy mission areas: " Information Operations 
generally; " Peacekeeping Intelligence (reactive); " Information Peacekeeping (proactive); " Early Warning 
(conflict deterrence, proactive counterterrorism); " Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations; and, " 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA444640 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA444640  
 
Stewart, Michael J. Information Operations, Information Warfare: Policy 
Perspectives and Implications for the Force. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War 
College, April 1997. 43p. 
Abstract: Information Operations and Information Warfare are hot topics today and as a result, there is 
a tremendous amount of intellectual capital invested in the debate over what impact of new information 
technologies will have in two areas. These areas parallel two of our three components of the national 
security strategy; first is enhancing our security and the second is promoting prosperity. In many regards, 
the interests involved are somewhat mutually exclusive, which presents a challenging environment for 
issue identification and policy development. This paper identifies a few of the many scenarios in which 
information operations/warfare are a component; reviews some of the directions provided to the 
government as a whole and the military in particular; discusses why our nation is now more vulnerable to 
asymmetric attack; and then provides a few historical precedents. Finally, several of the many issue areas 
are analyzed, followed by the derivative implications for our military forces. The basic philosophical 
underpinning in this analysis is that solutions to these emerging issues must be consistent with our 
historical identity and values; failing this, we expose our long-term interests to unacceptable and probably 
fatal risk. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA326791 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA326791  
 
Straughan, Matt. Information Operations and Unity of Effort: The Case for a Joint 
Interagency Information Operations Task Force. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 
Military Operations Department, June 1997. 26p. 
Abstract: With the end of the Cold War and the resulting down-sizing of the military, unity of effort 
between all instruments of U.S. national power is more important than ever. Currently, the organizational 
structure does not exist to effectively and efficiently coordinate the instruments of power below the 
national-strategic or theater-strategic level of operations. By establishing a Joint Interagency Information 
Operations Task Force (JIIOTF) at the operational level, in support of military operations, including 
MOOTW, unity of effort and a coordinated application of the information instrument of power can be 
achieved. The result of coordinated InfoOps would be reduced combat casualties, faster establishment of 
legitimacy for humanitarian operations, increased host nation support for relief missions, and more 
effective application of the other instruments of power. ANNOTATION: Reprint: Information Operations 
and Unity of Effort: The Case for a Joint Interagency Information Operations Task Force. 




Strawn, James C. Information Operations Challenges. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army 
War College, April 1998.  36p.  
Abstract: This paper examines the need for a coherent and well-defined national strategy for 
information operations. The impetus is today's environment and the realities of the environment we will 
face as we enter the next century. The paper begins by evaluating the present environment and 
highlighting key factors that contribute to the imperative nature of this challenge followed by a review of 
the current status of national initiatives. Finally, the paper discusses key steps to be taken in this arena. 
The review of the present environment includes a macro-level look at the United States and its 
information needs. This look contrasts and compares the United States with its allies and its potential 
adversaries. With the review of the environment providing a foundation, a candid discussion of our 
nation's information operations initiatives helps to bring the issues into focus. The initiatives cannot be 
viewed solely from a Department of Defense perspective as they are addressing national challenges. 
These challenges share similarities with those in the arena of the asymmetric Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) threat. The solutions to those WMD threats demanded interagency and multi-national 
cooperation, the sarne is true for threats in cyber space. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA344942 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA344942  
 
Tatge, Aletha S. Perception Management and Coalition Information Operations. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001. 101p. 
Abstract: This thesis focuses on the conduct of perception management (PM) within coalitions. 
Research has alluded to the possibility of predicting human behavior by creating stories that convey a 
believable reality. Further, does PM have any organizational process relationship with engagement 
planning? Target selection? Press statement coordination? The thesis focuses on how well coalitions are 
poised to conduct integrated PM operations. It identifies current PM capabilities by studying two recent 
coalition operations and determines how to best coordinate integration efforts. The purpose of this study 
is to analyze various methods of perception management and determine how they can be incorporated 
into current US Information Operations. One area of study will be the importance of credibility of our 
leaders when placed in a position of authority. This study will show that credibility is one of the toughest 
factors to achieve. A second area of study will be the value of story telling in gaining populace support 
and validation for intervening in conflicts that require the use of force and soldiers. As Stephen Pease 
said, "the message must be believable, though not necessarily true." (Stephen Pease 1950) 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA396269 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA396269  
 
Thomas, Timothy L. Cyber Mobilization: The Neglected Aspect of Information 
Operations and Counterinsurgency Doctrine. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military 
Studies Office, 2007. 23p.  
Abstract: For over two years, the U.S. armed forces have focused on seeking ways to counter insurgent 
use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Less attention has been paid to 
countering the mobilization process that produces the seemingly unending line of insurgents willing to (1) 
become suicide bomber (walking IEDs or WIEDs), (2) prepare the IEDs, and (3) fight street battles. The 
insurgents use the Internet's "cyber mobilization" potential to fuel and supply this line of volunteers. They 
have been particularly successful in recruiting volunteers from other countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt. This success has forced coalition forces to continually react to the environment instead of 
controlling it. 




Tulak, Arthur N. The Application of Information Operations Doctrine in Support of 
Peace Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 
School of Advances Military Studies, June 1999. 231p.  
Abstract: This study investigates the application of Army Information Operations (IO) doctrine in a 
peace operations environment. Doctrinal concepts are applied to the category of military operations other 
than war (MOOTW) in general, and peace operations in specific. where possible, examples of doctrine in 
application in contingency operations are provided to amplify the doctrinal discussions. The study is built 
upon current doctrinal sources for joint and Army IO and its component disciplines, as well as active 
collection of observations and primary research on Task Force Eagle in Operations Joint Endeavor, Joint 
Guard, and Joint Forge in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most frequent noncombat mission requiring IO has 
been peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Presently, there is no doctrinal source focused on 
implementing IO in peace operations. The study provides a starting point for a MOOTW-specific IO 
doctrine, identifying how the components of 10 are adapted to the special purpose of peace operations. 
Specific recommendations are provided for Army 10 doctrine and for the doctrines of the information-
based disciplines supporting IO. 
 
Tuner, Bunyamin. Information Operations in Strategic, Operational, and Tactical 
Levels of War: A Balanced Systematic Approach. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2003. 75p. 
Abstract: This thesis explores the idea whether a balanced systematic approach is a better way to 
integrate Information Operations (IO) at different levels of war compared to uncoordinated efforts at each 
level. Analysis of the role of information in a conflict in the context of information superiority provides the 
foundation of the thesis. DOD's IO core, supporting, and related capability based approach was used in 
the analysis of each level of warfare. Strategic, operational, and tactical level IO were analyzed by 
matching relevant IO capabilities with the IO effects desired at the respective levels. Sample systems 
were provided for each capability when appropriate. IO efforts in Operation Desert Storm and Operation 
Allied Force were analyzed. This thesis concluded that a balanced systematic approach to IO through its 
integration at all three levels of warfare will produce much better results than the uncoordinated cases in 
order to exploit the integrative effect of IO on the instruments of national power and the military 
capabilities at different levels of warfare. 




Velasco, Diego. Full Spectrum Information Operations and the Information 
Professional Officer Intermediate Qualification Process: Filling the Gap to Ensure 
the Continued Leadership of the Information Professional Community in the Area 
of Information Dominance. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 59p. 
Abstract: There currently exists a major effort within the United States Navy's Information Professional 
(IP) Community to overhaul and improve the qualification process for its officers. The overall effort has 
included the addition of technical refresher courses, re-examination of the Continuing Education Units 
(CEU) system, and the improvement of the Basic, Intermediate, and Advanced Qualification programs. 
This thesis specifically addresses the Intermediate Qualification (IQ) and the lack of Information 
Operations (IO) concepts therein. While some portions of the IQ that address highly technical areas exist, 
there is little to no mention of the importance of and concepts contained within IO, as defined by Joint 
Doctrine. The IP Community has a unique opportunity to train its officers in the concepts, competencies, 
and supporting activities of IO. This will ensure that the IP Community continues to be the Navy's leaders 
in the area of information dominance. This thesis provides recommended line items for injection into the 
IP IQ in the appropriate format with discussions and definitions that address the specific line items. The 
thesis also provides further recommendations for the continuing improvement and refinement of the IP 
qualification process, especially in the area of IO. 





Walker, Allisa M. Knowledge Portal Support to the Naval Postgraduate School's 
Advanced Distributed Learning Program for the Information Systems and 
Operations Curriculum. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2000. 55p.  
Abstract: The Naval Postgraduate School is in the process of migrating the Information Systems and 
Operations curriculum to a nonresident mode of delivery. Once the migration is complete, there will be a 
knowledge base available for use by battle staffs as well as policy and acquisition leaders. A knowledge 
portal may be the solution to facilitating the use of the knowledge base by both learners and operators. 
The goal of this research is to show how developing a knowledge portal for use with the Information 
Systems and Operations curriculum knowledge base could expand the use of tacit and explicit knowledge 
by the operators. By providing access to this repository of information and knowledge, users can capture 
the most up-to-date knowledge on issues in the world's political and military environment, have the ability 
to collaborate with experts in the field, and receive answers to questions that will aid in resolving complex 
issues. 




Waltz, Ed. Data Fusion in Offensive and Defensive Information Operations. Ann 
Arbor, MI: Veridian Systems Division, Inc., 2001. 15p. 
Abstract: The conduct of offensive and defensive Information Operations (IO) require coordinated 
targeting and protection, respectively, across physical, information and even cognitive domains. Even the 
specific IO activities of Computer Network Defense (CND) and Computer Network Attack (CNA) require 
the close coordination of activities across all three domains to encompass physical processing assets, 
information creation, flows and stores, and the cognitive behaviors of human network administrators and 
operators. This paper describes the role of data fusion to provide intelligence for IO and to conduct both 
offensive operations (OIO) and defensive operations (DIO). We build on prior papers that have introduced 
the concept of a three-domain model of IO targets, and the general application of data fusion to the more 
abstract functions of IO. These functions require the fusion of both quantitative and qualitative data (e.g. 
numerical and text data, respectively) to develop models of physical, symbolic and cognitive IO targets 
and situations. This paper describes conceptual implementations of data fusion structures to model and 
understand OIO and DIO targets within the domains of reality. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA400192 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400192  
 
Warren, Paul S. A New Kind of War: Adaptive Threat Doctrine and Information 
Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2001. 49p. 
Abstract: The United States military remains the dominant post-modern state combatant. Military 
actions in Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Desert Storm victory validated the theory that information-based 
technologies are decisive factors in modern military operations. Threats recognize that peer competitors 
of the U.S. do not exist and are several decades away from developing similar military technologies. 
Consequently, threat-based strategies seek alternative or asymmetrical methods of warfare designed to 
exploit U.S. weaknesses and disrupt or paralyze the decision-making apparatus. Information operations 
provide opportunities to avoid direct contact with superior conventional forces and threat capabilities 
enhanced where qualitative gaps with opposing forces exist. The theoretical framework for the study is a 
model of information warfare that draws a distinction between "cyberwar" and "netwar," two components 
of information warfare that are structurally different. Using a hybrid of this model, the effectiveness of 
threat strategy using "netwar" to disrupt the decision-making process and create paralysis at the strategic 
and operational level can be determined. Understanding how the threat is adapting to knowledge-based 
warfare and U.S. military information dominance is vital to U.S. national interests. What methods are state 
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and non-state actors using to counter U.S. technological superiority? Can adaptive threat applications be 
developed that cause strategic and operational paralysis? If so, then are they successful in achieving 
threat end-states and are they designed to use information operations to gain a relative advantage? Can 
it be shown that future threats to the security of the United States can develop new ways, specifically 
"netwar" strategies, to attack and exploit U.S. military weaknesses? 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA394428 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA394428  
 
Washington, Ollie, Jr. The Legal and Ethical Implications of Information 
Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001.  29p. 
Abstract: Information Operations (I0) is a family of programs and tools that are used to deprive or 
disrupt an adversary's information and information systems while assuring the continued availability of 
your own. The technological tools of IO have been developed and implemented so rapidly that the 
domestic and international laws that should govern their use have not kept pace. Hackers, cyber 
criminals, terrorist and foreign spies are using tools such as computer network attack while domestic and 
international laws are insufficient to adequately patrol them. Further, there are ethical issues involved in 
the use of these IO tools that may not have been adequately debated, at least from a societal standpoint, 
to mediate possible conflicts with our national values. IO tools will allow the U.S. to engage and disable 
enemy facilities previously engaged with kinetic weapons, without the physical collateral damage, but with 
possible significant impact on noncombatants. International agreements such as the Geneva Convention 
do not specifically address IO and even within the U.S. military the rules of engagement on IO are not 
clear. This paper will attempt to explore some of these incongruities and provide a perspective on where 
the U.S. stance could be on our use of IO. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA390619 
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White Papers - 2025. Volume 1. Awareness. Maxwell AFB: Air University, Center for 
Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education, 1996. 342p. 
Abstract: A robust information operations architecture can provide leaders dominant battlespace 
knowledge and tools for improved decision making. US armed forces in 2025 need an information 
operations system that generates products and services that are timely, reliable, relevant, and tailored to 
each user's needs. The products must come from systems that are secure, redundant, survivable, 
transportable, adaptable, deception resistant, capable of fusing vast amount of data, and capable of 
forecasting. The information operations architecture of 2025 proposed in this paper consists of thousands 
of widely distributed nodes performing the full range of collection, data fusion, analysis, and command 
functions-all linked together through a robust networking system. Data will be collected, organized into 
usable information, analyzed and assimilated, and displayed in a form that enhances the military decision 
maker's understanding of the situation. The architecture will also apply modeling, simulation, and 
forecasting tools to help commanders make sound choices for employing military force. This architecture 
allows the United States (US) armed forces to conduct Wisdom Warfare. The system can be used by the 
commander in chief, unit commander, supervisor, or technician. Somewhere in the workplace, in a 
vehicle, or on the person there will be a link to the sensors, transmitters, receivers, storage devices, and 
transformation systems that will provide, in push or pull fashion, all the synthesized information needed to 
accomplish the mission or task. Information will be presented in a variety of forms selected by the user. 
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White, Randall L. Command & Control Structures for Space and Information 
Operations in a Joint Command. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Air Command and 
Staff College, 2002. 43p. 
Abstract: This research develops two products for aiding a Joint Force Commander (JFC) tasked 
with developing command and control (C2) structures for space and information operation (IO) 
capabilities within a joint force. The first product is a decision matrix based upon two ideas 
essential to command and control. The first idea is that knowing the level of desired effect, that is, 
a strategic, operational, or tactical effect produced by space or IO functions is critical to the C2 
structure. The second idea is that the JFC must determine which is more important, the 
integration of functional capabilities into a single mission oriented team or the preservation of 
functional identities due to high demand/low density resources, the need to preserve critical 
functional expertise, or other related reasons which drive functional organizations. The second 
product of this research is a proposed core set of C2 structures across the three levels of 
command that can be adapted to the situation confronting a JFC. The core C2 structures lean 
toward the idea that space and IO be integrated with service capabilities in all Defense 
Departments rather than segregated into combatant commands or functional components 
independent from existing service organizations. The decision matrix and core C2 structures are 
based upon my analysis of service and joint doctrine and a case study I conducted on CENTCOMs 
employment of forces while conducting Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA420647 
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Williamson, Jennie M. Information Operations: Computer Network Attack in the 
21st Century. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 29p. 
Abstract: U.S. Information systems and critical infrastructures are vulnerable to attacks. The 
Department of Defense must establish directives to defend the U.S. information systems and 
critical infrastructures. The United States must devise measures to protect its citizens, critical 
infrastructures, and computer systems. The 21st century is more dynamic, with potential threats 
capable of launching cyber warfare via multiple means, targeting key United States' centers of 
gravity. Therefore, the United States must design a comprehensive computer network attack 
policy to deter potential adversaries. This study addresses current information operations policy, 
DoD roles and responsibilities, Computer Network Attack Concept and Strategy. Lastly, this report 
outlines the ends, ways and means of a computer network attack policy, designed to protect and 
sustain national security. The study highlights the current U.S. information operations policy as it 
relates to computer network attack. Further, the study describes why the U.S. must protect its 
information systems and critical infrastructures against potential attacks. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA402018 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA402018  
 
Wingfield, Thomas C. Legal Aspects of Offensive Information Operations in Space. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005. 17p.  
Abstract: What, then, are the specific steps to follow in performing a legal analysis of offensive 
information operations in space? First, correctly identify the type and subtype of operation contemplated. 
The three types are intelligence collection, offensive operations through satellites, and offensive 
operations against satellites. The subtypes for each are listed in the second section of this paper. 
Second, determine if this type of operation, in the light of all relevant circumstances, rises to the level of a 
use of force. Although international legal academics are only now turning to this question, the one settled 
concept in this area is that an information operation crosses the Article 2(4) threshold when it produces 
effects comparable to those of a kinetic attack which would be thought of as having crossed the 
threshold. What more than that would constitute a use of force is still an open question. If the action is the 
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equivalent of a use of force, it may only be undertaken pursuant to Chapter VII authorization, or as a 
lawful exercise of self-defense. Assuming the legality of acting at all, the operation must be conducted in 
accordance with the customary international legal standards of proportionality, discrimination, and 
chivalry. Offensive information operations in space will drive a revolution in technical, tactical, and legal 
thought. It is for the attorney adviser to the warfighter to present honest, closely reasoned legal advice to 
his client so that he may fight honorably and effectively. 
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http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435835  
 
Yingling, Paul L. Using the Targeting Process to Synchronize Information 
Operations at the Tactical Level. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff 
College, 2002 67p. 
Abstract: The U.S. Army's new capstone doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, recognizes that 
information is a powerful weapon in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Like other weapons, the 
effects of information must be synchronized with the effects of other systems to produce optimal results. 
Unfortunately, current U.S. Army doctrine does not provide a single coherent method for integrating the 
effects of maneuver, fires and information. This monograph seeks to remedy that flaw by analyzing the 
utility of the targeting process as a means of synchronizing information with the other elements of combat 
power at the tactical level. The decide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A) methodology of the targeting process 
is a useful conceptual tool for synchronizing effects on hostile forces. However, in practice the targeting 
process contains a bias towards lethal effects. With minor modifications, the targeting process could 
become a far more effective synchronization tool. 
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Although there are a number of very relevant reports issued with distribution limitations (e.g. 
FOUO or DOD only) due to the public nature of this bibliography, this section includes 
unclassified/unlimited distribution references only. Abstracts were taken from various databases 
and were written by the authors of the documents cited or by the abstracting service from which 
the citations were generated not by the author of this bibliography. 
 
Beauregard, Joseph E. Modeling Information Assurance. Wright Patterson AFB, OH: 
Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Engineering and Management, 2001. 223p. 
Abstract: The ever-increasing speed of information systems allows decision-makers around the world to 
gather, process, and disseminate information almost instantaneously. However, with this benefit there 
comes a price. Information is valuable and therefore a target to those who do not have it or wish to 
destroy it. The Internet has allowed information to flow freely, but it has also made information vulnerable 
to many forms of corruption. The U. S. military controls much of the world's most sensitive information, 
and since it cannot sacrifice losing the speed at which this information is currently processed and 
disseminated, it must find a way to assure its protection. There has been some effort to model information 
assurance in recent years, however the no accepted quantifiable model currently exists. This study 
presents a strategy to aid organizations, specifically organizations within the Department of Defense 
(DoD), in their efforts to protect valuable information and information systems. The model is reviewed and 
results from an actual analysis are presented. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA390985 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA390985  
 
Brodhun, III, Carl P. Prioritization of Information Assurance (IA) Technology in a 
Resource Constrained Environment. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2001. 120p. 
Abstract: Classical risk analysis is a static process that does not account for rapid evolutionary or 
generational changes in technology and technological solutions. This thesis defines a process that 
expands classical risk analysis to increase visualization of the security environment of an information 
system. It provides a comparative analysis of system attributes and encourages focused communications 
between decision-makers and information systems technicians. Personal interviews with domain experts 
from four organizations were used to construct a baseline model. Face validity of the model was 
determined during sessions with the domain experts. The model was calibrated to two specific scenarios 
using a pair of surveys to set link values and establish data for the initial nodes. A verification phase 
compared rough results from the model with expert opinion. The model evaluated, prioritized and 
graphically illustrated shortfalls within two information systems based on the relative importance of 
specific criteria established by the domain experts. It facilitated the extraction of implicit or tacit knowledge 
from the domain experts that would not emerge during a classical risk analysis. 




Cone, Benjamin D. A CYBERCIEGE Campaign Fulfilling Navy Information 
Assurance Training and Awareness Requirements. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006. 279p. 
Abstract: The broad use of information systems within organizations has led to an increased 
appreciation of the need to ensure that all users be aware of basic concepts in Information Assurance 
(IA). The Department of Defense (DOD) addressed the idea of user awareness in DOD Directive 8750.1. 
This directive requires that all users of DOD information systems undergo an initial IA awareness 
orientation followed by annual refresher instruction. This thesis created a CyberCIEGE campaign for the 
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Naval Postgraduate School's CyberCIEGE project that will fulfill Navy requirements to meet DOD 
Directive 8750.1. The first portion of this thesis is an analysis of four IA programs and products. 
Requirements for Navy IA awareness and training products were developed from this analysis. The 
second part of this thesis is a description of two CyberCIEGE scenarios that were created to fulfill these 
requirements. The first scenario focuses on basic IA awareness and emphasizes information that the 
Navy should reinforce. The scenario is intended for all users of Navy information systems. The second 
scenario is intended for technical users and addresses more advanced concepts and technical 
considerations. The technical user scenario emphasizes skill application and problem solving. 




Deschaine, Darren A. An Analysis of Biometric Technology as an Enabler to 
Information Assurance. Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 
School of Engineering and Management, 2005. 75p. 
Abstract: The use of and dependence on, Information technology (IT) has grown tremendously in the 
last two decades. Still, some believe the United States is only in the infancy of this growth. This explosive 
growth has opened the door to capabilities that were only dreamed of in the past. As easy as it is to see 
how advantageous this technology is, it also is clear that with its advantages come distinct responsibilities 
and new problems that must be addressed. For instance, the minute one begins using information 
processing systems, the world of information assurance (IA) becomes far more complex. As a result, the 
push for better IA is necessary. To reach this increased level of IA, a further dependence on technology 
has developed. As an example, the field of biometrics has matured and has become an enabler to the 
U.S. Department of Defense IA model. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA434466 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA434466  
 
Fox, Jonathan M. Information Assurance and the Defense in Depth: A Study of 
Infosec Warriors and Infosec Cowboys. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and 
General Staff College, 2003. 161p. 
Abstract: This study investigates the Army's ability to provide information assurance for the NIPRNET. 
Information assurance includes those actions that protect and defend information and information 
systems by ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. The study 
examines how the military's defense in depth policy provides information assurance with a system of 
layered network defenses. The study also examines current practices used in the corporate world to 
provide information assurance. With the cooperation of the Human Firewall Council, the study compared 
the performance of four organizations according to standards developed for the Council Council's 
Security Management Index. The four participants in the study included: an Army Directorate of 
Information Management, a government agency, a university, and a web development company. The 
study also compared the performance of the four participants with the aggregate results obtained by the 
Human Firewall Council. The study concluded the defense in depth policy does grant the Army an 
advantage over other organizations for providing information assurance. However, the Army would 
benefit from incorporating some of the common practices of private corporations in their overall 
information assurance plans. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA416561 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA416561  
 
Friedman, Arthur R. A Way to Operationalize the DOD's Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Program Using Information Assurance Policies and Technologies. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2005. 35p. 
Abstract: The Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection Program has 
recently reorganized under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense under 
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the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Requirements have been set forth in DoDD 3020.ff Defense 
Critical Infrastructure which is in final coordination and is anticipated to be published later this fiscal year. 
This policy states that Defense Critical Infrastructure and non-DoD infrastructures are essential to 
planning mobilizing deploying and sustaining military operations within the U.S. as well as globally shall 
be available when required. Today's Combatant Commanders do not have the ability to quickly and 
efficiently share information that identifies critical infrastructure assets and single points of failure to 
prevent physical or cyber attacks from impairing the Global Information Grid. The intent of this paper is to 
provide a construct to Operationalize the DoD's Critical Infrastructure Protection Program through the use 
of Information Assurance policies methodologies and technologies and to identify strategic implications of 
vulnerabilities to the Combatant Commander and supporting agencies. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA431755 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA431755  
 
Garvin, John R. and Peter H. Christensen. USMC Information Assurance Operational 
Testing and Training Strategy. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Operational Test and 
Evaluation Activity, 2001. 27p. 
Abstract: This briefing discusses MCOTEA's mission and scope, the USMC's high interest programs, 
cyber threat and network centric warfare, information assurance and joint interoperability. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA399993 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA399993  
 
Giovannetti, Robert G. An Analysis of Information Assurance Relating to the 
Department of Defense Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Passive Network. 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2005. 66p. 
Abstract: The mandates for suppliers to commence Radio Frequency Identification tagging set by Wal-
Mart and the Department of Defense is changing this long-time rumored technology into reality. Despite 
the many conveniences to automate and improve asset tracking this technology offers, consumer groups 
have obstinately opposed this adoption due to the perceived weaknesses in security and privacy of the 
network. While the heated debate between consumers and retailers continues, little to no research has 
addressed the implications of security on the Department of Defense Radio Frequency Identification 
network. This thesis utilized a historical analysis of Radio Frequency Identification literature to determine 
whether the current network design causes any serious security concerns adversaries could exploit. The 
research concluded that at the present level of implementation, there is little cause for concern over the 
security of the network, but as the network grows to its full deployment, more evaluation and monitoring of 
security issues will require further consideration. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA434410 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA434410  
 
Gorodetski, Vladimir I., Victor A. Skormin, and Leonard J. Popyack. Information 
Assurance in Computer Networks: Methods, Models and Architectures for 
Network Security. St. Petersburg, Russia: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2001.  
Abstract: This volume contains the papers selected for presentation at the International Workshop on 
Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Network Security Systems (MMM-ACNS 2001) held 
in St. Petersburg, Russia on May 21-23, 2001. The workshop was organized by the St. Petersburg 
Institute for Informatics and Automation of the Russian Academy of Sciences (SPIIRAS) in cooperation 
with the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory and the 
U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The workshop focus was on mathematical aspects of 
information and computer network security and the role of mathematical issues in contemporary and 
future development of models of secure computing. Topics included: mathematical models for computer 
networks and applied system security; methods and models for intrusion detection; mathematical basis 
and applied techniques of cryptography and steganography; applied techniques of cryptography and 
models for access control, authentication and authorization. 
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ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA396962 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA396962
 
Guild, R. James. Design and Analysis of a Model Reconfigurable Cyber-Exercise 
Laboratory (RCEL) for Information Assurance Education. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2004. 109p. 
Abstract: This thesis addresses the need to create a flexible laboratory environment for teaching 
network security. For educators to fully realize the benefit of such a facility, prototype exercise scenarios 
are also needed. The paper is based on a model laboratory created at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
The initial configuration of the NPS lab is described. The work then develops a list of learning objectives 
achievable in the kCEL. Six prototype cyber-exercise scenarios are presented to supplement the kCEL 
description. The activities within each potential scenario are described. The learning objectives met 
during each scenario are shown. This work demonstrates how a variety of potential kCEL exercises can 
supplement traditional information assurance education delivery techniques. 




Gumke, Randall. Navy/Marine Corps Intranet Information Assurance Operational 
Services Performance Measures. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001. 
130p. 
Abstract: Communicating in the Department of the Navy (DON) over the Internet is an everyday event. 
The DON is developing the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (N/MCI) to enhance this communication 
capability. The security of communicating over the N/MCI has become a concern to the DON. The DON is 
relying on the N/MCI contractor to provide security for their communications. Key aspects of this secure 
communication will be provided through the use of a DON Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which the 
N/MCI contractor is managing. To ensure the security of the PKI based communications the contract 
requires the monitoring of four PKI performance measures. This thesis analyzes performance measures, 
criterion, and standards then uses this analysis to review the contractual PKI performance measures and 
data collected from commercial PKI vendors. It recommends changes to these performance measures 
and provides additional performance criteria that should be included in the N/MCI contract. Finally, this 
thesis analyses how the N/MCI contract, specifically the PKI, impact DON members. 




Hart, James L. M. An Historical Analysis of Factors Contributing to the Emergence 
of the Intrusion Detection Discipline and its Role in Information Assurance. Wright 
Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Engineering and 
Management, 2005. 81p. 
Abstract: In 2003, Gartner, Inc., predicted the inevitable demise of the intrusion detection (ID) market, a 
major player in the computer security technology industry. In light of this prediction, IT executives need to 
know if intrusion detection technologies serve a strategic purpose within the framework of information 
assurance (IA). This research investigated the historical background and circumstances that led to the 
birth of the intrusion detection field and explored the evolution of the discipline through current research in 
order to identify appropriate roles for IDS technology within an information assurance framework. The 
research identified factors contributing to the birth of ID including increased procurement and employment 
of resource-sharing computer systems in the DoD, a growing need to operate in an open computing 
environment while maintaining security and the unmanageable volume of audit data produced as a result 
of security requirements. The research also uncovered six trends that could be used to describe the 
evolution of the ID discipline encompassing passive to active response mechanisms, centralized to 
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distributed management platforms, centralized to distributed/agent-based detection, single to multiple 
detection approaches within a system, host-based to network to hybrid analysis and software-based to 
hardware-based/in-line devices. Finally, the research outlined three roles suitable for IDS to fulfill within 
the IA framework including employing IDS as a stimulus to incident response mechanisms, as a forensic 
tool for gathering evidence of computer misuse and as a vulnerability assessment or policy enforcement 
facility. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA434323 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA434323  
 
Jorgensen, Jane and Philippe Rossignol. Information Assurance Cyber Ecology. 
Arlington, VA: IET Corporation, 2003. 211p. 
Abstract: Cyber Ecology is a systems-level discipline addressing the emergent properties of computer 
networks and their responses to perturbations, such as attacks. It is a cross-disciplinary synthesis 
incorporating elements of biology, epidemiology, ecology, computer science, and system engineering. In 
this work, methodologies from epidemiology and ecology were applied to information assurance. The 
goals of the Cyber Ecology project were to: (1) enable and demonstrate the discovery of noel IA 
technologies for the detection and mitigation of damage due to cyber attack through the application of 
ecological models, (2) design, develop, document, evaluate and deliver methodologies to assess the 
behavior of computer networks from attacks by infectious agents and direct attacks, and (3) develop and 
demonstrate methods to make system-level assessments about network health. The work in this report 
spans four major areas: (1) definition and scope of Cyber Ecology, (2) application of ecological concepts 
to the classification of malicious code, in which insider threat is briefly discussed, (3) epidemiological 
applications of Cyber Ecology, and 94) system health expressed as emergent properties that can be 
assessed through evaluation of network (community) structure. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA411943 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA411943  
 
Kaczor, William, Craig Thornley and Buddy Guynn. Taking the Mystery out of 
Information Assurance for the 21st Century Training Community. Orlando, FL: 
MTS Technologies, 2006. 10p. 
Abstract: Information Assurance "IA" is one of the most overlooked yet critical aspects of any 
Information Technology "IT" system. Although IA applies to every IT system, we will focus on its 
application to simulators and any IT powered training device connecting to a DoD network. IA is the 
overarching process consisting of Computer/Network/Data/Information Security. If IA is built into every 
training and education system, and maintained throughout its life cycle, it is guaranteed to lower 
compromising threats to DoD assets. This paper will take the mystery out of IA, system security 
engineering, and the security Certification and Accreditation "C&A" process from both government and 
industry perspectives. It will provide proven solutions to achieve C&A on any system under differing 
conditions and time frames, and document the process of IA using proven systems security engineering 
processes, the DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process "DITSCAP", 
and the documentation strategy of using the System Security Authorization Agreement "SSAA" and the 
System Security Plan "SSP". This paper will also provide examples of Information Assurance Vulnerability 
Alerts "IAVAs", including how they work and greatly reduce the risk to all IT systems. It will present the 
best practices for new systems, blended certification approaches, how to certify legacy systems, and the 
proper end of life disposal. The 21st century force is moving more toward a net-centric, real time, and IT-
based integrated operational and training environment. To achieve war-fighting excellence, IA of 
computer systems and networks should be a major focus of all new system designs for protection of 
national defense information and assets. 




Kang, George S. and Yvette Lee. Voice Biometrics for Information Assurance 
Applications. Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory, 2002. 43p. 
Abstract: In 2002, the President of the United States established an organization within the DOD to 
develop and promulgate biometrics technologies to achieve security in information, information systems, 
weapons, and facilities. NRL has been tasked to study voice biometrics for applications in which other 
biometrics techniques are difficult to apply. The ultimate goal of voice biometrics is to enable the use of 
voice as a password. Voice biometrics are "man-in-the-loop" systems in which system performance is 
significantly dependent on human performance. This aspect has not been properly emphasized by 
previous researchers in this field. Accordingly, we let each speaker choose his (or her) own test phrase 
that can be uttered consistently. The speech waveform is then pre-processed (i.e, equalized and 
normalized) to reduce the effect of inconsistent speaking. Subsequently, we extract five different voice 
features from the speech waveform. Some of them have never been used for voice biometrics. Finally, 
individual feature errors are combined to indicate a confidence level of speaker verification. Initial 
laboratory testing under various conditions shows encouraging results. We will be prepared to fleet-test 
our voice biometrics system in FY03. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA408449 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA408449  
 
Labert, Matthew J. Implementation of Information Assurance Risk Management 
Training into Existing Department of the Navy Training Pipelines. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 140p. 
Abstract: With the implementation and continuing research on information systems such as Information 
Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21) Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), and "Network-Centric 
warfare" there is little doubt that the Navy is becoming heavily dependent on information and information 
systems. Though much has been accomplished technically to protect and defend these systems an 
important security issue has thus far been overlooked the human factor. Information Assurance Risk 
Management (IARM) was a proposal to standardize the way DON personnel discuss, treat, and 
implement information assurance. IARM addresses the human security aspect of information and 
information systems in a regimented way to be understandable through all levels of the DON. To 
standardize the way DON personnel perceive information assurance, they must be taught what IARM is 
and how to use it. Can an IARM course be implemented in the DON, and if so, at what level and to who m 
should it be taught? 




Lamm, George A. Assessing and Managing Risks to Information Assurance: A 
Methodological Approach. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia, 2001. 306p. 
Abstract: Recent events such as the Yahoo! denial-of-service attack and the I Love you virus have 
sparked a dramatic interest in information assurance (IA) and the future security of information 
infrastructures. Information systems are facing an increase in interconnectedness, interdependency and 
complexity. Information assurance attempts to answer critical questions of trust and credibility associated 
with our digital environment and it represents a myriad of considerations and decisions that transcend 
technological advancement, legal, political, economic, social, cultural, institutional, organizational, and 
educational dimensions. Despite spending millions of dollars on firewalls, encryption technologies, and 
intrusion detection software, information infrastructure vulnerabilities and incidents continue to happen. 
These trends have a significant impact on military operations in the next decades. 




Lentz, Robert. Information Assurance and DoD: A Partnership with Industry. 
Washington, DC: Assistance Secretary of Defense, (Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence), 2002. 22p. 
Abstract: This briefing presents the information assurance environment, DoD's vision, the DoD IA 
community response and challenges, the DoD Industry Relationship, key influences on the DoD and a 
summary. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406432 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406432  
 
Li, Xiaohua. Wireless Information Assurance and Cooperative Communications. 
Binghamton, NY: State University at Binghamton, 2006. 24p. 
Abstract: This report consists of four parts. The first part develops physical-layer security techniques 
with both multi-input single- output (MISO) transmissions and multi-input multi-output (MIMO) 
transmissions. The second part addresses cooperative communications, whereas the third part involves 
the testbed development. The final part contains conclusions. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA449197 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449197  
 
Liu, Peng. Measuring Quality of Information Assurance (QoIA). University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University, 2003. 36p. 
Abstract: Current information assurance techniques do not allow us to state quantitatively how assured 
our systems and networks are. As a result, (a) security and assurance measures can only be designed 
and built into information systems in an ad hoc fashion, (b) it is difficult to characterize the capabilities of 
security measures, and (c) information systems cannot deliver quality of information assurance (QolA) 
guarantees. This seedling project had two objectives: (1) to explore an economics theoretic framework for 
measuring assurance and (2) to explore a theory of QolA management. For each objective, the study 
defines the problem space, offers some potentially feasible solutions, and creates a technology 
development roadmap for a 5 to 7 year time horizon. The key idea is to use incentive-based, economic 
models of attacker intent, objectives and strategies (AIOS) to measure a system's overall assurance 
capacity. As a result, a preliminary framework for AlOS modeling and inference is developed along with 
an approach which uses AlOS inferences to measure a system's assurance capacity. Two real-world 
assurance measuring case studies were conducted. Finally, a preliminary framework for measuring QolA 
and delivering QolA services in mission critical database systems is proposed. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA419205 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA419205  
 
Luiijf, H. A. M. Survey of Information Warfare, Information Operations and 
Information Assurance. The Hague, Netherlands: Fysisch en Elektronisch Laboratory, 
1999. 92p. 
Abstract: Research survey on the phenomena Information Warfare, Information Operations (Info Ops) 
and Information Assurance. History, development, definitions and developments in various countries 
around the globe. Appendix with list of abbreviations of terms in these fields. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA367670 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA367670  
 
May, Chris, et al. Advanced Information Assurance Handbook. Pittsburgh, PA: 
Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute, 2004. 282p.  
Abstract: This handbook is for technical staff members charged with administering and securing 
information systems and networks. The first module briefly reviews some best practices for securing host 
systems and covers specific techniques for securing Windows 2000 and Red Hat Linux systems. It also 
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discusses the importance of monitoring networked services to make sure they are available to users and 
briefly introduces two software tools that can be used for monitoring. The second module covers the 
importance of firewalls and provides instructions for their configuration and deployment. The third module 
presents the many tasks involved in using an intrusion detection system (IDS) on a network. Topics 
covered include implementing IDSs on host computers and on networks, using Snort (the most common 
open-source IDS), and interpreting and using the information gathered using an IDS. The fourth and final 
module covers real-world skills and techniques for synchronizing the time on networked computers from a 
central clock, collecting and securing information for forensic analysis, and using a remote, centralized 
storage point for log data gathered from multiple computers. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA443478 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA443478  
 
Miller, Scot. Evaluation of Information Assurance Requirements in a Net-Centric 
Army. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2005. 31p.  
Abstract: Network centric capabilities are a key enabler for the transformational army and planned 
employment of Units of Action in the future. Information Assurance refers to the security and assurance of 
the information that is being passed within the myriad networked systems at multiple data rates and 
security classifications. This paper will examine the requirements and concurrent capabilities necessary 
for this key strategic imperative of future Army operations as part of a joint and coalition force. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA432792 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA432792  
 
Muncaster, G. and E. J. Krall. “An Enterprise View of Defensive Information Assurance.”  
p. 714-718,  IN: IEEE Military Communications Conference Proceedings, 1999. 
MILCOM 1999. 1499p. 
Abstract: Real-world network-centric military and commercial systems which operate within the global 
mixed wireless and wireline infrastructure require practical enterprise-wide defensive information 
assurance (DIA). The increasing reliance on common, open standards and intrinsic complexity make such 
systems attractive and vulnerable to information warfare attack. A proactive, enterprise-wide DIA program 
is prudent, given the nature of information attack threats, and is beneficial to enterprises and their global 
customers. 
 
Nanton, Ulmont C., Jr. Achieving Information Assurance. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Army War College, 2004. 51p. 
Abstract: Achieving Information Assurance (IA) is an integral factor in the U.S. efforts to strengthen 
America's homeland security. Technology enhancements have enabled greater efficiency in our business 
processes. At the same time we have increased our dependency on technology and thus our 
vulnerability. While our enemy continues to exploit conventional means to harm us in our homeland the 
threat of compromised information systems in critical infrastructure poses an even greater threat to our 
national security. Technology enables attacks against our way of life from abroad. It is no longer 
necessary to take the fight to your neighbor. Our inability to secure the very systems that we have 
become wholly dependent on could very well be the catalyst that exploits our weakness. Information 
assurance is the application of controls to mitigate the risk of exposure of our information systems. Our 
current method of dealing with information security is one of reaction. This process is in urgent need of 
replacement with a system of proactive protection and immediate/automated corrective action. This paper 
will show that near real time information assurance is achievable. 




Ogren, Joel G. and James R. Langevin. Responding to the Threat of Cyberterrorism 
Through Information Assurance. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 
1999. 90p. 
Abstract: The number of people connecting to the Internet is growing at an astounding rate: estimates 
range from 100% to 400% annually over the next five years. This unprecedented level of 
interconnectedness has brought with it the specter of a new threat: cyberterrorism. This thesis examines 
the impact of this threat on the critical infrastructure of the United States, specifically focusing on 
Department of Defense issues and the National Information Infrastructure (NII). A working definition for 
cyberterrorism is derived, and a description of the Nation's critical infrastructure is provided. A number of 
possible measures for countering the threat of cyberterrorism are discussed, with particular attention 
given to the concept of information assurance. Information assurance demands that trustworthy systems 
be developed from untrustworthy components within power generation systems, banking, transportation, 
emergency services, and telecommunications. The importance of vulnerability testing (or red teaming) is 
emphasized as part of the concept of information assurance. To support this, a cyberterrorist red team 
was formed to participate in the Marine Corps' Urban Warrior Experiment. The objective of this thesis is to 
address the impact of these issues from a Systems Management perspective. This includes taking into 
account the changes that must occur in order to improve the U.S.' ability to detect, protect against, 
contain, neutralize, mitigate the effects of and recover from attacks on the Nation's Critical Infrastructure. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA366792  
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA366792  
 
Powers, Hampton and Milica Barjaktarovic. Concurrent Information Assurance 
Architecture. Freeville, NY: Wetstone Technologies, Inc., 2002. 104p. 
Abstract: Currently, many tasks in the information security field are accomplished in a sequential 
manner, often after the fact, which limits the urgency of time response and usefulness of the tools and 
approaches currently available. The next step toward more secure networking is taking a Concurrent 
Information Assurance (C-IA) approach, which executes security-critical functionality concurrently on 
several different levels. The C-IA Architecture (C-IAA) postulates concurrent information assurance (IA) 
by providing configurable, coordinated, automated situation analysis, decision assistance, and response. 
The C-IAA's objective is to create the underpinnings for an architecture that executes security-critical 
functionality in an automated fashion, distributively, concurrently, and separately from other applications. 
C-IAA systems exploit the severability of concurrent processing into separate execution environments to 
achieve a high confidence and minimal impact on information, IA components, and the organizations 
dependant on that information. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406860 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406860  
 
Scott, Kelvin B. An Analysis of Factors that have Influenced the Evolution of 
Information Assurance from World War I Through Vietnam to the Present. Wright 
Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Engineering and 
Management, 2004. 84p. 
Abstract: This study is an exploratory historical analysis of the factors that have influenced the evolution 
of military Information Assurance (IA) programs from World War I to the present. Although the term IA has 
recently been widely used throughout the Information Resource Management field (IRM), evidence 
indicates that information and information systems protection mechanisms were used during every U.S. 
Military conflict. This research proposes to increase the body of knowledge within the information systems 
management field by exploring the areas related to Information Assurance (IA) and the ultimate goal of U. 
S. Defensive Information Warfare. I found that significant events related to the protection of information 
and information systems security led to certain levels of IA being explored throughout each U.S. Military 
conflict. The evaluation of these events provides key information that reveals a common approach to IA 
throughout history and supports the identification of key concepts that have influenced this evolutionary 
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process and shaped the role of IA in current military operations, with indicators of how it may be used in 
the future. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA425253 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA425253   
 
Sledge, Carol A. Building Information Assurance Educational Capacity: Pilot 
Efforts to Date. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie-Mellon University, 2005.  36p. 
Abstract: This report describes efforts by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) to increase the 
capacity of institutions of higher education to offer information assurance (IA) and information security (IS) 
courses, to expand existing IA and IS offerings, and to include IA and IS topics and perspectives, as 
appropriate, in other courses. Naturally, these efforts must be aligned with a department's foci, its current 
curriculum, and its accreditation requirements. To accomplish its goals, the SEI transitions courseware, 
materials, and a survivability and information assurance curriculum to various departments at institutions 
of higher education, participates in NSF-funded faculty capacity-building programs, creates partnerships 
with key regional educational institutions, and offers IA symposia, among other efforts. While the SEI 
works with all institutions of higher education, there is a particular focus on minority-serving institutions 
(MSIs) and community colleges in the United States. Rather than build a new infrastructure to accomplish 
this, the SEI utilizes partnerships that leverage the strengths of the SEI and the strengths of the partner 
educational institutions, builds upon existing trusted relationships and infrastructure, and sustains the 
incorporation of new and evolving materials. Leveraging other complementary programs, events, and 
organizations broadens the offering and makes it more cost effective to all parties concerned. Over the 
past 3 years, the SEI has developed a multi-pronged approach for its educational outreach in information 
assurance, with the goal of increasing the educational information assurance capacity. While the focus is 
primarily on information security and information assurance, the SEI also includes related software 
engineering areas (e.g., process improvement) that are areas of core competency for the SEI and for 
which the SEI offers workshops for faculty and others. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA441832 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA441832  
 
VanPutte, Michael A. A Computational Model and Multi-Agent Simulation for 
Information Assurance. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 178p. 
Abstract: This dissertation introduces a computational model of IA called the Social-Technical 
Information Assurance Model (STIAM). STIAM models organizations, information infrastructures, and 
human actors as a complex adaptive system. STIAM provides a structured approach to express 
organizational IA issues and a graphical notation for depicting the elements and interactions. The model 
can be implemented in a computational system to discover possible adaptive behavior in an IA 
environment. A multi-agent simulation is presented that introduces several innovations in multi-agent 
systems including iconnectors, a biologically inspired visual language and mechanism for inter-agent 
communications. The computational model and simulation demonstrate how complex societies of 
autonomous entities interact. STIAM can be implemented as a hypothesis generator for scenario 
development in computer network defensive mechanisms. 




Witten, Brian. Information Assurance and Survivability Operational 
Experimentation (OPX). Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
2002. 17p. 
Abstract: This briefing was presented during the Phoenix Challenge 2002 Conference and Warfighter 
Day. It concerns information assurance and survivability operational experimentation (OPX). The strategy 
of OPX objectives are to: accelerate transition of effective technologies, information research agenda with 
operational experience. Its key experimentation risks and transition metrics are: limited operational staff 
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time, and impact on operational systems. Its approach is: leverage mature research, well tested in lab, 
and to field cautiously. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406361 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406361  
 
Woodhouse, Allen F. Information Assurance: A National Policy Struggling With 
Implementation. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001. 27p.  
Abstract: The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was the first national effort to 
address the vulnerabilities created by the revolution in information technology. The Commission was 
established in July 1996 and rendered its report in October 1997. The results of the report were alarming. 
The nation's critical infrastructures had become increasingly automated, interlinked, and relied heavily on 
computer controlled systems. Moreover, the Commission found a wide spectrum of threats, increasing 
vulnerabilities in both private sector and government systems, and no national focus or policy. After 
reviewing the report, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), which became 
the national policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Information Assurance. This paper will 
examine the adequacy and effectiveness of PDD 63. It will focus on how clearly the policy states 
objectives and acceptable risks. It will address the policy's consistency with the National Security 
Strategy. Since more than 90 percent of the information systems that the government uses belong to the 
private sector, the paper will examine the private sector's role in the policy's implementation. Finally, with 
the current trend toward economic globalization, the issue of foreign policy cooperation must be 
addressed as well. 
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 Documents, Theses & Technical Reports 
 
Although there are a number of very relevant reports issued with distribution limitations (e.g. 
FOUO or DOD only) due to the public nature of this bibliography, this section includes 
unclassified/unlimited distribution references only. Abstracts were taken from various databases 
and were written by the authors of the documents cited or by the abstracting service from which 
the citations were generated not by the author of this bibliography. 
 
Byram, Judith K. and James P. Harris. Developing and Fielding Information 
Dominance. San Diego, CA: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, 2002. 17p. 
Abstract: This paper describes the process improvements that comprise the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command's Horizontal Integration Initiative. It tells how these process improvements are leading 
to improved C4ISR capability, sustainability, and cost effectiveness as the System Command fields 
successive Blocks of its horizontally integrated product line: "IT-21". The process improvements represent 
a holistic view of end to end capabilities: commonality in hardware, software, and data structure; tight 
configuration management; built in ILS; and rigorous testing to horizontally integrate shipboard C4ISR 
designs. The paper recounts how these improvements became the foundation for SPAWAR's IT-21 re-
engineering initiative; and discusses development and fielding plans for the Fleet's first fully integrated 
C4ISR architecture: IT-21 - Block 1. An organizational overview of the IT-21 Block 1 architecture, within 
its functional enclaves (GENSER, SCI, UNCLAS, Networks, Transport), lists key features of the end to 
end design package. As Block 1 readies for delivery in 2003, development of its successor architecture, 
IT-21 Block 2, is already underway. The features of the IT-21 Block 2 design process - requirements 
analysis, technology insertion, interface planning, and cost/benefit analysis - provide insight into the 
dynamics which will shape Navy C4ISR in years to come. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA461923 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA461923  
 
Catudal, Joseph T. Road to Information Dominance: ‘System of Systems’ Concept 
for the United States Armed Forces. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 
1998. 145p. 
Abstract: Information and technical superiority is the foundation on which our National Military Strategy 
implementation rests. The advancement of technology transformed warfare into the art of employing 
integrated advanced information and weapons systems with forces to dominate an opponent strategically, 
operationally and tactically. The dominance exhibited by U.S. forces in Operation Desert Storm 
demonstrates reliance on advanced technology to win decisively. Maintaining a technological edge grows 
increasingly important as force structure decreases and high-tech smart, expert and possibly brilliant 
weapons become readily available on the open market. Our current technological advantage is based on 
past experience with an investment in technology. It is prudent and reasonable to assume that our future 
war fighting capabilities will be appreciably forged by today's contribution. This study focuses on 
information dominance through the U.S. Armed Forces System of Systems concept. It addresses and 
analyzes current and future strategic implications and requirements for U.S. warfighting communications 
and information systems. It proposes a more flexible, reliable, responsive, robust and survivable high 
capacity throughput communications and bitways system to support future force projection operations for 
the Force and/or Army After Next. Lastly, it concludes with a suggested methodology to implement the 
System of Systems concept to enable information dominance. 




Cross, Frederick A. Making the Information Manager (G6/J6): Leveraging 
Information Management to Achieve Information Dominance. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Army War College, 2002. 33p. 
Abstract: The three primary communications disciplines offered to signal officers by the U.S. Army 
Signal Corps separately do not meet the educational and training needs required of the G6/J6 Information 
Manager to support future doctrine. In that context, should the U.S. Army Signal School's institutional 
training and educational programs for its three primary officer disciplines; Basic Branch 25, Functional 
Area 24 and Functional Area 53, be restructured in order to provide signal officers the proper tools 
necessary to become an effective G6/J6 Information Manager; supporting the complex and vast 
informational requirements of the future warfighter? The Army Signal Corps face tremendous challenges 
in educating, training and aligning the proper skill-sets required of its officers to successfully assist the 
Army and the joint community in meeting Joint Vision 2020 objectives in information technology. 
Developing effective, confident and skilled Army Information Managers is essential in ensuring not only 
Army, but Joint warfighters as well achieve and enjoy information dominance across the entire spectrum 
of conflict. In the draft version of the new FM 6.0, Command and Control, the Army's information 
management function is assigned to the G6 (Army Signal Officer). To properly fulfill the roles and 
functions of the G6/J6, it is my belief that Signal Officers must be trained and educated in a cross-section 
of skills pulled from each of the three specific signal disciplines. The future G6/J6 Information Manager 
must be multi-talented, skilled and educated not only in the installation, operation and maintenance of 
traditional communications systems, but also proficient in tactical operations, intelligence and information 
systems technologies- including data network engineering and computer network and system design. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA400753 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400753  
 
Bolstad, Cheryl A and Mica R. Endsley. Information Dissonance, Shared Mental 
Models and Shared Displays: An Empirical Evaluation of Information Dominance 
Techniques. Dayton, OH: Logicon Technical Services, Inc., 1998. 51p. 
Abstract: This study experimentally tested the use of shared mental models and shared displays as a 
means of enhancing team situation awareness (SA). Teams were tested using a simulation of an aircraft 
defense task that incorporated features of a distributed team architecture. As hypothesized, the presence 
of shared displays and shared mental models improved team performance. However, the mechanism 
whereby the shared displays aided performance was not direct as expected. Teams were initially slower 
when first given a shared display, but a residual effect was seen in later trials where it aided performance. 
While shared displays initially slowed team performance in this task, most likely due to extra attention 
demands, they also provided for the development of shared mental models that greatly enhanced 
performance after they were removed. The combination of non-shared displays and no mental model was 
highly detrimental to performance. Teams who experienced this condition first were unable to ever 
develop very good performance. Overall, we found that effective team performance could be enhanced 
by providing teams with sufficient information to build a shared mental model of each other's tasks and 
goals, either through direct instruction, or through provision of shared displays. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA37133 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA37133  
 
Kaminski, Paul C. Information Dominance for the Warfighter: The Present to Year 
2025.  Arlington, VA: Joint Publications Research Service, October 1996. 9p. 
Abstract: In summary, it is clear that we encounter some difficult challenges as well as some significant 
opportunities as we enter the next century. Our combat forces will increasingly exploit our information 
dominance to turn inside an adversary's decision cycle. System of systems architectures will provide this 
kind of information superiority and will dominate the 21st century battlefield. In this environment, the 
United States will need to extend an information umbrella over our friends and allies during coalition 
operations. Reliance on large system of systems architectures will expose our forces to significant 
vulnerabilities. The traditional approach, providing a wall around our systems, will not be fully effective 
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against information warfare attacks. Our systems must be robust and continue adequate performance of 
critical services even after attacks have taken place. To design survivability into our information systems, 
it is my sense that perhaps we will have to take a broader view and perhaps benefit from understanding 
how living organisms, populations and societies survive. Information survivability or defensive information 
warfare is not just a DoD issue. It is a national issue. It is a concern of both public and private institutions. 
My sense is that there is a tremendous opportunity to leverage investment through cooperative 
development of dual use technologies. In a famous 1837 lecture, Ralph Waldo Emerson asked his 
audience, If there is any period one would desire to be born in, is it not the age of revolution, when the old 
and new stand side by side... Like Emerson, we, too, live in age of revolution the continuing explosion of 
information systems raises rich new possibilities as well as some important new vulnerabilities. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA340223 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA340223  
 
Kaura, Mary A. In Support of Information Dominance: Acquisitions and 
Organizations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1998. 46p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this work is to provide a basis and a framework for today's command, control, 
computer, communications, and intelligence (C4I) acquisition policies that will ensure the military is 
positioned to support success on the 21st century battlefield. This paper establishes an approximation of 
future warfare and the changing nature of organizational structures by summarizing current published 
works. Resulting tenets for C4I operations are then developed. A summary of the technical constraints 
that are related to and important for the implementation of the C4I tenets are provided. Specifically 
considered are technology hurdles in bandwidth, computer technology, and software complexity. Finally, 
current and recommended acquisition policies that are applicable to the success of C4I architectures in 
support of 21st century Warfare are discussed. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA351075 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA351075  
 
Kaye, Tom and George Galdorisi. Achieving Information Dominance: Seven 
Imperatives for Success. San Diego, CA: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, 
2002. 22p. 
Abstract: The importance of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance) as a key enabler for warfighting success has long been recognized. 
What has been less clear is a means for U.S.-led joint and coalition forces to achieve C4ISR dominance. 
Understanding not just the operational needs and the technical requirements - but also the functional 
capabilities required to achieve this goal - can hasten the day when C4ISR dominance for United States 
military forces is more than a futuristic goal. We address a critical issue - how does the technical 
community achieve this goal? The overarching thesis of this paper is that in order to achieve C4ISR 
dominance, the technical community should neither chase means to overcome extant enemy operational 
capabilities nor attempt to push systems to the operational forces based solely on available technology. 
Rather, it should build to a discrete set of functional capabilities to achieve this C4ISR dominance. This 
paper identifies seven functional imperatives to achieve this C4ISR dominance over an adversary. We 
conclude that what has remained timeless from the days of Sun Tzu to today's conflicts are the universal 
needs of warfighters to have the right information, at the right place, at the right time. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA461794 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA461794  
 
Kearney, Kevin N. Denial and Deception--Network-Centric Challenge. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, February 1999. 24p. 
Abstract: Adversarial denial and deception (D&D) poses a serious challenge to future operational 
concepts based on perceived informational superiority. An analysis of how D&D may interact in a future 
network centric environment demonstrates some inherent vulnerabilities of information technology (IT) 
based warfighting theory. Operational D&D has continued to keep pace with sensor development and 
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through physical, technical and administrative means will be able to influence sensor derived information. 
Once our information is tainted, network centric's reliance on information dominance will become a 
vulnerability. Deception will travel at high speeds and effect multiple operational levels due to the 
networked operational picture provided by network centric theory. Our dependence on reliable and timely 
information, if affected by D&D, may lead to ambiguity, misdirection, and/or false security. Network 
centric's speed of command will further exasperate D&D's effect by increasing the speed of deception 
while simultaneously reducing the likely identification of deception through analysis. Our speed and 
networked precision may also finely hone our operational art to the point of making us predictable and 
therefore more susceptible to adversarial D&D. The additional network centric attributes of self 
synchronization, platform reduction, and adversarial lock out will also contribute to our vulnerability to 
D&D by creating an environment of enemy underestimation and increasing the severity of consequences 
of friendly action taken under the influence of adversarial D&D. The D&D challenge that network centric 
warfighting faces can be addressed through an increased emphasis on the importance of networked 
analysis. Additionally, future doctrine must reflect a clear understanding of anti-D&D methodologies so 
that operational commanders of the future are aware of and can plan how to counter D&D when they face 
it. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363099 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363099  
 
Lee, James D. Information Dominance in Military Decision Making. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, June 1999. 134p. 
Abstract: This study considers how ABCS (Army Battle Command System) capabilities achieve 
information dominance and how they influence the military decision making process. The work examines 
how ABCS enables commanders and staffs to achieve information dominance at the brigade and 
battalion levels. Further, it describes how ABCS influence battle command in an expanded battlespace. A 
review of recent trends at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) indicates that no great advantage if 
gained is realized by achieving situational awareness at the brigade level. It appears the better-trained 
force in execution wins on the battlefield regardless of increased awareness. The study determined that 
technologies like ABCS are the first step towards producing future digitized systems that will gain 
information dominance for the future commander. It promotes the continued development information 
dominance technologies that enable a better decision-making process. It further concludes that man and 
battle command remain the continuity that provides ABCS its power by leveraging its capabilities at the 
right point and time on the battlefield. Finally, with the expanded battlespace, it identifies the problem that 
brigades do not have the weapons systems to influence this battlespace, hence, the current failures at the 
CTCs today. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA367899 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA367899  
 
Lee, James G. Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance. Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air University, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1999. 46p. 
Abstract: The launch of the Soviet "Sputnik" satellite in October 1957 shocked the world and propelled 
the rhetoric and the realities of the Cold War into the space age. At the same time, the Soviet feat raised 
the threat of mass destruction from space, and served as the basis for strategists to argue for a means to 
shoot down enemy satellites. Although the arguments used to justify the need for an antisatellite (ASAT) 
weapon have changed in the years since "Sputnik," the policy and strategy for its employment have 
always focused on the need to destroy, or threaten to destroy, Soviet satellites on orbit. 






Lynam, D. A. In Search of the Holy Grail Information Dominance. London, UK: 
Ministry of Defence, 2001. 13p. 
Abstract: These viewgraphs discuss information dominance which is the ability to use information to 
decide and act faster than the enemy while denying them the opportunity to do the same. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406922 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406922  
 
Mitre Corporation. Horizontal Integration: Broader Access Models for Realizing 
Information Dominance. McLean, VA: Mitre Corporation, Jason Program Office, 2004. 
61p. 
Abstract: Horizontal integration refers to the desired end-state where intelligence of all kinds flows 
rapidly and seamlessly to the warfighter, and enables information dominance warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA429342 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA429342  
 
Murray, William P. ’Will the Blind Be Leading the Blind,’ the Clipper Chip 
Controversy and Its Relevance to Informational Dominance of the Battlefield. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1998. 28p. 
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competencies - accuracy, lethality, target identification, and cycle time - will necessarily undergo great 
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Penetrating sensors and designators, coupled with microtechnology, will permit weapons to have the 
processing power required to "touch" targets in exactly the right spot. Variable lethality will permit the 
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to his command in the Korean war serve to demonstrate their permanence. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA348394 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA348394  
 
Velasco, Diego, Jr. Full Spectrum Information Operations and the Information 
Professional Officer Intermediate Qualification Process: Filling the Gap to Ensure 
the Continued Leadership of the Information Professional Community in the Area 
of Information Dominance. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 71p.  
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(CEU) system, and the improvement of the Basic, Intermediate, and Advanced Qualification programs. 
This thesis specifically addresses the Intermediate Qualification (IQ) and the lack of Information 
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IP IQ in the appropriate format with discussions and definitions that address the specific line items. The 
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Abstract: This thesis analyzes space-based communications support for medium brigade combat team 
forces over the next three years. The army's reaction to changes in the national security environment and 
increased technology as outlined in Joint Vision 2010 has been to pursue digitization of the force and 
develop a new, Medium Weight brigade-- rapidly deployable, reliant on high-capacity information 
architecture, and capable of early entry and stability and support operations. The study examined the role 
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Abstract: Joint tactical C4ISR architecture -- or the integration of command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance assets -- has long been a focus of defense 
visionaries. They picture systems linking assets, enabling the Armed Forces to detect and strike targets 
with blinding speed. Such architecture has broader implications. It can enable Joint Vision 2010 and 
ultimately a revolution in military affairs. An advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) by U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM) represents progress in realizing such visionary concepts. The Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology testified before Congress that, "We must achieve an 
interoperable and integrated, secure, and smart C4ISR infrastructure that encompasses both strategic 
and tactical needs. Enhanced situation awareness and information assurance are. . .the backbone of the 
revolution in military affairs." That potential was realized in part during the Persian Gulf War. U.S. forces 
could see targets faster with airborne warning and control and joint surveillance target attack systems. 
And they could hit them with greater precision. But operations are often far from perfect. The old problem 
remained: getting the right information to the right place at the right time. A fully integrated C4ISR 
architecture is the solution. It can bind the services together with defense, intelligence, and other 
governmental agencies. It will synchronize the unique strengths of organizations and enable the more 
seamless integration of service capabilities sought by JV 2010. This system of systems can link all 
sensors -- strategic, theater, and tactical -- within an enhanced command and control framework. 
Information will be fused with other friendly information and distributed as a common operational picture 
to users. Just as the computer and Internet have empowered individuals, shared information from an 
integrated C4ISR architecture may do the same for small units. 
  
 
Childs, James C. MOOTW and Information Superiority: The Importance of 
Continuity As a Principle of MOOTW in the 21st Century. Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2000. 27p. 
Abstract: MOOTW encompass a wide variety of diverse missions, which are characterized by political 
sensitivity and less than concrete objectives. A commander may have little control over MOOTW in his 
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theater, yet he is ultimately responsible for the success of any missions occurring there, making 
coordination of all MOOTW within his theater is a formidable task. The principle of continuity, the idea that 
all operations, regardless of the extent of a commander's involvement in them, can be planned and 
coordinated toward defined objectives across the spectrum of MOOTW, is the key to success in MOOTW. 
Continuity will ensure that MOOTW are coordinated very much the like traditional wartime campaign plan, 
but with an emphasis on interagency cooperation, sharing of information and intelligence (essential when 
taken within the context of Joint Vision 2010 and its demand for information superiority), and the current 
principles of MOOTW. readiness both for increased hostilities and for post-hostility restoration. Focusing 
on continuity ensures readiness for all contingencies, and enables the commander to better anticipate the 
transition point to hostilities. In addition, as the difficulties with Operation Just Cause showed in Panama, 
focusing on continuity will also make planning for those operations easier and, perhaps more importantly, 
will ensure the proper framework is in place for transition to post-hostilities. This paper analyzes the 
current principles of MOOTW, drawing on MOOTW aver the past two decades and looking to the future of 
MOOTW and the military's role. It introduces continuity as a proposed addition to the MOOTW principles, 
explains its particular relevance for the future, examines counter-arguments to its adoption as a principle, 
and urges for a change which embraces continuity as an essential tenet of joint doctrine. 
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Corman, David E., et al. Transforming Legacy Systems to Obtain Information 
Superiority. St. Louis, MO: Boeing Co., 2001. 10p. 
Abstract: The United States and its allies are being challenged by the advantages (and threats) of the 
Global Information Age. In response to these challenges, a new force structure is being proposed which 
is built upon global awareness, global engagement, and rapid deployment of specific (effects based) 
forces. Revolutionary advances in information resources and technology are key contributors to this force 
structure. In the face of a constrained DOD budget, an unprecedented system demand for lean 
operations in both peacetime and wartime, and the emergence of threats requiring immediate response, it 
is imperative that innovative technologies be developed to enable legacy weapon systems to exploit the 
information revolution, achieve information dominance, and meet the required operational tempo. This 
paper presents an embedded-system architecture, open system middleware services, and a software 
wrapper schema that will enable legacy systems to fully exploit evolving information technology 
capabilities in the context of an Network Centric Information Architecture (NCIA). 
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Dunn, III, Charles, et al. Information Superiority/Battle Command (Network Centric 
Warfare Environment). Fort Gordon, GA: Battle Command Laboratory, 2004. 38p. 
Abstract: The Battle Command Battle Laboratory is the U.S. Army's test bed for advanced networking 
and telecommunications experimentation. Over the past two years the lab has conducted a series of 
experiments focused on the Army's conceptual Future Force network. These experiments were designed 
to integrate a myriad of network-related study issues into a technical analysis of future network concepts. 
The results of these experiments provide the analytical underpinnings supporting the viability of 
transitioning the conceptual design of the Army's Future Force into an actual warfighting entity. The 
Army's Future Force is designed to be a faster, lighter, but more lethal force than today's force. The 
Future Force will use information superiority as its premier combat enabler. Information superiority 
coupled with an ultra-reliable networked Battle Command and Control (C2) system will ensure that 
separate units fight as one. This connectivity and orchestration are performed within a network-centric 
environment. The Army's view of Network Centric Warfare can be described as the orchestration of 
integrated successes of its core operational concepts (dominant maneuver, precision engagement, 
focused/just-in-time logistics, space-to-mud telecommunications, and full dimensional protection), which 




Ellis, Jeffrey A. Joint Vision 2010: Information Superiority and Its Effect on the 
Command and Control Process. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military 
Operations Department, February 1998. 20p. 
Abstract: With the implementation of Joint Vision 2010, information superiority will impact every aspect 
of operational art, but none will be so great as the impact on operational command and control. Through 
information superiority, the operational commander theoretically gains a clearer picture of the battlespace, 
thus mitigating the fog of war. This study examines some of the potential command and control issues 
facing the operational commander as he attempts to conduct Major Operations and Campaigns. Given 
the diverse threat, it is doubtful that U.S. forces can gain and maintain information superiority over our 
enemies. The need for information superiority will hamper our ability to operate in a combined 
environment. Information superiority may lead to operational command and control that is too rigid and 
too centralized to maintain friendly freedom of action. Operational commanders may become transfixed 
by increasing levels of information focusing on data instead of the application of forces in space and time. 
In the end, information superiority will provide a clearer picture of the battlespace but it will not mitigate 
the fog of war. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA348564 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA348564  
Abstract: Given the proliferation of commercial imaging systems and commercially available geospatial 
information systems, can the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provide U.S. forces with the 
data required to achieve information superiority with respect to terrain? This is possible only if NIMA can 
build and provide warfighters geospatial information faster, relevant, and more accurate than any 
adversary, therefore achieving information dominance. An adversary will also want to see the battlespace 
with the same fidelity. If the same information is available to all, then the U.S. will have to determine the 
geospatial information preparedness level required to maintain the information edge. An information 
superiority edge will be sustained by adherence to NIMA established standards of timeliness, relevance, 
and accuracy for geospatial information. Because of the availability of geospatial information from 
commercial sources, adversaries of the U.S. may have an archive of readiness data that is relevant and 
fairly accurate, yet it appears that our adversaries will lack a responsiveness capability for timely 
geospatial data leaving U.S. forces with an information edge. 
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Erwin, Ralph M. Geospatial Information in Support of Information Superiority. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 34p. 
  
Abstract: This paper examines how information should flow among networked entities in Network-
Centric Operations and Warfare (NCOW). In particular, should the entities actively seek, acquire, and 
process relevant information, or should they wait to react to information that others send to them? In 
short, should they pull information, or should they rely upon others to push information to them? In most 
tactical contexts, "smart push" will improve efficiency by orders of magnitude compared to "smart pull." 
This analysis reveals that efficient information processing chains require a general capability to watch for 
key events. Humans and the computer applications supporting them will use this capability to detect 
events matching conditions of interest they specify. This capability plays a key role in transforming 
networks into integrated value chains. Where traditional networks aim at supporting unregulated 
exchanges for data bit flows best suited to random access and unpredictable process sequences, the 
capability to delegate condition monitoring enables one to transform networks into conveyers of timely, 
valuable information. To maximize efficiency, one must use processes in which each successive step 
receives information just as valuable as its input. Thus, condition monitoring and its associated "smart 
 
Hayes-Roth, Rick. Two Theories of Process Design for Information Superiority: 
Smart Pull vs. Smart Push. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 39p. 
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push" constitute a required foundation for the efficient process chains needed to achieve information 
superiority. Seventeen briefing charts summarize the presentation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA461578 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA461578  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA471464 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA471464
 
Hogan, Todd C. Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Dilemma: Can the Department of Defense Achieve Information Superiority. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2007. 89p. 
Abstract: Joint Force commanders, military services and governmental agencies recently stated an 
operational requirement for a persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. 
The need for persistence implies a need to detect, identify, and characterize change in a target's status 
anywhere, anytime, in any weather, with increasingly higher levels of fidelity. Persistent ISR is the ability 
to do this with sufficient timeliness and precision to achieve the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) 
objectives. The Global War on Terror's (GWOT) multitude of threats demands an ISR capability with the 
persistence to find, fix, and track single individuals in a crowd; locate camouflaged, concealed, or mobile 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and monitor any area on the globe sufficiently enough that 
meaningful changes can be detected and correctly interpreted in near-real-time. The persistent ISR 
capability would provide combatant commanders with assured and continued observational access to the 
multitude of elusive adversaries operating in their area of responsibility. However, is the realization of 
persistence currently achievable in the Department of Defense (DoD)? Insufficient intelligence collection 
platforms coupled with convoluted command and control responsibilities currently limit the Department's 
capability to achieve persistence in the near term.  
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Horne, Jeffrey C. Information Superiority as an American Center of Gravity: 
Concepts for Change in the 21st Century. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 
2000. 34p. 
Abstract: America has made a choice; more than any other nation, the United States is dependent on 
cyberspace. We have embraced new information technologies, and the trappings of the revolution they 
have ignited, with unbridled enthusiasm. Our homes, schools, businesses, markets, communication 
systems, and transportation grids rely on information and telecommunication systems beyond 
expectations of only a decade ago. Accordingly, the information distribution and processing 
infrastructures supporting the U.S. elements of national power have become strategic assets worthy of a 
detailed protection plan to ensure their viability against any intruder. The U.S. Military's vision for the 
conduct of future wars, Joint Vision 2010, embraces these views and calls for information superiority as a 
baseline requirement in achieving battlefield dominance in future wars. This paper focuses on the effects 
of the information revolution and geostrategic change as they relate to evolving national security 
paradigms and developing military doctrine. We review the informational threat, examine specific 
incursions, and develop emotive concepts for the defense of military information networks while also 
presenting rationale for sharing offensive information operation capabilities with our foes. The discussion 
concludes with strategic recommendations to continue refinement of our efforts to achieve information 
superiority well into the millennium. 
  
 
Jordan, Terry L. and Russell S. Voce. Centeralizing to Achieve Information 
Superiority. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 98p.  
Abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to propose a potential organizational structure for effectively 
utilizing Information Operations (IO) within the Department of Defense (DOD), This thesis is in response 
to a request for research from the vice commander of the 193 Special Operations Wing. According to this 
individual, the FY 1999 Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment, IO panel cycle, highlighted various 
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deficiencies ranging from inadequate manning and force structure, to ineffective planning and integration 
processes, to inadequate capabilities available to support CINC requirements. Currently no one federal 
agency or military department has total responsibility or authority to bring all the disparate, but dependent, 
IO function/requirements together. As a result, funding, personnel resourcing, and control is fragmented 
to the detriment of the nation's warfighting capabilities. As demonstrated by the above finding, the subject 
of IO has pervaded numerous warfighting commands, doctrinal documents, and future vision plans. 
Despite this pervasion, there is no single agency within DOD that has the sole responsibility for providing 
or prosecuting information operations. The thesis will answer the question: What is an effective 
organizational structure for providing information operations that produces the synergistic effects of 
centralization without reducing the gains achieved at unit levels by having a decentralized approach? The 
answer to this question will provide an organizational model that may be applied to any individual service, 
or DOD as a whole, to provide an organized approach to IO. The authors of this thesis do not contend 
that this model will be the only way to organize for IO, only one way to organize for IO. 
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Abstract: This thesis examines the initial effort to formulate principles for information-based operations. 
Although it is impossible to explore each aspect of this transformation, it is worthwhile to examine current 
efforts by the US military to develop a doctrinal foundation for Information Operations (10). It explores the 
ongoing struggle to capture within the confines of Joint military doctrine those critical features of this "new 
age driven by information". The world community is increasingly dependent on reliable information traffic. 
Information has become a commodity and source of power unto itself. Alvin Toffler describes this period 
as the transformation of societies from second-wave (industrial/mechanical) to third-wave' (information-
based) means. The growing dependence of the US military on these infrastructures reveals potentially 
vulnerable elements of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). This monograph examines the need 
for a comprehensive 10 doctrine. It yields a critical analysis of existing doctrine, illuminates several flaws 
within the current construct, and concludes with a suggested model for 10 development. Doctrinal models 
are developed for the Army, Air Force, and Navy respectively. These models explain those aspects which 
most essentially describe the doctrinal culture' of each service component. These factors include: service 
organization; employment of forces (both in peace and during crisis); and methods of control. In turn, 
each component model is compared to the revised 10 model. 
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Kardos, Thomas J. Information Superiority: Seeking Command of the Cyber-Sea. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, 2000. 63p. 
  
 
Kaye, Tom and George Galdorisi. Achieving Information Superiority in Coalition 
Operations: Seven Imperatives for Success. San Diego, CA: Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Center, 2002. 22p. 
Abstract: The importance of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance) as a key enabler for warfighting success has long been recognized. 
What has been less clear is a means for coalition forces to achieve information superiority and C4ISR 
dominance. Understanding not just the operational needs and the technical requirements but also the 
functional capabilities required to achieve this goal can hasten the day when C4ISR dominance for 
coalition forces is more than a futuristic goal. We address a critical issue-how does the technical 
community achieve this goal? The overarching thesis of this paper is that in order to achieve information 
superiority and C4ISR dominance, the technical community should neither chase means to overcome 
extant enemy operational capabilities nor attempt to push systems to the operational forces based solely 
on available technology. Rather, it should build to a discrete set of functional capabilities to achieve 
information superiority. This paper identifies seven functional imperatives to achieve this C4ISR 
dominance over an adversary. We conclude that what has remained timeless from the days of Sun Tzu to 
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today's conflicts are the universal needs of warfighters to have the right information, at the right place, at 
the right time.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA467611 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA467611
 
Kren, James. Collaborative Exploitation and Analysis: Helping the Joint Force 
Commander Achieve Information Superiority. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 
February 1998. 28p. 
Abstract: The National Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA) new concept of Collaborative 
Exploitation and Analysis provides a virtual staff that can augment the Joint Force Commander (JFC) 
during mission analysis, planning, and execution. By 2010, Collaborative Exploitation and Analysis will 
help the JFC achieve information superiority provided the JFC understands what it can do for him and 
therefore knows to ask for this help. Collaborative Exploitation and Analysis is the advancement of these 
technological capabilities to achieve a network of imagery and geospatial databases, and dynamic 
workgroups to resolve time critical issues. Information superiority is significant to the JFC because 
constant knowledge about the battlespace improves mission effectiveness. Information superiority 
supports operational art concepts. Requirements for achieving information superiority are battlespace 
awareness, effective employment of forces, and a communications grid (network) that ensures 
uninterrupted uncorrupted service. Since October 1996, NIMA has been striving to move the imagery and 
geospatial communities closer together through its leadership of the United States Imagery and 
Geospatial Information System (USIGS). In this role, the agency is developing an end to end architecture 
to provide an environment that ensures the information edge. 
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Kuperman, Gilbert G., Randall D. Whitaker and Scott M. Brown. Cyber Warrior: 
Information Superiority Through Advanced Multi-Sensory Command and Control 
Technologies. Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness 
Directorate, 2000. 10p.  
Abstract: This paper explores the functions of a conceptual, future watch center whose mission is to 
support Air Force information assurance requirements. A cognitive systems engineering approach is 
described through the insertion of multi-sensory, user interface technologies may be accomplished. 
  
Lasley, Jennifer. Denial and Deception: A Serious Threat to Information 
Superiority? Washington, DC: National War College, 2000. 15p. 
 
Abstract: Today’s military vision of the future, embodied in the Chairman’s Joint Vision documents, 
paints an impressive picture of the future battlespace where US forces are superior in every dimension 
largely because of two critical enabling factors: technology innovation and information superiority. 
Information superiority, in fact, underpins each of the four new concepts of future warfare: dominant 
maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. Achieving information 
superiority, however, will be difficult, if not impossible, due to a host of issues, the most pernicious of 
which is the enemy’s ability to conduct successful denial and deception (D&D) operations. Foreign actors 
increasingly are using D&D as an important part of an asymmetric strategy to counter overwhelming US 
military superiority, and many of the reasons for their success are the result of US vulnerabilities. These 
include: ignorance of the foreign D&D threat, security negligence that provides foreign actors with a 
wealth of information vital to their D&D efforts, intentional release of information to foreign governments 
that compromises US collection assets, and American hubris that discounts the viability of such a threat. 
The results of these vulnerabilities can range from costly military campaigns to, to future surprise, to 
outright defeat in a worst case scenario. The Departments of Defense and State, together with the 
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intelligence community, need to address these shortfalls in order to limit future opportunities for foreign 
D&D exploitation and to ensure information superiority in a JV2010 or 2020 environment.  
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Laudy, Claire, Juliette Mattioli and Nicholas Museux. Cognitive Situation Awareness 
for Information Superiority. Orsay, France: Thales Research and Technology, 2006. 
28p. 
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Abstract: We present a summary of the drawbacks and deficiencies that we noticed in the currently 
available Command Support Systems (CSS) and the methodology we propose to improve them: Situation 
Awareness support through Cognitive Fusion of Information stemmed out of document analysis. Our 
approach is divided into two parts: a methodology for situation representation out of document analysis 
and a methodology for situation analysis and reasoning to support decision-making. The situation 
representation part is based on the use of conceptual graphs and fusion of nodes in graph structures, 
whereas the situation analysis part follows Complex Event Processing methodology. 
  
Malloy, Rodney E. The Fleeting Nature of Information Superiority rt, RI: 
Naval War College, 2004. 20p. 




Abstract: The United States of America has seen vast growth in the information element of power. This 
paper will contrast the profound impacts of information-based warfare and information warfare on modern 
U.S. war fighting. The idea of information superiority becoming a key enabler for U.S. operational success 
will be examined. War fighting concepts will be discussed in the context of information superiority, leading 
to the identification of critical vulnerabilities. Finally, a strategy will be outlined to quantify these 
vulnerabilities and lead to development of operational war fighting concepts to achieve information 
superiority verses an information age adversary. 
  
McIntosh, Gary A. Information Superiority and Game Theory: The Value of Varying 
Levels of Information. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 103p.  
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Abstract: The ability to acquire and use information superiority to enhance combat power and contribute 
to the success of military operations is a primary factor in the fulfillment of the tenets of Joint Vision 2020. 
This thesis examines how various levels of information and information superiority affect strategy choices 
and decision-making in determining the payoff value for opposing forces in a classic zero-sum two-sided 
contest. The results show that if opposing forces possess options with equivalent strategic capabilities, 
the payoff advantage is determined by the quantity of choices from which to choose. The degree of 
advantage in payoff for the force wide superior information is determined by the amount of choices and 
the quantify of bad information for the opponent. When a force possesses significantly fewer strategic 
options, more superior information is required to assume a payoff advantage, and for a force having more 
flexibility, significantly less information is required to affect an advantage in payoff. Additionally, we see 
that the effects of intelligence provides the greatest payoff advantage when a force possesses its 






Miller, Russell F. Developing and Retaining Information Warriors: An Imperative to 
Achieve Information Superiority. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2000. 
38p. 
Abstract: Developing effective policy, doctrine, organizations, technology, and most importantly, skilled 
people are essential to ensure our warfighters enjoy information superiority across the spectrum of 
conflict. In this context, "information warriors"-people skilled in the art of conducting information 
operations-are essential to achieving information superiority. Information warriors must be multi-skilled-at 
a minimum, proficient in operations, intelligence and information technologies. Unfortunately, all military 
services face significant challenges in retaining information technology (IT) professionals-people with 
many of the critical skills needed to conduct effective information operations. This paper analyzes Air 
Force IT retention and its impact on achieving information superiority. In this context, information 
superiority is the desirable end-state, information operations the way to win it, and standing up a new Air 
Force Information Operations (IO) career field the best way to retain the IT professionals needed to 
achieve it. Key reasons IT professionals leave the Air Force are identified, leading to the conclusion that 
to improve IT retention, the Air Force must do a better job addressing both tangible and non-tangible 
satisfiers. Besides aiding IT retention, a separate Air Force IO career track is the best way to develop 
%information warriors"-the people warfighters will task to win information superiority on future battlefields. 
Joint vision 2010 makes it clear that attracting and retaining people with the intellect, training and 
motivation to prevail across the spectrum of military operations is critical to the future success of our 
forces. To that end, developing and retaining "information warriors" capable of conducting decisive 
information operations is a strategic, operational and tactical imperative. To fail in this endeavor will 
significantly jeopardize our ability to prevail in future conflicts. 
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Norton, Timothy P. Information Management: Is the U.S. Army prepared for 
Information Superiority? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff 
College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003. 52p. 
Abstract: Although the Army Vision 2010 states that one of the keys to success on the modern 
battlefield is to achieve information superiority, the current U.S. Army doctrine in this area does not 
support it. Specifically, the topic of information management, one of the fundamentals in information 
superiority, is lacking in the clarity and depth required to meet this lofty goal. Operational advantages of 
information superiority are obtained through the systematic provision of clear, accurate, and useable 
information. Under the current doctrine, the discussion is limited to the products and ignores the process. 
If a product focus is not addressed the U.S. Army will not reach the stated goal of information superiority. 
To understand this serious deficiency, this study examines current doctrinal definitions and concepts of 
information management and compared them with business and academic writings on the subject. The 
intent was to assess if the Army s concepts are sufficient to manage the information that we strive to 
create. The researched revealed that the Army is not prepared. Doctrine does not provide guidance on 
the concept of information management as a system. The doctrinal definitions identify products and 
qualities of information but fail to discuss frameworks and principles that are essential to information 
management. This gap in information management doctrine makes it nearly impossible to achieve the 
goal of information superiority. The Army must address these weaknesses in current doctrine. To improve 
information management, the Army must redefine the term information management in a manner that 
supports a systems approach, produce a conceptual framework for its application, publish principles of 






Pease, Michael R. Information Superiority: 'Where's the Beef?’’ Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, February 1998. 23p. 
Abstract: Joint Vision 2010 rests on the assumption that U.S. forces will enjoy dominant battle space 
knowledge or information superiority over any potential adversary by 2010. While Joint Vision 2010 points 
to the many positive trends in information technology and friendly C4, this is only half of the information 
superiority problem. Information superiority also includes Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) The nature of C4 information fundamentally different from that of ISR. While information age 
advances tend to favor improved C4, they can seriously hinder ISR. In most areas and levels of imagery, 
signals and human ISR, the current state and trends do not guarantee information superiority in 2010. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA348443 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA348443  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA402716 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA402716
 
Pee, Eng Yau. An Exploratory Analysis on the Effects of Information Superiority 
on Battle Outcomes. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 125p. 
Abstract: Visions of future warfighting, such as Joint Vision 2020, emphasize using new technologies to 
obtain and exploit information advantages to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. 
Unfortunately, our warfighting models are notoriously poor at capturing the effects of information on battle 
outcomes. Moreover, traditional measures of effectiveness (MOEs) usually ignore the effects of 
information and decision making on battle outcomes. The Department of the Navy and other DoD 
organizations have tasked RAND to create a framework for developing measures and metrics to assess 
the impact of C4ISR systems and procedures on battle outcomes. In order to quantify the effects of 
information and decision making on battle outcomes, RAND built a deterministic model and hypothesized 
a scenario involving the search for, and destruction of a time-critical target (TCT). This thesis extends 
their work by making the simulation stochastic and exploring practical issues such as: (1) the effects of 
improved C4ISR systems and procedures on battle outcomes; (2) which messaging and data processing 
delay reductions give the greatest improvements in kill probability; (3) which command and control 




Price, Judith M. Information Superiority and Geographic Information Systems: 
Where Is the U.S. Army? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2003. 46p. 
Abstract: The Joint Staff published Joint Vision documents in 1996 and 2000 to provide the joint 
conceptual framework for the transformation effort. The United States Army embarked upon its own 
transformation towards its Objective Force in conjunction with the Joint Vision. Both initiatives depend 
upon realizing the potential of information age technologies and exploiting the information superiority to 
which those technologies contribute. Geospatial information provides the foundation for information 
superiority, which in turn supports the initiatives embodied in Army transformation and the tenets of Joint 
Vision. Geospatial information references locations on the surface of the earth incorporating the domains 
of land, sea, air and space and, as such, becomes the foundation upon which all other battlespace 
information is integrated. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace 
visualization, planning, decisions and actions. Without geospatial information, information superiority and 
subsequently decision superiority cannot succeed. While significant progress has occurred 
technologically, challenges remain with systems interoperability, training and support agencies. Part of 
the challenge rests in changing the experiential mindset but this is the way we have always done it in 
ensuring the United States Army's acquisition systems develop interoperable technological applications 
based on a sole common geospatial information baseline and revising the education and training systems 
that support the military and its support agencies. In conclusion, geospatial information is a relevant 
enabler but still requires continued refinements to meet the demands of Joint Vision and Army 
transformation in developing current and future requirements. 
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Van Haperen, Kees. Working Towards Information Superiority: Application 
Coherence for Digitisation Programmes - A Method for Coherently Defining 
Requirements for Future Command and Control Information Systems. Hampshire, 
UK: HI-Q Systems Ltd., 2003. 41p. 
Abstract: Within the UK, a conceptual model has been developed which represents the main processes 
of the Army, i.e. the Army Activity Model (AAM). It predominantly illustrates information dependencies 
between processes and information elements that are exchanged between them. Over the last 18 
months, the AAM has significantly matured. Moreover, there is a better understanding of its relevance for 
current and future Information Systems. A methodology has recently been developed that enables the 
richness of the AAM to be exploited for developing new C2 Information Systems (IS). By using this 
methodology coherent development and definition of user requirements can be achieved. In addition, the 
methodology enables, albeit at a high level, the assessment of coherence between C2IS and, more 
specifically, the processes and information that these systems support. Using UK Case Study based on 
the development of Joint Fire Support (JFS) Battlefield Information System Application (BISA), it is 
explained how the methodology allows the use of the AAM for development of new CCIS. It is explained 
various Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) and Modelling techniques helped to relate the JFS BISA to the 
AAM and define or validate coherent user requirements. Using the AAM, application coherence can be 
assessed and visualized at both informatics as well as technology levels. Although such assessments are 
conducted at a high level, they nevertheless provide detailed information on gaps and overlaps in the 
definition of IS requirements. This information could be used to improve requirements definition and aid 
coherent and interoperable system development. Finally, they will attempt to contrast the application 
coherence method with the COBP. 
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Zum Brunnen, Richard L., et al. Information Operations Vulnerability/Survivability 
Assessment (IOVSA): Process Structure. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Army 
Research Laboratory, 2000. 67p.  
Abstract: The Survivability/Lethality Directorate (SLAD) of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) 
has developed an information operations vulnerability/survivability assessment (IOVSA) process. The 
objective of the IOVSA process is to establish a systematic approach that permits analysis and evaluation 
of the survivability of military component level and weapon systems that include information technology 
(IT) items. The process will apply throughout the life cycle phases of any Department of Defense (DOD) 
system that collects, stores, transmits, or processes classified and/or sensitive but unclassified (SBU) 
information, as well as commercial components to DOD systems. The IOVSA process fulfills many of 
those process activities required by the DOD In formation Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) by providing much of the required vulnerability information. The IOVSA 
plan for a particular system is a focused plan that has been designed to provide the decision-makers with 
the necessary information to make informed decisions concerning the susceptibilities and vulnerabilities 
of the system to information operations (10) threats. By addressing the 10 threats, the system will 
significantly improve its survivability by planning for both avoiding and withstanding potential problems 
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Abstract: The ability to defend the United States cyber sovereign territory is a must for the country to 
continue to enjoy relative freedom. The actual defense of this is far more difficult than the traditional 
defense of land, sea or air space. The Internet offers an environment of exponential growth in both 
technology and users. Couple this with an infantile and developing governing system and the Internet is 
both a conduit for use and a vehicle for attack. The history of cyber attack is key in determining the ability 
to defend and the mode in which to do it. By tracing the capabilities of adversaries, both internal and 
external, we can attempt to delineate the point where the electronic intrusion becomes alarming to the 
nation. Combine this understanding with a thorough knowledge of current methodologies and tools used 
for cyber attack and one has a good jump on "knowing one's enemy." Constraining, yet legitimizing, the 
effort of governments to fight the unbounded attack of cyber warriors are laws and agreements which 
attempt to lay ground rules for cyber utilization. Careful construction of these rules joined with vigilant 
international agreements can facilitate apprehension and thwarting of would-be attackers worldwide. 
Laws which are drafted without thought to the defense of information systems can be equally as 
damaging to the government that adopts them. This monograph concludes with the current efforts 
underway by the United States government and the Department of Defense in particular. Presidential 
Decision Directives 62 and 63 posture the United States for success in combating cyber aggression. The 
follow through by the legislative, judiciary branches and various departments will determine the success 
of this country in securing its national information infrastructure.  
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Duklis, Peter S., Jr. The Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations 
Organization (JRVIO); Cyber Warriors Just a Click Away. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Army War College, 2002. 32p. 
Abstract: Informational power has now been coined as a national power along with political, economic 
and military powers. Moreover, Information Operations (IO) is a key stratagem to protect and facilitate our 
national interests across the full spectrum of engagement. The Department of Defense (DoD) 
incorporates information operations as part of all of its current plans, operations and exercises. Yet, there 
are very few organizations dedicated solely to IO. However, DoD conducted the Reserve Component 
Employment 2000-2005 (RCE-05) Study in which it was directed that a Joint Reserve Component Virtual 
Information Operations Organization (JRVIO) be established to support joint and inter-agency 
organizations. In this paper, I will determine what virtual means, how it will be used for IO, and how a joint 
reserve unit is structured and functions. Furthermore, I will make a recommendation on how and where 
this/these JRVIO(s) should be utilized to support overall DoD Information Operations and specifically, 




Glass, Deborah P. Cyberterrorism Versus Cyberwar: at What Point Does 
Department of Justice Turn Over Cyber Incidents to the Department of Defense? 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001. 28p. 
Abstract: The United States is increasingly dependent upon technology to the extent that every facet of 
the Nation's critical infrastructure (CI) depends on computer technology at some level. The conduct of 
future warfare, both offensively and defensively, is also increasingly technological. The realization that the 
U.S. is extremely vulnerable to asymmetric warfare via the Internet and to acts of terrorism was part of the 
driving force behind the development of PDD 63. Because of the widespread dependence on the CI, 
consideration is being given to assigning ultimate responsibility over these interconnected systems to a 
single agency. Currently the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has cognizance over items relating to 
terrorism. The Department of Defense has responsibility when it comes to acts of war. The line between 
terrorism and warfare over the Internet is ambiguous, as are the lines of authority. This paper will examine 
the definitions of terrorism and warfare where the Global Information Infrastructure and other components 
of our nation's CI are concerned. At what point, and by what mechanism should responsibility and 
authority be transferred from the FBI to the DoD? Should a different, perhaps even a new, agency be 
given ultimate response responsibility for attacks on the CI? 
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Haber, Matthew E. Computer Network Attack and the Laws of Armed Conflict: 
Searching for Moral Beacons in Twenty-First-Century Cyberwarfare. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2002. 123p. 
Abstract: Computer network attack ushered in change for the profession of arms. Militaries achieve 
effects using computers, previously attained only through physical destruction. Computer network attack's 
problem is it operates outside the observable domain the laws of armed conflict describe, yet its effects 
are what the laws address. Thus, the primary research question is: Does a legal framework of analysis 
exist for computer network attack? The secondary question became: If a framework exists, is it applied 
consistently throughout the Department of Defense? A search of literature and interviews with information 
operators and their associated lawyers revealed a framework by Thomas Wingfield. The framework 
analyzes the level of force but does not address the four basic principles for warfare; military necessity, 
humanity, proportionality, and discrimination. Also, the framework is not applied throughout the 
Department of Defense. The Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations' creation is the first step in 
building a hierarchical structure for consistent application of law to computer network attack. Research 
recommends such a structure expand Wingfield's framework for computer network attack to be a viable 
weapon for Twenty-First-Century Warfare. 
  
 
Howes, Norman R., Michael Mezzino and John Sarkesian. On Cyber Warfare 
Command and Control Systems. Washington, DC: Missile Agency, 2004.  44p. 
Abstract: As Defense agencies and services expand their reliance on computer networks, risk to 
information availability and integrity increases. It is no longer adequate to rely solely on the now traditional 
defense-in-depth strategy. We must recognize that we are engaged in a form of warfare, cyber warfare, 
and deploy our resources using the strategy and tactics of warfare. Most Defense organizations have not 
yet developed strategies or tactics for cyber warfare. This causes security devices to be used ineffectively 
and responses to be untimely. Cyber warfare then becomes a one-sided battle where the attacker makes 
all the strikes and the target of the attack responds so slowly that the attacker usually gets away without 
being identified. Employing cyber warfare strategy and tactics requires a cyber warfare command and 
control system. Responses to cyber attacks do not require offensive measures outside our own network 
boundaries to be effective, but they do require timely responses. Timely offensive action taken within our 
own network boundaries can lead to an identification of the attacker. During the past two years we have 
 247
developed a prototype cyber warfare command and control system to demonstrate that defense-in-depth 
can be taken to a new level that is active and anticipatory rather than passive and reactive. 
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Knapp, Kenneth J. Cyber Warfare: Raising Information Security to a Top Priority. 
Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2004. 34p. 
Abstract: Beyond the media hype, information warfare has become a central concern of the Internet 
age. While not denying the obvious military implications, a 15-year review (1990-2004) of information 
conflict reveals twelve characteristics and trends that affect civilian communities as well. For example, 
there is the growing availability of low-cost cyber weaponry on the Internet as modern societies 
increasingly rely on information infrastructures, and civilian organizations become the primary targets of 
attacks. Additionally, information warfare encompasses such domains as espionage, media perception, 
nation-state relations, and transnational criminal activities. As information conflict becomes a growing 
concern, managers must understand this reality and plan to defend against attacks. As a conclusion, this 
article provides a summary of the twelve selected characteristics of information conflict and offers a 
comprehensive strategy to promote effective information security in organizations. 
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Mays, John B. Cyberwar as Anti-War: The Keystroke is Mightier than the Sword. 
McLean, VA: Booz-Allen and Hamilton, 1998. 8p. 
Abstract: This report relates examples of wars in the past as wars to that utilize the power of 
information. Cyberwar is another powerful type of war that can be described as "actions taken during 
times of crisis or conflict (including war) to affect adversary information and information systems while 
defending one's own information and information systems." Computer network attack is a derivative of the 
commercial sector. 
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O'Hara, Timothy F. Cyber Warfare/Cyber Terrorism. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War 
College, 2004. 35p. 
Abstract: Section 1 of this paper provides an overview of cyber warfare as an element of information 
warfare, starting with the general background of the current strategic environment the United States is 
operating in. This section also examines why information warfare has become such an attractive 
alternative form of conflict, reviews the traditional principles of warfare and why they may or may not 
apply to cyber warfare, and proposes new principles of warfare that may be needed to conduct cyber 
warfare. Section 1 concludes with a review of offensive and defensive cyber warfare concepts. Section 2 
presents a general overview of cyber terrorism, including definitions of cyber terrorism and cyber terrorism 
support. This section examines three possible levels of cyber terrorist attack and concludes with an 
analysis of the factors that may or may not encourage terrorists to engage in cyber terrorist operations. 
The third and final section of the paper attempts to answer the following question: "Is cyber terrorism a 
legitimate threat?" This section examines factors that should be considered when evaluating cyber 






Stytz, Martin R., Sheila R. Banks and Michael J. Young. Realistic and Affordable 
Cyberware Opponents for the Information Warfare Battlespace. Wright-Patterson 
AFB, OH: Air Force Research Laboratory, 2003 42p. 
Abstract: As military environments increase in the complexity, fidelity, scope, and number of 
participants, the reliance of the military upon information superiority to facilitate successful operations 
increases. In conjunction with this increase upon accurate and timely information the vulnerability of 
military forces to information attack also increases. Additionally, information management capability 
improvements inevitably increase the value of the information management networks and software; 
thereby, directly increasing the incentive for attacking or pirating the network and software capabilities. 
Therefore, as the information management capabilities of military forces increase, there is a 
corresponding need for improved security for the software and network systems and this need for 
improved security will increase as the value of the software and network systems increases. This 
improvement in information management capabilities must be accompanied by a corresponding increase 
in the ability to manage the protection of military information systems, which is a topic that has received 
scant attention. 
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Abstract: Cyber Warfare is widely touted to be the next generation of warfare. As America's reliance on 
automated systems and information technology increases, so too does the potential vulnerability to cyber 
attack. Nation and non-nation states are developing the capability to wage cyber warfare. Historically, the 
Air Force and DoD have concentrated their efforts toward defensive network operations. However, a shift 
in doctrine has shown both the Air Force and DoD acknowledging the potential for Information Warfare. 
What appears to be lacking is the trained and educated cyber warrior force that will carry out the 
information operations if needed. This research project examines the doctrine of DoD and national 
agencies to engage in information operations and efforts in place to train cyber warriors. In turn, this 
research project offers recommendations for a career development and progression model for an Air 
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of dependence also provide numerous vulnerabilities. This paper will focus specifically on Network 
Centric Warfare's vulnerabilities in terms of sensors cyberterrorism/ Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) and 
bandwidth/ frequency. The assessment of the areas listed above and the other strategic implications will 
lead to a conclusion as to its efficacy of Network Centric Warfare as the centerpiece of Transformation 
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Baker, Matthew E. Human Factors in Network Centric Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 2002. 31p.  
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Abstract: The speed of information transfer in Network Centric Warfare is rapidly out pacing the 
capability to absorb and act effectively. Numerous problems, such as micro-management and limited 
endurance have been documented in studies of human interaction in information systems. Many of these 
problems are the result of limited human cognitive capability in the face of the massive amounts of 
information provided in NCW. Specifically, the operational level of warfare, commanders are being 
overwhelmed due to human factors, limitations and tendencies. 
   
Barksdale, Carl A. The Network Centric Operations - Effects Based Operations 
Marriage: Can It Enable Prediction of "Higher Order" Effects on the Will of the 
Adversary. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002. 24p. 
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Abstract: Network Centric Operations is touted as enabling Effects Based Operations targeted at the 
'will and belief systems' of the adversary. This assertion is explored. Specifically, for Effects-Based 
Operations against the will and belief systems to be enabled, the operational commander needs to know 
what makes an adversary give up and needs to be able to plan and assess the associated indicators of 
the desired operational effect? Assessment implies measurement or sensing. The will and belief systems 
are psychological factors that have defied measurement or assessment. Historical analysis is conducted 
for three losing side's reactions to identify any patterns that may be used as measures or as indicators 
that desired effects have been achieved. Effects-Based Operations is a good theoretical approach to 
targeting and operational planning. It answers the question, Why are we taking this action? However, 
since the will and belief systems of the adversary are psychological factors, this paper shows that 
planning for higher order effects remains problematic. Thus, the operational commander will still have to 
rely on his/her gut fuel and occasional fleeting indicators to discern higher order effects on the will of the 
adversary vice plan and confirm effects via the promised in-depth knowledge provided by the 
omnipresent sensor grid in Network Centric Operations. 
  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA415843 
 
Barton, Keith W. Leveraging Information Technology to Enable Network Centric 
Engineer Reconnaissance Operations. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2003. 102p. 
Abstract: The Naval Construction Force has traditionally depended on outside sources to obtain and 
analyze engineering data in contingency situations. The Navy has embarked on an initiative to develop 
Seabee Engineer Reconnaissance Teams to perform this function, both as a basis for projects slated for 
in-house construction and as a product to deliver to other organizations. Exercises and operations have 
thus far shown that the concept is viable, but Seabee Engineer Reconnaissance Teams have 
encountered problems with data gathering and reporting, and transmission of data and images. 
Concurrently, the Department of Defense is pursuing a transformation toward network- centric warfare. 
Network Centric Warfare represents a powerful set of warfighting concepts and associated military 
capabilities that allow warfighters to take full advantage of all available information in order to bring all 
available assets to bear in a rapid and flexible manner. This research explores the state of the practice of 
military engineer reconnaissance as described by established Army doctrine and as enacted by Navy 
Seabee Engineer Reconnaissance Teams. Commercial information technology applications are reviewed 
in the areas of geographic information systems, collaborative design, and wireless communications. 
Solutions are proposed for their potential to enable network centric engineer reconnaissance operations. 
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Berger, Alexander. Organizational Innovation and Redesign in the Information Age: 
The Drug War, Netwar, and Other Lower-End Conflict. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 1998. 209p. 
Abstract: The end of the Cold War and the rise of the Information Age have fostered an uncertain 
security environment which the United States is struggling to master. The purpose of this thesis is to 
explore the factors that lead complex organizations to initiate large-scale structural change in the face of 
environmental uncertainty; and more specifically to determine how the rise of the Information Age may 
change the organizational requirements of the U.S. national security structure. This thesis creates a 
unique framework for analysis, blending principles of organization and innovation theory with the theory of 
information-based netwar. This study analyzes the organizational structures adopted by several 
transnational drug cartels, and compares them to that of U.S. counternarcotics forces. Next, this thesis 
reviews a series of recent occurrences pertaining to national security to test whether there are 
manifestations of netwar threats emerging, and whether new and old organizational actors are learning to 
adapt their structures to gain an advantage over the United States. Finally, this thesis is both predictive 
and prescriptive with regard to the issues of organizational redesign. It argues that structural changes are 
necessary for the United States to ensure the national security in an Information Age. Then it makes 
recommendations that would help the U.S. security structure redesign itself to become more agile in the 
face of Information Age threats. 
  
 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA424706 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424706
Berglund, Jan. Network Centric Warfare: A Realistic Defense Alternative for 
Smaller Nations? Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. 160p. 
Abstract: This thesis establishes an analytical framework for identifying and discussing strategic factors 
considered important when implementing Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a new warfighting concept 
for the information age. Although the findings have a broad application, the focus is on NCW 
implementation in the NATO Alliance's small countries, and in Norway in particular. A key question is if 
the emerging NCW concept is a feasible defense alternative for smaller nations. Central to the study are 
factors found in the strategic environment, such as Norway's strategic freedom of maneuver, its affiliation 
with NATO, the impact of national interests, economic and technological assumptions, and the cultural 
premises that underlie the power of information. The changing features in the nature of conflict and in 
future potential opponents also will influence NCW mission challenges, opportunities, and constraints. A 
particularly important mission challenge is the neglected military view of low-intensity conflicts as "worthy" 
military missions as well as the sociological impact on networked actors and opponents, as conditioned 
by new trends in the information age. A key finding is that NCW, which also takes into consideration the 
impact of other strategic factors discussed in this thesis, has the potential to rise to the many challenges 
and achieve many of the objectives currently "floating" in existing military transformation strategies. 
  
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/04Jun%5FBerglund.pdf  
Blatt, Nicole I. Trust and Influence in the Information Age: Operational 
Requirements for Network Centric Warfare. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2004. 113p. 
 
Abstract: Military leaders and scholars alike debate the existence of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) 
based on information technology. This thesis will show that the Information RMA not only exists, but will 
also reshape how we plan, operate, educate, organize, train, and equip forces for the 21st century. This 
thesis introduces the Communication Technology (CommTech) Model to explain how communication 
technologies affect organizations, leadership styles, and decision-making processes. Due to the growth in 
networking enterprises, leaders will have to relinquish their tight, centralized control over subordinates. 
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Instead, they will have to perfect their use of softer power skills such as influence and trust as they 
embrace decentralized decision-making. Network Centric Warfare, Self-Synchronization, and Network 
Enabled Operations are concepts that provide the framework for integrating information technology into 
the battlespace. The debate that drives centralized versus decentralized control in network operations is 
analyzed with respect to the CommTech Model. A new term called Operational Trust is introduced and 
developed, identifying ways to make it easier to build trust among network entities. Finally, the thesis 
focuses on what leaders need to do to shape network culture for effective operations. 




Borchert, R. Alistair. Organizational Fitness of a Proposed Network Centric 
Organization. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998. 149p. 
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capitalizes on technology to obtain and maintain an 
enhanced situational awareness and uses the distributed offensive firepower of the collective force to 
fight the battle. Speed of Command and Self- Synchronization are key tenants of NCW. The author 
proposes an organization designed to operate in the NCW environment. It consists of the Force 
Commander and commanders of Situational Awareness, Resources, Effects, and Operations. The 
research question of this thesis is whether or not the proposed organization is fit in the NCW 
environment. The organization is looked at in two 'snapshots': one is the planning process and the other 
is the execution process. The expert system Organizational Consultant is used to analyze the 
organization and determine its organizational fitness. The results indicate that the proposed organization 
is fit if changes are made to make the planning process highly centralized and the execution process 
decentralized. Formalization will also need to be lowered in the organization. 
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Braunlinger, Thomas K. Network Centric Warfare Implementation and Assessment. 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2005. 88p. 
Abstract: This study examines three primary questions: (1) What is the definition of network-centric 
warfare?, (2) Are the military services implementing the network-centric warfare concept?, and (3) Is the 
network-centric warfare concept a new theory of warfare or rather a modification or extension of previous 
theories? To answer these questions, various publications on network-centric warfare and the various 
military service transformation plans were reviewed. The definition of network-centric warfare developed 
is the linkage of people, systems, and platforms to form a self-synchronized networked force that creates 
shared battlespace awareness for information superiority and speed of command. A review of the 
services transformation plans showed that the services may not be using the same terms, but they are 
implementing the concepts of network-centric warfare. The study concludes that network-centric warfare 
is not a new theory of warfare, but a concept that supports the maneuver theory of warfare, similar to the 
concept of blitzkrieg developed by Germany prior to World War II. To emphasize this the term "network-
enabled warfare" is suggested as a more appropriate term. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA436488 
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Brown, Michael A. Implications of Outsourcing on Network Centric Warfare. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 29p. 
Abstract: The Department of Defense (DoD) has taken about 80 percent of the government cutbacks 
since the end of the Cold Wan As a means to fashion cost savings and gain efficiencies, DoD is seeking 
to streamline much of its infrastructure. One popular idea to assist in the streamlining effort is through the 
outsourcing of Information Technology (IT) functions. There is a sentiment within the Department of the 
Army (DA) that the entire Information Management/information Systems element of the Army can be 
outsourced without having an impact to the Army. The purpose of this research paper is to examine this 
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sentiment to determine if it makes sense or where it could create problems as the Army moves towards a 
network centric warfare environment. It will examine the Army's IT requirements to support network 
centric warfare, examine potential outsourcing options, and determine the implications of these options to 
the effectiveness of achieving the requirements. 
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Caneva, Joseph W. Network-Centric Warfare: Implications for Applying the 
Principles of War. Newport RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations 
Department, May 1999.  25p. 
Abstract: Noting the competitive advantage that a computer network system completely integrated into 
a firm's structure and operations has provided to businesses, individuals have begun to argue that 
adoption of this concept by the United States armed forces would produce a comparable, competitive 
advantage in warfare. This concept, "network-centric warfare," a vision of warfare focused upon the 
central importance of a network of sensors, platforms, weapons, and users and its resulting synergistic 
effect, is beginning to cause considerable debate among those interested in the future of America's 
armed forces. Advocates of the network-centric concept of warfare foresee that it will provide a clear, 
detailed picture of the battlespace, increased speed of command, self- synchronization of units, and 
increased ability to mass effects. These enhanced capabilities, if ultimately realized, obviously have the 
potential to affect the manner in which commanders conduct war at the operational level. The paper's 
intent is to take the anticipated benefits of network-centric warfare as givens and then to examine the 
implications of these capabilities in applying the principles of war at the operational level of warfare. 
  
 
Carr, James. Network Centric Coalitions: Pull, Pass, or Plug-In? Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, May 1999. 25p. 
Abstract: The author traces the evolution of Network Centric Warfare, showing its American roots. He 
shows that NCW is not a remote concept on the horizon, it is nascent in today's maritime operations and 
inevitably will be the way in which the U.S. Navy will fight future wars. Then he reveals a gaping mismatch 
between the emerging operational doctrine and the strategy it will be tasked to support. Since it is largely 
an American conception for warfare, the United States thus bears the burden to pursue interoperability 
with regional coalition partners if it is to fight 'together when we can, alone if we must'. Finally, the author 
presents options for addressing this strategic/operational mismatch and proposes a way ahead. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA370694 
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Carr, Timothy D. Network-Centric Warfare: Are We Past the Age of De-centralized 
Execution? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004. 21p.  
Abstract: This paper examines the validity of the concept of "Centralized Command, De-centralized 
Control", and offers an alternative view of Operational-level involvement in tactical execution made 
possible by current and developing information technology. The paper begins by citing positive examples 
of Centralized control during several recent tactical actions. A review of information factors necessary to 
provide overall battlefield situational awareness is conducted, including current and developing 
capabilities. Instances where Centralized control of tactical execution would not he desired are discussed, 
along with the requirement to retain current capabilities to operate without Centralized control of tactical 
actions. The scope of operations where a Joint Force Commander might become involved in tactical 
control is discussed with examples delivered. The current Joint Staff composition is given and a modified 
Joint Staff Organization is presented to help the Joint Force Commander integrate himself into tactical 
execution in a positive fashion. This paper questions the universal application of accepted doctrine. It 
asserts the value of deviating from doctrine where such deviation would work to more rapidly achieve 
Operational objectives. Recommendations are made regarding the composition of the typical Joint Staff in 
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order to take advantage of technological innovation. While technological advances provide the basis of 
the paper's premise, the paper is focused on Leadership and Command relationships rather than 
technology. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA422804 
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Cianciolo, Mark G. Network Centric Warfare: A Bridge Too Far? Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 2003. 19p. 
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is viewed as the bedrock of transformation and future 
warfighting (i.e. common operating picture flattening command and control by connecting strategic level 
commanders to tactical level warfighters). However the moral domain of conflict having been largely 
ignored by NCW advocates will in all likelihood prohibit its successful implementation at the lowest level of 
warfighting; the tactical level. Therefore in future conflict the author believes that it is this domain the 
moral domain that if not completely understood and taken into account will limit if not prevent the full 
potential and exploitation of Network Centric Warfare as envisioned by its advocates. This research paper 
is relevant to the strategic operational and tactical levels of warfare in that NCW is clearly a major pillar in 
the quest for transformation of United States military forces. If the human dimension is a single point of 
failure in Network Centric Warfare then the NCW concept needs to address this issue and identify the 
relationship and human interface required to successfully achieve and propel this future capability from a 
concept in its present form to a reality in its application. 
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Copley, E. C. A Commander in Chief's Network-Centric Odyssey. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2002. 26p. 
Abstract: Network-Centric Operations continues to gain acceptance as a construct for future military 
operations. Operational Art, on the other hand, stands as a principal construct for past military successes 
and constitutes current joint doctrine. Some critics suggest implementing Network-Centric Operations 
presages the death of Operational Art. Each Armed Service has begun training and equipping its force 
using the tenets of Network-Centric Operations, but those forces come together for the first time under 
the combatant Commander-in-Chief. The CINC will have to determine how a fully networked force affects 
existing methods of employment to achieve operational and strategic objectives. This paper reconciles 
Network-Centric Operations and Operational Art by analyzing the underlying assumptions, assertions, 
and interrelationships. The analysis results in the conclusion that Network-Centric Operations and 
Operational Art are not mutually exclusive but mutually supporting constructs. In fact, a synergy appears 
that accomplishes strategic and operational objectives with extraordinary effectiveness. This conclusion 
leads to six recommendations for the Commander-in-Chief that harmonizes Network-Centric Operations 
and Operational Art in the theater of operations to ensure future success. 
  
 
Coury, Michael J. The Joint Air Operations Center in the Realm of Network Centric 
Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 34p. 
Abstract: The concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is advertised to significantly change the way 
the military operates in the future. The proliferation of information technology and its ability to provide for 
centralized control while decentralizing execution are but two foundations for these changes. Those 
concepts, however, are not novel. In fact, the evolution of the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) 
demonstrates a continual effort to achieve those same objectives. Unfortunately, the JAOC still falls short 
in achieving the expediency of execution so necessarily in modern warfare. The ability to support 
significantly increased operational tempo will be required not only in the JAOCts domain of airspace, but 
on the ground and at sea as well. Given the adherence to the manner in which the JAOC currently 
organizes and functions, there is only so far technology can go to improve timely and efficient execution. 
 267
With the advent of NCW, the JAOC has an opportunity to metamorphose again, achieving improvements 
to support vastly increased operational tempo. Limitations of organization, functions and execution can be 
resolved by applying the NCW concepts of shared awareness, self-synchronization and massing effect. 
By rethinking the current function and execution methodology of the JAOC and melding them into a Joint 
Operations Center (JOC) organized by capability rather than operational median, we will provide for the 
efficiency inherent in NCW and a more robust and high tempo at all levels of military operations. 
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Critchlow, Robert D. Weaving the Net: Linking Space Systems to Theater 
Operations. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1998. 22p. 
Abstract: Joint Vision 2010 visualizes a military in which the principle of mass is redefined. Mass in 
2010 will be characterized by the massing of effects, rather than mass derived by way of a superior 
number of people or platforms. Information superiority, by enabling dominant battlefield awareness, is the 
key to achieving this redefinition. Information superiority is achieved in the military in the same way it is 
being achieved in the civilian sector: through a shift away from expensive and centralized platforms 
toward a distributed information architecture. Network centric warfare relies on a pervasive information 
grid that provides the nervous system that links sensors and shooters. The information grid can be 
achieved only through heavy reliance on space based assets. Joint forces already lean upon satellites to 
support their communication needs, as seen in Desert Storm. Only space based communications can 
meet the needs of forces deploying from CONUS to remote locations that lack indigenous 
communications infrastructures. It is unlikely that theater commanders will have the time to establish 
ground based communications in a fast moving crisis. These assets must be military, as commercial 
systems present limitations that will not be overcome except in the gravest of contingencies. 
Unfortunately, existing constraints prohibit space systems from completely fulfilling the dream of 
bandwidth on demand required to implement the JV2010 operational concepts. Technical limitations cap 
the capability of existing satellite constellations. More importantly, organizational inefficiencies hamper the 
joint force commander's ability to maximize support from these finite resources. Exploiting existing unified 
command structures, by centralizing authority to apportion MILSATCOM resources by mission need 
under USSPACECOM, could provide meaningful improvements. 
  
 
Cummings, John J. Does Network Centric Warfare Equal Micromanagerial 
Warfare? Minimizing Micromanagement at the Operational Level of War? Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, 2003. 24p. 
Abstract: Recent advances in communications, sensors, and computers have brought the U.S. military 
into a new age of technical transformation. This transformation has resulted in a new approach to the 
conduct of warfare, often referred to as network centric warfare (NCW). NCW possesses incredible 
potential for the lethal and efficient conduct of future wars, but it also enables a less than desirable aspect 
of armed conflict--leadership by micromanagement. This is a result of the capabilities inherent in NCW 
that cause senior leaders, unable to resist the urge to control tactical operations, to directly influence the 
achievement of strategic objectives. The intent of this paper is to examine micromanagement at the 
operational level of war, more specifically, from the national-strategic (civilian leaders) and theater-
strategic/theater-operational (COCOM) level to the tactical level. Analysis from recent military operations 
will be conducted to develop short term and long term approaches that will minimize the effects of this 
ineffective leadership style. 





Day, Newell B., II. Network Centric Warfare and the Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1999. 20p. 
Abstract: The JFACC concept rests on the belief that aircraft possess a unique ability to reach the deep 
battle and need to be centrally controlled and coordinated. Today, however, the JFACC controls more 
than just aircraft. The JFACC staff continues to grow to accommodate controlling and coordinating new 
technologies. In reality, the ability of aircraft to reach and influence the deep battle is no longer unique. It 
applies to a myriad of weapons, sensors, and information. A network centric automated system is better 
suited to control and coordinate these assets. Such a system would be able to absorb the functions of 
JFACC as a subset of functions performed. The system would be far streamlined and much more efficient 
than the JFACC. This system is interactive and fuses all information, weapons, and sensors into a 
common situational picture for all users. This system is a battlespace system. 
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DeLange, Eric P. and Mike Morris. Decision-Centric Warfare: Reading Between the 
Lines of Network-Centric Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. 26p. 
Abstract: Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), as it has come to be called, is here to stay. While the 
benefits are proving to be many, there are also potential risks that can adversely affect operational 
leadership. Increasingly, commanders today must be aware of how the effects of information overload, 
instantaneous communications, and increased opportunities to insert themselves in levels of war outside 
their traditional sphere of influence can have a bearing on their decision-making. NCW's very name has a 
tendency to focus attention strictly on the technology, as if once "the system" is implemented or "the 
device" installed, that everything will work out for the best. The technology is merely an enabler, another 
addition to commanders' toolkits to help them make better decisions. To avoid the "if you build it they will 
come" mentality, the focus must be maintained on decision-making and the decisions that result through 
a commander's application of operational art. This paper proposes replacing one word and calling it 
Decision-Centric Warfare to maintain the proper focus. Not only does the name change align more 
directly with Joint Vision 2020's concept of decision superiority, but when one looks at the NCW 
terminology and construct, decisions are really what NCW is all about. 
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Diggs, D. G. Weapons of Mass Destruction a Network-Centered Threat. Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, May 1998. 23p. 
Abstract: Battlespace dominance is more than the physical control of air, land, and sea. Under the 
network centric concept of operations, U.S. forces must be ready to control the infosphere in order to 
assure military objectives can be achieved. Perhaps the most effective information warfare (IW) weapon 
is a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), specifically a biological or nuclear weapon. Important questions 
should be answered about the ability to protect American information networks from the significant 
information disruption characteristics of WMD. 
  
 
DIRusso, Lawrence R. Casting Our Net: Can Network Centric Warfare and 
Multinational Operations Coexist? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 20p. 
Abstract: This paper is based on three assumptions: That the United States will develop Network 
Centric Warfare, that future military operations will involve allied and coalition partners, and that these 
partners will not be able to afford full implementation of network-centricity into their forces. Given these 
assumptions, can a Joint Task Force Commander integrate network-centric units and traditional forces 
and still accomplish his mission? An analysis of the basic tenets of Network-Centric Warfare (shared 
awareness, speed of command, self-synchronization, greater lethality, and increased survivability) 
indicates they are compatible with multinational operations. Through proper force allocation, mission 
 269
assignment, procedural considerations, and technological adaptations, a Joint Task Force Commander 
will be well served by an integrated force that can meet the required objectives. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA389591 
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Abstract: Network-centric warfare (NCW) will create distinct advantages in the operational factors of 
space, time, force, and their interrelationships. Information superiority, the capability for cooperatively 
engaged precision effects, and a responsive command and control architecture will enable commanders 
operating in NCW to preempt enemy forces, negating an adversary's options before they can be 
executed. Though the technical challenges in NCW are significant, they are incrementally proving 
surmountable through war gaming and experimentation. The true limit of NCW's operational capability 
however, may not be technology, but law and politics. Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces 
provides the base-line guidance and authorization for the use of military force in concert with international 
law and national policy. This paper examines the implications for NCW under Standing Rules of 
Engagement for self-defense, revealing several potential vulnerabilities and ambiguities that could 
significantly impact its operational capability. Operational concepts, structure, doctrine, and planning must 
anticipate the reality that military operations will be constrained by law and political imperatives. Though 
NCW provides unprecedented levels of battlespace knowledge and speed of command, the initiative that 
it avails U.S. forces could be significantly undermined if it fails to adequately coalesce with rules of 
engagement (ROE). 
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Donnelly, Michael P. The First Salvo: Implications of Standing Rules of 
Engagement for U.S. Forces in Network-Centric Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, 2002. 29p.  
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Eisen, Stefan, Jr. Network Warfare. It's Not Just for Hackers Anymore. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 1995. 27p. 
Abstract: Network warfare (Netwar) is the latest tool in the Information warfare toolbox. Where C2W 
targets the enemy's military electronic spectrum and provides defense against enemy C2W efforts, 
Netwar targets enemy computer networks that support both military and civilian functions (such as 
communications, logistics, transportation, and other computer controlled networks) in order to provide the 
operational commander with an additional tool to either prevent or win conflicts. Netwar also has 
defensive features, helping the operational commander defend against the inevitable enemy attack on 
friendly computer network systems. 
  
 
Erb, Stephen S. Network Centric Warfare: An Operational Perspective. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2004. 37p.  
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare development is currently proceeding from the tactical level up, with 
little concern to the overarching requirements of the operational level of war. The implied assumption is 
that the concepts, both technical and organizational, will naturally scale to the operational and strategic 
levels. Absent an operational perspective, what is likely to develop is a large-scale tactical tool set and an 
operational staff structure that evolves to support this tactical tool set. This paper examines Network 
Centric Warfare from the Operational Commander's perspective by first examining the Operational 
Commander's requirements of a command and control system, comparing those requirements to what 
Network Centric Warfare as currently envisioned will provide, then recommends an operational staff 
organization to support the requirements of the Operational Commander in a Network Centric Warfare 
environment. The recommended staff structure is designed to provide the Operational Commander the 
flexibility to benefit from self-synchronized forces as well as to take close control of forces when required 
by the mission. 
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Erbetta, John. Attrition in Network Centric Warfare. Malvern, UK: Defence Science 
and Technology Laboratory, 2003. 17p. 
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is concerned with exploiting information to maximize combat 
power. Integration of C2 systems is able to increase military effectiveness, whether in maneuver, 
engagement, logistics, or protection. However, this increases the potential length of the electronic chain 
from sensor to shooter. This paper acknowledges that battle damage and force attrition (both equipment 
and human) occur in real conflict. The hypothesis is that at some point this may result in decreased force 
effectiveness rather than increased advantage. Information warfare means that positive attacks on 
systems themselves compound the problem. Emerging technologies applicable to NCW as a force 
multiplier need to be recognized as counter to the impediments to progress in the development of NCW. 
The impact of battle damage, attrition, and cyber attack is addressed as well as system security and the 
associated human factors of authority and responsibility. Options to minimize these vulnerabilities are 
postulated. The development of distributed systems and the potential of using arbitration in decision 
making is viewed as one way to minimize the impact of performance on C2 effectiveness. The paper also 
recognizes that while dominance (in its widest sense) is the ambition of symmetric warfare, in the 
asymmetric case structures can be undermined by relatively unsophisticated attack. In particular, the 
paper's purpose is to underline the fact that implementations need to ensure that attrition results in 
graceful, rather than catastrophic, degradation. At the extreme end of the C2 performance spectrum the 
following question must be asked: To what extent can degraded C2 performance threaten force 
effectiveness? Assessment at this level is difficult and real answers are only likely to come from real-life 
exercises that study the degree of reliance on C2 effectiveness during battle. The output will indicate that 
steps that need to be taken. 
  
 
Erdie, Philip B. Network-Centric Strategic-Level Deception. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2004. 49p.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA427121 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA427121
Abstract: This thesis explores strategic-level deception in the context of network-centric information 
operations. Advances in information technology and the global connectedness of communications 
networks have created new opportunities and challenges for conducting strategic and operational level 
deception campaigns with significant utilization of cyberspace. Planning and executing concurrent 
strategic-level deceptions among distributed participants and against multiple targets requires speed, 
flexibility, and situational awareness. This thesis begins with a historical account of twentieth century use 
of strategic-level deception, followed by a definition of network deception, considerations for achieving 
network-based deception, and our proposed model of command structure for network-centric planning 
and execution of deception campaigns in the twenty-first century. 
  
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/04Sep%5FErdie.pdf  
Farmen, Stephen E. Network Centric (NETCENTRIC) Warfare (NCW): A 
LOGCENTRIC Perspective. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 25p. 
 
Abstract: As the concept of Network Centric (NETCENTRIC) Warfare (NCW) evolves to produce what 
many experts and military professionals view as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), it would be both 
wise and prudent for the U.S. military to consider a simultaneous Logistics Centric (LOGCENTRIC) 
approach to better harness our efforts for near-term gain and prepare for long-term benefit. This may 
affect a boost in combat power immediately and, more importantly, allow us to form a responsive logistics 
architecture relevant to a giant leap into NCW, Joint Vision 2010/20, and a SMA we can control and use 
to our advantage. NCW and the RMA it suggests will be ineffective if we let enthusiasm for its potential 
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outdistance our capability to support its inception and diminish the combat power it was intended to 
increase. We must use the current inter-conflict period to build a forward-looking logistics architecture that 
nurtures NCW to make its promise of increased combat power a reality. If one has a concept but lacks 
precise requirements, one is best served by building capability to determine the endstate, not vice versa. 
A LOGCENTRIC approach to NETCENTRIC warfare supports this theory. Only with a LOGCENTRIC 
approach to NCW can we meter this concept to life in a positive manner. Thus, a LOGCENTRIC 
approach to NETCENTRIC warfare is a more prudent way to ensure a smooth road ahead as we evolve 
in the 21st century. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA389710 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389710  
 
Abstract: This study examines the concept of network-centric warfare with the aims of characterising 
network centricity as clearly as possible and identifying metrics for level of net-centricity'. Properties of 
network-centric systems, as expounded in the literature, were critically examined to derive examples of 
suitable metrics. This examination suggests that, except for the provision of reachback, none of the 
properties is clearly diagnostic of network centricity: it is possible to conceive of systems displaying one or 
more of them despite not being net-centric as we understand the term. This means that metrics for these 
properties are not well correlated with the degree of network centricity of the system. Another list of 
properties was compiled, derived from characteristics of the internet and other effective networks, that is 
better suited to the identification of network centricity. Consideration of this led to the conclusion that 
access to a high-capability network is not sufficient for a system to be network-centric, it is also necessary 
that the network be used in an appropriate manner-a manner supporting the force as a whole, rather than 
being focused on the needs of a particular unit or platform. Not only must the right information be 
available to the right person at the right time in the right form, but also it must be put to the right use. This 
emphasis on motivation in the definition of network centricity parallels, though is distinct from, recent work 
emphasizing human aspects in command and control (C2). As with C2, network centricity is not just about 
hardware. The question of defining a general metric that faithfully indicates level of network centricity is 
examined with the aid of a specific example, but remains open. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA420257 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA420257
Fewell, M. P. and Mark G. Hazen. Network-Centric Warfare-Its Nature and 
Modelling. Salisbury, Australia: Defence Science and  Technology Organisation, 
Systems Sciences Laboratory, 2003. 67p.  
    
Finnegan, Richard J. Organizational Implications of Network-Centric Warfare. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1999. 25p. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363092 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363092
 
Abstract: One of the many proposed responses to the rapidly changing global environment and 
significant fiscal constraints at the onset of the information age has been the concept of network centric 
warfare. The proponents of the concept draw support from successes achieved by high tech segments of 
the business world that have embraced advances in information technology. At issue is not whether or 
not the Navy (and other services) will seek to exploit information technology to the fullest extent possible. 
Indeed examples of the Navy's quest to distribute information in a graphic network format actually predate 
the end of the Cold War by decades. What is controversial is the extent to which the introduction of 
advanced information technology will change the hierarchical system of human interaction that has 
dominated successful military organizations for thousands of years. Before we decide our course we must 
examine the likely political realities of tomorrow's conflicts, the characteristics of current versus proposed 





Garth, Dennis. Network Centric Warfare and Its Impact on Operational Functions. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003. 23p.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA415477 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415477
Abstract: Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), or Network-Centric Operations (NCO), is a term that evokes 
strong opinions. The proponents of NCW look to the future and see sensor grids, weapons platforms 
netted together, and the free flow of information relating the minute details of friendly and enemy forces. 
The opponents of NCW claim that the ability of net centric operations to give the commander detailed 
information about the battlespace will flatten the command hierarchy and tempt operational commanders 
to dabble in tactical decisions rather than concentrating on operational art. The use of Net-centric tools in 
modern warfare has not hampered warfighting. On the contrary, they have provided the synthesis of 
information needed to conduct operations, greatly enhancing the warfighting capability of the modern 
commander. For NCW to mature from the current tactical to the future operational level, it must support 
the operational commander and his/her staff in the functions of operational art. NCW as it exists today 
and in the near future can provide the Operational Commander with the tools to plan, collaborate and 
increase the speed with which the staff perform. It is through NCW that the Operational Commander will 
react quicker there-by shocking the adversary or thwarting an enemy timetable for victory. Net centric 
warfare will, in the future, bring these about. 
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Geraghty, Barbara A. Will Network-Centric Warfare be the Death Knell for 
Allied/Coalition Operations? Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 1999. 25p. 
Abstract: The U.S. Navy is undergoing a shift in its focus from platform-centric to network-centric 
warfare in the coming century. Enabled by the recent advances in information technology, network-centric 
warfare connects widely dispersed platforms into a robust network capable of massing tremendous 
effects. Network-centric warfare will challenge the operational commander when planning allied /coalition 
operations in two major areas. The first is interoperability, which includes issues of technology 
compatibility, intelligence sharing, classified material security policy, language, and rules of engagement. 
The second challenge addresses the issue of command and control, specifically as national culture and 
subordination of forces affect it. The operational commander must determine the ability of coalition 
partner forces to be part of the network and assign mission tasks accordingly. As history has shown, 
coalition operations require significant leadership on the part of the commander and network-centric 
warfare is simply another factor to add to the challenge. 
  
 
Ginter, Karl. Space Technology and Network Centric Warfare: A Strategic Paradox. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2007. 22p. 
Abstract: The Department of Defense (DoD) force transformation is in large measure predicated on 
harnessing and exploiting the benefits of shared information on the battlefield to develop a common 
operating picture. The DoD's aggressive pursuit of information technologies to enable network-centric 
warfare (NCW) will generate a significant warfighting advantage as well as potential pitfalls. The Global 
Information Grid (GIG) is the telecommunications infrastructure -- the network backbone -- by which the 
United States facilitates NCW and executes its dominant forms of strategic power, both economically and 
militarily. A significant portion of the GIG relies upon space-based assets and technologies that expose 
the United States to vulnerabilities -- the very same space-based technologies that enable NCW. This 
paper addresses threats to the GIG, vulnerabilities of our space-based assets, and examines concerns 
about the implicit reliance upon space-based technologies to execute NCW. It evaluates the strengths 
and weaknesses of employing space technology in a network-centric environment, considers future 
threats posed by adversaries using asymmetric warfare, and examines the impacts on warfighting 
capabilities and national security. Finally, this paper identifies and recommends measures that mitigate 
risk to the United States' principal enabler of NCW -- space-based technology. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA469763 
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Glenn, Michelle L. Command and Control in the Systems Technology Battle Lab. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1999. 109p. 
Abstract: Joint Vision 2010 introduces the emerging operational concepts of Dominant Maneuver. 
Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and Full Dimensional Protection enabled by Information 
Superiority. Information Superiority is gained through operational architectures that closely couple the 
capabilities of sensors, C2, and shooters. This architecture of future warfare can be characterized as 
Network Centric Warfare. The Navy's response to adapt and develop new operational concepts in support 
of Network Centric Warfare is Information Technology for the Twenty First Century (IT-21). IT-21 is a 
reprioritization of existing Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) 
programs of record focused on accelerating the transition to a personal computer (PC) based tactical and 
support warfighting network. Battle Labs exist Service wide to aid in this growth process. Battle labs are 
focused organizations created to explore new technology, concepts, doctrine, or tactics, techniques and 
procedures to improve the efficiency and combat power of the forces. The Systems Technology Battle 
Lab was established to inject an academic viewpoint into experiments and research sponsored by the 
MBC and Commander, Third Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT). Currently, the documentation on the systems 
installed and how they work together to provide a centralized forum for experimentation and research is 
inadequate. The purpose of this thesis is to provide the STBL user with a guide describing the capabilities 
of the STBL and an example of its utilization in an integrated form. 
  
 
Gomez, Richard M. Centralized Command - Decentralized Execution: Implications 
of Operating in a Network Centric Warfare Environment. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University, 2003. 39p. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA424 605 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424605
Abstract: Advances in technology have brought about many chances to the employment of force. 
Information Operations and Network Centric Warfare significantly enhance situational awareness 
throughout the command hierarchy and provide an avenue for the highest levels to view battlefield 
actions as they develop. These chances have a great impact on the leadership of military forces. The line 
between Centralized Command and Decentralized Execution has at times become blurred, and there is 
grave potential for leaders to attempt to execute the battles at the major command levels. A thorough 
understanding of command relationships and leadership principles at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of conflict, coupled with increased education on the benefits and dangers of technology and 
information systems are required to maintain effective force employment and achieve the asymmetric 
effects that Network Centric Warfare can create. 
  
 
Gonzales, Daniel, et al. Network-Centric Operations Case Study: Air-to-Air Combat 
With and Without Link 16. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005 136p. 
Abstract: In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Air Force at the request of Congress conducted the Joint Tactical 
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Operational Special Project. In this exercise, the capabilities of F-
15 air superiority aircraft equipped with voice-only communications were compared with F-15s equipped 
with voice and JTIDS Link 16 data link communications in tactical air-to-air combat. More than 12,000 
sorties were flown in this special project. Blue offensive counterair packages composed of these F-15s 
ranged in size from two to eight aircraft. In all cases, the packages were controlled and cued by Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. The size of the engagements ranged from two Blue 
fighters on two Red fighters to eight Blue fighters on 16 Red fighters. Engagements occurred during 
daylight and night conditions. The primary independent variable was whether the Blue F-15s were 
equipped with the Link 16 data link or with conventional voice communications only. The capability of the 
Red aircraft remained consistent during the project. On average, Blue offensive counterair packages 
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equipped with Link 16 achieved a two-and-a-half times improvement in kill ratio (Red aircraft to Blue 
aircraft destroyed ), both during the day and at night. However, it was unclear how and why this 
significant improvement in force effectiveness arose. The aim of this study is to understand whether this 
increase in combat effectiveness stemmed from the network-centric capabilities of F-15 aircraft equipped 
with Link 16 and fighter pilots able to effectively use data link communications. 
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Greenwood, Michael D. E Pluribus Unum: Enhancing Intelligence Support in the 
Network Centric Environment. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1999. 23p. 
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare's emphasis on timeliness and targeting challenges the Intelligence 
Community to concurrently support tactical combat operations and operational planning and execution 
while maintaining strategic situational awareness. To successfully accomplish each requirement obligates 
the Intelligence Community to make fundamental changes in the authority of the Supported Theater 
Intelligence Officer relative to the other members of the Intelligence Community. Additionally, a renewed 
emphasis must be placed on the collection of human intelligence, the development of regional expertise, 
and utilization of imagery analysts. Lastly, the Network Centric Warfare's requirement to concurrently 
support the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels places a premium on accessing archived 
intelligence via the Information Grid. As a consequence, the Intelligence Community must use available 




Guthrie, Joseph W., et al. The Effects of Collaborative Technologies on Individual 
and Team Performance in a Network Centric Warfare (NCW) Environment. 
Orlando, FL: University of Central Florida, 2007. 50p.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA470167 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA470167
Abstract: Organizations believe that teams are the answer to many of their problems and are 
implementing them more readily into their daily business practices. The ubiquitous nature of teams in 
organizations and the current organizational trend of focusing on a more global marketplace have 
changed the ways in which teams collaborate. In the public and private business sector, organizations 
foster global partnerships that require employees from different parts of the world to work together to 
develop new ideas, solve problems, and make decisions. In order to ensure that these teams continue to 
perform at a high level and produce desired outcomes, researchers must better understand how teams 
operate in collaborative environments. 
  
Abstract: Two major purposes are served by this report. The first is to describe the Synthesized and 
Human Aerospace Forces in an immersive Research Environment (SAFIRE), a simulation capability 
linking many of the Warfighter Interface Division's (AFRL/HEC) human-in-the-loop simulations together as 
well as with external AFRL and AFMC assets. The second purpose is to document the initial use of the 
SAFIRE architecture in its intended role, as a tool supporting evaluations of crew-system interfaces used 
in a network-centric environment. Information availability was manipulated experimentally during 
simulated air-to-air combat simulations of an air base defense mission scenario that involved multiple 
friendly and adversary aircraft as well as simulated airborne command and control. Statistical analysis of 
resultant data indicated that the manipulation of information availability did affect both objective measures 
of performance and subjective measures of situation awareness. The presence of these effects clearly 
demonstrates SAFIRE's ability to support crew-system interface evaluations. In addition, the presence of 
 
Haas, Michael W., Matthew S. Middenorf, and Shari Ulring. The SAFIRE and an Initial 
Network-Centric Warfare Evaluation. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Research 
Laboratory, 2006. 59p. 
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a practice effect was observed indicating more attention should be focused on experimental design 
issues for future studies to reduce this effect or to compensate for its presence. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA457041 
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Hakimzadeh, Kavon. The Issue of Decision Up-Creep in Network Centric Warfare. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003. 24p.  
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Abstract: Network Centric Warfare (NCW) will provide operational commanders with unprecedented 
access to tactical level information. Depending on any number of external factors from politics to 
personality, access to this information may tempt operational commanders to micromanage the tactical 
actions of their subordinates. While it is the commander's prerogative to make decisions for any level of 
the force, the problem of "decision up-creep" could undermine synchronization on the tactical level and 
undo many of the war fighting benefits derived from a fully netted force. This paper serves three 
purposes. First, through the use of examples from recent operations, it shows that the unprecedented 
"reach" provided by NCW will increase the operational commander's temptation to micromanage tactical 
actions. Second this paper shows that decision up-creep would virtually negate all of the benefits of 
NCW. Finally, this paper presents organizational, doctrinal and cultural alternatives for mitigating decision 
up-creep. 
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Hannon, Jeffery A. Network Centric Warfare and Its Effect on Unit of Employmentx 
(UEx) Use of Mission Command. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General 
Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005,  57p. 
Abstract: The 2002 NSS call for "transforming to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-
first century", and the Army's leadership elected to concentrate the service's transformation efforts on 
battle command. The three pillars supporting the U.S. Army's transformation of battle command are its 
doctrine of mission command, reorganization of its warfighting forces - including the creation of the Unit of 
Employment (x) (UEx) headquarters - and the emerging joint concept of network centric warfare (NCW). 
The decision to merge these practices and concepts, coupled with the focus on transformation through 
battle command, necessitates understanding how network centric warfare may affect the UEX's use of 
mission command doctrine. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, states 
that trust and mutual understanding underpin the practice of mission command. Evaluated against these 
two principles, the Army's move to a brigade-based force, coupled with policy changes and emerging 
warfighting concepts, improves UE(x) commanders' ability to exercise mission command. These 
improvements overshadow the tendency of commanders to diminish trust and mutual understanding by 
relying on centralized command and control practices, which result from the influence of U.S. Army 
policies, UE (x)structural and conceptual limitations, and features of network centric warfare theory. 
  
 
Hansen, Donald K. Can Decentralized Command and Control Complement 
Network-Centric Warfare? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004. 21p.  
Abstract: Future technology will allow the Joint Force Commander unprecedented access to the tactical 
level of war. Depending on his personality, he may chose to directly control events unfolding at the 
tactical level or leave the fighting to individuals charged with employing their weapon systems. The ability 
of a pilot, tank driver or infantry battalion commander in the future to share his operational picture with the 
entire chain of command (shared situational awareness) and vice versa, begs the need for sound, 
authoritative command and control doctrine to maximize the inherent benefits of this information 
advantage. All players in this future system must share a common rule set in order to exploit the war 
fighting advantages described in Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020). Command and control doctrine must now 
outline this new rule set. With a common rule set, reorganization, training and education of staffs and 
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combat units can begin. Overcoming old paradigms will be difficult, but by applying the doctrine of 
maneuver warfare to Network-centric Warfare (NCW) and JV 2020 concepts, a better command and 
control method can be implemented. The purpose of this paper is to reconcile the conflicts between 
maneuver warfare doctrine and the warfighting concepts currently being developed under JV 2020 and 
NCW by establishing a strong case for decentralized command and control. 
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Harvey, Charles and Lance Schultz. Analysis of the Impact of Network-Centric 
Warfare on the Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Intelligence 
at the Operational Level. Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 1999. 69p. 
Abstract: This project sought to determine the impacts of network centric warfare (NCW) on the 
planning and direction of intelligence at the operational level, and what changes in joint intelligence 
doctrine (JID) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) should/should not be made to support it? 
To meet those objectives, the analysis compared the NCW concept to the fundamentals upon which 
intelligence is to be employed in military operations (intelligence doctrine), the plans for taking doctrine to 
the field (the TTPs), and how the TTPs become reality in a real world operation (DESERT FOX). To serve 
as a point of departure, a working model for Now was established from the current literature. (This paper 
has classified appendices)  
  
 
Heaney, Thomas A., Jr. Battle Command and Network-Centric Warfare: Putting 
First Things First. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 28p.  
Abstract: At the dawn of the information Age, the commander's concept of operation, for arranging 
potential combat power into victorious campaigns, major operations, and battles, is still the essence of 
military operations. It is the commander who translates higher concepts and guidance, from the strategic 
to tactical levels of war, through his visualization of the operation to accomplish the mission 
Consequently, his concept of operation directs all battlefield activities to achieve the desired military end-
state. Network-Centric Warfare is a technologically based process designed to harness the power of the 
Information Age by exploiting technological advances to achieve dominance in the information domain. 
Through a network of new systems (sensors, information, and weapons), warfighters translate this 
information into dominant warfare-centered Network-Centric Operations (NCO). NCO shifts the 
operational paradigm from platform-centric to effects-based operations, by linking geographically 
dispersed warfighters (through a common operational picture) to overwhelm potential adversaries. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA393569 
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Heickero, Roland. Some Thoughts on the Application of Military Theory to 
Information Operations and Network Centric Warfare. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish 
Defence Research Agency, 2006. 27p. 
Abstract: The transformation into a world based on communication and information leads to Information 
Operations (IO) becoming more important than ever. Thus, there is a need to develop new methodologies 
for successful IO that take into account the change towards network-enabling warfare capabilities. In a 
network-centric warfare approach it is important to understand the opponents' network structure and 
communication system and how they use these resources. Equally important is to understand one's own 
network structure in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Every type of network has it own vulnerabilities 
in the form of vital nodes, links, and platforms, regardless of whether it is a communications, 
organizational, or biological network. If one understand one's own structure as well as that of one's 
opponents, the chances of effective IO increase greatly. A fruitful way forward is to use theories based on 
center of gravity (CoG) and critical vulnerabilities (CV). This paper first discusses the logic of networks in 
general terms and then considers different types of networks and their respective abilities to resist attacks 
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of different kinds due to center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Twenty briefing charts summarize the 
presentation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA461536 
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Helme, E. C., III. Diminishing the Critical Vulnerability of Space. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, Joint Military Operations Department, February 1998. 21p. 
Abstract: Network-centric warfare (NCW) relies heavily on the exploitation of space and technology to 
create a more efficient, effective end responsive form of combat power than is presently available to 
United States forces. The backbone of NCW is the advanced communication and sensor systems that 
reside in space. These data paths produce a flow of information that promises a greater military reach, 
irrespective of force size, and supports an increasing trend toward power projection in an ERA of 
diminishing forward bases. Unfortunately, our propensity to levy an increasing number of systems upon 
the skeleton of space has increased its importance as a target to any potential future adversary. 
Furthermore, a shift to NCW would mark a potentially dangerous commitment to electronic connectivity in 
order to assure combat power. This increased risk results from the fragility of space assets because 
components of our space architecture are assailable with relatively low cost, low technology weapons and 
tactics. Therefore, if we recognize these assets as a critical vulnerability, bow do we reconcile a trend 
toward increasing our dependence on space. The solution requires an environment of innovation that 
strives to balance hardware, techniques and skills in such a way that realizes the advantages of network-
centric warfare without compromising the combat power of individual platforms. Preserving the capability 
of platform-centric warfare reduces the vulnerability of space assets and safeguards our ability to mass 
effects regardless of connectivity.  
  
 
Henseler, Sean P. Addressing the Legal Challenges of Network Centric Warfare. 
Case In Point: The Legal Implications of Obtaining an "Information and 
Knowledge Advantage" Prior to Hostilities. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 
28p. 
Abstract: If it is true that the Navy is moving away from platform-centric toward network-centric warfare 
(NCW), then its leaders must ensure that any such transition is accomplished in the most efficient and 
effective manner possible. Since the Navy's current vision of net-centric operations raises many complex 
and often unsettled legal issues, the Navy must establish a formal framework for analyzing the legal 
challenges posed by NCW then integrate this framework into any NCW transition process. Future net-
centric operational commanders have a vested interest in ensuring that the legal implications of NCW on 
factor space, time, and forces have been thoroughly considered. Current and future international and 
domestic law might limit the ability of net-centric commanders to optimize the key concepts of the Navy's 
vision of net-centric operations. If the technological and doctrinal aspects of NCW continue to rapidly 
evolve without regard for the legal challenges, the Navy might find itself in a position where it has 
invested a tremendous amount of time and money developing a system of sensors and platforms that 
cannot be employed as envisioned due to legal constraints. 
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Hestad, Daniel R. A Discretionary-Mandatory Model as Applied to Network Centric 
Warfare and Information Operations. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2001. 97p.  
Abstract: The concepts of DoD information operations and network centric warfare are still in their 
infancy. In order to develop concepts, the right conceptual models need to be developed from which to 
design and implement these concepts. Information operations and network centric warfare are 
fundamentally based on trust decisions. However, the key to developing these concepts is for DoD to 
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develop the organizational framework from which trust, inside and outside, of an organization may be 
achieved and used to its advantage. In this thesis, an organizational model is submitted for review to be 
applied to DoD information systems and operational organizations. 
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Hilton, Paul K. Expeditionary Maneuver: A Synthesis of Network Centric Concepts. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003. 21p. 
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Abstract: Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) is a unique and appropriate concept for 21st century 
warfare because it is a synthesis of the best of traditional realistic warfare concepts, stable maneuver 
warfare doctrine, and the contemporary concepts of network centric warfare (NCW). The Marine Corps 
EMW concept emphasizes the realities of confusion, human factors, danger, and uncertainty to craft a 
concept that relies on well-trained and motivated people. The NCW concept is about how the network will 
provide synergy and added combat power by accomplishing tasks that formerly required standing forces. 
EMW is about tailored forces to accomplish a mission and using maneuver to get there. NCW is about the 
network helping to share resources to get the right combat capability to the right place and time. EMW on 
the battlefield today will rely heavily on a robust and ubiquitous network, but it will not be entirely 




Abstract: Significant technological advances over the past few decades have fueled the continual and 
rapid development of an information-based world. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has become the 
buzzword of the young millennium within the Department of Defense (DoD) and is quickly becoming a 
popularly shared vision and rallying cry for force transformation among United States military leaders. An 
essential element in fully implementing this network-centric way of thinking is to develop useful measures 
to help gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of both our military networks and our strategic NCW 
doctrine. The goal of this research is first to provide a comprehensive summary of the key literary works 
that have forged a foundational basis for defining NCW. Second, this work will utilize a System 
Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) combat model, which represents a Kosovo-like engagement 
(provided by the Space and Missile Center), to serve as a tool in exploring the use of NCW metrics in 
military worth analysis. Third and last, this effort selects measures for the physical, information, and 
cognitive domains of NCW and analyzes the outputs from the Kosovo scenario that are pertinent to each 
domain in order to assess the usefulness of each metric. In the final analysis, the average target 
detection distance outputs and average communication channel message loading metrics chosen for the 
physical and information domains yielded mixed results and levels of utility. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA446395 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA446395
Honabarger, Jason B. Modeling Network Centric Warfare (NCW) With the System 
Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force 
Institute of Technology, 2006. 108p. 
  
Hooper, Gary R. Command Concepts and Staff Organization for Joint Vision 2010. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1998. 27p. 
 
Abstract: Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) describes the need for new procedures and organizations to 
implement its concepts. Two significant and inseparable issues are how forces will be commanded and 
how the Joint Force Commander will organize his staff to conduct the type of operations described in JY 
2010. JV 2010 places a premium on Information Age concepts such as non-linear dynamics, speed of 
command, network-centric warfare, and blurred levels of war. Our present hierarchical command 
structure, which is based upon linear reductionism, is inappropriate for Information Age operations. 
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Additionally, the doctrine of 'centralized planning, decentralized execution' is not flexible enough to handle 
the full spectrum of envisioned military operations. A more flexible command concept is required. A 'Flat 
Ring' model for staff functions which emphasizes speed of command and network operations is described 
and recommended. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA348415 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA348415  
 
Huffaker, Jacob A. The Benefit of 802.20 Technologies on Information Flow in 
Network Centric Warfare. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005 57p.  
Abstract: This thesis will focus on the area of 802.20 wireless networking and how this technology will 
vastly benefit the US military forces, especially in the Network Centric concept of operations, where 
information flow is crucial.  It will investigate this technology using published literature and previously 
gathered experimental data.  This thesis will then relate its findings to Network Centric Warfare and the 
matters that could be most affected by this new technology. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA439218 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA439218  
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/05Sep%5FHuffaker.pdf   
 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA430546 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA430546
A Human-Centric Architecture for Net-Centric Operations. Vienna, VA: Evidence 
Based Research, 2005. 64p. 
Abstract: Net-Centric Operations seek to improve military effectiveness among spatially distributed and 
possibly culturally diverse teams. Key to the net-centric operational concept are agile teams that excel 
even in the most difficult circumstances. Such teams can self-synchronize, smoothly coordinating to 
exploit the diverse perspectives and expertise within the team. The members of such teams are on the 
same wavelength, continually making adjustments to leverage each others abilities and to accommodate 
each others needs. Recent research on the cognitive foundations of collaboration and teamwork has 
identified key cognitive enablers to effective teamwork. These cognitive enablers are the knowledge and 
understandings that team members require to work together successfully. Accordingly, it is very desirable 
that teams acquire and maintain this knowledge. There are three technical prerequisites to ensure that 
spatially distributed team members can do this: an architecture that provides reliable communications 
connectivity among team members; information that supports task performance and team coordination; 
and a means for team members to evaluate performance and correct problems. This report describes 
how to create an infrastructure that achieves these technical prerequisites. 
  
 
Kearney, Kevin N. Denial and Deception--Network-Centric Challenge. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, February 1999. 24p. 
Abstract: Adversarial denial and deception (D&D) poses a serious challenge to future operational 
concepts based on perceived informational superiority. An analysis of how D&D may interact in a future 
network centric environment demonstrates some inherent vulnerabilities of information technology (IT) 
based warfighting theory. Operational D&D has continued to keep pace with sensor development and 
through physical, technical and administrative means will be able to influence sensor derived information. 
Once our information is tainted, network centric's reliance on information dominance will become a 
vulnerability. Deception will travel at high speeds and effect multiple operational levels due to the 
networked operational picture provided by network centric theory. Our dependence on reliable and timely 
information, if affected by D&D, may lead to ambiguity, misdirection, and/or false security. Network 
centric's speed of command will further exasperate D&D's effect by increasing the speed of deception 
while simultaneously reducing the likely identification of deception through analysis. Our speed and 
networked precision may also finely hone our operational art to the point of making us predictable and 
therefore more susceptible to adversarial D&D. The additional network centric attributes of self 
synchronization, platform reduction, and adversarial lock out will also contribute to our vulnerability to 
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D&D by creating an environment of enemy underestimation and increasing the severity of consequences 
of friendly action taken under the influence of adversarial D&D. The D&D challenge that network centric 
warfighting faces can be addressed through an increased emphasis on the importance of networked 
analysis. Additionally, future doctrine must reflect a clear understanding of anti-D&D methodologies so 
that operational commanders of the future are aware of and can plan how to counter D&D when they face 
it. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363099 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA363099  
 
Klingbeil, Ralph S. and Keith M. Sullivan. A Proposed Framework for Network-
Centric Maritime Warfare Analysis. Newport, RI: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 
2003. 16p. 
Abstract: The benefits of network-centric warfare are addressed in many publications, but few of these 
publications actually demonstrate how to quantify these alleged benefits. This report proposes an 
analytical framework to quantify the value-added of network-centric warfare; that framework is queueing 
theory, which is based on the concept of a demand-for-service process. Most warfare tasks can be 
characterized as demand-for-service processes. This report shows how queueing theory can be applied 
to demand-for-service warfare tasks and thus provide the basis for analyzing and quantifying those tasks. 
In addition, this report demonstrates how the functions of many of the independent and dependent 
variables and associated warfare metrics can be translated into the characteristics and metrics of queues. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA416829 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA416829  
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Knight, Michele, Les Vencel and Terry Moon. A Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
Compliance Process for Australian Defence. Edinburgh, Australia: Defence Science 
and Technology Organisation, 2006. 85p. 
Abstract: The NCW Program Office (NCWPO) is responsible for ensuring that the ADF's capability 
projects are Network Centric Warfare (NCW) compliant, from the time they are listed in the Defence 
Capability Plan until they enter service as realised capabilities and throughout life-of-type. The NCWPO 
has engaged a number of different groups to look at the problem of NCW Compliance from different 
perspectives. This report describes one of these studies. It proposes an NCW Compliance Process that is 
based on a simple underlying conceptual model. It also identifies some critical issues to be addressed by 
the NCWPO in order to improve the rigour and quality of the NCW Compliance Process. 
  
Kuhn, James K. Network Centric Warfare: The End of Objective Oriented 
Command and Control. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1998. 28p. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA348447 
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Abstract: The rapid incorporation of emerging technologies, particularly information technologies, in the 
military presents both tremendous opportunities and challenges for all aspects of the American way of 
war. One of the most significant impacts of information technology on the military is being called a new 
form of warfare: network-centric. Network-centric warfare is the enabling concept for JV2010 and Concept 
for Future Joint Operations. It proposes to revolutionize war through the emerging concepts of speed of 
command and self-synchronization. A totally new approach to warfare, it is characterized by unique 
strengths and weaknesses. Most significant of these is its impact on command and control of forces 
throughout the battlespace. The current US command and control system is based on an objective-
oriented approach to command. However, it does not create the conditions for the quantum 
improvements in effective employment of assets foreseen by network-centric warfare. Network-centric 
warfare, then, requires a different command and control system to realize the full potential of JV2010. 
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 Abstract: This paper seeks to analyze the command and control issues an sing from the advent of 
NCW. While information superiority is not a new concept, the blazing speed of advancement in 
information technologies have brought about dramatic changes to other lifestyles and profound changes 
in the conduct of modern warfare. This leads to the birth of Network Centric Warfare. NCW offers great 
opportunities to dramatically enhance combat prowess by establishing shared situational awareness, 
increasing speed of command, improving systems' lethality and survivability, and enabling greater 
flexibility through self synchronization. However, these revolutionary changes in NCW do not depend on 
technology alone. In order to harness the full benefits of NCW, the full span of elements ranging from 
organization, doctrine operational concepts to training must co-evolve. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA422430 
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Lim, Soon-Chia. Network Centric Warfare: A Command and Control Perspective. 




ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA405613 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA405613
Livingood, Debra M. The Integration of Civil Relief Agencies Into Network Centric 
Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002. 26p. 
Abstract: The U.S. military is currently in the process of undergoing a visionary transformation of its 
forces using technological advances with the goal of maintaining global superiority into and beyond the 
21st century. The single most important technological advancement that will transform the military and 
allow it to attain full spectrum dominance will be the capability to effectively capture and integrate the vast 
amount of information on individual networks into a Common Operating Picture (COP). The military's 
vision is to accomplish this with Network Centric Warfare (NCW) through the integration of informational 
grids. The military, though, continues to maintain its focus narrowly on information obtained by military 
sources only and is neglecting to include another significant information source: civil relief agencies. In 
order to achieve true information superiority the information from thousands of civil relief agencies needs 
to be integrated into the COP. Over the past decade the U.S. military has been heavily involved with 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) which, by its nature, includes interaction with numerous 
civil relief agencies. Throughout all of these operations, the critical importance of efficiently sharing 
information between the military and these agencies has been proven over and over again. This is 
especially true in MOOTW, but as Operation Enduring Freedom has shown, it is also important in war. 
Therefore, to neglect developing methods to integrate the civil relief agencies' vital information into the 
COP could prove to be disastrous. 
  
 
Llinas, James. Service-Oriented Architectures, Network-Centric Warfare, and 
Agile, Self-Synchronized C2: Impacts to Data Fusion Process Design. Buffalo, NY: 
State University of New York - Buffalo, 2006. 79p. 
Abstract: One of the primary if not the central motivating rationale for Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is 
that NCW provides an enabling mechanism for information sharing and shared understanding and 
awareness of military situations of interest, that in turn allows the realization of entirely new concepts of 
C2 that are advertised as providing greatly increased agility, speed of command, and synchronization in 
C2. In turn, the underlying enabling IT mechanism for NCW is the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
concept, within which all functional services, to include Data Fusion Services, will presumably operate. 
These attractive but as-yet-not-fully-defined concepts represent a challenge to the Data Fusion 
community in terms of understanding the implications of the evolving NCW, SOA, and new C2 concepts 
on the design of Data Fusion Services. Key to this understanding in particular is the need for a close 
dialog with the C2 research community on exactly what the information needs of new C2 concepts will be 
and how those needs can best be met by appropriately-designed Data Fusion Services. This talk will 
address each of these issues and argue for the need for both: (1) a multi-community approach to the 
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architecting of effective and efficient SOA's, and (2) for new initiatives in distributed Data Fusion to 
address the specific technical challenges of NCW-specific Data Fusion Service design and 
implementation. (It should be noted that this paper is drawn largely from US literature and so presents a 
US-based viewpoint developed by the author; the paper does not represent any official US governmental 
views.) This brief paper is intended to sketch the topical areas that will be addressed in the associated 
Keynote speech. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA474190 
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Logan, Charles J. Complexity at the Battle of Midway: Implications for Network-
Centric Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 23p. 
Abstract: The lessons of the battle of Midway are relevant to the U.S. Navy's effort to implement 
network-centric warfare. Japanese forces at the battle were superior to those of the United States both in 
number and quality. Both forces employed the same technology and similar tactics. The margin of U.S. 
victory was superior intelligence, and command and control that relied on the initiative of subordinates to 
self-organize to defeat the enemy. U.S. execution of the Midway battle plan exemplified the tenets of 
shared awareness, speed of command, and self-synchronization to meet the commander's intent that will 
underpin the network-centric Navy. The U.S. Navy must adapt its concept of command and control to 
realize fully the benefits of network-centric operations. Navy doctrine should more explicitly recognize that 
its fighting forces are a complex adaptive system and command them as such. Control should become 
less rather than more centralized as the result of more information. The commander's intent will become 
even more important as subordinate levels of command gain more information and power to influence the 
battle. The principles of war, particularly simplicity, will retain their importance in the network-centric 
environment. 
  
Abstract: Organizational structure has profound effects on a joint force commander's ability to perform 
military actions. Organizations and their environment exhibit an interdependent relationship, requiring a 
commander to evolve his organization to rapidly achieve mission accomplishment. The CNO Strategic 
Studies Group XIX report of September 2000 has identified the FORCEnet as being the basis for the U.S. 
Navy's future network-centric organization, and outlines a military environment that includes multitudes of 
manned and unmanned vehicles, platforms, sensors, weapons and warfighters. These naval elements 
will operate jointly, leveraging organizational structure to rapidly sense, assess, and respond to the 
defense of the nation's security interests as directed by the President. The focus of this research is to 
examine this envisioned future military environment, the military actions required to achieve success in 
that environment and the organizational structure(s) that will best fit those action requirements. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA417518 
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Maguire, Gregory M. Concept of a Dynamic Organizational Schema for a Network-
Centric Organization. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. 119p. 
  
McCarthy, Shannon E. Marketing Network Centric Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, 2001. 23p. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA389557 
 
Abstract: The Navy has created an innovative concept to fight future wars and deal with operations 
other than war-network centric warfare (NCW) . Unfortunately, NCW remains a Navy premise that is not 
well recognized or accepted by its own members or those of the other services. In order to be effective, 
NCW must transition from a Navy concept to a joint product. NCW advocates can effect this transition by 
using basic business principles to market NCW. They can tailor a solid mix of product, price, place, and 
promotion to target and win over operational commanders. This is the first and vital step to successfully 




ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA370751 
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Monroe, Deborah. Net-Centric Warfare: Are We Ready to be Cyber-Warriors? 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 1999. 21p. 
Abstract: Joint Vision 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's template for future military 
operations, identifies information superiority as the linchpin of the emerging operational concepts of 
Dominant Maneuver, precision Engagement, Focused Logistics and Full Dimensional protection. While 
the technical challenges to realizing these concepts are acknowledged, I contend the tasks required to 
successfully integrate the human and cultural side of Joint Vision 2010's information superiority are as 
daunting as any of the still unsolved technical hurdles. Currently, the human element of technology 
enabled warfare is not getting the attention it needs. The military must begin to examine whether current 




Morua, Michael L. Network Centric Operations: The Enterprise Battle Group 
Experience. Annapolis, MD: Naval Academy, 2002. 11p.  
Abstract: With increased information flow and rapidly paced military operations, decision makers find it 
difficult to maintain full situational awareness, resulting in ineffective decision-making in stressful and 
time-constrained environments. How does one manage increased information loads in a shorter time 
without negatively impacting decision-makers? Due to the competitive nature of warfare and a 
commander's desire to gain a military advantage over an enemy, military operations can become fast 
paced. in terms of Boyd's OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide Act) Loop, when a dynamic OODA Loop 
process is combined with real-time, high volume, networked information systems currently accessible on 
ships, the naval decision maker/operator can now better respond to the action and seize the initiative in 
battle. The Information Technology (IT) revolution has made sailors accessible to e-mail, electronic 
documents, Internet web-pages, chatrooms, and video teleconferencing. However, 
unconstrained/uncontrolled use of information resources can quickly overwhelm operators and cause 
information overload. The Navy's doctrine on Network Centric Operations exploits the advances in IT-21 
systems in order to improve the OODA loop process, determine the enemy's vulnerabilities, and finally 
achieve the desired end-state. Network Centric Operations focus combative power from the network 
rather than individual platforms. IT and Network Centric innovations that were demonstrated during 
Enterprise Battle Group's (ENTBATGRU) 2002 Deployment will be discussed. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA400008 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400008  
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Moses, Bruce D. Intelligence Collection: Supporting Full Spectrum Dominance and 
Network Centric Warfare? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff 
College, Schools of Advanced Military Studies, 2004. 82p. 
Abstract: This monograph examines whether the Army's information collection efforts are supporting the 
goal of full spectrum dominance and whether these are in harmony with the concepts of network centric 
warfare. Full spectrum dominance and network centric warfare are central themes in Department of 
Defense and Army transformation literature and both require information collection and an understanding 
of the role of cognition empowered by networking for success. More specifically, it examines whether 
Army collection efforts are focusing too heavily on collection for combat operations and leaving it unable 
to fully exploit the access to adversary systems during stability operations. This study found that the 
institutional Army is not fully supporting the goal of full spectrum dominance or network centric warfare but 
is still myopically investing heavily in efforts to defeat the adversary's conventional capabilities with 
standoff collection technology and is not creating the organizational, systems and technical architectures 
necessary to leverage the power of a fully networked force. 
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Mosley, Robbie L. Network Centric Warfare: Does Funding Priorities Support the 
Strategy? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2006.  22p. 
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare is a central component of the Defense Department's transformation 
initiatives. It continues the journey of transforming the military services into joint capabilities-based 
formations for meeting the challenges of the 21st Century. The following analysis provides a microscopic 
slice of the Defense Department's transformational concepts for the military. The Army's Future Combat 
System serves as an excellent case study for reviewing some key elements of defense transformation 
and the feasibility of funding network centric operations. This paper examines issues with the processes 
for obtaining the necessary resources to include the complexities of transforming a military service. Finally 
the paper provides recommendations on ensuring the successful implementation of the transformation 
objectives. While the Military Departments are updating their operational constructs toward Network 
Centric Warfare Vision the funding debates reflect a significant gap in obtaining the necessary resources 
for full implementation. In essence Network Centric Warfare is struggling for valuable resources and may 
falter due to the de-synchronization of intra-dependent programs. 
  
 
Abstract: There are many views about how the still-developing concept of Network-Centric Warfare will 
transform our U.S. military. Operational commanders, leading military forces at the operational level of 
war, will remain relevant and essential to the effective conduct of Network-Centric Warfare. The key 
question is how an operational commander can effectively command his dispersed and decentralized 
forces while taking advantage of the capabilities offered by Network-Centric Warfare. A formal statement 
of clear, concise Commander's Intent is currently the primary means by which operational commanders 
guide the effective warfighting of their subordinate commands. A revised and improved style of 
Commander's Intent that capitalizes on new capabilities will be essential to effective Network-Centric 
Warfare. 
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Neely, David S. Network-Centric Commander's Intent: The Key to Network-Centric. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003. 28p.  
  
 
Nissen, Mark E. Understanding "Understanding" Flow for Network-Centric 
Warfare: Military Knowledge-Flow Mechanics. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2002. 50p. 
Abstract: Network-centric warfare (NCW) emphasizes information superiority for battlespace efficacy, 
but it is clear that the mechanics of how knowledge flows are just as important as those pertaining to the 
networks and communication systems used to transmit data and information. Unfortunately, with the 
strong presumption that knowledge is distinct from data and information, knowledge-flow mechanics in 
the warfare context are not well understood; even the term knowledge is used in conflicting ways (e.g., to 
describe information flows) by NCW experts, operational personnel and developers of military doctrine. 
Mapping key concepts from technologically enabled business models in which NCW is based in large part 
to the military, we substitute the term understanding flow when discussing the mechanics of how 
knowledge flows in the NCW context. In one respect, this mapping and terminological substitution enable 
us to move forward and model knowledge-flow mechanics in a manner that is consistent with the 
operational Navy's lexicon; in another respect, however, it is clear that Navy lexicon does not yet include 
the term understanding flow. Hence, naval conceptualization of NCW may be missing a vital element. 
Informed by recent advances in knowledge-flow theory, the research described in this technical report 
develops a four-dimensional model of understanding-flow mechanics. This multidimensional model 
enables a novel capability to recognize a variety of understanding-flow patterns found in the military 
enterprise, to distinguish such patterns from their counterparts pertaining to information and data, and to 
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enhance the speed and efficiency of NCW understanding flows. Just as understanding the mechanics of 
electrical flow is critical to developing useful electronic devices, understanding the mechanics of 
understanding flow is critical to conceiving useful NCW systems. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA406729 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA406729  
 
Abstract: One of the most daunting tasks the U.S. military will face in the 21st century is the issue of 
implementing effective command and control (C2) of joint and coalition military operations. As new 
technologies are implemented to support Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010), successful C2 must give the 
commander the flexibility to use faster and more accurate information technologies in order to increase 
battlespace knowledge and situational awareness. The dynamics of new technologies is linked to the 
Information Age and is commonly referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which is leveraged 
through the enabling concepts of 'Information Superiority' and 'Network-Centric Warfare'. The challenge 
for the future commander is to exploit the RMA by applying a flexible C2 process to control the 
battlespace. Thus, as networked forces bring faster and more accurate information across all levels of 
war, the operational commander will exert his influence by maintaining a flexible networked architecture 
through a continuum based on his intent and the tempo of operations. A more focused understanding of 
networked C2 is the key to the evolution of new and existing joint architectures in order to keep pace with 
information technologies. The military must embrace an aggressive transition to a more flexible 
organization that is linked to a networked hierarchy to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA363260 
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Olmo, Frank J. Command and Control in Joint Vision 2010: Flexible, Adaptive and 
Networked.  Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 
February 1999. 25p. 
  
 
Olsson, Eric J. Literature Survey on Network Concepts and Measures to Support 
Research in Network-Centric. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. 89p. 
Abstract: The United States Navy and its joint partners continually seek to maintain a responsive, agile, 
and effective fighting force well suited to combat present-day threats to national security. As a result, U.S. 
forces are currently undergoing force transformation to adopt an organizational structure capable of 
supporting this mission. This new organizational structure is known as Network-Centric Warfare. The 
purpose of this research is to analyze any performance metrics, measures of effectiveness, or analytical 
methods used by existing organizations engaged in network-centric operations that would assist the Navy 
and joint forces along with their transformation process. This research will be done in the form of a 
literature review, examining existing material written on communication, economic/business, and 
social/organizational networks. In addition to identifying quantitative and qualitative metrics, an emphasis 
will be placed on the methodologies used for network assessment. Final sections relate findings from 
each resource to Network-Centric Warfare and address matters relevant to the future of force 
transformation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA417514 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA417514  
Abstract: The world is undergoing an information revolution with the rapid advance of information 
technologies. Undoubtedly, information operations is becoming more dynamic and essential to daily 
activities of the United States military services. Within the Department of Defense (DoD) many concepts 
have evolved which formulate utilizing the virtual information domain to support operations in the 
traditional physical domains of land, sea, air and space. One such concept, Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW), defines and describes how the US military should organize and fight in the information age. By 
 
Osmun, Richard O. Building the Intelligence Foundation for Network Centric 
Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 31p.  
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incorporating an intelligence analysis grid, the concept of NCW will optimize the utility of available 
information and produce shared awareness. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA393521 
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Performance Learning Roadmap: A Network-Centric Approach for Engaged 
Learners. Ft. Belvoir, VA: National Defense University, 2005. 32p. 
Abstract:  The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) workplace is rapidly evolving to transform 
the way we conduct business. Spread all over the world to provide critical systems and support to the 
warfighter, our workforce demands responsive, point-of-need learning, the ability to access knowledge, 
and the ability to collaborate with experts at the point of-need. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
is developing learning and job performance support systems that remain with the AT&L workforce 24 /7 
and throughout their careers the concept of "continuous presence. Our focus is to shape a network-
centrlc learning environment and exploit online resources and expertise. At the same time, we continue to 
reshape and improve our resident learning assets. 
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Poole, James A. Challenge of Netwar for the Operational Commander. Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, March 1996. 30p. 
Abstract: The threat of intrusions to U.S. domestic and military infrastructure and information systems is 
very real and may affect our national security now and in the future. Information has become a new 
center of gravity that must be protected. Netwar is one tool of Information Warfare that the operational 
commander can use in defensive and offensive operations to gain information dominance. Netwar targets 
military or civilian non-weapons computer networks to gain a military advantage while it protects one's 
own systems from attack. With an overview of Netwar concepts, this paper explores the benefits of 
Netwar for the commander, the defensive and offensive decisions that must be made, and some 
prescriptions for the future that will enable the commander to fight and win conflicts effectively in the 
twenty-first century. 
   
 
Porter, Carl D. Network Centric Warfare - Transforming the U.S. Army. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2004. 43p. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA423794 
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Abstract: The old paradigms of U.S. military operations in the industrial age are dead. Military relevance 
in the information-dominated 21st Century no longer comes from the industrial age concept of massing 
forces or attrition warfare. Rather, it comes from a new information age paradigm in which access to 
information enables the rapid employment of the right force at the right place and time to achieve 
strategic objectives, while preventing any adversary from doing the same. To achieve this position of 
dominance, the Department of Defense has embraced the concepts of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
as a way to transform the force and achieve Joint Vision 2020 objectives. This information age concept 
provides a systems view of the battle space that can radically compress the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of war and dramatically increase combat power through shared awareness and self-
synchronization. The concept will not take hold in the U.S. Army, however, without a substantial effort to 
overcome impediments and a corresponding co-evolution of processes, organizations, and technology 
infrastructure. This research paper provides a summary of network centric warfare concepts and 




Quinn, Timothy W. Can We Get There From Here? RMAs, Network-Centric Warfare 
and the Process of Transformation. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1999. 
25p. 
Abstract: Among the hot buzzwords in U.S. military circles at present are the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) and Network Centric Warfare (NCW). RMA enthusiasts and technocrats argue that by 
harnessing emerging information technologies the U.S. can achieve Information Dominance in the 
battlespace of tomorrow, and fundamentally change the nature of warfare. The RMA is comprised of 
three elements: technology, doctrine, and organizational adaptation encompassed in the perceived 
strategic context. Network Centric Warfare envisions the combination of advanced sensors, weapons, 
and C4I systems from geographically dispersed units networked together into a continuously evolving 
ecosystem to create a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The results are forces achieving the 
massing of effects versus the massing of forces, operating with increased speed and synchronized from 
the bottom up to lock out enemy options while locking in success. Although the means of conducting war 
will change, the nature of it will not. The key to successfully formulating, implementing, and realizing any 
RMA will be the investment of our intellectual capital along the path. There is no such thing as the 
foreseeable future and we must not lock ourselves into a course with no allowable deviation but rather 
critically assess the who, what when, why, where and how as we move into the 21st century. We cannot 
wait for someone else to solve the problems for us rather we must all be involved to get there from here. 
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Randall, Bobbie L. Sun Tzu: The Art of Network Centric Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Army War College, 2001. 40p.  
Abstract: To meet the challenges of the future, the United States must have a strategy to ensure the 
joint force of tomorrow will be able to achieve full spectrum dominance. Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) 
provides the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision of 21st century military operations and describes 
America's future military capability objectives. As our long-term objectives are evolving, however, so is 
our ability, from a technological and organizational perspective, to meet those objectives. Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) provides the potential for significantly enhanced resources and instruments through which 
these objectives can be achieved. However, organizations (especially military organizations) often find it 
difficult to translate radically new resources into required capabilities. For this, we need a roadmap linking 
the development of future capabilities to future objectives. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military 
philosopher, provides this necessary linkage. This paper examines the realization of JV2020 future 
military capability objectives (ends) by using Sun Tzu's timeless warfighting principles (ways) to guide the 
use of evolving NCW technologies and organizations (means). 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA389680 
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Read, Derek W. The Abbott and Costello Effect: Who's on What, and What's Where 
When? A Human-Centered Method to Investigate Network Centric Warfare 
Systems. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 71p.  
Abstract: Technological advancements, especially in communications systems, have led to a 
burgeoning interest in network centric warfare (NCW), fundamentally changing how warfare is being 
conducted. Network centric warfare (NCW) systems are being rushed to the field and are offered as a 
solution for the fog of war and as a way to reduce manpower costs. To date, there are no empirical 
findings that support or refute these NCW system claims. The goal of this thesis was to ascertain the 
utility of the Geographical Recall and Analysis of Data in the Environment (GRADE) as a method and 
process by which complex human-technological systems can be assessed. The GRADE builds upon the 
Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC). This study essentially determines if GRADE could be used 
in model validation in laboratory and field settings for evaluating NCW claims. Unfortunately, that 
research goal was not entirely realized due to constraints and limitations in the data collection exercise. 
The thesis discusses the lessons learned from this research effort and makes recommendations about 
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future exercises and how to better populate the DMSC with data. Additional recommendations for 
changes to the processes and procedures for data collection are provided. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA474389 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA474389  
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Abstract: Network-centric warfare (NCW) has changed the way the Department of Defense addresses 
technological improvements for its military forces. No longer is the emphasis on enhancing the 
capabilities of a single platform, but the focus is now on networking people, processes and technology to 
enable knowledge sharing and rapid decision-making. The capabilities required to support network-
centric operations (NCO) in the NCW environment must be supported by new, innovative networked 
communication technologies. There are many sources of requirements for these software systems 
supporting NCO, which may increase in number as the Services continue to develop the capabilities 
necessary for the transformation to a fully networked military force. Requirements may also emerge and 
continue to evolve following the fielding of a NCO capability because new technology has the potential to 
change how warfighters work. Requirements evolution results in requirements engineering challenges 
associated with the acquisition and development of network-centric software systems. As such, an 
approach is needed to provide for consistency in elicitation, management and documentation of evolving 
requirements for technological capabilities supporting NCO. The purpose of this research is to address 
the problem of evolving requirements. The requirements engineering framework proposed by this thesis 
incorporates classification theory and requirements modeling principles, and is supported by the 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) family of technologies. Particular attention has been paid to the 
selection of nonproprietary, platform independent technology to ensure data can be exchanged between 
organizations. The framework demonstrates a means by which requirements can be classified and 
structured in a standardized format. 
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Reynolds, Linda K. A Framework for the Management of Evolving Requirements in 
Software Systems Supporting Network-Centric Warfare. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006. 121p. 
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/06Jun%5FReynolds.pdf  
Abstract: In the January 2003 issue of the United States Naval Institute's Proceedings, Dr. Milan Vego, 
Professor of Operations at the Naval War College, warns, "Network Centric Warfare (NCW) increasingly
is becoming a new orthodoxy - a set of beliefs that cannot seriously be challenged."1 He and many other 
critics contend that NCW theorists fail to consider "Clause-witzian thoughts on the nature of war, the 
relationship between policy and use of military power, and the effect of fog of war and friction."2 They 
lament the perceived emphasis on tactics and targeting to the apparent exclusion of operational art, and 
warn that command and control (C2) is becoming increasingly centralized.3 What they don't say is that 
NCW is a bad idea, that it is unachievable, or that there is an alternate path for the transformation of the 
Defense Department advocated by the current administration. One look at the Secretary of Defense's 
transformation plan (including his choice for heading the Office of Transformation), at recent defense 
authorization figures, or at any of the emerging joint and Service operational concepts will confirm that 
NCW plays a prominent (if not dominant) role in the reshaping of the military. 
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Saunders, Clayton D. Al Qaeda: An Example of Network-Centric Operations. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002. 24p.  
Abstract: On 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda used information and knowledge advantage, access, and 
the ability to support forward-based teams, to conduct effects-based operations against the United States. 
Although obviously not employing the theory, in practice these operations appear to have been network-
centric in nature, with Al Qaeda reaping the benefits inherent in this organizational and operational 
structure to conduct its attacks. Since VADM Cebrowski and John Garstka's January 1998 article, 
"Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," many defense related professional journals have 
continued the discussion, defining network-centric operations, describing their benefit to the fighting force 
and explaining how to develop the capability. But the discussion goes far beyond the military. In recent 
years there has been a change in the structure of information and technology that makes more 
information available more rapidly. Al Qaeda, by the way it uses information technology has, in effect, 
become a network-centric organization. Although it is a very different organization than the U.S. military, 
or more specifically, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of a regional unified military command, an 
examination of Al Qaeda's structure and operations may yield useful examples of network-centric theory 
put into practice. 
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Scherrer, Joseph H. Risks and Vulnerabilities of Network-Centric Forces: Insights 
from the Science of Complexity. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003. 27p. 
Abstract: NCW relies heavily on complexity science concepts like complex adaptive systems self-
organization and network effects to support its proponents' claims of decisive operational utility to the war 
fighter. While many commentators have critiqued NCW from the historical, national-strategic, and 
"human-centric" perspectives, little work has been done to analyze the science behind the concept. This 
despite the fact that leading scientists in the field of complexity science admit that much more work needs 
to be done before the science's relevance to organized human activities is definitively proven. With the 
U.S. staking so much on network-centric capabilities, it is vital that the purported benefits of NCW be 
balanced by a frank assessment of its risks and vulnerabilities in anticipation of adversary challenges. For 
a combatant commander, the effects of an adversary intent on neutralizing or denying NCW's advantage 
will be immediately felt in the operational battlespace. As part of the operational planning process, a 
combatant commander's planning staff must identify the critical vulnerabilities associated with network-
centric forces and formulate courses of action that mitigate risk and ensure operational protection of vital 
NCW capabilities. The central thesis of this paper is that the use of network-centric forces introduces risks 
and vulnerabilities that affect a combatant commander's ability to conduct operational warfare. An 
analysis is presented that illustrates potential risks and vulnerabilities of NCW, and recommendations are 
made that might help a combatant commander and a joint planning staff cope with them. 
  
 
Schroeder, Michael C. The Issue of Command and Control in Network Centric 
Systems. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 24p.  
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare (NCW) promises enormous military advantages including information 
superiority, self-synchronization and increased decision making speed. However, with these advantages 
comes the capacity of the operational commander to exert too much control over the tactical levels of his 
command. The problem with the operational commander becoming involved in the tactical level is two 
fold. First, the operational commander is not the most qualified to manage those systems at the tactical 
level. Second, when the operational commander is making decisions at the tactical level, he is not making 
operational decisions which will have greater reaching implications. This paper will focus on the role of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) with regard to the operational function of command and control. It will 
first review the concepts of NCW, command and control, and the concepts of decentralized and 
centralized controls. Then, with this foundation, recent examples will be examined to derive 
recommendations for organization, doctrine and human elements to achieve the optimum command and 
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control structure. Through implementation of these recommendations future command and control 
structure will ensure the benefits of NCW are maximized and the risk of micromanagement minimized. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA390188 
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Senenko, Christopher M. Network Centric Warfare and the Principles of War. 
Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, 2007. 66p. 
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Abstract: A central pillar of future warfighting concepts for the United States military is the idea of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW). This new approach to military operations attempts to leverage 
Information Age innovations and apply them to the execution of warfare. Some advocates of this concept 
believe that it will change the character and nature of warfare, therefore, making the conventional 
concepts of warfare obsolete. The principles of war are another way of referring to the conventional 
concepts and character of warfare. The United States military has adopted a standardized series of 
principles which have stood the test of time and can be traced back to many of the classical theorists of 
warfare such as the Prussian strategic theorist Carl Von Clausewitz, and the ancient Chinese military 
thinker Sun Tzu. It is these principles that must be analyzed when determining whether or not NCW has 
radically altered the landscape of warfare. While NCW concepts are force enablers and will assist the 
military of the future in the execution of its mission, they do not radically alter the classical principles of 
warfare and for this reason they should not be considered the prime motivator for future resourcing and 
doctrinal decisions. 
  
Slais, Thomas A., Jr. Some Principles of Network-Centric Warfare: A Look at How 
Network-Centric Warfare Applies to the Principles of War. Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, February 1999. 27p. 
Abstract: The principles of war are one of the most important and enduring facets of operational art. 
Network centric warfare, enabled by technology of the information age, is a new concept the U.S. is 
adopting in order to fight faster, cheaper and better in the 21st century. This analysis shows that network 
centric warfare applies to the principles of war specifically, the principles of mass, offensive, unity of 
command and security. With regard to mass, the information, sensor and engagement grids of network 
centric warfare, will enable dispersed forces to mass effects by coordinating location, identification and 
targeting information from sensors to rapidly employ long range, precision fires, using shared information 
from a common operational picture. With respect to offensive, network centric warfare will effectively allow 
us to dominate factor time and operate inside the enemy's decision cycle. Thus, it will enhance our ability 
to seize and retain the initiative and preserve our freedom of action. As it applies to unity of command, 
network centric warfare will aid tactical commanders, armed with a clearly defined commander's intent 
from the operational level, to maintain the situational awareness required to self synchronize and act on 
opportunities while maintaining unity of effort toward achieving the operational commander's objective. 
Finally, with regard to security, network centric warfare will increase our ability to achieve battle space 
dominance through information superiority. However, we will be increasingly dependent on protecting our 
C4I systems to ensure that we can achieve our military objectives. The tie that binds network centric 
warfare to the principles of war is that it will enable enhanced situational awareness, which will improve 
our ability to abide by the principles in a more sufficient manner. 





Steadley, Robert S. Operational Meteorology and Oceanography and Network-
Centric Warfare: Implications for the Joint Force Commander.  Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, Joint Military Operations Department, February 1998. 28p. 
Abstract: After a number of years of exponential growth in the technologies of computing power and 
global wireless communications, the U.S. Navy has adopted Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as the latest 
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'Revolution in Military Affairs'. This concept has the potential for wide application in the joint arena, where 
the rapid rate of data and information assimilation, fusion, and dissemination offer the Joint Force 
Commander (JFC) the potential to achieve Dominant Battlespace Awareness. Adapting to a 'network-
centric' environment should be a key focus of all DOD components, but particularly service organizations, 
such as meteorology and oceanography (METOC), who will be tasked to support an ambitious charter of 
network requirements. The components must therefore scrutinize current operations with an eye towards 
supporting the concept of network nodes, which would act as a control and fusion hubs for the vast 
amounts of data and information flowing into the network. These nodes would serve as focal points for 
the flow of full spectrum support across the range of warfighters operating in a particular Joint Operating 
Area (JOA). When applied to the joint arena, the JFC, through the assigned Joint METOC Officer (JMO) 
should assess the best location and composition of the supporting node, with respect to the nature of the 
assigned mission and JOA. This paper discusses a number of METOC node options available to the JFC. 
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Tay, Chee B. and Whye K. Mui. An Architecture for Network Centric Operations in 
Unconventional Crisis: Lessons Learnt from Singapore's SARS Experience. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 101p. 
Abstract: Singapore and many parts of Asia were hit with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
in March 2003. The spread of SARS lead to a rapidly deteriorating and chaotic situation. Because SARS 
was a new infection, there was no prior knowledge that could be referenced to tackle such a complex, 
unknown and rapidly changing problem. Fortunately, through sound measures coupled with good 
leadership, quick action and inter-agency cooperation, the situation was quickly brought under control. 
This thesis uses the SARS incident as a case study to identify a set of network centric warfare 
methodologies and technologies that can be leveraged to facilitate the understanding and management of 
complex and rapidly changing situations. The same set of methodologies and technologies can also be 




Abstract: In response to technological advances, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) emerged as a theory 
to leverage the technology available in today's world. Advocates of NCW claim that technology will 
improve information sharing by "&robustly networking a force", thereby improving mission effectiveness. 
This study proposes a methodology with which to test the first tenet of NCW: a robustly networked force 
improves information sharing. Lessons learned from Human Systems Integration (HSI) demonstrate that 
in order to improve mission effectiveness, characteristics of both the human and the technology must be 
considered. As such, the impact of human characteristics and traits on mission effectiveness, as 
measured by individual and team performance, are assessed using a computer simulation, C3Fire. 
Results at the individual level, suggest that persons scoring high on extraversion and low on pessimism 
perform better than those scoring low on extraversion and high on pessimism. In contrast, at the team 
level, homogenous teams as measured by optimism-pessimism performed worse than diverse teams. 
Results of this thesis provide a methodology with which to examine NCW's claims in a laboratory setting. 
Preliminary evidence demonstrates the need to consider human characteristics and traits in the design 
and composition of network teams. 
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Thorne, Mike. Network Centric Warfare and the Changing Role of the Signal Corps. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2004. 31p.  
Abstract: This research paper will explore the missions and construct for Army future force information 
and knowledge management organizations as part of a network centric information infrastructure. The 
Network Centric Information infrastructure will herald in a new paradigm for the Army Signal Corps-it no 
longer will be just a communications provider. Through the implementation of enhanced technologies and 
the adoption of a network centric approach we can obviate the need for communications installers and 
maintainers on the future battlefield. This requires a vision predicated on dramatically changing the Signal 
Corps as we know it. We must begin with the end in mind and recognize that technology and new 
doctrine will allow us to move to this new paradigm. We can field a future force with embedded 
communications capabilities thereby allowing the Signal Corps to move into the arena of joint information 
and knowledge management. This will require specialized training but not a unique force to implement. 
We can mold Military Intelligence (MI) Information Operations (IO) and automation officers into a cohesive 
team of knowledge management professionals that will be the core of the new Signal Corps. Professional 
Army communicators must embrace new missions and define a new paradigm or find themselves in 
forced obsolescence. This paper will propose a feasible course of action that will facilitate the 
development of a network centric information infrastructure in support of the future force. Furthermore the 
paper will present the benefits of transforming the core mission of the Signal Corps to one of knowledge 
management in keeping with the overall implementation of a network centric system in an era of joint 
interdependence. 
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Valentine, Jennifer R. Application of the Strategic Alignment Model and 
Information Technology Governance Concepts to Support Network Centric 
Warfare. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2006. 116p. 
Abstract: This thesis analyzes the fields of E-Business and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) in order to 
identify gaps and overlaps within the two bodies of knowledge. Successful implementation of E-business 
is more than simply applying a technology to an existing business model. It is about evolving business 
processes and structures in order for the organization to accommodate for this new dynamic 
environment. This thesis proposes that while the two areas? success fundamentally resides in the 
implementation and exploitation of technology, it is only through sound IT Governance policies and 
strategic alignment practices that success can be measured. Technology has the ability to bring 
increased capabilities to the warfigther. This work suggests the Air Force must analyze the implications of 
technology to its current structure, policies and processes prior to implementation on the enterprise. This 
thesis presents how the Strategic Alignment Model, as developed by Henderson and Venkatraman, can 
be applied to Air Force operations in order to better align its IT and mission objectives. Finally, this thesis 
proposes a model of the components necessary to execute an E-Business model wihtin an organization 
and suggests the same components are necessary to execute NCW initiatives. 
  
Abstract: As the world's sole superpower, the United States will operate in an asymmetric environment 
for the foreseeable future. This asymmetric environment is ultimately defined by perceived differences in 
the will and means of the United States in relation to its opponents. Unable to compete with the United 
States militarily, the asymmetric enemy perceives his will to fight as his competitive edge. These 
perceptions underwrite enemy strategies aimed at eroding U.S. will to fight by exploiting what the enemy 
believes is a U.S. aversion to casualties. To deal with this emerging challenge, the U.S. military is 
adopting an effects-based approach aimed at striking the adversary's will to fight. Acting quickly and 
 
Vandegrift, Todd D. The Asymmetric Response to Network-Centric Lock-Out 
Strategies and the Escalation of Violence. Newport RI: Naval War College, 2004. 
27p. 
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decisively, effects-based strategies strive to "lock-out" or foreclose alternate enemy courses of action. 
However, the enemy's reaction must be considered as the operational commander employs these 
strategies. Given the opponent's dwindling opportunity for military action as a result of a "lock-out" 
strategy, he may be expected to escalate the level of violence on an increasing compressed time line. 
Asymmetric enemies may be expected to strike preemptively to dissuade or complicate U.S. military 
action. The use of force may be directed at U.S. military targets to increase U.S. casualties, or at other 
U.S. "opponents" to complicate or deter U.S. military involvement. To mitigate the effects of these enemy 
counter-efforts, the operational commander must focus on effective operational protection and accurate 
identification of enemy courses of action during the planning process. 
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Villa, Jiancarlo. Network Centric Warfare - A Tool or Hindrance to the Operational 
Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004. 27p. 
Abstract:  Network Centric Warfare has been identified as the manner in which the Joint Force will 
operate in the 21st Century. Six years after VADM Arthur Cebrowski proposed the road to a netted force, 
we are able to examine the progress toward the attainment of that goal. To achieve its goals of speed of 
command and self-synchronization of the forces, NCW integrates three grids into a combined picture 
aimed at simplifying the planning and execution processes. The information of these grids is merged into 
a common operating picture which is to be a coherent picture of the battlefield. Independent production 
and development of networks by the various branches of the military service has caused the COP to 
receive its information from systems which have been produced in a stove pipe' and don't truly integrate 
into the COP. The current challenge for the Joint Force is to achieve the ordered objectives with a smaller 
force while increasing speed and effectiveness of mission accomplishment. Network Centric Warfare 
must facilitate the Joint Force Commander's achievement of the Joint Vision 2020 mandate of full 
spectrum dominance and enable his expediency of command which is integral in the effective conduct of 
operations across the military spectrum. NCW architects are successfully proceeding to develop the 
tenets of speed of command and self synchronization by providing technologically advanced sensors and 
systems. However, they must not lose sight of the fact that NCW technology must enable operational art 
and aid in the commander's ability to synchronize fires and maneuver along with the available instruments 
of National Power to achieve the objective. 
  
Abstract: Much of the NCW related work done by the military has been in technological and operational 
domains. The literature review in this report focuses on the human and organisational factors that need to 
be considered to make the most of the future NCW context and enable future warfighters to deal with war, 
peace, terrorism and overall uncertainty. Particular focus is placed on the transformation of warfighting 
and the issues that individuals and groups face in the NC environment. Such issues include: 
organisational culture, cognitive demands, the nature of information, C2 processes, knowledge 
mobilisation and learning, and transformational pathways organisations may follow while changing from a 
traditional hierarchical way of operating to more flexible and decentralised structures. The report 
concludes with suggestions for future research in the human dimension of effective NCW. 
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Warne, Leoni, et al. The Network Centric Warrior: The Human Dimension of 
Network Centric Warfare. Salisbury, Australia: Defence Science and Technology 






Washington, Julius C. Network Centric Warfare and Command and Control: 
Rethinking Organizational Architecture. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 26p.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA393553 
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Abstract: We know from history that the ability of a military commander to effectively control his forces 
was forever changed by the French Revolution and the levee en masse. Thereafter, the sheer size and 
dispersion of forces made it necessary to subdivide them, and eventually to institute a rigid organizational 
system that has become increasingly more complex. Communications became extremely difficult with the 
available signal technology, making it almost impossible to synchronize these widely dispersed forces. 
The subsequent arrival of the telegraph vastly improved military communications, and today forces of 
almost unlimited size and separation routinely share information and intelligence in near-real time. From 
the late 20th century explosion in information and computing technology emerges the concept of Network 
Centric Warfare. Network Centric Warfare applies the vast potential of the Information Age to warfare, 
envisioning a netted battle force executing high-speed, synchronized operations with precise effect. Rich, 
scalable visualizations that reflect all relevant factors in the battlespace, or Common Operating Pictures 
(COPs) as they have been coined, become the essential element of United States military power in the 
21st century. 
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Wells, David P. Managing the Double Edged Sword of Network-Centric Warfare. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003. 17p. 
Abstract: Network Centric Warfare can tend to collapse the operational level war by allowing information 
to flow around or past hierarchical staff structures and directly between tactical and strategic level 
decision makers. Why this has benefits in that it may streamline decision-making and reduce staff sizes, it 
can have serious detrimental impacts on joint warfare. Fortunately, by employing developed Information 
Management techniques during planning disciplined staffs can develop methods that will enhance the 
positive benefits of Network Centric Warfare while negating many of its serious drawbacks and 
weaknesses. 
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West, Paul D.  Network-Centric System Implications for the Hypersonic Interceptor 
System. West Point: NY: Military Academy, 2005. 51p. 
Abstract: This report identifies the qualities and attributes of network-centric (NCS), describes a 
taxonomy of 13 critical NCS risk factors, and outlines a value-based model for NCS risk management, all 
as they affect the operation of a hypersonic interceptor (HSI) system. Successful employment of an HSI 
system requires a thorough integration of operations into the larger NCS super-system. Required 
capabilities previously identified for an HSI indicate the intent for this system is to function in full 
collaboration with the Joint Exercise Support System Intelligence Module(JIM), Unit of Employment (UE), 
and Unit of Action (UA) forces, which will operate in a network-centric framework. Based on these 
required capabilities and the common NCS factors, it is recommended that the Hypersonic Interceptor IPT 
identify specific measures of effectiveness (MOE) relevant for system risk management in an NCS 
environment and incorporate these measures and the methodology described in this report into the 
system life-cycle management plan. Specific actions to implement these recommendations include the 
development of a decision support tool to assess key stakeholder risk profiles and to model attribute 
weights in pre- and ongoing HSI operations, development of MOE to assess ongoing and post-operations 
analysis, and collaboration with engineers and operators of related NCS node programs. 




White, Orrick. Network Centric Operations: Challenges Associated with the 
Human-in-the-Loop. Ottawa, Canada: Defence Research and Development Centre, 
2005. 31p. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA436359 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436359
Abstract: The human-system interface is central for achieving Network Centric Operations (NCO). 
Without systems that are designed to be human-centric, NCO will be a "non-starter." Given this reality, 
studies of command and control compatibility between human operators and the network are crucial. 
Without this human-oriented focus, unintended consequences will inevitably occur. Unfortunately, this 
would be just what the gurus of network-centric operations were trying to overcome. 
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Williamson, Ahmed T. Analyzing the Effects of Network Centric Warfare on 
Warfighter Empowerment. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 173p.  
Abstract: NCW is a conceptual warfighting paradigm that seeks to exploit the advantages of information 
technologies to develop information superiority, leading to battlefield awareness and later escalating to 
battlefield dominance during future military operations. While military forces are currently experimenting 
within the framework of this new concept, efforts are being made to harness the opportunities made 
available by implementing network-centric concepts to increased operational efficiency and enhance 
combat power effectiveness so that optimal desired results may be achieved. However, the modem 
Marine Corps is comfortable and quite successful implementing its current, subordinate empowering 
doctrine of Maneuver Warfare, which emphasis the human behavioral aspects of warfare over technology 
implementation. The issue, then, is: how will Marine Corps warfighting performance be affected by 
changes in doctrine driven by advances in and the implementation of technology. This thesis seeks to 
answer this question through exploratory research of theoretical concepts on organizational performance, 
an examination of current and future warfighting concepts, and an assessment of the practicality of 
successfully implementing future warfighting concepts based upon the principles of a theoretical 
framework. Recommendations are provided for creation of a metro that will adequately assess the 
performance of empowered warfighters in a Network Centric Warfare environment. 
  
Witsken, Jeffrey R.  Network-Centric Warfare: Implications for Operational Design. 
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Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2002. 64p. 
Abstract: The United States military is adapting itself to fight warfare in the Information Age, preparing 
forces that use information superiority as a key weapon. Advocates of this communication-based and 
information-based form of warfare use the term 'Network-Centric Warfare' to describe the new paradigm. 
This new form of warfighting is expected to fully exploit the power of shared information and superior 
communications. Both of the recent 'Joint Vision' documents, Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020, 
embrace this new form of warfare as a central feature of the future of the U.S. military. But does Network-
Centric Warfare significantly alter operational design of a campaign? Network-Centric Warfare is 
essentially warfare that generates combat power by effectively linking (networking) actors, sensors, and 
decision-makers. Shimon Naveh's definition of a campaign (as the competition of two competing complex 
systems) helps frame the context and relevance of Network-Centric Warfare. Given this context, one 
cannot underestimate the central importance of the sensor network to the overall effectiveness of the 
networked force. A campaign planner must consider the abilities and limitations of his sensor network as 
he plans the campaign, and design appropriate actions accordingly. Additionally, the campaign planner 
must carefully balance dispersion and mass to counter erosion of forces and sustain operational 
momentum. A campaign plan must contain the right balance of Network-Centric Warfare and traditional 
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using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as a case study and to a lesser extent, recent OOTW operations. 
Based on the successes and failures found in these examinations, the monograph draws conclusions as 
to the abilities of the psychological operations force to conduct information warfare. 
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Esarey, Clinton D. Media and the U.S. Army: You Don't Always Get What You Want; 
You May Just Get What You Need. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and 
General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1994. 58p. 
Abstract: Recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated that the United States Army must successfully 
wield new information technologies to ensure land force dominance into the twenty-first century. Currently 
the Army is developing an Information Operations Concept that describes the framework for the Army to 
conduct information warfare; however, the concept only generically treats the dynamic to move 
information from the battlefield to external audiences such as the American people. Because the media-
military relationship will be instrumental in acquiring and disseminating information to the American 
people, understanding and invoking a stable relationship is of enduring importance to the Army and the 
nation. Therefore, the purpose of this monograph is to examine the characteristics of the U.S. media--
Army relationship in the twenty-first century.  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA284136 
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Freeman, Bryan R. The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and 
Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 77p. 
Abstract: Organizing for and conducting effective public affairs, public diplomacy, and psychological 
operations in support of national security objectives is a complex endeavor. In many instances, the 
desired psychological effects are contingent upon the efficiency of the organization conducting the 
programs and the development and dissemination of appropriate messages and themes. At present, the 
U.S. Government's ability to influence on a global scale is deficient due to fragmented organizational 
structure and underdeveloped doctrine relating to strategic influence. Duplication of efforts, inconsistent 
themes, and the lack of a long-term, strategically focused, integrated information strategy have been 
inhibitors to American foreign policy success. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the U.S. 
Government and the American people have wondered why we have been unable to effectively influence 
the majority of the population in the Middle East. Since that time, the government has struggled with the 
question of how to both organize for and effectively conduct a strategic influence campaign in support of 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The United States' present capacity to conduct strategic influence in 
the Middle East is hindered by a dysfunctional organizational structure relative to strategic information 
operations and an institutional reluctance to recognize or value strategic influence as an effective 
instrument of statecraft. This thesis examines the three primary components of U.S. strategic influence: 
public diplomacy, public affairs, and psychological operations. Next is a look at various U.S. strategic 
information programs, their organizational structure, and the changes that have occurred in focus and 
policies from the beginning of the 20th century to the present. The final chapter examines public 




Gallogly, Erin J. Nonlethal Information Operations Targeting Process: Duties, 
Responsibilities and Procedures. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and 
General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, December 1998. 60p. 
Abstract: This monograph's purpose is twofold. First, it provides the Joint Task Force Commander 
procedures by which to integrate nonlethal information operations into the joint targeting process and 
recommends duties and responsibilities for staff officers to ensure they integrate information operations 
into plans and operations. Second, it offers information operations officers a single document from which 
to develop standing operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint Publications 3-0, 
Doctrine for Joint Operations, and 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, provide the doctrinal 
underpinnings for joint targeting. Additionally, Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations, provides doctrine and guidance for information operations targeting. Currently there is neither 
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Army doctrine for information operations targeting nor tactics, techniques, and procedures on how to 
integrate information operations into the targeting process. This monograph attempts to fill this gap. The 
capabilities, limitations, and Employment considerations are outlined for the nonlethal information 
operations capabilities and activities (i.e., civil affairs, electronic warfare, military deception, psychological 
operations, public affairs, and special information operations). Finally, the author makes several 
recommendations in the areas of 
personnel and organization, training and education, doctrine, and operations. 
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Goldstein, Frank L. and Benjamin F. Findley. Psychological Operations: Principles 
and Case Studies. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1996. 351p. 
Abstract: The scope of military PSYOP during World War II, the Korean War, and in much of the 1960s 
was primarily limited to combat propaganda and psychological warfare (psywar). During those times, it 
was accepted as a specialized tactical application and as a subordinate operation. The experiences of 
these conflicts, especially the Vietnam War, convinced some American military and political leaders that 
the psychological dimension of national power and conflict encompasses diverse elements and many 
activities-nonmilitary as well as military-in both peacetime and war in support of our national policy and 
objectives. Its scope can vary from the tactical battlefield to the operational theater to the strategic levels 
of conflict to national political and military goals. Part I serves as an introduction to the overall nature, 
historical background, and concepts of PSYOP, and to some principles that can be used for training in the 
field of psychological operations. The independent articles in this section reflect the broad range of 
historical development and thought about PSYOP and are intended to be a foundation for understanding 
the basic nature and key elements of PSYOP. Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, and Col Daniel W. 
Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired, provide a general introduction to and a commonly accepted definition of 
PSYOP. The authors explore the three types of PSYOP and give several examples of strategic, tactical, 
operational, and consolidation PSYOP. They divide propaganda into white, gray, and black classes, and 
present the various resources of psychological operations. The six major military objectives of PSYOP are 
condensed for the reader. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA316643 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA316643  
 
Haulman, Daniel L. USAF Psychological Operations, 1990-2003. Maxwell AFB, AL: 
Air Force Historical Research Agency, 2003. 22p.  
Abstract: Psychological operations attempt to alter the behavior of people in enemy-controlled territory. 
Airplanes have served as psychological instruments in recent conflicts by dropping leaflets and 
broadcasting radio and television messages. In conjunction with air strikes, these methods have 
persuaded enemy troops to surrender, abandon their positions, and stop fighting. In association with 
humanitarian air missions, they also have convinced civilians to turn against enemy leadership and 
welcome friendly forces. This paper reports on the military operations that involved psychological 
missions from 1990 to 2003, the advantages and disadvantages of various psychological operations, and 
the lessons learned from them. Only recently did the Air Force and its sister services carve out a 
significant place for psychological operations in their doctrine. The fact that Air Force doctrine must 
include psychological operations is perhaps the most important of the lessons learned since 1990. As Air 
Force doctrine continues to evolve, it should devote increasing attention to psychological operations. The 
lessons learned over the past 13 years are as follows: (1) Formulators of Air Force doctrine should 
continue to develop psychological operations theory; (2) Psychological operations should be part of 
operation plans from the beginning; (3) Psychological operations should be coordinated with other air 
operations; (4) Media and messages should be tailored carefully for the target population; (5) 
Psychological operations should complement each other; (6) Certain aircraft are more appropriate for 
psychological operations than others; (7) Vulnerability of psychological operations aircraft limits their use; 
(8) Eliminating enemy media enhances alternative information; and (9) Timing leaflet drops according to 
weather conditions enhances their effectiveness. 
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http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA434034  
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA380231 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA380231
 
Kerchner, Philip M., Richard F. Deckro and Jack M. Kloeber, Jr. Valuing 
Psychological Operations. Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of 
Technology, 1999. 27p.  
Abstract: Psychological Operations - targeting not just the physical capabilities of an opponent but the 
psychological dimensions as well is a key military consideration. The direct and almost instantaneous 
communication available with today's technology provides an even greater potential for exploiting the 
vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of the mind of the adversary. This effort develops a model for 
evaluating PSYOP products using multi-objective decision analysis and Value Focused Thinking. The 
model allows the Psychological Operations Detachment Commander to quantify the potential of proposed 
PSYOP products in meeting the psychological objectives. 
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Lamb, Christopher J. Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from 
Recent Operational Experience. Washington, DC: National War College, 2005. 220p. 
Abstract: Extant lessons learned and guidance are correct but inadequate. Currently, psychological 
operations (PSYOP) are able to produce modest effects, particularly at the tactical level, with minimum 
resources. The Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) 
produced joint lessons learned about PSYOP from recent operations that identify factors constraining its 
ability to produce greater effects. These lessons learned are accurate and consistent with the four 
lessons repeatedly revealed in postoperational assessments of PSYOP namely, that PSYOP 
performance suffers from: a lack of national-level themes to guide message formulation, slow product 
approval process that renders some products irrelevant, questionable product quality with uncertain 
effects and an overall lack of resources, including insufficient force structure. 
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Larsen, Stephen C. Conducting Psychological Operations in Sophisticated Media 
Environments. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 
June 1999. 128p. 
Abstract: This study investigates doctrine, education, and training improvements necessary to produce 
effective Psychological Operations audio, visual, and audio-visual products in sophisticated media 
environments. Current ongoing operations such as that in Bosnia Herzegovina cause Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP) personnel affect behavioral modification in target audiences accustomed to very 
sophisticated media. The quality and sophistication of PSYOP products must be competitive with those 
other media in order to gain and hold the attention of the target audience. Recent PSYOP experience is 
mostly third world targeting audiences accustomed to the most basic and unsophisticated media. Current 
doctrine, education and training supports the conduct of PSYOP targeting audiences accustomed to 
relatively unsophisticated media. This thesis emphasizes proper target audience analysis and product 
development appropriate to sophisticated media environments. Particular attention is given to graphic 





Lescault, Maurice A., Jr. The Power of Persuasion: Army PSYOP Control and 
Execution Entering the Third Wave. Charlottesville, VA: Judge Advocate General’s 
School, 1996.  
Abstract: Information is creating a revolution in our society and our military. Recognizing that conflict 
has its root in ideology and perception affects this ideology, military units that have the capability to 
modulate perceptions become critical to successfully achieving national security goals. Military 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units are the only units that have this capability. Therefore, these 
units should be used as a true strategic asset to achieve national security objectives. To accomplish this 
successfully will require changes in control and execution. Enhanced control will make the routine use of 
military PSYOP more acceptable. Accomplishing this requires two things. First, the United States must 
formalize limits on the employment of PSYOP in statute and policy. Second, it must vest control of all 
information assets in the National Security Advisor. This consolidated control will ensure effective 
execution through proper integration with other activities supporting national security objectives. Efficient 
and effective execution will not be feasible, however, without force structure changes in military PSYOP. 
First, the Army should form regionalized PSYOP groups under each Regional CINC. Second, it should 
collocate these assets with the CINCs under their operational control. These changes in control and 
execution will help the United States to properly leverage information power as the Third Wave continues 
to change the world. 
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Leyda, Christopher L. Joint Doctrine to Integrate Theater Strategic Psychological 
Operations at the National Level: Searching for Needles in a Haystack. Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, 2002. 24p. 
Abstract: Current joint doctrine clearly defines how a combatant commander can develop plans, 
organize forces, and conduct psychological operations within operational and tactical realms. However, 
joint doctrine stops short of providing solid mechanisms and procedures to integrate theater strategic 
psychological operations at the national level and with other governmental agencies responsible for 
information activities. A revision of joint publications: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations 
(JP 3-08); Joint Information Operation (JP 3-13); and Psychological Operations (JP 3-53) must occur to 
clearly define a coordination mechanism to integrate theater strategic psychological operations initiatives 
at the national level. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA409154 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA409154  
 
Loeblein, James T. Building Psychological Operations (PSYOP) into the 
Operational Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES). Newport, RI: Naval War 
College, 1997. 21p. 
Abstract: Psychological Operations (PSYOP) provide combatant commanders with a force 
enhancement capability across the full military operational spectrum; from peace to crisis to war. 
Numerous lessons learned from the Gulf War and other recent Military Operations Other than War 
(MOOTW) emphasize that early, centralized planning at the highest levels form the prerequisite for 
effective PSYOP implementation at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of warfare. The central 
planning instrument for initial mission analysis and Course of Action (COA) selection is the Commander's 
Estimate of the Situation (CES). Presently, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 
broadly addresses PSYOP in both deliberate and crisis action planning. However, this doctrine fails to 
provide direct guidance on how to include PSYOP with all other force considerations throughout the CES. 
Operational planners often apply PSYOP in a shotgun approach at the end of the CES process. This 
application of PSYOP as a late or stand alone force or weapon system fails to incorporate the full 
potential PSYOP brings to the operational commander's arsenal. In contrast, PSYOP must be analyzed 
and compared with other force assets at the beginning of this planning process. Therefore, integrating 
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PSYOP directly into the CES provides the combatant commander with a well planned and synergized 
decision in time of peace or crisis. 
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Lungu, Angela M. WAR.COM: The Internet and Psychological Operations. Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, 2001. 30p. 
Abstract: As an information medium and vehicle of influence, the Internet is a powerful tool, in both 
open societies as well as in those whose only glimpse of the outside world is increasingly viewed and 
shaped through webpages, E-mail, and electronic chat rooms. Moreover, the sword cuts both ways, as 
unconstrained (legally, socially, politically) adversaries find the Internet an effective vehicle for influencing 
popular support for their cause or inciting the opposite against the U.S. or its interests. Consequently, the 
realm of military psychological operations (PSYOP) must be expanded to include the Internet. Just as 
obvious is the need for action to remove or update current policy and legal constraints on the use of the 
Internet by military PSYOP forces, allowing them to embrace the full range of media, so that the U.S. will 
not be placed at a disadvantage. Although current international law restricts many aspects of PSYOP 
either through ambiguity or non-currency, there is ample legal room for both the U.S. and others to 
conduct PSYOP using modern technology and media such as the Internet. Existing policy and legal 
restrictions, however, must be changed, allowing military PSYOP forces to both defend and counter 
adversarial disinformation and propaganda attacks which impact on the achievement of military 
objectives. By examining this issue, I hope to highlight the importance of the Internet for PSYOP and 
foment further discussion. 
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Mugg, David. Satan vs. Satan: The Use of Black PSYOP to Regain the Tactical 
Initiative in the Counterinsurgency Fight. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2007. 113p. 
Abstract: In the counterinsurgency fight, the insurgent has the tactical initiative because he is able to 
pick the time, place, and intensity of his own engagements. The insurgent s environment, however, is a 
very difficult one despite his initiative. The insurgent must balance the mutually exclusive requirements of 
hiding (operational security) and fighting (operational effectiveness) in order to gain/maintain legitimacy 
without being prematurely destroyed by the state. What if the state could influence this balance? What if 
there was a way for the state to directly target the insurgent s resource allocation between these 
competing requirements? Typically, states attempt this through influencing the population to support the 
state and reject the insurgent. But what if the state could use the insurgent s own propaganda machine 
against itself? Through mathematical modeling, I will show that Black PSYOP enables the state to make 
strategic moves on behalf of the insurgent that are so detrimental to his cause that he must act in order to 
counter his own moves. In this way, the state is able to turn Satan against himself. How shall then his 
kingdom stand? ---Matthew 12:26 
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/07Jun%5FMugg.pdf  
 
Muirhead, John. The Mind as a Target: Psychological Operations and Data Fusion 
Technology. San Antonio, TX: Air Intelligence Agency, 2001. 7p. 
Abstract: Psychological Operations (PSYOP) involve actions taken to change the perceptions and 
ultimately the behavior of a particular foreign audience. The conduct of PSYOP requires an accurate 
understanding of the targeted audience and the means of influencing that audience in terms of specific 
goals and objectives. To accomplish this challenging category of operations directed at the minds of the 
target audience, PSYOP planners need access to cultural, sociopolitical, and current-event/situation data. 
In addition to the need for this information to be accurate, there is the critical need for the information to 
 313
be updated as close to real-time as possible. While there are initiatives underway that address these 
needs, a new potential may be found in the field of data fusion. The process of collection of multiple 
sources of data, and the correlation and combination of the data to model the target audience, is a form of 
data fusion. This paper introduces the discipline of PSYOP, the critical needs for data within the process 
of target audience analysis (TAA), and insight as to where automated data fusion processes might play a 
role in future PSYOP planning systems. 
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Mushtare, Jeremy S. PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: 
Preparing for Korean Reunification. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2005. 144p. 
Abstract: Psychological operations (PSYOP) forces should undertake significant doctrinal, training, and 
operational reforms to ensure the viability of support provided to U.S. led stabilization and reconstruction 
efforts. Such operations involve increased civilmilitary interactions and necessitate effective cross-cultural 
communications with not only the indigenous populace, but a host of transnational actors as well. Today's 
PSYOP training is reflective of a persisting "Cold War mentality" that fails to adequately prepare soldiers 
for effective post-conflict situations such as the reunification of the Korean peninsula, whether brought 
about either through a renewal of combat operations or the result of diplomatic means. Meanwhile, North 
Korea's formidable and adept propaganda machine has persisted in isolating its populace from external 
influences for more than a halfcentury. Post-Korean War generation North Koreans have been 
successfully indoctrinated since birth to despise the United States. Furthermore, anti-U.S. sentiment has 
been on the rise in South Korea for a number of years. Under the current training model, contemporary 
psychological operations forces are ill-prepared to conduct effective operations in an environment 
involving two-way, face-to-face communications such as those required while stabilizing and 
reconstructing a nation. The case of Korean reunification serves as an extreme scenario that 
nevertheless depicts the drastic need for improvements in the capabilities of modern PSYOP forces. 
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/05Mar%5FMushtare.pdf  
Abstract: The technology revolution the world is now experiencing has changed the way we do 
business, the way we live, and the way we fight wars. Never before in our history has the population been 
exposed to the magnitude of information they are being exposed to today. This information has a direct 
affect on how the United States interacts with other nations, allies, and adversaries. A potential now 
exists to use information to our advantage in the pursuit of our national interests. This Strategic Research 
Paper examines the importance of using information in Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as a strategic 
tool for achieving national goals and objectives. It provides a review of national security policies pertaining 
to use of PSYOP, examines the availability and relevancy of PSYOP policy, and provides an analysis of 
the policy and recommendations to improve it. Additionally this research paper will analyze the use of 
PSYOP during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (DS/DS) and examine lessons 
learned from the use of PSYOP as a combat multiplier during this war. 
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Perry, Kathy J. The Use of Psychological Operations as a Strategic Tool. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2000. 26p. 
  
 
Pugmire, Brian M. Psychological Operations: Will the Real Approval Authority 
Please Stand Up? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002. 26p. 
Abstract: The only organic tool the combatant commander has in his arsenal to communicate with 
enemy forces or civilians in his theater is Psychological Operations. Accordingly, when the Psychological 
Operations effort is well coordinated, it can aid significantly in the success of the commander's mission. 
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To be most effective Psychological Operations must be timely. Psychological Operations are most 
responsive when the theater level commander retains the approval authority for Psychological Operations 
products. The approval process begins, however, at levels well above the combatant commander. The 
Psychological Operations plan must be approved at the Secretary of Defense level via the Joint Staff. 
Considering the degree of technological advances in the information arena to which the world is now 
exposed, this process must have interagency coordination for a truly synchronized effort. It is imperative 
that during peace and war the office responsible for approving Psychological Operations plans and 
products be defined clearly and supported by all agencies and organizations responsible for information 
activities. Unfortunately, in practice, this is not always the case. 
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Sammons, David H., Jr. PSYOP and the Problem of Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOE) for the Combatant Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004. 18p. 
Abstract: Perhaps the greatest psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign is the one in which the 
PSYOP community has exalted the effectiveness of their trade as a combat multiplier and peacetime 
contributor in the pursuit of national and military objectives. This often one-sided viewpoint dismisses the 
difficulty of PSYOP assessment and only exacerbates the key problem of which the total PSYOP program 
suffers. The Combatant Commander needs full disclosure of the facts based on the PSYOP principle of 
truthfulness. The reader is introduced to the doctrinal definitions of PSYOP and Measure of Effectiveness 
(MOE) and examples of PSYOP used in Operations ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM in 
Afghanistan. The thesis for this research paper is that PSYOP measures of effectiveness (MOE) are a 
significant problem that the Combatant Commander will need to address in planning and the actual 
conduct of war. The purpose of this paper is to assist the Combatant Commander in gaining a greater 
understanding of PSYOP MOE by exploring: 1) the scope of the problem, 2) the methods and procedures 
used to address the problem, and 3) four broad recommendations. 
 
Schoennauer, Eric. Suicide Terrorism: How Psychological Operations Can Make a 
Difference. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 73p. 
Abstract: Military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) is based on a Cold War construct that has not 
been significantly overhauled since the end of that era. Today's most pressing challenge, the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT) requires a different solution set. The Quadrennial Defense Review, the Information 
Operations Roadmap, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the Report of the 9/11 
Commission all recognize this fact. How the military PSYOP community can best adjust to this new 
environment and effectively address one of its major threats, that of suicide terrorism, is the subject of this 
paper. I will argue that examining what can, and arguably should, be done to counter the threat of suicide 
terrorism will also help us to see ways in which PSYOP could better be configured and employed in this 
new era. The first chapter of my thesis will examine the evolution of suicide terrorism in some detail but 
will quickly focus on what have emerged as the consensus opinions as to the motivations and 
vulnerabilities of this tactic. Chapter two looks at the identified motivations and vulnerabilities from a 
PSYOP perspective and tries to apply logical PSYOP measures against them. In chapter three I review 
the assets and organizational structure of the PSYOP community and suggest ways the current structure 
could be best applied to meet the threat. Chapter four then looks for a way ahead and focuses on how 
and why making three critical changes to military Psychological Operations could improve the 
organizations ability to accomplish its mission; not only in terms of seeking to mitigate suicide attacks but 
also with respect a whole host of new and expanded missions the PSYOP community will increasingly be 
called upon to address in the contemporary operating environment. 





Siegel, Adam B. The Role of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 
1996. 44p. 
Abstract: The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a study to identify and analyze alternative 
ways the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) might consider to improve its ability to conduct Humanitarian 
Assistance Operations (HAOs). To achieve this objective we (1) examined how the military has conducted 
HAOs in the past; (2) identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations; and (3) 
assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organization, education and 
training, doctrine and documentation. and equipment and supplies. The study was co-sponsored by the 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). This 
briefing discusses the role of Civilian Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in HAOs, 
focusing on what this role means in terms of actual requirements. The briefing presents an overview of 
general U.S. CA and PSYOP capabilities. It discusses USMC CA and PSYOP capabilities and what 
theses capabilities mean for the ability of the Marine Corps to conduct operations. It also suggests ways 
to integrate the capabilities of the other services with Marine Corps units to more effectively conduct 
operations. 
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Sokoloski, Joseph A., III. Strategic PSYOP Management: A Marketing Management 
Approach. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 117p. 
Abstract: United States Military Psychological Operations are engaged in a type of mass marketing of 
ideas. To accomplish this The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command 
(USACAPOC) employs active and reserve PSYOP units to conduct PSYOP campaigns. However the 
methodology used to manage these campaigns often hinders the effective employment of timely and 
effective Psychological Operations. PSYOP has a difficult job to accomplish but PSYOP does not have 
the proper management tools and their national stakeholders do not understand the process. The 
opportunity derived from this study is to adapt principles of civilian marketing management to provide a 
framework and tools to develop PSYOP campaign management into a more efficient, target audience 
based mechanism. 
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Summe, Jack N. Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, and a Policy for 
the Future. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 1999. 52p. 
Abstract: There is a growing interest within DoD concerning the advent of Information Warfare. This 
interest seems to center around two competing concepts of IW. First is the asymmetrical threat of 
information-based capabilities used against critical U.S. systems, and second, the burgeoning 
opportunities that a future Revolution in Military Affairs presents when based on the geometric growth of 
friendly information-based capabilities. Both analytical tracks seem to indicate that the U.S. must boldly 
and firmly grasp the potentialities embedded in the growing information age. Yet there are areas within 
the information environment that have not yet been addressed. Two such areas are a stated National 
policy for Information Warfare and the future strategic requirements and capabilities for the application of 
DoD Psychological Operations in support of our new Information Warfare policy. This paper addresses 
both issues and develops a point of departure for academic dialogue in these two extremely important 




Thomas, Timothy L. New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological 
Warfare. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2005. 11p. 
Abstract: Chinese military analysts have meticulously studied the use of armed force during the 1991 
Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They have noted with great interest the integration of military 
strikes and psychological-warfare activities, and the increased strategic role that the mass media played 
during both operations. To highlight the apparent shifting emphasis toward psychological warfare for 
officers of the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, the prominent Chinese military journal China Military 
Science has published six articles on psychological warfare during the last two years: "On PSYWAR in 
Recent High-Tech Local Wars," by Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping; "The Doctrine of Psychological 
Operations in Ancient China," by Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng; "Focus on Psychological War 
Against the Background of Grand Strategy," and "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand 
Strategy," both written by Xu Hezhen; "Comparison of Psychological Warfare between China and the 
West," by Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong; and "On Defense in Modern Psychological 
Warfare," by Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli. 
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Torres, Herminio, Jr. Management Meaning: The Role of Psychological Operations 
and Public Diplomacy in a National Information Warfare Strategy. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995. 59p. 
Abstract: Recent advances in both the speed and breadth of communications capabilities have 
drastically increased the value of Strategic Political Communications. The ability of individuals to gain 
exposure to information beyond the control of national authorities has greatly increased the level of public 
engagement in foreign relations and diplomacy. However, the much discussed 'Information Revolution' is 
not limited to the technical advances achieved in the hardware of communications. Both Military 
Psychological Operations and Public Diplomacy are crucial to ensuring national strategic objectives are 
obtained by helping to shape international perceptions of the United States, its way of life, and its national 
interests. The United States needs a national level agency tasked, and granted codified authority, to 
devise, coordinate and implement a National Information Strategy. A National Information Strategy will 
bolster the National Security Strategy by focusing the efforts of all agencies involved in disseminating 
information for the federal government. With an understanding of the role and power of information, this 
agency could provide the framework for an information campaign specifically targeted to the political-
military situation of an emerging crisis. 
  
 
Tulak, Arthur. Improving Tactical Psyop Video Dissemination in Media-Austere 
Operating Environments. Pearl Harbor Naval Station, HI: Pacific Command, Standing 
Joint Force HQ, 2004. 55p. 
Abstract: U.S. video psychological operations (PSYOP) are difficult in austere operating environments 
lacking a mature television infrastructure. The need for video PSYOP in such environments is great, due 
to low literacy rates, which narrow the reach of traditional print products. Video PSYOP has generally 
required an extant television network and viewing audience. In operating environments where a network 
and viewing audience are not developed, tactical dissemination means must fill the gap. Recent 
operations demonstrate the requirement for video PSYOP in media-austere environments where the 
target audience lacks access to television, due to poverty, or lack of supporting infrastructure. Media-
austere operating environments lack the indigenous TV programming necessary to attract the target 
audience. Accordingly, Video PSYOP also requires a supporting base of culturally appropriate video 
programming. PSYOP modernization efforts must obtain access to such supplemental programming while 
developing the technical means for tactical video dissemination. In a media austere operating 
environment, tailor-made video products must be created and delivered on-site, in remote villages, 
military bases, and cities, to small audiences using tactical dissemination systems operated by PSYOP 
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soldiers. Successful video PSYOP in media austere operating environments require modern, versatile 
tactical video dissemination means that can withstand field conditions and complement tactical 
operations. 
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Vitto, Vincent. The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in 
Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict. 
Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2000. 68p. 
Abstract: The Terms of Reference charged the Task Force with reviewing PSYOP activities within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) - The purpose of the review was to: assess the capability of the United 
States Armed Forces to develop programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of 
the general public; assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to deliver such 
information; and assess other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in times 
of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use of emerging mobile communication technologies. 
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Abstract: A revolution in Psychological Operations (PSYOP) will occur in the near future. The Internet 
will be the vehicle to enable a revolution in PSYOP and improve the capabilities of PSYOP to achieve 
objectives specified in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The paper is structured to support this thesis 
by first providing a detailed definition and description of PSYOP. Next the importance of communication 
techniques in developing PSYOP methods is described. The understanding gained from these sections is 
then used to emphasize how the Internet can revolutionize PSYOP. Reflex control was presented as a 
method of PSYOP for the future. Then, based on the knowledge presented in this paper, some 
recommendations are made on how the Internet could be used to revolutionize future PSYOP campaigns. 
PSYOP has been an essential element of warfare since ancient times. PSYOP will continue to be a key 
strategic weapon to provide the ways to accomplish the objectives specified in the NSS. As Napolean 
Bonaparte once said, "There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the 
sword is always beaten by the mind". 
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FOUO or DOD only) due to the public nature of this bibliography, this section includes 
unclassified/unlimited distribution references only. Abstracts were taken from various databases 
and were written by the authors of the documents cited or by the abstracting service from which 
the citations were generated not by the author of this bibliography. 
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Aldrich, Richard W. Cyberterrorism and Computer Crimes: Issues Surrounding the 
Establishment of an International Legal Regime. US Air Force Academy, CO: 
Institute for National Security Studies, 2000. 104p.  
Abstract:  This is the 32nd volume in the Occasional Paper series of the U.S. Air Force Institute for 
National Security Studies (INSS). This paper, along with Occasional Paper 33, Steven Rinaldi's "Sharing 
the Knowledge: Government-Private Sector Partnerships to Enhance Information Security," address the 
context surrounding the question of how the U.S. military responds to the cyber threat facing the 
American military and society today. Rinaldi examines the issues of partnering and sharing sensitive 
information across private and governmental sectors as a central requirement of a national risk reduction 
and management effort in the face of the threat of cyber attack. In this paper, Richard Aldrich examines 
definitional and jurisdictional issues, constitutional and statutory concerns, and both the necessity and 
desirability of an international treaty addressing cyberterrorism and computer crime. Together these two 
papers provide fresh thinking and critical perspective on a security threat arena that increasingly 
captivates the headlines. 
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Bond, James N. Peacetime Foreign Data Manipulation as One Aspect of Offensive 
Information Warfare: Questions of Legality under the United Nations Charter 
Article 2(4). Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 1996. 110p. 
Abstract: The report discusses the issue of whether manipulation of a foreign state's data may be 
considered to be the use of force against that country in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. The 
paper first reviews the different methods of interpreting treaties such as the U.N. Charter, then examines 
briefly whether Article 2(4) is still a valid norm under international law. The paper concludes that in certain 
circumstances data manipulation could be the use of force, but is more likely to be considered an 
intervention in the internal affairs of the foreign state than the use of force. 
  
 
Ellis, Bryan W. The International Legal Implications and Limitations of Information 
Warfare: What Are Our Options? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2001. 
29p. 
Abstract: When we examine the relationship between information warfare (IW) and the law, particularly 
international law and the law of war, it becomes apparent that fundamental questions need to be 
explored. How is "war defined as it relates to IW and what activities will we define as IW? Who are 
considered combatants in IW? How do the terms "force, "armed attack," or "aggression" equate or relate 
to IW? Does "war require physical violence and human casualties? How will established legal principles 
related to national sovereignty be affected by IW? These questions and issues merely hint at the 
tremendous uncertainties surrounding the evolving discipline of IW. This paper examines IW from a 
layman's legal perspective and explores issues such as the law of war and standing international 
agreements to which the United States is a signatory. The concept for the employment of IW is evolving 
and as recently demonstrated in Yugoslavia, legal constraints, limitations, and issues appear to be the 
norm. There is currently no authoritative legal or international agreement as to whether an IW "attack" is 
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comparable to an "attack" or "use of force" in the traditional sense. With this as a context, the study 
identifies several legal approaches our armed forces could employ offensively, defensively, or in 
retaliation to an information attack. 
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Haber, Matthew E. Computer Network Attack and the Laws of Armed Conflict: 
Searching for Moral Beacons in Twenty-First-Century Cyberwarfare. Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and Staff College, 2002. 123p. 
Abstract: Computer network attack ushered in change for the profession of arms. Militaries achieve 
effects using computers, previously attained only through physical destruction. Computer network attack's 
problem is it operates outside the observable domain the laws of armed conflict describe, yet its effects 
are what the laws address. Thus, the primary research question is: Does a legal framework of analysis 
exist for computer network attack? The secondary question became: If a framework exists, is it applied 
consistently throughout the Department of Defense? A search of literature and interviews with information 
operators and their associated lawyers revealed a framework by Thomas Wingfield. The framework 
analyzes the level of force but does not address the four basic principles for warfare; military necessity, 
humanity, proportionality, and discrimination. Also, the framework is not applied throughout the 
Department of Defense. The Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations' creation is the first step in 
building a hierarchical structure for consistent application of law to computer network attack. Research 
recommends such a structure expand Wingfield's framework for computer network attack to be a viable 
weapon for Twenty-First-Century Warfare. 
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Case In Point: The Legal Implications of Obtaining an "Information and 
Knowledge Advantage" Prior to Hostilities. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001. 
28p. 
Abstract: If it is true that the Navy is moving away from platform-centric toward network-centric warfare 
(NCW), then its leaders must ensure that any such transition is accomplished in the most efficient and 
effective manner possible. Since the Navy's current vision of net-centric operations raises many complex 
and often unsettled legal issues, the Navy must establish a formal framework for analyzing the legal 
challenges posed by NCW then integrate this framework into any NCW transition process. Future net-
centric operational commanders have a vested interest in ensuring that the legal implications of NCW on 
factor space, time, and forces have been thoroughly considered. Current and future international and 
domestic law might limit the ability of net-centric commanders to optimize the key concepts of the Navy's 
vision of net-centric operations. If the technological and doctrinal aspects of NCW continue to rapidly 
evolve without regard for the legal challenges, the Navy might find itself in a position where it has 
invested a tremendous amount of time and money developing a system of sensors and platforms that 
cannot be employed as envisioned due to legal constraints. 
  
 
Information Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organizational Considerations 
for Assurance. McLean VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 1995. 
454p. 
Abstract: Performing essential national security-related functional activities is depending more and more 
on a rapidly evolving, supporting information infrastructure. In view of the dependency, and because the 
Department of Defense (DoD) information infrastructure is embedded in larger national and international 
infrastructures, DoD officials, their advisors, and others within and outside the government have 
recommended to the National Security Council staff that it may be necessary to initiate 
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interdepartmental/interagency discussions. Topics of such a dialogue would include the dependency and 
vulnerability issues and the need for national policy to deal with them. The Chief, Information Warfare 
Division (J6K), Directorate of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J6), the Joint 
Staff, commissioned this report to prepare the Joint Staff to participate in and contribute to these 
discussions. The breadth and extreme complexity of the subject matter, other related ongoing activities, 
and the scope of the task limited the number of environmental areas and organizations which could be 
addressed. The report does, however, address the breadth and complexity of the policy and strategy 
issues and summarize the views of those in positions of importance to the development of policy for 
information warfare. To develop the organizational policy considerations, the study group reviewed 
organizations which have a stated role in information warfare and organizations which have related 
missions and functions. This report presents several key organizations in a broad range encompassing 
international, national, state and local, public and private, government and industry organizations. The 
environmental areas examined were: Information Infrastructure, Legal Environment, Regulatory 
Environment, Policy Environment, Emerging Technologies, Adversary Capabilities. 
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Kuschner, Karl W. Legal and Practical Constraints on Information Warfare. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 1996. 22p. 
Abstract: Information warfare weapons must meet the same tests for necessity and proportionality as 
other weapons under the laws of armed conflict. In addition, commanders must recognize and weigh the 
possible consequences of weapons that can devastate the information systems of an adversary. 
Problems such as lack of enemy command and control, post-hostility reconstruction, and retaliation, 
among others, must be considered by the commander contemplating the use of information weapons. 
  
 
Lipinski, T. A. “Information Warfare American Style: The Battle for Page Numbers, Real 
Time Event Data and Other Factual Information. Recent Legal Developments.” P. 105-
115, IN: Technology and Society, 1998. ISTAS 98. Wiring the World: The Impact of 
Information Technology on Society. Proceedings of the 1998 International 
Symposium, June 12-13 1998. 176p.  
Abstract: The development of the National Information Infrastructure opens new avenues for 
information products and services. As these information products and services are developed and 
marketed, the producers of those products and service seek to protect their proprietary interest in the 
underlying information. Attempts to extend legal protection to basic facts and other public domain 
information demonstrate that the public information space is eroding. Recent information controversies 
can form the basis for establishing several predictors useful in determining when future information 
ownership controversies may develop and result in the loss of public information space. One set of 
predictors describes the information environment. A second set of predictors characterizes the 
marketplace environment. Identifying instances where elements of each set of predictors exist suggest a 
change in information rights or ownership most likely to result in the critical loss of access to public 
information space. 
 
Meader, Gerald H. Information Warfare: Few Challenges for Public International 
Law. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, September 1997. 
56p. 
Abstract: Information Warfare is of Rising Concern A threshold question is, Why address this issue at 
all. It deserves a look because our increasing dependence on information and information technologies 
makes us ever more vulnerable to this attractive, elegant weapon. Dependence on the National 
Information Infrastructure According to a recent report by a Defense Science Board Task Force, the 
information infrastructure of the United States is increasingly vulnerable. Indeed, because the U.S. is so 
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very dependent on information technology, it is one of the most vulnerable nations to IW attack. This 
vulnerability extends to infrastructures related to military C4I, oil and gas control, water supply, 
government operations, mass media, civil emergency services, transportation control, finances (national 
and global), and production, inventory and process controls. They are vulnerable because all of these 
systems use increasingly complex, interconnected network control systems. These infrastructures are 
also interdependent such that an attack on one could have a cascade effect on others. 
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http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA329719  
 
Miller, Earl E. Army Transformation and Information Operations: The International 
Legal Implications. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002. 35p. 
Abstract:  As many nations throughout the world have become entrenched in what has been described 
as the information revolution, many legal parameters of information operations remain uncertain. 
Information is fast becoming a strategic resource that permeates every facet of the U.S. National Military 
Strategy. The proliferation of information-based technologies will substantially transform the Army's 
doctrine as well as its structure. The evolution of the information environment has specific legal 
implications within the international community. This paper examines these challenges and proposes to 
establish a framework for the inevitable global debate over related legal issues. 
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ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA394055 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA394055
 
Miller, Robert D. International Law: How It Affects Rules of Engagement and 
Responses in Information Warfare. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1997. 
48p. 
Abstract: The importance of reliable, timely information to the success of military operations, while 
precluding an adversary from accessing information, has been known since wars began. Today, a 
combination of electronic devices, such as computers and sensors, are creating an "information age" that 
redefines how we conduct military operations. A major challenge to decision makers and military leaders 
is to understand the impact of international laws in the information age and its influence on rules of 
engagement (ROE), and response development. By all accounts, our dependence on information and 
information systems will continue to grow along with technological advances, enhancing our own 
command, control, communications, computer, and information capabilities, while also increasing our 
vulnerabilities. As a result, a key issue our decision makers and military leaders must be aware of 
concerns the legal considerations in using IW and in responding to IW threats and attacks. Developers of 
our ROE must provide the guidance for legally, appropriately responding to IW attacks, while ensuring the 
right to self-defense. Our leaders must also devise appropriate response options against foreign powers 
conducting IW operations against the US. We must base responses on the level of threat to our national 
interests, while considering intent, international law, and elements such as proportionality and necessity 
inherent in the Law of Armed Conflict. 
  
 
O'Brien, Gregory J. International Legal Limitations on Information Warfare. 
Washington, DC: George Washington University, School of Law, May 1998. 85p. 
Abstract: We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs... are changing 
the face of war and how we prepare for war. Information war has no front line. Potential battlefields are 
anywhere networked systems allow access to oil and as pipelines, for example, electric power grids, 
telephone switching networks. In sum, the U.S. homeland may no longer provide a sanctuary from 
outside attack. A panel of Defense Department experts recently warned the nation about the prospect of 
an electronic Pearl Harbor, a crippling sneak attack on the nation's defense and civilian information 
systems in which 'cyberterrorists' and other unknown assailants cripple the nation's, or the world's, 
computer-networked communications, financial, and national defense systems. 
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Pottorff, James P., Jr. Legal Preparation of the Battlefield: Issues in Combined 
Operations. Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 1999. 25p. 
Abstract: This JMO paper discusses the issues arising when allies and coalition partners in combined 
operations have different laws and policies with regard to such matters as antipersonnel land mines, rules 
of engagement, and protected places. Recognition, analysis, and, when possible, reconciliation of 
domestic law and policy differences among members of a coalition or alliance should be included in a 
CINC's planning for any combined operation. In that light, this paper discusses the implications of 
differences in law and policy among members of multinational forces, highlights several of the more 
significant of these issues, and proposes some solutions that may mitigate, if not alleviate, problems 
created by these variations.. 
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Roig, William A. Creating Rules of Engagement for Information Warfare: Examining 
the Policy Implications of International Law. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint 
Military Operations Department, June 1997. 20p. 
Abstract: Achieving the full revolutionary impact of information warfare requires distinguishing the 
methods of information attack from other forms of warfare on policy and legal grounds. Information attack 
represents a revolutionary new form of warfare from a legal perspective because it allows a severe effect, 
and therefore intense coercion, to occur with little or no violence and little traditional destruction. 
  
 
Smits, Theodore V. Computer Network Attack as a Tool for the Operational 
Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 
2000. 28p. 
Abstract:  Computer network attack provides the capability for an attack to be carried out at the speed of 
light, effortlessly across international boundaries. It has the potential to provide the Operational 
Commander additional capabilities along the entire spectrum of warfare from deterrence to combat 
operations. Key enemy systems, including radar, air traffic control and communications have the potential 
to be rapidly removed from operation without having to move a single plane, put U.S. personnel in harms 
way or expend expensive precision guided munitions. However, the law of armed conflict and other 
international laws raise legal issues that potentially limit the implementation of this new weapon. The 
Operational Commander must be knowledgeable of the basis of the legal issues so that suitable network 
attack targets can be selected during the operational plan development, targets against which an attack 
plan can be developed and approved in the period required to support the attack's employment in the 
conflict. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ADA378752 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378752  
Abstract: The question of how to characterize an information warfare attack, particularly what is known 
as a "hacker attack,: has not been fully developed. It must be, though, in order to understand how a 
nation can respond to it. This paper explores applicable tenets of international law. It identifies various 
methods of engaging in the spectrum of activities known as information warfare, and then discusses the 
 
Vadnais, Daniel M. Law of Armed Conflict and Information Warfare--How Does the 
Rule Regarding Reprisals Apply to an Information Warfare Attack? Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1997 34p. 
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one that has been underexplored in the context of a military response. Finally, it addresses the 
applicability of the law of armed conflict to a "hacker attack." Given that during wartime, almost any 
means of imposing one belligerent's will on another is legitimate, subject to the various tenets 
international law, the question that needs to be addressed is what range of activities is permissible during 
times other than war, when parties are not engaged in traditionally understood applications of armed 
force." The current body of international law seems to mitigate against including hacking" in the definition 
of armed force," the standard necessary for unilateral military armed reprisal actions. In that case, unless 
the initial attack rises to the level that would permit some action by the "victim" in self-defense, that nation 
is relegated to seeking action from the United Nations Security Council. 
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